Abstract: This paper aims to establish a homology between two forms of art: the portraits of Octavian Augustus and Augustan poetry, particularly the works of Horace, Ovid, Propertius, and Virgil. The theoretical frameworks of Nora (1989), Assmann (1995 and 2011), Halbwachs (1968), and Galinsky (2014-2016) are mobilized to support the argument that both artistic expressions can be interpreted as vehicles of collective memory and cultural memory, serving the perpetuation of power and art

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to show, based on Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration, how soul plays the role of explanatory cause of life in De Anima (henceforth de An.) 2.1-4. Firstly, I evaluate Aristotle’s requirement, in Posterior Analytics (henceforth APo) 1.2 and 2.16, that universal demonstrations must satisfy a coextensional criterion between a given explanandum (A-term) and its most appropriate explanans (B-term). In addition, I argue that this criterion does not entail a causal symmetry between both those terms. Following Angioni (2014a) and Zuppolini (2018), I argue that, whenever one is before apparent multiple-causes scenario cases(in which there seems to be more than one possible cause to the same explanandum(, one shall still find a unified and fully appropriate explanation of that explanandum. In the second part of this paper, I examine an example from de An. 2.1-4 in view of APo 2.16-17. I argue that soul might be pointed out as the explanatory principle (B) that explains why life (A) belongs to a living body (C). Also, I argue that, although there is a core-dependent homonymy taking place between plants (γ1), animals (γ2) and the nutritive capacity (α1), the nutritive soul (β1) plays the role of an incidental factor (συμβεβηκός) in the context of a scientific demonstration that has by explananda whatsoever attributes (αn) that belong to animals (γ2) qua living beings endowed with a perceptive soul (β1) that explains why attributes (αn) belong to them.

Abstract: Hereby we intend to examine the way by which tyranny and the tyrant are presented in Republic, a Platonic dialogue around which we will circumscribe the present study. Our interest emerges from the resurgence, in the 21st century, of democratically elected regimes that, however, flirt with authoritarianism. Socrates’ thesis, presented in Republic VIII (562b-563e), according to which tyranny arises from within democracy, highlights the contradictions inherent in this government regime since its beginnings, helping us to rethink it today. For the purposes of this study we follow the emergence of the issue of tyranny from the first book of the dialogue, until we reach the proper examination of this regime in books VIII and IX, up to which we are faced with the surprising argument that inside each one of us inhabits a sleeping tyrant (Rep.IX, 576b4-6). The city-soul analogy proposed in Republic II, as well as the composite soul thesis in Republic IV work as guiding conceptions of our investigation.

Resumo: Neste artigo pretendemos abordar o modo como a tirania e o tirano são apresentados na República, diálogo platônico sobre o qual iremos circunscrever o presente exame. Nosso interesse emerge do ressurgimento, em pleno século XXI, de regimes democraticamente eleitos que, todavia, flertam com o autoritarismo. A tese defendida por Sócrates em República VIII (562b-563e), segundo a qual a tirania nasce do interior da democracia, evidencia as contradições inerentes a esse regime de governo desde seus primórdios, ajudando-nos a repensá-lo nos dias atuais. Para efeito do presente exame, acompanhamos o surgimento do tema da tirania desde o primeiro livro do diálogo, até chegar ao enfoque propriamente dito desse regime nos livros VIII e IX, em que nos deparamos com o surpreendente argumento de que em cada um de nós habita um tirano adormecido (Rep. IX, 576b4-6). A analogia cidade-alma proposta em República II, bem como a tese da alma compósita, em República IV, servem de eixos norteadores para a nossa reflexão.

Abstract: We presente the trnaslation of a specific passage from the novel Leucippe and Clitophon, by Achilles Tatius: the scene in which the main character goes to meet his cousin Clinias and receives from him valuable teachings on seduction. This passage draws our attention because it dialogues with Roman erotic elegy, especially Ovid's Ars Amatoria, and because of its concise, unitary structure, which resonates like a short story within the novel. We have sought to recreate in our translation aesthetic and literary elements that resonate with these elements, especially the dynamism of the narrative, without losing the lyrical - or elegiac - nuances of the text.

Resumo: Apresentamos a tradução de uma passagem específica do romance Leucipe e Clitofonte, de Aquiles Tácio: a cena em que o personagem principal vai ao encontro de seu primo Clínias e recebe dele valiosos ensinamentos sobre sedução. Tal passagem nos chama a atenção por dialogar com a elegia erótica romana, especialmente com a Ars Amatoria de Ovídio e, pela sua estrutura concisa e unitária que ressoa como um pequeno conto dentro do romance. Buscamos, então, recriar em nossa tradução elementos estéticos e literários que ressoem estes aspectos, especialmente o dinamismo da narrativa, sem perder as nuances líricas - ou elegíacas - do texto.

Abstract: This paper argues that Plato in the Statesman consistently rejects all existing forms of constitution, separating off one, “the knowledgeable constitution,” from any other sort of rule, whether by a single individual, by a few, or by the many, and whether rule and the offices into which it is organized are or are not governed by effective checks and balances - a division that gives us kingship vs tyranny, aristocracy vs oligarchy, and two different types of democracy. All existing “statesmen” are written off without exception as “sophists” and “experts in faction,” and the quality of the laws of any existing constitution is declared to be at best sub judice insofar as they have all been formulated in the absence of the relevant political expertise. The paper goes on to consider these outcomes further, in relation to Plato’s Republic and Laws.

Abstract: In the Statesman (287c3-5), Plato proposes that the philosophical divider should divide analogously to how the butcher divides a sacrificial animal. According to the common interpretation, the example of animal sacrifice illustrates that we should “cut off limbs” (kata mele), that is, divide non-dichotomously into functional parts of a living whole. We argue that this interpretation is historically inaccurate and philosophically problematic: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of sacrificial butchery and leads to textual puzzles. Against the common interpretation, we argue that the example of animal sacrifice illustrates that correct division minimizes (it cuts into the smallest number possible) by first dividing dichotomously and then dividing non-dichotomously into “parts,” not “limbs.” We will show that both the philosophical divider and sacrificial butcher proceed exactly in this way. By taking Plato’s comparison to the historical practice of animal sacrifice seriously, our interpretation provides better solutions to several textual puzzles than the common interpretation.

Abstract: The Statesman is unique in the particular emphasis it places on paradigm: crafting and presenting two distinct paradigms, in great detail and at some length, but also turning to define and explain paradigm itself as a method that can help us progress from what is familiar to us from perception and experience, to what is unfamiliar and may “exist” only in the realm of ideas and thinking. In this paper I wish first to examine the Stranger’s explanation of paradigm, to see what it is and how it functions. Then, I wish to examine in turn the two paradigms the Stranger offers, the myth and the account of weaving: to see whether and how they fit his explanation of what a paradigm is; to explore how the Stranger employs each in his search for the being and the definition of the statesman; and to consider what each paradigm helps disclose that we might not have as easily discovered without them. The final question will be: what does the Statesman’s highlighting of the being and use of paradigm have to teach us about how we might advance toward knowledge of “the greater things.”

Abstract: This paper provides a framework for understanding how nonideal constitutions are better or worse imitations of the ideal constitution. My suggestion is that the nonideal constitutions imitate the skill of the political expert, which includes an epistemic component (their political knowledge) and two teleological components (the benefit to the citizens on the one hand, and the unity of the city on the other). I then show how some constitutions better imitate the political expert’s skill across these dimensions, as higher-ranked constitutions are in a better epistemic condition, better benefit the citizens, and better foster unity in the city than lower-ranked constitutions. A major upshot of my reading will be to show that Plato recognizes the value of some nonideal constitutions while making clear how they still fall short of the ideal.

Abstract: Remarks made by the Eleatic Visitor at Statesman 293a-300e are often read as implying that laws are hopelessly defective in comparison with expert political knowledge. Specifically, laws seem inadequate to the task of capturing the variability, mutability, and finely-grained detail of human life (294a6-b7). On the other hand, the Visitor endorses a strict form of law-abidingness for non-ideal constitutions. The tension between these positions has greatly exercised scholars. In this paper, I argue for a reading on which (1) the political expert, no less than laws, must rely on “rougher methods,” i.e. generalizations across individual cases; (2) law-making is a constitutive part of the statesman’s expertise; (3) laws are necessary for political communities and their value exceeds the merely instrumental or heuristic.

Abstract: This paper explores privation in the Statesman, first from a methodological point of view, and then politically. I begin (§1) with the Rule of Bisection (262a-e): classes should be bifurcated by form, which apparently excludes division by positive and negative terms (e.g. human and non-human). The significance of the restriction is debated. I argue that the correct interpretation must take into account the preponderance of privative terms in the subsequent divisions of animals. According to one definition, humans are two-footed, non-interbreeding, hornless land animals; according to another, they are featherless, two-footed land animals (264d-266e). On my reading of the rule, classes should be bifurcated with reference to constitutive features of the resulting subclasses; while negative properties never satisfy this requirement, privations are in some cases partly constitutive of the target class in division. This insight allows me to offer a charitable reading of the Eleatic Stranger’s definitions of the human herd, which others have disparaged, as relevant for political theory (§2) and tightly linked with the Myth of the Ages (268e-274d) that follows these divisions (§3). In the final section, I sketch a unified outlook on the dialogue as concerned with effective political collaboration, under the supervision of a statesman who expertly integrates each member into the self-protective fabric of society (§4).

Abstract: This paper aims to look at the ancient city of Athens and some of its political challenges through the eyes of Plato. I will do this by relating two concepts that permeate Plato's political concerns: democracy and misology. Beyond the tragic event of Socrates' death at democratic hands, there is perhaps something even deeper in Plato's struggle to see democracy as something that can work, so to speak. Plato no doubt has a profoundly pessimistic view of the human being. And the city, who was traditionally supposed to educate men, is not delivering anymore (if ever). First of all, Plato clearly identifies the origin of political and social instability in the economic imbalance between πλοῦτος (richness) and πενία (poverty). Secondly, Plato's diagnosis, what his eyes are seeing, is even more perceptive and accurate. He outlines a second source of problem for democracy, one the probably resonate even more dramatically in our very present days: one that Socrates calls misology in the Phaedo: the hatred of discourses. Apart from the fact that there is a significant distance and a radical difference between the democracy of the 5th and 4th centuries, when Plato actually writes his dialogues, the most relevant question that emerges from the investigation is probably that a democracy itself is not something stable, an ontological object, not even today. And Plato was well aware of all this.

Resumo: Este artigo é uma tentativa de esclarecer a relação entre a posição dissidente assumida por estoicos antigos em seu contexto social e a maneira corajosa como defenderam suas posições políticas a partir de alguns princípios do sistema estoico, o que levou muitos deles ao exílio e à morte durante o Período Imperial Romano (terceira fase da civilização romana, que se estendeu de 27 AEC a 476 EC). Sugerimos que a marginalização desses grupos, bem como a sua perseguição, posiciona os estoicos de maneira única, tanto em seu próprio tempo como no nosso.

Abstract: This article is an attempt to clarify the relationship between the dissident position taken by the ancient Stoics in their social context and the courageous way in which they defended their political positions in adherence to their Stoic philosophical principles - positions which led many of them to exile and death during the Imperial Period (the third phase of Roman civilization, which extended from 27 BCE to 476 CE). We suggest that the marginalization of these groups, as well as the persecution of them, uniquely positions the Stoics both in their own time and in ours.