Abstract When one speaks duplicitously one performs a (risky) speech act and at the same time intends that one have deniability regarding that speech act. What is it for a speaker who performs an illocutionary act to have deniability regarding that act? I first review an answer to this question proposed by Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou. According to them, deniability is “an epistemic notion. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways” (2023, p. 373). I argue, however, that the epistemic account is refuted by a counterexample, and informed by the counterexample, I propose an alternative. According to my alternative account, deniability concerns illocutionary norms: a speaker has deniability regarding an illocutionary action iff (i) she is permitted to deny having performed the action, and (ii) if she denies having performed the action, she thereby avoids being responsible for it. I conclude by considering the implications of illocutionary norms account of deniability for the vexed issue of the determinants of illocutionary force; I argue that the illocutionary norms account of deniability provides evidence in support of McDonald’s (2021) “collaboration” view.

Abstract While philosophers are and have always been interested in, if not obsessed by, questions of the kind What is x?, somehow ironically, the question What is knowledge of what x is? did not receive much attention. Thankfully, to properly answer this question, André Abath suggested his erotetic view, according to which S knows what x is in context c if and only if S knows a proposition (or propositions) that properly answer (that is, provide a proper answer to) the question of what x is in c, where for a proposition to properly answer a question in a context it should be such that, in that context, it settles the question, it brings the inquiry to a close. In my commentary, I will discuss whether the erotetic view might be taken to give us too few or too many knowers. During such discussion, I will investigate into Abath’s notion of partial knowledge and his sophisticated rejection of the claim that his view is excessively intellectualist.

Abstract This book symposium comprises a précis of André J. Abath’s book Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (Springer, 2022) together with five critical commentaries on different aspects of the book-written by Veronica Campos, Guilherme Araújo Cardoso, Giulia Felappi, Ernesto Perini-Santos and Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro-, and the author’s replies.

Abstract This submission is addressed to the symposium on Prof. André Abath’s book “Knowing What Things Are: An Erotetic-Based Account” (2022).

Abstract In Knowing What Things Are, Abath shifts the focus of epistemology from propositional knowledge to the capacity to answer questions, emphasizing knowledge as an outcome of human activity. He highlights the role of interrogatives in epistemic evaluation. However, his emphasis on Socratic questions ("What is X?") overlooks the interconnectedness of different types of questions within an inquiry. This paper examines two Socratic questions: "What is a gene?" and "What is a marriage?" In the case of "What is a gene?" advances in molecular biology challenge the classical molecular gene concept, leading to a pluralistic or emergent definition. Inquiry into genes involves meta-level questions concerning the concept’s definition and the role of related terms such as "heritable." Similarly, "What is a marriage?" encompasses both descriptive and normative dimensions, requiring an understanding of legal, social, and cultural definitions. Abath’s erotetic framework, which aims to refine answers to Socratic questions, must account for these meta-level inquiries and the various ways an inquiry can be directed to provide a more comprehensive depiction of knowledge as an activity.

Abstract This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the question “What is X?” within a given inquiry context. While this view successfully accommodates variations in epistemic demands across contexts, I argue that it overlooks the role of deal-breaker propositions - false claims that fundamentally undermine knowledge ascription, even when surrounded by otherwise accurate information. By introducing the notion of relative essences, I propose an amendment to Abath’s account that accounts for the epistemic weight of these propositions. This refinement strengthens the erotetic view by addressing cases where misleading assertions obstruct knowledge transmission.

Abstract In "Knowing What Things Are", A. Abath’s account of knowledge has two main features. Firstly, it is inquiry-based or erotetic: knowledge is to be understood in terms of answers to questions of the form “What is x?” Secondly, it is contextualist: answers to questions of the form “what is x?” are dependent on contextual factors, as they should be evaluated as true and satisfactory given the specific purposes (or goals) of an inquiry. Here I focus on the contextualist component of Abath's account. I argue that there is a tension between the descriptive account Abath advocates in chapters 1-5 and the normative account developed in chapters 6-7. I argue, in particular, that Abath's contextualism faces trouble when applied to knowledge of strongly social kinds and moral/political obligations, which are inherently normative.

Abstract In this response to my commentators, I address several challenges to the erotetic account of knowing what things are, developed in Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach. I clarify how my view handles complex webs of inquiry, contextual variation in answers, and normative dimensions of questions involving social kinds. Drawing on cases such as “What is a gene?” and “What is marriage?”, I explore how different epistemic and practical goals shape what counts as a good answer to “What is x?” questions. I also respond to worries about over- and under-generation of knowledge attributions, and the possibility of non-propositional knowledge. Finally, I consider the implications of my contextualism for truth, content, and fictional discourse, and suggest refinements to the original framework to better accommodate issues raised by my critics.

Abstract There is an ongoing debate in the ontology of action about whether actions are processes, events, relations, or sui generis entities. This paper focuses on the process view, the view that actions are processes. I challenge it in two ways. First, I argue that some actions are not processes because their performance need not be associated with or accompanied by a process. Second, I critically discuss three main arguments that have been advanced to support the process view. My view, the pluralist view, is that process-theorists are right to hold that certain actions are processes, but wrong to maintain that every action is a process: activities are processes, acts are not, and some acts are composed of a process whereas others are not.

Abstract When we engage with fictions, we are, in effect, pretending to deal with reports of actual events. After all, numerous fictional works are explicitly designed to facilitate this kind of pretense. This was the prevailing understanding of fiction in both analytic philosophy and classical narratology for decades. However, there is a significant problem with this view: many fictional narratives routinely portray scenarios that could not possibly be the subject of anyone’s reporting. Currie’s 'mindless fictions' are one such example. This issue can be referred to as the problem of unreportability. The standard solution to this challenge has been to argue that fictions are not pretend reports, but rather direct authorial stipulations to imagine specific scenarios. This paper contends, however, that such an explanation fails to provide a satisfactory account of fiction. By drawing on Walton’s notion of ‘silly questions’, it instead argues for a revised version of the report model-one that doesn’t necessarily depend on ubiquitous fictional reporters.

Abstract In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents.

Abstract Mauro Dorato's "Science and Representative Democracy" argues for the essential link between science and democracy. He posits both as problem-solving systems, advocating for representative democracy to integrate scientific knowledge into policy and emphasizing scientific literacy for informed citizen participation. Revisiting the Lippmann-Dewey debate, he champions education and utilizes Condorcet's jury theorem to highlight the potential of informed decision-making. He tackles challenges like scientific disinformation and advocates for scientific literacy. By comparing the principles of science and democracy, he reveals their interconnectedness. While further exploration of practical challenges and direct democracy's potential would be beneficial, the book remains a valuable contribution to understanding the vital relationship between science and democracy in the modern world.

Abstract In his development of an ontology for mathematics in line with Fregean abstractionism, Øystein Linnebo proposes criteria of identity as a mechanism for reference. This proposed mechanism appears to conflict with Saul Kripke's historical theory of names. However, Linnebo, distinguishing between semantic and metasemantic domains, asserts that no real conflict exists; while Kripke's theory is semantic, his is metasemantic. This paper posits a counter-argument, contending that Linnebo's account, contrary to his claim, indeed conflicts with Kripke's historical theory of names. The paper underscores that, in Kripke's framework, the reference relation transcends the individual, inhabiting a social domain.

Abstract The objective of this article is to introduce the debate regarding how to organize the competing definitions of intellectual humility. Some of the main accounts will be presented, but the focus will be on the categorizations of these conceptions, i.e., the ways to organize them. Two categorizations will be examined: the epistemic categorization and the dispositional categorization. I will offer a detailed examination of both, clarifying their differences and highlighting their relevance to understanding intellectual humility. Furthermore, I will explore how these categorizations relate to key topics in the ongoing debates surrounding the analyses. I will suggest four criteria for evaluating the categorizations and apply them to the discussion about how to categorize intellectual humility accounts, arguing that the epistemic categorization is superior to the dispositional categorization. In doing so, I also emphasize the relevance of these taxonomic matters to the first order philosophical debate concerning the definition of intellectual humility.