Abstract Vanity underlies human behavior and can be expressed in various forms in social, moral, aesthetic, and economic fields. It is an emotional complex that encompasses narcissism and histrionics as character traits, as well as other functions such as memory, imagination, cognition, and instinctive drive. Using a psychological-philosophical approach, this study explores the influence of vanity on economic behavior, detailing vanity within social interactions between an agent who exhibits vanity and a spectator who observes, particularly in the context of mutual comparison related to external signs of wealth. moral aesthetic fields traits memory imagination cognition drive psychologicalphilosophical psychological philosophical approach observes wealth

Abstract The Book Symposium consists of four texts. In the first, the author summarizes his book, presenting its main contribution and giving an overview of the chapters. In the second, Stéphane Marchand, after highlighting the methodological affinity between the book and his training in France, discusses the new division of the initial chapters of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the more robust interpretation of the notion of skeptical logos. In the third text, Casey Perin also insists on this last point. In his view, Smith correctly raises a central issue in Sexto’s interpretation and draws attention to a crucial but little-studied passage. However, Smith would not have been able to explain how skepticism could be normative without dogmatism adequately. The last text is the author's response to the objections raised. texts first second Marchand France logos point view Sextos Sexto s littlestudied little studied passage However adequately authors raised

Abstract Truthmaking (2023), by Jamin Asay, is part of the “Elements in Metaphysics” series, published by the Cambridge University Press. The book is an excellent brief introduction to truthmaking theory: accessible, clear, and enjoyable, covering the most fundamental problems of the field. One of the highlights of the book is the chapter on truthmakers for truths concerning social constructions. It successfully shows that truthmaking theory is not only related to abstract metaphysical problems but is also tied to central puzzles in ethics and political philosophy (more specifically philosophies of race and gender). 2023, 2023 , (2023) Asay Elements Metaphysics series Press accessible clear enjoyable field constructions more gender. gender . gender) 202 (2023 20 (202 2 (20 (2 (

Abstract A critical review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles. RodriguezPereyras Rodriguez Pereyra s Indiscernibles

Abstract According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) -leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem- offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science. measurement Traditionally dualism dualists dualist s mindbody mind body processbased based CCCI (CCCI leaning Whiteheads Whitehead science

Abstract I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism. realismrealism modelsshowing models showing antirealist idealization underdetermination contextuality multiplicity metainduction. metainduction meta induction. induction meta-induction physics atom orthodox substanceparadigmatic substance paradigmatic substance-paradigmatic thingrealism. thingrealism thing thing-realism Therefore empiricism

Abstract Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what self-transformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative self-transformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information. reality exception Nevertheless literature gap Here analysis complex functionallycausally functionally causally determined basis Then selftransformative self transformative themselves common However selftransformativeness transformativeness wellformed well formed description using nonclassic non classic mereology by selfmodulating modulating variables. variables . variables) Finally mechanisms welldescribed described theory information

Abstract In the literature, there are several claims about the centrality of a pro- cess ontology. It has often proved difficult, however, to understand what a process is supposed to be, and what the central difference to thing-based ontologies amounts to. It would be useful to see what an abstract account of this difference consists in. This paper provides a sketch of what logic we should use for a process-based ontology, and argues that intuitionistic logic, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, provide a useful basis for process ontology. A brief sketch of probability for processes is made. literature pro ontology difficult however thingbased thing based in processbased analysis made

Abstract Process metaphysics is both internally coherent and coherent with what we know about the basic ‘what there is’ of the world, whereas a particle-as-particular metaphysics is neither. One consequence of a process metaphysics is that metaphysical emergence becomes explicable, and, in turn, normative emergence. This point is developed with models of the emergence of normative function and of representation. These are steps toward an integrated naturalistic understanding of the world. world particleasparticular particle as particular neither explicable turn representation

Abstract It is often argued that constitution and causation are different kinds of dependence relations. Some have argued for a distinction between constitutive explanation of causal capacities that explain what a system would do in specific situations from causal or etiological explanations that explain why an event such as a change in the property of a system happened. In what follows we argue against the claim that causation and constitution are always distinct metaphysical relations. This paper develops a temporal account of constitution. We call this species of constitution, diachronic constitution. We show how diachronic constitution is a consequence of a common type of causation in the empirical sciences: continuous reciprocal causation, a variety of causal production instantiated in complex dynamical systems. Hence, this paper seeks to establish that constitution does not only resemble causation in certain respects. We argue for the stronger claim that constitution can be analysed in terms of causation understood as production of change. Temporalizing the constitution relation is neither as remarkable nor as problematic as it might initially seem. The idea of diachronic constitution will appear almost inevitable in the context of complex dynamical systems, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states in such systems. relations happened sciences systems Hence respects seem

Abstract At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in that book was on cases where people are not believed or where deflated credibility is given to their word as a result of prejudice in the hearer . However, Lackey points out that there are many instances where people are wronged not by being granted too little credibility but by being given too much credibility. False confessions, guilty pleas, and eyewitness testimony are sometimes taken as sufficient to imprison people or even execute them, despite the fact that the testimony in question has been extracted through manipulation, deception, and coercion and despite the fact that other evidence is lacking or conflicts with the false confessions, guilty pleas, or eyewitness testimony. Lackeys s identified Frickers Fricker hermeneutical injustice. However confessions pleas them manipulation deception

Abstract From the outset of Western philosophy most occidental philosophers held that both existence and knowledge depended on stability - what is genuinely changing does not have a clear essence or identity and is thus not an object for knowledge, nor can it be expressed in language. This is the case even though change touches all areas of life, shaping both the self and world, in subjective experience as well as scientific discoveries. In this contribution I will consider why precisely change is seen as such a vexing problem for knowledge and I will look at what that means for our ability to know a world that is fundamentally characterised by change. In part 1, I discuss how the assumption that change can neither be known nor put into words, led to the development of epistemologies and ontologies that bypass the problem of change by understanding it in terms of its opposite. I will show how this strategy limits our ability to come to terms with concrete reality. In part 2, I point towards possible ways out of this predicament. I will use the Aristotelian tode ti to propose a novel way to encounter change on its own terms. language life discoveries 1 words opposite reality 2 predicament

Abstract In this paper we present novel conceptions of identity arising in and motivated by a recently emerged branch of mathematical logic, namely, Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). We consider an established 2013 version of HoTT as well as its more recent generalised version called Directed HoTT or Directed Type theory (DTT), which at the time of writing remains a work in progress. In HoTT, and in particular in DTT, identity is not just a relation but a mathematical structure which admits for an interpretation in terms of Homotopy theory (directed Homotopy theory in the case of DTT), which in its turn is supported by common intuitions concerning identity of material objects through time, change and locomotion. The DDTbased conception of identity presented in the paper is nonsymmetric: here identity is “directed” or has a “sense”. We compare the HoTT-based conceptions of identity with standard theories of identity based on the Classical Predicate calculus, and show how the HoTT-based identity helps to treat traditional logical and philosophical problems related to identity and time. In the concluding part of the paper we explore some ontological implications of the HoTT-based identity and show how HoTT and DTT can serve for designing formal process ontologies. The paper is self-contained and comprises expositions and informal explanations of all relevant philosophical, logical and mathematical contents. logic namely HoTT. . (HoTT) 201 , (DTT) progress directed DTT) locomotion nonsymmetric “directed sense. sense “sense” HoTTbased calculus ontologies selfcontained self contained contents (HoTT 20 (DTT “sense 2

Abstract When we engage with fictions, we are, in effect, pretending to deal with reports of actual events. After all, numerous fictional works are explicitly designed to facilitate this kind of pretense. This was the prevailing understanding of fiction in both analytic philosophy and classical narratology for decades. However, there is a significant problem with this view: many fictional narratives routinely portray scenarios that could not possibly be the subject of anyone’s reporting. Currie’s 'mindless fictions' are one such example. This issue can be referred to as the problem of unreportability. The standard solution to this challenge has been to argue that fictions are not pretend reports, but rather direct authorial stipulations to imagine specific scenarios. This paper contends, however, that such an explanation fails to provide a satisfactory account of fiction. By drawing on Walton’s notion of ‘silly questions’, it instead argues for a revised version of the report model-one that doesn’t necessarily depend on ubiquitous fictional reporters. effect events all pretense decades However view anyones anyone s reporting Curries Currie mindless example unreportability contends however Waltons Walton silly questions, questions , questions’ modelone model doesnt doesn t reporters