Abstract Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what self-transformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative self-transformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information. reality exception Nevertheless literature gap Here analysis complex functionallycausally functionally causally determined basis Then selftransformative self transformative themselves common However selftransformativeness transformativeness wellformed well formed description using nonclassic non classic mereology by selfmodulating modulating variables. variables . variables) Finally mechanisms welldescribed described theory information

Abstract A critical review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles. RodriguezPereyras Rodriguez Pereyra s Indiscernibles

Abstract Truthmaking (2023), by Jamin Asay, is part of the “Elements in Metaphysics” series, published by the Cambridge University Press. The book is an excellent brief introduction to truthmaking theory: accessible, clear, and enjoyable, covering the most fundamental problems of the field. One of the highlights of the book is the chapter on truthmakers for truths concerning social constructions. It successfully shows that truthmaking theory is not only related to abstract metaphysical problems but is also tied to central puzzles in ethics and political philosophy (more specifically philosophies of race and gender). 2023, 2023 , (2023) Asay Elements Metaphysics series Press accessible clear enjoyable field constructions more gender. gender . gender) 202 (2023 20 (202 2 (20 (2 (

Abstract Vanity underlies human behavior and can be expressed in various forms in social, moral, aesthetic, and economic fields. It is an emotional complex that encompasses narcissism and histrionics as character traits, as well as other functions such as memory, imagination, cognition, and instinctive drive. Using a psychological-philosophical approach, this study explores the influence of vanity on economic behavior, detailing vanity within social interactions between an agent who exhibits vanity and a spectator who observes, particularly in the context of mutual comparison related to external signs of wealth. moral aesthetic fields traits memory imagination cognition drive psychologicalphilosophical psychological philosophical approach observes wealth

Abstract The Book Symposium consists of four texts. In the first, the author summarizes his book, presenting its main contribution and giving an overview of the chapters. In the second, Stéphane Marchand, after highlighting the methodological affinity between the book and his training in France, discusses the new division of the initial chapters of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the more robust interpretation of the notion of skeptical logos. In the third text, Casey Perin also insists on this last point. In his view, Smith correctly raises a central issue in Sexto’s interpretation and draws attention to a crucial but little-studied passage. However, Smith would not have been able to explain how skepticism could be normative without dogmatism adequately. The last text is the author's response to the objections raised. texts first second Marchand France logos point view Sextos Sexto s littlestudied little studied passage However adequately authors raised

Abstract It is often argued that constitution and causation are different kinds of dependence relations. Some have argued for a distinction between constitutive explanation of causal capacities that explain what a system would do in specific situations from causal or etiological explanations that explain why an event such as a change in the property of a system happened. In what follows we argue against the claim that causation and constitution are always distinct metaphysical relations. This paper develops a temporal account of constitution. We call this species of constitution, diachronic constitution. We show how diachronic constitution is a consequence of a common type of causation in the empirical sciences: continuous reciprocal causation, a variety of causal production instantiated in complex dynamical systems. Hence, this paper seeks to establish that constitution does not only resemble causation in certain respects. We argue for the stronger claim that constitution can be analysed in terms of causation understood as production of change. Temporalizing the constitution relation is neither as remarkable nor as problematic as it might initially seem. The idea of diachronic constitution will appear almost inevitable in the context of complex dynamical systems, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states in such systems. relations happened sciences systems Hence respects seem

Abstract The aim of this paper is to delve into the epistemological challenge surrounding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of belief and credence through a decision-theoretic framework: belief emerges as a cognitive process balancing the urge for information and the fear of error. The first part is primarily historical, and delves into the philosophy of science and its concern about the acceptance of probabilistic hypothesis. In the second part, the focus shifts from the philosophy of science to contemporary epistemology, specifically the rationality of belief and credence. The main outcome of this paper lies in highlighting how the decision-theoretic approach illuminates the nature of belief rationality, exploring the connection between belief and credence, the context-dependent nature of belief, and the significance of deductive closure as rational requirements. decisiontheoretic decision theoretic framework error historical hypothesis epistemology contextdependent context dependent requirements

Abstract Process metaphysics is both internally coherent and coherent with what we know about the basic ‘what there is’ of the world, whereas a particle-as-particular metaphysics is neither. One consequence of a process metaphysics is that metaphysical emergence becomes explicable, and, in turn, normative emergence. This point is developed with models of the emergence of normative function and of representation. These are steps toward an integrated naturalistic understanding of the world. world particleasparticular particle as particular neither explicable turn representation

Abstract In the literature, there are several claims about the centrality of a pro- cess ontology. It has often proved difficult, however, to understand what a process is supposed to be, and what the central difference to thing-based ontologies amounts to. It would be useful to see what an abstract account of this difference consists in. This paper provides a sketch of what logic we should use for a process-based ontology, and argues that intuitionistic logic, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, provide a useful basis for process ontology. A brief sketch of probability for processes is made. literature pro ontology difficult however thingbased thing based in processbased analysis made

Abstract At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in that book was on cases where people are not believed or where deflated credibility is given to their word as a result of prejudice in the hearer . However, Lackey points out that there are many instances where people are wronged not by being granted too little credibility but by being given too much credibility. False confessions, guilty pleas, and eyewitness testimony are sometimes taken as sufficient to imprison people or even execute them, despite the fact that the testimony in question has been extracted through manipulation, deception, and coercion and despite the fact that other evidence is lacking or conflicts with the false confessions, guilty pleas, or eyewitness testimony. Lackeys s identified Frickers Fricker hermeneutical injustice. However confessions pleas them manipulation deception

Abstract According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) -leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem- offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science. measurement Traditionally dualism dualists dualist s mindbody mind body processbased based CCCI (CCCI leaning Whiteheads Whitehead science

Abstract I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism. realismrealism modelsshowing models showing antirealist idealization underdetermination contextuality multiplicity metainduction. metainduction meta induction. induction meta-induction physics atom orthodox substanceparadigmatic substance paradigmatic substance-paradigmatic thingrealism. thingrealism thing thing-realism Therefore empiricism

Abstract Critical Study. Gottfried Gabriel: Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn. Brill/ Schöningh, 2022. Study Gabriel Kant Gesamtwerk Paderborn Brill Schöningh 2022 202 20 2

Abstract A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. Indeed, some want to give a significant role to ignorance in epistemological theorizing. In this paper, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realized the relevance of what we call ‘Socratic ignorance’ in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labor that we find in our society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others and with others. theory Indeed theorizing paper ignorant society clear hold stubborn