Abstract: Portuguese translation of Aristotle’s Prophecy in Sleep, preceded by a short presentation of the text and accompanied by explanatory notes

Resumo: Tradução para o português do opúsculo Da adivinhação durante o sono, de Aristóteles, precedido de breve apresentação e acompanhada de notas elucidativas do texto.

Abstract: The acceptance of the identity of the Idea of the Good and the One does not necessarily implies that Plato and Plotinus understand it in the same way, as Gerson has recently sustained. The difference, I intend to show, is supported by a gnoseological aspect of their philosophies. Even if both philosophers accept the possibility of arriving at a presence in the principle itself, and even if they use the same erotic metaphor to describe it, this presence means for Plato the flourishing of Nous and the generation of episteme, whereas for Plotinus it is superior to episteme and requires the complete retirement not just of intellection, but also of the desire to think the Good. Correspondingly, Plato considers the Good/One as a Form - as the Form of Forms - at the summit of being and the intelligible realm, while Plotinus conceives it as aneideon, amorphon and apeiron, and therefore, as radically transcendent to being and thinking.

Resumo: La aceptación de la identidad de la Idea del Bien con lo Uno no necesariamente implica, como recentemente ha sostenido Gerson (2019), que Platón y Plotino comparten esa identificación en los mismos términos. Para insistir en esta diferencia me apoyo en un argumento gnoseológico. Si bien ambos filósofos sostienen la posibilidad de acceder a una presencia en el principio y para describirla recurren a una metáfora erótica, para Platón esa presencia implica la realización plena del Nous en la aprehensión noética del Bien y la generación de episteme, mientras que para Plotino implica el recogimiento no solo de la intelección, sino del deseo mismo de inteligir para acceder a una presencia superior a la episteme. Consecuentemente, Platón concibe al Bien/Uno como Idea - como Idea de Ideas - y cúspide del ser y lo inteligible, mientras que Plotino lo concibe como aneideon, amorfon y apeiron, y, por ende, como radicalmente transcendente al ser y al pensar.

Abstract: This paper is centered on Thassos, an island situated in the Northern Aegean, settled by Greeks from Paros. We focus on the Archaic Period, more specifically on the sixth century BC, the peak of local production. Departing from the archaeological contexts through excavation reports, we analyze significant social and religious connections among votive materials associated with the Thasian black-figure pottery. These connections brought us elements that allowed us to interpret the multiculturalism imbricated within the objects, the mimicry and the innovations in the decoration of this black-figure pottery, as well as the particular demand in quantitative terms of a type of vessel called lekane, an object that was loaded with information and religious and apotropaic meaning. In addition, those same elements also showed us traits that reveal votive practices, judging by the way the pottery was exhibited, and its decorative features, which to date are only attested in Thassos. The research revealed intrinsic relationships linked to the various facets of Artemis, the protection of women in childbirth, revealed through the analysis of the objects in context.

Abstract: In Laws, mousike is restored to the constitution of the city (Magnesia) as an instrument for the education of citizens. According to the Athenian Stranger, the regulation and preservation of mousike's correct forms, through melos and schema, is also responsible for the maintenance of Magnesia's cultural and political stability. In this context, Plato praises Egyptian art, which would have maintained its style and, consequently, Egyptian politics stable for a long time. This article will thus present a translation of 653c - 654a and three contemporary interpretations of this eulogy. Lastly, the three interpretations will be evaluated and a possibility of an approximation between the Platonic praise and (visual) Egyptian art will be suggested, considering its probable social, religious and political functions.

Resumo: Em Leis, a mousike é restabelecida na constituição da cidade (Magnésia) como um instrumento para a educação dos cidadãos. Segundo o Estrangeiro Ateniense, a regulação e preservação das formas corretas da mousike, através de melos e schema, é também responsável pela manutenção da estabilidade cultural e política de Magnésia. Neste contexto, Platão enuncia um elogio à arte egípcia, que teria mantido o seu estilo e, consequentemente, a política egípcia teria permanecido estável por um longo tempo. Este artigo apresentará uma tradução do trecho 653c - 654a e três interpretações contemporâneas deste elogio. Por fim, as interpretações expostas serão avaliadas e uma possibilidade de aproximação entre o elogio platônico e a própria arte (visual) egípcia será sugerida, considerando suas prováveis funções sociais, religiosas e políticas.

Abstract: In this article, we present and explain ten different possible meanings of a chance event - some ontological, some epistemic - and provide examples whenever possible. We describe and illustrate more carefully the view of chance (tyche) expressed by Aristotle in his Physics, a demanding and complex notion, and critically contrast it with the other senses examined, attempting to determine any (in)compatibilism.

Resumen: El presente trabajo toma como punto de partida el contexto de la Metafísica en el que Aristóteles cita el fr. 28B 16 DK de Parménides, el cual es analizado a la luz de otros pasajes paralelos dentro del Corpus Aristotelicum, así como de la confrontación con el comentario que Teofrasto hace de ese mismo fragmento parmenídeo en el De Sensibus, con la finalidad de presentar, con base en un exhaustivo examen léxico y semántico, una reconstrucción de la interpretación que el Estagirita dio a los planteamientos parmenídeos relativos a ciertas funciones psíquicas (percepción sensorial y/o cognición). En consonancia con este análisis, hemos intentado también hacer una valoración acerca de la objetividad de la crítica de Aristóteles hacia los planteamientos filosóficos vertidos en el poema de Parménides.

Abstract: The starting point for this study is the passage in Metaphysics, in which Aristotle quotes Parmenides’ fr. 28B 16 DK, which is analyzed in the light of other parallel passages within the Corpus Aristotelicum, as well as through the confrontation with Theophrastus’ comment in the De Sensibus on this same Parmenides' fragment, in order to attempt, through an exhaustive lexical and semantic examination, a reconstruction of the interpretation that the Stagirite provided for Parmenides' approach to certain psychic functions (sensory perception and / or cognition). In line with this analysis, we will also try to assess the objectivity of the critique that Aristotle addressed to the philosophical views contained in Parmenides’ poem.

Abstract: By framing Aristotle’s dialectic in the broader context of scientific inquiry and demonstration, this paper is aimed at showing of what use the “reputable opinions” can be for grasping the principles of sciences, as declared in Topics I.2. It argues that such a use cannot imply ‒ at any stage of inquiry ‒ a replacement of the logic and intrinsic goals of demonstration by those proper to dialectic. However, it also defends a substantive (but still modest) contribution of dialectic ‒ beyond its well-attested methodological role in discarding contradictory opinions and its (possible though not germane to the context of Topics I.2) application to proving the principle of non-contradiction by means of refutation. This contribution consists in providing the preliminary accounts of facts in order to have scientific inquiry started, as required in Posterior Analytics II.8. To better appreciate how the proposed location of dialectic in a pre-demonstrative stage of inquiry is operational, the paper finally examines Physics IV.1-5.

Resumen: En el Fedón, tras ofrecer numerosos argumentos a favor de la inmortalidad del alma, se introduce un mythos acerca de su vida ultraterrena. Dado el tenor del tema en cuestión y las limitaciones humanas para dar con un logos estrictamente verdadero al respecto, Sócrates y sus allegados acuerdan en que se debe buscar el “más difícil de refutar” (85d1) entre los logoi humanos. Este trabajo intenta determinar en qué medida la asociación entre el mito presentado hacia el final del diálogo y los argumentos precedentes contribuye a ese objetivo. En este sentido pretende mostrar, por un lado, que el mito mencionado posee los caracteres atribuidos a la noble mentira en R. II-III -texto que plantea la necesidad de acudir a relatos que, aunque ficticios, resultan útiles para instaurar la justicia en el alma del auditorio-; y, por el otro, que en virtud de su carácter persuasivo, el mito contribuye a fortalecer el logos hasta allí desarrollado para volverlo lo más irrefutable posible, generando confianza en la necesidad de llevar adelante una vida virtuosa, inclusive en el auditorio que no forma parte del círculo filosófico.

Abstract: In the Phaedo, after offering several arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul, a mythos is introduced about its afterlife. Given the tenor of the topic at hand and the human limitations in coming up with strictly true logos on the subject, Socrates and his associates agree that the "most difficult to refute" (dysexelenktotaton, 85d1) should be sought among the human logoi. This paper attempts to determine to what extent the association between the myth presented towards the end of the dialogue and the preceding arguments contributes to this goal. In this sense it intends to show, on the one hand, that the myth mentioned has the characteristics of the noble lie in R. II-III -a text that suggests the need to use tales that, despite being fictional, are useful to establish justice in the soul of the audience-; and, on the other hand, that because of its persuasive character, the myth contributes to strengthen the logos developed so far in order to make it as irrefutable as possible, generating faith in the importance of virtuous life, even in the audience that is not part of the philosophical circle.

Resumen: De entre los héroes sofócleos, la figura de Neoptólemo sobresale por su particular dificultad para comprometerse de manera definitiva con un curso de acción. El joven acepta llevar a cabo un engaño pergeñado por Odiseo para obtener el arco infalible de Filoctetes, quien vive hace diez años abandonado en la isla desierta de Lemnos. Pero una vez avanzada la treta, cuando se aproxima realmente al objetivo, de pronto se ve asaltado por una duda que le impide seguir adelante, de manera tal que se desdibuja su posición de agente capaz de concretar el plan. Neoptólemo termina por confesar al solitario isleño el motivo fraudulento de su presencia, y, excusándose, aduce estar gobernado por una “necesidad” (v.923: ananke). En este trabajo presentaré, en primer lugar, las condiciones de emergencia y las características del plan ideado por el ingenioso rey de Ítaca; en segundo lugar, una explicación de la indecisión de Neoptólemo a partir de la particular relación entre su discurso y la realidad que pretende referir; en tercer lugar, me centraré en las derivas ontológicas del conflicto central de la obra y, finalmente, avanzaré sobre los corolarios prácticos que se siguen de lo laborado en los puntos anteriores.

Abstract: Among the Sophoclean heroes, the figure that stands out is the one of Neoptolemus, in particular because of his difficulty when successfully delivering a course of an action. The young man assumes to carry out a ruse devised by Odysseus in order to obtain the infallible bow of Philoctetes, who has been living for ten years marooned in the deserted island of Lemnos. But once being close to his goal, he is suddenly seized by a doubt that prevents him from achieving such purpose, and therefore undermining his capacity as an agent. Neoptolemus eventually confesses to the lonely islander the dishonest motive for his presence, and, by excusing himself, claims to be governed by a "necessity" (v.923: ananke). This paper will firstly expose the context of development and characteristics of the plan devised by the ingenious king of Ithaca; and will secondly explain Neoptolemus' indecision based on the particular relationship between his discourse and the reality he pretends; moreover it will emphasize the ontological derivations of the central conflict of the play and, finally, it will enter into the practical corollaries regarding the previous points.

Abstract: While refutation is usually related to Plato's early, Socratic, dialogues, this paper is aimed at exploring the link between refutation and dialectic in some of his middle and late dialogues. First, it argues that refutation assumes a constructive role in the Phaedo, where the best logos is the least refutable, and also in the Republic, where the philosopher is invited to fight his way through all elenchoi. Then, it tries to show that the gymnasia of Prm. 130a ff. is aimed at training young Socrates to come to the aid of the theory he embraces preventing it from being refuted. He should travel and explore all the paths, by assuming a hypothesis as well as the opposite one. This methodology paves the way on which Plato advances in the Sophist, where the antinomic structure of the gymnasia gives way to a “constructive” dialectic in which the aporia is solved and a thesis is established by refutation. The last section of this paper is devoted to analysing Sph. 251c-252e, where the positive and constructive function of the elenchus is especially clear. Plato argues for the symploke eidon by exploring all the hypotheses that are open to the search and refuting those that ultimately represent obstacles to his position. The symploke is the truth which remains when all the hypotheses that contradict it have been refuted. The conclusion is that the elenchus does not disappear but is put at the service of the truth, as an essential part of the method for attaining a positive doctrine.

Resumen: En este trabajo tomo como eje el concepto de ironía para analizar el elenchos que Sócrates practica sobre las opiniones de Calicles en el diálogo Gorgias. Asumo como punto de partida que Sócrates aspira a que su interlocutor modifique su disposición anímica y adopte un modo de vida filosófico, abandonando el retórico. Para ello, desarrolla un elenchos irónico que posee tres momentos: una fingida aceptación por parte de Sócrates de la dicotomía presentada por Calicles entre la vida del político, digna de imitación, y la del filósofo, merecedora de reproche; una inversión de dicha dicotomía; y finalmente una puesta en cuestión de dicha inversión. Concluiré sosteniendo que este tercer momento constituye una nueva maniobra socrática para instar a Calicles a que suspenda sus actividades políticas y examine previamente con él, de manera filosófica, el camino para volverse virtuoso.

Abstract: In this work I use the concept of irony to analyze the elenchos that Socrates practices on the opinions of Callicles in the Gorgias. I assume as a starting point that Socrates aims at the modification of his interlocutor´s animic disposition, adopting a philosophical way of life and abandoning the rhetorical one. To do this, he develops an ironic elenchos that has three moments: a feigned acceptance by Socrates of the dichotomy presented by Callicles between the life of the politician, worthy of imitation, and that of the philosopher, worthy of reproach; a reversal of that dichotomy; and finally, a questioning of that reversal. I will conclude by arguing that this third moment constitutes a new Socratic maneuver to urge Callicles to suspend his political activities, and previously examine philosophically with him the way to become virtuous.

Abstract: In Supplices, one of Euripides' most political tragedies, a surprising approximation between the world of myth and that of the spectator is produced. Although Theseus, its protagonist, is represented as a “democratic king”, it does not present a scene that can be compared to the experience of the most typical institution of Athenian democracy, the collective deliberation that defines the assembly open to all citizens. However, at different times in the first episode, it comes pretty close. Thus, the aim of this paper is to discuss how this tragedy represents forms of deliberation and consensus, and so it investigates the intricacies of two scenarios that lead to an attack war policy developed in the drama, one in Argos, the other in Athens.

Resumo: Em Suplicantes, uma das mais políticas tragédias de Eurípides, é produzida uma aproximação surpreendente entre o mundo do mito e o do espectador. Embora Teseu, seu protagonista, seja representado como um “rei democrático”, nela não está presente uma cena que possa ser equiparada à experiência da mais típica instituição da democracia ateniense, a deliberação coletiva definidora da assembleia aberta a todos os cidadãos. Todavia, em diferentes momentos do primeiro episódio, chega-se bastante perto. Assim, o objetivo deste texto é discutir como essa tragédia representa formas de deliberação e consenso, para o que se investigam os meandros de dois cenários que levam a uma política de guerra de ataque desenvolvidos no drama, um em Argos, outro, em Atenas.