Abstract In this critical notice we review Bozickovic's recent proposal to settle two interrelated issues: (i) the issue of the cognitive significance of indexical thoughts expressed at a time in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the subject either mistakes two objects for one or one for two different objects; (ii) that of the cognitive dynamics of temporal indexical thoughts in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the belief seems to be retained while the proper adjustments fail to be made (that is, in cases such as Rip Van Winkle's). We argue that, despite its elegance and merits, the proposal falls short of accounting for the problematic cases in their full complexity. For one thing, the intended non-modal construal of Frege's Criterion of Difference promoted by Bozickovic does not block, in our view, the “proliferation” of senses brought about by the occasion-sensitivity of the individuation of demonstrative thoughts. For another, the proposal fails to appreciate the need for the subject to have an adequate conception of the object of her thought when it comes to orienting herself in space and time. That being so, we take it to be unfit to settle (ii).

ABSTRACT Recanati challenges what he characterizes as the Fregean conception of meaning, resorting to cases of semantic variability proposed by Searle and Travis. According to him, truth-conditional pragmatics - a position that settles the influence of context over conventional meanings under the frame of pragmatic functions - accommodates better those cases to the objective of providing a systematic truth-conditional theory of meaning. In contrast with this approach, he characterizes radical contextualism as the position according to which the phenomenon of semantic variability is persistent and incompatible with the postulation of literal meanings. According to him, to the extent that radical contextualism is contrary to the postulation of literal meanings, it is also incompatible with the postulation of Fregean senses. That view is so antagonistic to the neo-Fregean conception of Fregean senses that it deserves to be revised.

RESUMEN Recanati cuestiona lo que caracteriza como la concepción fregeana del significado acudiendo a casos de variabilidad semántica propuestos por Searle y Travis. De acuerdo con él, el pragmatismo veritativo-condicional - postura que sitúa la influencia del contexto sobre significados convencionales bajo el marco de funciones pragmáticas - acomoda mejor estos casos dado el objetivo de proveer una teoría veritativo-condicional del significado. En contraste con esta aproximación, Recanati caracteriza el contextualismo radical como una posición de acuerdo con la cual el fenómeno de variabilidad semántica es persistente e incompatible con la postulación de significados literales. De acuerdo con él, dado que el contextualismo radical es contrario a la postulación de significados literales, tal postura es también incompatible con la postulación de sentidos fregeanos. Esta visión es tan antagónica con relación a la concepción neo-fregeana de sentidos fregeanos que merece la pena ser revisada.