Abstract In this article, I analyse common arguments raised against historical determinism. I refer to the treatment given to the topic by Ernest Nagel in “Determinism in History” (1959). Nagel identifies five different arguments which allegedly show that history is not deterministic and argues that they fall short. I revisit, re-evaluate, and make amendments to these arguments. Special attention is given to one of them: The argument that the emergence of novelties in human affairs would be incompatible with the standard view of determinism. I use the theory of convergent evolution to clarify why novelties cannot be used against the deterministic assumption, especially if by determinism we mean only the ontological sense of the doctrine - which I call uniqueness of evolution - and not predictive determinism. I conclude that common attacks on the possibility of historical determinism are grounded on incomplete human knowledge of the historical world. article Determinism History 1959. 1959 . (1959) short revisit reevaluate, reevaluate re evaluate, evaluate re-evaluate them assumption world 195 (1959 19 (195 1 (19 (1 (

Abstract: In this article, we present and explain ten different possible meanings of a chance event - some ontological, some epistemic - and provide examples whenever possible. We describe and illustrate more carefully the view of chance (tyche) expressed by Aristotle in his Physics, a demanding and complex notion, and critically contrast it with the other senses examined, attempting to determine any (in)compatibilism.