RESUMO Este artigo tem como objetivo discutir os padrões regionais de territorialização de votos de candidatos a vereador no município de São Paulo. Em diálogo com a literatura sobre a geografia eleitoral no sistema de lista aberta e no município de São Paulo, exploramos a distribuição espacial de votos desses candidatos por meio de um indicador global de concentração e da identificação de territórios eleitorais no município, ressaltando como os fatores de gênero e partido estão associados a esses padrões. Nossos principais resultados apontam que candidatos competitivos têm votação mais dispersa que os não competitivos; existem regiões sub ou sobrerrepresentadas em relação ao seu eleitorado, e padrões claros entre os principais partidos; candidaturas femininas competitivas têm padrões de concentração distintos daquele de candidaturas masculinas. Paulo eleitorado partidos masculinas

ABSTRACT This article examines the regional voting patterns for city councilors in São Paulo, focusing on its territorialization. Drawing from electoral geography literature within open list systems and specifically in São Paulo, we analyze the spatial distribution of votes for candidates. Employing a global concentration indicator, we delineate electoral territories and underscore the influence of party affiliation and gender on these patterns. Our findings reveal that in São Paulo, competitive candidates tend to garner more dispersed votes compared to non-competitive ones. Additionally, certain regions exhibit either under- or over-representation relative to their electorate, with clear concentration patterns observed among major political parties. Moreover, we observe distinctive concentration patterns among competitive female candidates as compared to their male counterparts. Paulo territorialization indicator noncompetitive non ones Additionally under overrepresentation over representation electorate parties Moreover counterparts

Until 2013, the Brazilian executive branch had control over the execution of all discretionary public spending. In that context, all Brazilian legislators could do was amend the budget proposal prepared by the government. This article analyzes whether EC 86/2015, known as the mandatory budget amendment EC, has reduced executive dominance over the financial cycle of individual budget amendments. To this end, we examine descriptively and inferentially the main changes proposed by EC 86/2015, as well as data about the individual amendments executed before and after the constitutional change. Our results indicate that executive dominance was reduced after the change in the budget execution rules: the amount paid and the number of executed individual amendments have increased, while the profile of legislators with executed amendments also changed: Being part of the government coalition became less important. This article contributes to legislative studies by exploring the empirical implications of this important constitutional change. From a theoretical point of view, our findings challenge the expectation that the executive uses amendment execution as a bargaining tool to secure legislative support in roll-call votes in the National Congress, especially in the post-EC 86/2015 period. 2013 spending context 862015 86 2015 end rules increased changed view rollcall roll call Congress postEC post 86/201 period 201 86201 8 86/20 20 8620 86/2 2 862 86/