Abstract Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies that donate to winning electoral campaigns are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than companies that do not make these contributions. The relationship between politicians and companies may be signaled by political connections in which companies try to get political benefits in exchange for providing politicians with campaign financing. The hypothesis is that a quid pro quo occurs in which these companies benefit from favorable tax treatment that reduces their relative tax burden. Design/methodology/approach The focus of this study is donations that were made in the presidential elections of 2010 and 2014. The sample covers the period between 2010 and 2016 for companies listed on the B3 Stock Exchange, using proxies for tax aggressiveness computed based on value-added reporting. Through linear regressions, the authors have tested whether the companies that made these campaign contributions tend to have a lower tax burden. Findings The proposed hypothesis was confirmed, revealing that a political connection between campaign donations reduces the tax burden for donating companies during the years following the election. These donations appear to depict an environment characterized by an exchange of favors in which the donating companies exhibit greater tax aggressiveness than non-donating companies. Originality/value The current study deals with a subject that has not yet been examined empirically in Brazil and reinforces the position adopted by the Supreme Court in prohibiting campaign donations to inhibit quid pro quo practices. The study offers additional arguments for the criminalization of the so-called “second set of books” used to record electoral campaign contributions.

Resumo A necessidade de capital de giro e o índice de liquidez influenciam na agressividade fiscal? O artigo investiga se o nível de agressividade fiscal se altera dependendo da estrutura financeira de uma empresa, tendo por base o Modelo Fleuriet para análise dinâmica do capital de giro. O planejamento tributário é uma forma de se obter recursos internamente e, de acordo com a Pecking Order Theory, os recursos internos são os primeiros utilizados pelas empresas para financiarem suas atividades. Um modelo de regressão linear múltipla para dados em painel com efeitos fixos de empresa e ano foi adotado para testar a relação. Como variáveis de interesse utilizaram-se variáveis dummy, uma para cada tipo de estrutura financeira proposta pelo Modelo Fleuriet. Em uma amostra composta por 2.142 empresas-ano listadas na B3 entre 2010 a 2016 verificou-se que, tanto nas empresas mais saudáveis quanto nas menos saudáveis, não há diferença significativa no nível de agressividade fiscal entre as empresas classificadas de acordo com as estruturas do Modelo Fleuriet. Porém as análises adicionais para o Índice de Liquidez Dinâmico e o Índice de Liquidez Geral mostraram que quanto maior a liquidez menor é a agressividade fiscal. Os achados apontam que uma maior agressividade fiscal pode ser explicada em parte por uma dificuldade de liquidez.

Abstract Does the need for working capital and liquidity ratios influence tax aggressiveness? This article investigates If the level of fiscal aggressiveness changes depending on the financial structure of a Company, based on the Fleuriet model for dynamic analysis of the working capital. Tax planning is a way of obtaining resources internally and, according to the hierarchy proposed by pecking order theory, internal resources are the first used by companies to finance their activities. A multiple linear regression model for panel data with fixed company and year effects has been adopted to test the relationship. As a variable of interest, dummy variables were used, one for each type of financial structure proposed by the Fleuriet model. In a sample consisting of 2,142 companies-year listed in B3 between 2010 to 2016, it was found that in both healthier and less healthy companies, there is no significant difference in the level of tax aggressiveness between companies classified according to the structures of the Fleuriet model. However, the additional analyses for the dynamic liquidity ratio and the general liquidity ratio showed that the higher the liquidity, lower is the tax aggressiveness. The findings point out that greater tax aggressiveness can be explained in part by liquidity difficulties.