ABSTRACT The informational paradigm of communication stipulates that agents talk to convey non-redundant information to other agents. If we turn to self-directed talk and, in particular, to private speech, however, we find a clear counterexample. After all, in self-directed speech, the roles of speaker and hearer coincide in the same agent. My goal here is to search for an alternative paradigm that explains private speech in its various intrapersonal and intersubjective uses. To that end, I consider two alternatives, the dispositional and the deontic paradigms, which assume respectively that we talk to generate dispositions and to negotiate commitments in coordinated actions. In comparing their merits, I show that the second one is preferable because it explains private uses of language with phatic function better than the first one. Such uses show that communication can turn to aspects of its own infrastructure; regrettably, they have been systematically neglected in the philosophical literature, even though they seem to be a crucial part of a complete answer to the question “Why do we talk?”. nonredundant non redundant selfdirected self directed particular however counterexample all agent end alternatives paradigms actions merits infrastructure regrettably literature Why talk. . talk?” talk?

RESUMO O paradigma informacional da comunicação estipula que agentes usam a fala para transmitir informação não-redundante a outros agentes. Se olharmos para a fala auto-direcionada e, em particular, para a fala privada, no entanto, nos deparamos com um claro contraexemplo: nela, os papéis de falante e ouvinte coincidem no mesmo agente. Meu objetivo aqui será, então, somar-me aos esforços de buscar um paradigma alternativo que explique a fala privada, em seus vários usos, intrapessoais e intersubjetivos. Para isso, considero dois candidatos: o paradigma disposicional e o deôntico, segundo os quais a fala serve, respectivamente, para gerar disposições e para negociar compromissos em ações coordenadas. Ao comparar os méritos de ambos, mostro que o segundo é preferível por conseguir explicar usos da fala privada com função fática mais facilmente que o primeiro. Tais usos evidenciam que a comunicação também pode voltar-se para aspectos de sua própria infraestrutura e da ação-entre-participantes. Lamentavelmente, eles vêm sendo negligenciados na literatura filosófica, embora pareçam ser peça-chave de qualquer resposta completa à pergunta “Por que falamos?”. nãoredundante não redundante autodirecionada auto direcionada particular entanto contraexemplo nela agente será então somarme somar me intersubjetivos isso candidatos deôntico serve respectivamente coordenadas ambos primeiro voltarse voltar se açãoentreparticipantes. açãoentreparticipantes ação entre participantes. participantes ação-entre-participantes Lamentavelmente filosófica peçachave peça chave Por falamos. falamos . falamos?” falamos?

Abstract One of the characteristics of what has been called “dogwhistle politics” is the presence of a rhetoric that targets minority groups implicitly. For example, terms like ‘illegals’ and ‘illegal immigrants’, used to target Latin-Americans, have come to permeate the American political discourse as well as everyday conversations. Here I focus on how such expressions, which I call illegality frame code words (IFCW, for short), can be countered by recalcitrant hearers. I begin with the assumption that IFCWs are racial code words, conversational devices that convey implicit racial appeals while allowing for deniability. I then discuss how the existence of an Illegality Frame in the American Immigration debate supports their deniability. Lastly, I discuss how recalcitrant hearers can counter utterances that contain them. In particular, I propose reframing as an adequate strategy. In reframing, agents take control of the goals or the QUD (question under discussion) of the conversation to exclude certain topics from the common ground and include others. The idea is to “change the conversation” to neutralize problematic moves. This maneuver is advantageous not only because it helps to hinder veiled discriminatory practices, but also because it affords control over “the terms of the conversation”. dogwhistle politics implicitly example ‘illegals illegals illegal immigrants, immigrants , immigrants’ LatinAmericans, LatinAmericans Latin Americans, Americans Latin-Americans conversations expressions IFCW, IFCW (IFCW short, short short) deniability Lastly them particular strategy question discussion others change moves practices conversation. .

Abstract Bozickovic’s The Indexical Point of View is a richly informative and solid philosophical work about the problem of cognitive significance involving indexical thoughts and expressions. Although I tend to agree with most of what is said in the book, here I will make some comments on two minor correlated points regarding Bozickovic’s Fregean account of indirect speech reports (or ISRs). After presenting some of the author's ideas about reports, I will claim that the tracking and updating involved in ISRs is of a complex kind that requires attention to the role played by speech reporters and their audiences. Following that, I will hold that a general theory of correct ISR strictly in Fregean terms (as Bozickovic’s) fails to account for that - at least directly.

RESUMO A Teoria Reflexivo-Referencial pode ser definida como uma abordagem multiproposicional da interpretação de enunciações. Nesse sentido, seu proponente principal, John Perry, sustenta que enunciações de frases com termos singulares expressam vários conteúdos, a depender de como falantes/ intérpretes exploram a informação provida pelas situações nas quais elas são produzidas. Entretanto, a teoria Reflexivo-Referencial diz muito pouco sobre conteúdos implicados, como pressuposições, por exemplo. Aqui, discuto a possibilidade de incluir pressuposições, definidas em termos do conceito de notat-issueness, no quadro da posição. Começo com uma breve caracterização de suas motivações e principais teses, seguida por um estudo de caso do conteúdo pressuposicional not-at-issue expresso por um tipo específico de termo singular, os nomes próprios. Para concluir, pondero acerca de algumas consequências desse projeto geral de expansão teórica.

ABSTRACT The Reflexive-Referential Theory is a multi-content approach to utterance interpretation. Its main proponent, John Perry, assumes that utterances of sentences with singular terms express several contents, depending on how their utterers and interpreters harness information from the situations in which they are produced. However, the theory says little to nothing about implied content, like presuppositions. Here, I discuss the possibility of including presuppositions, defined in terms of the concept of not-at-issue content, in this view. I begin with a brief characterization of the Reflexive-Referential theory in what regards its theoretical motivations and main thesis, followed by a study case of presuppositional not-at-issue content associated to a specific class of singular terms, proper names. To conclude, I ponder over a few consequences of this overall project of theoretical expansion.