Resumo Este artigo analisa o processo de mudança institucional nas instituições de accountability no Brasil, com foco em processos endógenos, exógenos e sistêmicos. Os estudiosos geralmente analisam a mudança institucional considerando fatores explicativos endógenos e exógenos para falar sobre a direção e os resultados das mudanças. Além desses dois fatores, este trabalho propõe um terceiro. Este artigo propõe que o processo de mudança institucional deve ser entendido em termos de variáveis sistêmicas e deve levar em conta as interações entre instituições como um fator relevante na explicação do veto ou promoção da mudança institucional. Com base em evidências qualitativas coletadas de entrevistas com os principais atores das instituições de accountability no Brasil, o artigo discute as mudanças incrementais ocorridas nestas instituições. Demonstramos que, apesar dessas mudanças incrementais, o resultado final em termos de mudança institucional não foi uma mudança sistêmica mais ampla, com maior cooperação e coordenação das atividades de controle entre as instituições de accountability. Os processos de accountability são entendidos como parte de um sistema dinâmico, segundo o qual a concorrência e a cooperação fazem parte do repertório de ação dos agentes e são usados de forma diferente dependendo da situação.

Abstract This article analyzes the process of institutional change, focusing on endogenous, exogenous and systemic processes. Scholars usually analyze institutional change considering endogenous and exogenous explanatory factors to talk about the direction and outcomes of the changes. In addition to these two factors, this paper proposes a third one. This paper proposes that the process of institutional change should be understood in terms of systemic variables and should take into account the interactions between institutions as a relevant factor in explaining the veto or promotion of institutional change. Based on qualitative evidence gathered from interviews with key accountability actors in Brazil, the paper discusses the incremental changes that occurred in the Brazilian accountability institutions. We demonstrate that, despite these incremental changes, the final result in terms of institutional change was not a broader systemic change with greater cooperation and coordination of control activities between accountability institutions. Accountability processes are understood as part of a dynamic system, under which competition and cooperation are part of the action repertoire of accountability actors and used differently depending on the situation.

The central purpose of this paper is to map out the Brazilian web of accountability institutions and observe how institutions establish links with each other in order to control corruption cases that reach them. Focus is on institutions that are part of the Brazilian anti-corruption agenda, which include the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, the Federal Police, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Justice and the Ministries. In the literature, the most widespread argument is that, despite recent institutional improvements, the result produced by this web in terms of coordination is still weak. This article tests this claim by looking at the program called 'Inspections from Public Lotteries'. Through a longitudinal approach, I observed the flux of control activities among the institutions, especially the establishment of investigative and judicial proceedings. Not only I explored the extent to which corruption impacts the establishment of interactions, but I also investigated how the interactions affect the speed of judicial proceedings – using logistic regressions and survival analysis. The conclusion is that the Brazilian web is able to articulate itself in order to hold public officials accountable (something new in this recent democracy), but not in a homogeneous way across all institutions (something the literature has missed). Furthermore, I demonstrate that the entire web of accountability institutions is unable to arrive at a decision in a timely manner.

This article analyzes the relationship between the development of new public administration and the perception of corruption in Brazil under democratic rule. We contend that the reason for the persistently widespread perception of corruption in Brazil is that despite important changes in the institutions with oversight of the Brazilian state, such administrative reforms have assigned limited priority to frontline civil servants. Organizational progress in the new public administration has focused on upper-level public employees, with little impact on the middle and lower echelons, so that practices like graft and bribery between public employees and ordinary citizens are still commonplace. Thus, the management changes have failed to produce a perception of improvement in accountability, and corruption is still seen as common, even within a context of administrative changes.

Dans cet article, on examine le rapport entre l'expansion de la nouvelle gestion publique et la perception de la corruption dans le Brésil démocratique. On avance que, si l'idée de la corruption persiste, malgré les changements importants dans les institutions de contrôle de l'État brésilien, c'est parce que les réformes administratives n'ont pas bénéficié aux fonctionnaires de première ligne. Malgré les progrès, en matière de gestion, de la nouvelle administration, qui favorisent les hauts fonctionnaires, les changements institutionnels n'ont pratiquement pas changé la conduite des employés de bureau en contact avec l'usager, de telle sorte que la pratique de la concussion et du bakchich reste fréquente dans les rapports entre fonctionnaires et citoyens. Ainsi les modifications dans la gestion ne correspondent pas, chez ces derniers, à un sentiment d'amélioration de la redevabilité du service public, ce qui préserve donc la sensation de corruption malgré ce cadre de transformations.