RESUMO Neste artigo, argumento que a crítica de Plotino contra a deliberação divina na Enéada VI.7 não busca banir toda teleologia de sua filosofia da natureza. Ao contrário, sua crítica procura adequar a teleologia ao seu sistema metafísico de forma a torná-la consistente com os princípios básicos que regem o universo inteligível. Nesse sentido, Plotino não propõe banir das explicações naturais toda referência às noções de utilidade ou benefício, mas busca conciliar essas noções com uma ontologia na qual o Intelecto tem sempre prioridade sobre o mundo sensível. Para esse fim, Plotino introduz, em primeiro lugar, o que chamo de uma teleologia vertical, segundo a qual as diferentes espécies animais criam as condições necessárias para a manutenção de formas mais elevadas de vida inteligível, como genera. Em segundo lugar, Plotino introduz uma teleologia horizontal, por meio da qual os vários órgãos animais fornecem um coeficiente mínimo de conteúdo noético para cada espécie em seu respectivo nível ontológico. Desse modo, Plotino esboça uma teleologia propriamente ‘noética’ na Enéada VI.7.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Plotinus’s critique of divine deliberation in Ennead VI.7 does not seek to banish teleology altogether from his philosophy of nature. Rather, his critique aims to situate teleology within his own metaphysical system so as to reconcile it with the basic principles governing the intelligible universe. In this sense, Plotinus does not propose that we expunge all reference to notions of utility and benefit from our natural explanations; he merely wishes to render those notions coherent with an ontology in which the intelligible always takes precedence over sensible reality. To this end, Plotinus introduces, first, what I call a vertical teleology, where the different animal species create the necessary conditions for the maintenance of higher forms of intelligible life, such as genera. Second, Plotinus advances what I call a horizontal teleology, where the various animal organs serve to provide a minimal coefficient of noetic content to each species in its respective ontic level. Plotinus thus sketches the outlines of a properly ‘noetic’ teleology in Ennead VI.7.

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models - a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism - I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.