Abstract: Parmenides introduces two “novelties” which will remain forever as the pillars of “philosophy”: the certainty that, if there are ὄντα (who could deny it?) it is because there is εἶναι; and the necessity of following a “method” in order to come to know. The very narrow limits of this article prevent us from dealing with the first question. On the other hand, we try to justify the second. The notion of path (= method) is fundamental in Parmenides (the notion, represented by 7 different words, appears 21 times in the recovered fragments of his Poem). Now, a way supposes a traveler, a guide and a goal to reach. According to the dichotomous scheme of his thought, there is for Parmenides a “good” path (traveled by a future philosopher, guided by the Heliads and the Goddess and whose goal is the truth) and a “bad” path (traveled by the mortals “who know nothing”, guided by a wandering thought and which advances without precise direction). These two paths are opposed in fr. 6, where the Goddess says that, unlike (δέ) the path of mortals, the κέλευθος of all that are, is παλίντροπος, for it has to necessarily reach the starting point, which is the κέλευθος πειθοῦς of verse 2.5. Fr. 5 (“It is common (ξυνόν δέ) for me from where (ὁππόθεν) I begin, for I shall return to it again” [πάλιν]) confirms this assumption.

Résumé: Parménide introduit deux “nouveautés” qui vont rester pour toujours comme les piliers de la “philosophie”: la certitude selon laquelle, s’il y a des ὄντα (qui pourrait le nier?) c’est parce qu’il y a εἶναι; et la nécessité de suivre une “méthode” pour arriver à connaître. Les très étroites limites de cet article nous empêchent de nous occuper de la première question. En revanche, nous essayons de justifier la deuxième. La notion de chemin (= méthode) est fondamentale chez Parménide (la notion, représentée par 7 mots différents, apparaît 21 fois dans les fragments récupérés de son Poème). Or, un chemin suppose un voyageur, un guide et un but à atteindre. Selon le schéma dichotomique propre à sa pensé, il y a pour Parménide un “bon” chemin (parcouru par un futur philosophe, guidé par les Héliades et la Déesse et qui a pour but la vérité) et un “mauvais” chemin (parcouru par les mortels “qui ne savent rien”, guidés par une pensée vagabonde et qui avance sans direction précise). Ces deux chemins sont opposés au fr. 6, où la Déesse dit que, contrairement (δέ) au chemin des mortels, le κέλευθος de tout ce qui est, est παλίντροπος, car il a doit obligatoirement rejoindre le point de départ, qui est le κέλευθος πειθοῦς du vers 2.5. Le fr. 5 (“Il est commun (ξυνόν δέ) pour moi où (ὁππόθεν) je commence, car j’y reviendrai à nouveau” [πάλιν]) confirme cette hypothèse.

Abstract: In some of the Aristotelian accounts, Parmenides’ thesis is construed in opposition to the philosophy of nature; on the other hand, he is also depicted, in a different context, as a cosmologist, to whom the Stagirite (and a long tradition afterwards, ending with Simplicius) ascribes a theory of becoming and its principles. In this paper, I exhibit and analyse the relevant passages from Physics I 1-3, Metaphysics I 3 and 5 and On generation and corruption I 3, providing an interpretation that aims to solve the apparent paradox, making sense of the information we can gather from Aristotle’s and Simplicius’ testimonies. Eventually, I propose a construal of the Two Ways of fr. 2 with an emphasis on the predicative reading of einai, which could hint at the Parmenidean approach to cosmology that runs in parallel with the argument on Being.

Abstract “Koinōnia and Justice. From Republic to Parmenides”. The main reason why the developmental interpretation of the platonic Parmenides believes this dialogue constitutes a crisis in the development of Plato’s thought is the idea that the philosopher criticizes therein its Theory of Ideas of the middle period - Phaedo, Symposium, Republic. The theory supposedly criticized would conceive the Ideas as absolutely simple and isolated unities that, as such, would make impossible the fulfilment of their own function. This would only be possible by a new relational conception of the Ideas introduced in Parmenides and developed in Sophist. In contrast to some scholars who do not even mention certain passages in those dialogues (e.g. Cordero, 2014, 2016), I will show 1) that the notion of koinōnia is essential to the project of the Republic, since its central idea, the notion of justice, is unthinkable without the notion of koinōnia of the Ideas with each other; and 2) that Parmenides makes use of this notion of justice (150a) precisely in relation to the eidetical koinōnia (143a-b) and to the Idea conceived as a whole (ὅλον) “which has come to be one complete/perfect thing out of all its parts - ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός” (157e1, ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν, 157c6, ἓν τέλειον µόρια ἔχον, 157e4).

Resumen La razón fundamental por la que, según cierto modelo historiográfico el Parménides platónico constituye un diálogo de crisis en el desarrollo del pensamiento de Platón, es la supuesta presencia en él de una crítica de la Teoría de las Ideas del período medio -Fedón, Banquete, República. La insuficiencia de esa teoría consistiría en una concepción de las Ideas como unidades absolutamente simples y completamente aisladas que les impediría cumplir la función para la cual habrían sido concebidas. Esa función solo podría ser cumplida por una nueva concepción relacional de las Ideas que estaría sugerida en el Parménides y desarrollada en el Sofista. Así pues, por contraste con la que yo llamaría una estrategia del silencio (p. ej. Cordero, 2014, 2016), quisiera 1) insistir en que la noción de koinōnía es fundamental e imprescindible para el proyecto de la República, pues su tema central, la noción de justicia, es impensable sin la noción de koinōnía entre las Ideas; y 2) hacer notar el uso de esa noción de justicia en el Parménides (cf. 150a), precisamente en conexión con la cuestión de la interrelación eidética (143a-b) y la concepción de la Idea como un todo (ὅλον) “que ha surgido como un uno a partir de todos las partes - ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός” (157e1, ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν, 157c6, ἓν τέλειον µόρια ἔχον, 157e4).

Abstract: The starting point for this study is the passage in Metaphysics, in which Aristotle quotes Parmenides’ fr. 28B 16 DK, which is analyzed in the light of other parallel passages within the Corpus Aristotelicum, as well as through the confrontation with Theophrastus’ comment in the De Sensibus on this same Parmenides' fragment, in order to attempt, through an exhaustive lexical and semantic examination, a reconstruction of the interpretation that the Stagirite provided for Parmenides' approach to certain psychic functions (sensory perception and / or cognition). In line with this analysis, we will also try to assess the objectivity of the critique that Aristotle addressed to the philosophical views contained in Parmenides’ poem.

Resumen: El presente trabajo toma como punto de partida el contexto de la Metafísica en el que Aristóteles cita el fr. 28B 16 DK de Parménides, el cual es analizado a la luz de otros pasajes paralelos dentro del Corpus Aristotelicum, así como de la confrontación con el comentario que Teofrasto hace de ese mismo fragmento parmenídeo en el De Sensibus, con la finalidad de presentar, con base en un exhaustivo examen léxico y semántico, una reconstrucción de la interpretación que el Estagirita dio a los planteamientos parmenídeos relativos a ciertas funciones psíquicas (percepción sensorial y/o cognición). En consonancia con este análisis, hemos intentado también hacer una valoración acerca de la objetividad de la crítica de Aristóteles hacia los planteamientos filosóficos vertidos en el poema de Parménides.

Resumo: Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade - e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise.

Abstract: In the first two sections of this paper, I present some of the arguments that the Buddhist Indian philosophers Nāgārjuna (second/third century) and Vasubandhu (fourth/fifth century) use to show the logical untenability of the phenomena of motion and of the existence of multiple external/extramental objects. The logic of these arguments seems to be quite comparable - and actually, within contemporary buddhological studies, it was sometimes compared - to the one that Zeno of Elea uses in his paradoxes against motion and multiplicity. However, in the third section, I try to show that the most immediate philosophical purposes of these three thinkers diverge and are irreconcilable. While Zeno criticizes motion and multiplicity in order to show the plausibility of the attributes of motionlessness and uniqueness of Parmenides’ Being, Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu’s paradoxes should be understood within philosophical projects that, in tune with the Buddha’s teaching of the “middle way”, try to keep themselves equidistant from the categories of “being” and “non-being”, avoiding both. Finally, in the fourth and last section, I defend the thesis that the ultimate purposes of the Eleatics’ view and those of the two Buddhist philosophers are, once again, comparable. Both Parmenides and the Buddha, as well as their respective epigones, try to promote an “epistemic revolution”, in their followers, which consists in the shift from the ordinary vision of reality to an extraordinary or supreme understanding, coincident with reality in itself and, therefore, ultimately true.

Abstract In the present work, we will focus on the analysis of Par- menides’ and Melissus’ criticisms made in fragment 9 of On Philosophy. We believe that this fragment is a relatively solid testimony that in this work Aris- totle would have tried to inquire around one of the principles of the real: the physis, presenting the problems that its denial presupposes. To perform our analysis, we will divide the work into two parts. In the first, we will examine the context in which the fragment 9 of On philosophy and the source from which it has reached us is mentioned: Sextus Empiricus. In the second part, we will focus on the argumentative strategies that Aristotle would have implemented to develop the thesis presented in this fragment.

Resumen En el presente trabajo, nos centraremos en el análisis de las críticas a Parménides y Meliso realizadas en el fragmento 9 de Sobre la filosofía. Creemos que este fragmento es un testimonio relativamente sólido de que en esta obra Aristóteles habría intentado indagar en torno a uno de los principios de lo real: la physis, presentando las problemáticas que su negación presupone. Para realizar nuestro análisis, dividiremos el trabajo en dos partes. En la primera, examinaremos el contexto en el cual aparece citado el fragmento 9 de Sobre la filosofía y la fuente por la cual nos ha llegado: Sexto Empírico. En la segunda parte, nos centraremos en las estrategias argumentativas que Aris tóteles habría implementado para desarrollar las tesis presentadas en el fragmento en cuestión.

RESUMEN ¿Por qué cuando Platón quiere justificar su definición del sofista como un «fabricante de imágenes» (Sofista, 236c), se apoya sobre dos versos auténticos de Parménides (fr. 7.1-2) que aluden, sin duda alguna, al camino recorrido por los «mortales que nada saben» (fr. 6.4)? ¿Quiere acaso sugerir que esos «mortales», que son en realidad «fabricantes de opiniones» (doxaí), son un antecedente de los sofistas, que son «fabricantes de imágenes»?

ABSTRACT Why, when Plato wants to justify his definition of the sophist as an "image maker"(Sopfest, 236c), he quotes two authentic verses of Parmenides (fr. 7.1-2) that undoubtedly allude to the path taken by the "mortals who know nothing" (fr. 6.4)? Does he want to suggest that these "mortals", who are actually "opinions (doxaí) makers" are ancestors of the sophists, who are "image makers"?

Abstract Spanish version of the manuscript, preserved in the Swiss Literary Archive (SLA - Schweizerische Literaturarchiv), of the plenary lecture “Lire Paul Celan” [Reading Paul Celan], given by Jean Bollack (Strasbourg 1923-Paris, 2012) at the Paul Celan International Seminar, organized by the National University of San Martín (Argentina) in 2007, and expanded during the Strasbourg European Literature Meetings in 2008.

Resumen Versión castellana del manuscrito, conservado en el Archivo Literario Suizo (SLA - Schweizerische Literaturarchiv), de la conferencia plenaria “Lire Paul Celan” [Leer a Paul Celan] ofrecida por Jean Bollack (Estrasburgo 1923-París, 2012) en el Seminario Internacional Paul Celan, organizado por la Universidad Nacional de San Martín (Argentina) en 2007, y ampliada durante los Encuentros Europeos de Literatura, celebrados en Estraburgo en 2008.

Abstract: While in Republic (523a) Plato considers there is no need of the existence of a Finger’s Form, since a no-finger can be imagined, in Book X he affirms the existence of a Bed’s Form, a substantial object such as the finger. This Platonic inaccuracy related to the Form of substances is confirmed in the Parmenides, when Socrates confesses his doubts about them. But in the Sophist, a later dialogue, we find a coherent response because The Form of the Other justifies that there be an opposite to the finger, a “no-finger”, which is simply something different from the finger.

Resumen: En la República (523a), Platón considera innecesaria la existencia de una Forma del dedo, pues no puede imaginase un no-dedo, mientras que en el Libro X afirma la existencia de una Forma de la cama, un objeto sustancial como el dedo. Esta imprecisión platónica respecto de las Formas de sustancias se confirma en el Parménides, cuando Sócrates confiesa dudar al respecto. Este artículo encuentra en un diálogo posterior, el Sofista, una respuesta coherente. La Forma de lo Otro justifica que, respecto de un dedo, haya su contrario, un “no-dedo”, que es simplemente algo diferente del dedo.

Abstract: According to the Eleatic Principle, only items which have the capacity to affect or be affected are. Recently, there has been a question about what, if anything, is Eleatic about the Eleatic Principle (EP). I examine the purported origins of the EP in Plato’s Sophist and argue that the text presents three ways in which something can affect or be affected: (1) as tangible contact, (2) as Cambridge change, and (3) by being responsible for the way something else is. Next, I look to the historical Eleatics in search of precursors to the EP. Against recent work in this area, I argue that elements of the EP are present in Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. The poem of Parmenides is compatible with (1) and (2) through the interaction of Light and Night, and the characterization of what-is as knowable. Zeno’s moving arrow paradox employs elements of (2), while his argument from complete divisibility adds preconditions to (3). Finally, against the traditional view that Melissus denies the existence of the sensible world, I show that for Melissus, the sensible world exists alongside what-is. The causal link between what-is and the sensible world, along with Melissus’ commitment to what-is as the object of knowledge renders Melissus the Eleatic whose Eleaticism is most represented in the Eleatic Principle. Alternatives for the application of the EP in contemporary metaphysics and reasons for the inclusion of an Eleatic visitor as the main interlocutor of a dialogue that is often taken as a criticism of Eleaticism emerge.

Resumo: Ao colocar a diairesis em comunhão com a dialética, Platão rompe com a estrutura dicotômica-unívoca parmenídica; no Fragmento 2 do Poema Da Natureza, a deusa estabelece que há apenas dois caminhos para a verdade, um que é e outro que não é. Desses dois caminhos, Parmênides nega o segundo, afirmando que é impossível conhecer o que não é: para o filósofo préssocrático conhecer algo está relacionado ao é, logo, para ele, é impossível conhecer o que não é. De maneira que há, em Parmênides, uma cisão entre “ser” e “não-ser”. O desafio, ao qual nos propomos neste artigo, é explorar as implicações, para a diairesis no Sofista de Platão, quanto à afirmação parmenídica sobre a impossibilidade cognoscível a respeito do não-ser.

Abstract: By placing diairesis in communion with the dialectic, Plato breaks with the dichotomous-univocal Parmenidean structure; in Fragment 2 of the poem On Nature by Parmenides, the goddess establishes that there are only two routes to the truth, one that is and one that is not. Of these two, Parmenides denies the second, stating that it is impossible to know what is not: for the pre-socratic philosopher to know something is related to what is, therefore, for him, it is impossible to know what is not. So, in Parmenides, there is a split between “being” and “not-being”. Therefore, our objective in this article, is to explore the implications, for the diairesis in Plato's Sophist, of the Parmenidean affirmation that non-being is impossible to know.

Riassunto: Durante il V secolo AC Parmenide ebbe molti e qualificati lettori, tra cui Zenone, Empedocle, Anassagora, Leucippo, Melisso, Protagora, Gorgia, Ippia. Tre di loro hanno cercato di fare molto di più di quello che è stato in grado di fare lui con l' ‘esercizio deduttivo’ che incontriamo in 28B8.1-33 (o, nel caso di Melisso, con l'intera dottrina dell'essere), e ci sono riusciti. In effetti, che si siano sforzati di superare l'elevato standard già raggiunto da Parmenide nell'invenzione dei passaggi strettamente deduttivi è sostanzialmente fuori discussione. Il mio articolo è dedicato a rendere conto degli ambiziosi obiettivi che Zenone, Melisso e Gorgia raggiunsero, ciascuno in modi molto differenti.

Abstract: During the fifth century BCE Parmenides had many and qualified readers, among whom Zeno, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Melissus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias. Three of them tried to do much more than what he was able to do with the ‘deductive exercise’ we encounter in 28B8.1-33 (or, in the case of Melissus, with the whole doctrine of being), and they succeeded. Indeed, that they strived to overcome the high standard already reached by Parmenides in the invention of strictly deductive passages is basically out of the question. My paper is devoted to account for the ambitious aims Zeno, Melissus, and Gorgias attained, each in a very distinguished manner.

Abstract: The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias' treatise On Non-Being - the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author - are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias' thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the narratives of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias' teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions considerably impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias' teaching, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues, raised by Gorgias, in the general philosophic and, particularly, epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy.

Abstract: The Goddess of Parmenides always announces that the δόξαι are a human product. But there is one point that has not generally been noticed in the studies devoted to the study of the δόξαι: they describe a human activity that consists in explaining reality by the presence of opposite principles, and that is always related to "nomination" (see fr. 8.51, fr. 8.38-41, fr 9, fr. 19.3). Was there a school in Parmenides' time which corresponded to this sketch, or is it a collage of Parmenides'? In any case, it is attested the presence of a branch of Pythagorism which was characterized, precisely, by "placing" names on things.

Résumé: La Déesse de Parménide annonce toujours que les δόξαι sont un produit humain. Mais il y a un point qui n'a pas été en général remarqué dans les études consacrées à l'étude des δόξαι: elles décrivent une activité humaine qui consiste a expliquer la réalité par la présence de principes opposés, et qui est toujours en rapport avec la "nomination" (voir fr. 8.51, fr. 8.38-41, fr 9, fr. 19.3). Il y avait à l'époque de Parménide une école qui correspondait à ce portrait robot, ou s'agit-il d'un collage de Parménide? Quoi qu'il en soit, il est attesté la présence d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui se caractérisait, précisément, pour "placer" des noms sur les choses.

Abstract In this critical note, I will present an analysis of the textual materials that constitute the 19th chapter, dedicated to Parmenides, of the Early Greek Philosophy series by A. Laks and G. Most. After offering a quantitative comparison of the texts in this chapter and the editions of H. Diels and A.H. Coxon, and after specifying which "new" texts figure in this edition and how they are presented, I will provide considerations on the concept of reception and how it operates throughout this chapter, on the definite overcoming of the distinction between testimonia and fragmenta, and on the advantages and disadvantages of cutting out the texts for the schematic and thematic presentation of its contents. Finally, I examine how Parmenides' doctrine is presented and comment on some of the decisions that the authors made on a few of the innumerable problems related to the textual transmission of the Poem.

Resumen En esta nota crítica presento un análisis de los materiales textuales que constituyen el capítulo 19 de la serie Early Greek Philosophy de A. Laks y G. Most dedicado a Parménides. Después de comparar cuantitativamente los textos de este capítulo con las ediciones de H. Diels y A.H. Coxon, así como de precisar cuáles son los textos "nuevos" que figuran en esta edición y las formas en que los editores decidieron presentarlos, ofrezco algunas consideraciones sobre el concepto mismo de recepción y su operatividad en este capítulo, sobre la superación definitiva de la distinción entre testimonios y fragmentos y sobre las ventajas y desventajas que supone cortar los textos para la presentación esquemática y temática de los contenidos. Por último, examino el modo en que la doctrina de Parménides se presenta en este capítulo y muestro algunas de las decisiones que los autores tomaron sobre los innumerables problemas de transmisión textual del Poema.