Abstract. This paper discusses the concept of heterogeneity and the problem of application in the Schematism of pure concepts, the first chapter of the Analytic of principles in Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason. It puts forward a distinction between the thesis of heterogeneity as metaphysical independence between concepts and intuitions, on the one hand, and heterogeneity as lack of homogeneity in the components of judgment, on the other. The paper claims that the latter, not the former, generates the problem of the application of categories to appearances. It also claims that, although the concept of application is present in the problem of the objective validity of the categories in the Transcendental deduction, application only appears as a problem in the Schematism chapter. On these grounds, and in contrast to those continuist readings which take the Schematism chapter to be a part of the problematic raised in the Deduction, this essay proposes that Schematism represents a new problem in Kant´s program of a critique of pure reason. Although akin to Mario Caimi´s “discontinuist” reading of Schematism (2015 and 2017), my proposal differs from it in one vital point, namely, on how to understand the distinction between transcendental schemata and schemata of empirical concepts. According to my proposal, heterogeneity as lack of homogeneity arises only for the application of categories to appearances, but not for empirical and mathematical concepts, so the role of schemata for these is not as a mediator between concepts and their objects. Finally, the paper argues for a central, exemplary role for mathematical schemata in the solution to the application problem. Kant takes the idea of schemata as ruled processes from his view of mathematical cognition, and it is precisely in this role that transcendental schemata are meant to solve the application problem.

Resumen. Este trabajo discute el concepto de “heterogeneidad” y el problema de la aplicación en el “Esquematismo de los conceptos puros”, el primer capítulo de la Analítica de los principios en la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant. Propone, primero, una distinción entre la tesis de la heterogeneidad como independencia metafísica entre conceptos e intuiciones, por un lado, y la heterogeneidad como falta de homogeneidad en los componentes del juicio, por otro. El trabajo afirma que esta última, y no la primera, genera el problema de la aplicación de las categorías a los fenómenos. Sostiene asimismo que, aunque el concepto de “aplicación” está presente en el problema de la validez objetiva de las categorías en la Deducción trascendental, la aplicación solo aparece como problema en el capítulo del Esquematismo. Sobre esta base, y en contraste con las lecturas “continuistas” predominantes que toman al Esquematismo como una parte de la problemática de la Deducción, este trabajo propone además que el Esquematismo representa un nuevo problema en el programa de Kant. Aunque afín a la lectura “discontinuista” de Mario Caimi (2015 y 2017), esta propuesta difiere de ella en un punto vital: cómo entender la distinción entre los esquemas trascendentales y los esquemas de los conceptos empíricos y de los matemáticos. Según nuestra propuesta, la heterogeneidad como falta de homogeneidad surge solo para la aplicación de las categorías a los fenómenos, pero no para los conceptos empíricos y los matemáticos, así que los esquemas de los dos últimos no tienen un papel mediador. Finalmente, el trabajo sostiene que los esquemas matemáticos juegan un rol ejemplar en la solución al problema de la aplicación: Kant toma la idea de “esquema” como proceso reglado de su concepción del conocimiento matemático, y en este papel contribuyen a resolver el problema de la aplicación.

Abstract: This paper presents a brief contribution to the study of the historical sources of Kant’s practical philosophy, discussing the Kantian project of a metaphysics of morals as a doctrine of duties in the context of German natural law of the 17th and 18th centuries. At first, Christian Thomasius’ distinction between internal and external obligation is exposed as the basis for the differentiation between legal duties and ethical duties. Then the Kantian opposition between a doctrine of right and a doctrine of virtue is discussed against the background of Alexander Baumgarten’s and Gottfried Achenwall’s reception of Thomasius.

Resumo: O presente artigo apresenta uma breve contribuição ao estudo das fontes históricas da filosofia prática de Kant, discutindo o projeto kantiano de uma metafísica dos costumes enquanto uma doutrina dos deveres. à luz do direito natural alemão dos séculos 17 e 18. Em um primeiro momento. é exposta a distinção de Christian Thomasius entre obrigação interna e obrigação externa. como base para a diferenciação entre deveres jurídicos e deveres éticos. Na sequência. a oposição kantiana entre uma doutrina do direito e uma doutrina da virtude é discutida. sob o pano de fundo da recepção de Thomasius, por parte de Alexander Baumgarten e Gottfried Achenwall.

Resumen El texto propone quince tesis sobre la noción de racionalidad política cuyo origen se puede rastrear en la filosofía de Immanuel Kant, en el ideal del uso público de la razón como un proyecto que postula la crítica y la justificación de normas capaces de causar una afectación personal. Se asume la autonomía como condición y límite de las reglas, y la posibilidad de resolver discursivamente su validez. La propuesta continúa una línea de interpretación de la razón pública que en la filosofía contemporánea desarrollaron Hannah Arendt, John Rawls o Jürgen Habermas. Es una lectura libre de estos filósofos, del ensayo sobre la ilustración y de la crítica de la facultad de juzgar que contienen la mayoría de las claves para pensar la racionalidad política.

Abstract This text presents fifteen theses on the notion of political rationality, whose origin can be traced back to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, particularly in the ideal of public use of reason. This project emphasizes the critical examination and justification of norms that can cause a personal impact. Autonomy is regarded as both a condition and a limitation of rules, while the possibility of determining their validity through discourse is acknowledged. The proposal continues a line of interpretation of public reason that Hannah Arendt, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas developed in contemporary philosophy. It is a free reading of this philosophers, drawing from the essay on enlightenment and the critique of judgment that contain most of the keys for thinking about political rationality.

Resumen Este escrito reflexiona las condiciones en las que las categorías prescriben leyes del entendimiento y cómo son concebidas existentes en lo pensado. Kant formula el carácter prescriptivo legal de las categorías, su carácter apriorístico y su estatus de forma de pensamiento y concepto puro, abriendo la posibilidad de otorgarles contenido general como conceptos absolutos (Hegel) o como expresión de lo real (Marx). Las categorías rigen la apropiación empírica, mágico-religiosa, artística o teórica de objetos y fenómenos. El pensamiento categorial despojado de conceptos fue formulado y denominado razón teórica por Kant, Hegel anhela pensar con conceptos y Marx construye modelos teóricos puros categoriales.

Abstract This paper reflects on the conditions in which the categories prescribe laws of understanding and how they are conceived as existing in what is thought. Kant formulates the legal prescriptive character of the categories, their aprioristic character, and their status as a form of thought and a pure concept, opening the possibility of granting them general content as absolute concepts (Hegel) or as an expression of reality (Marx). Categories govern the empirical, magical-religious, artistic, or theoretical appropriation of objects and phenomena. Categorical thought stripped of concepts was formulated and called theoretical reason by Kant, Hegel longs to think with concepts, and Marx builds pure categorical theoretical models.

RESUMO O presente artigo pretende oferecer uma interpretação do estatuto do conceito de diferença na filosofia de Deleuze. Como é notório, o filósofo procurou pensar a diferença sem sua tradicional subordinação à identidade, procurando pensá-la em si mesma. Neste sentido, Deleuze conclui que a diferença é o próprio ser na célebre tese da univocidade. Qual seria o estatuto desta afirmação? Que elementos tornam possível uma afirmação ontológica desta envergadura? No presente texto, pretendemos responder a estas perguntas interpretando o conceito de diferença enquanto um conceito especulativo, argumentando que ele está no campo do pensável e não do cognoscível. Neste sentido, analisaremos o engajamento crítico de Deleuze com Kant, a fim de demonstrar que se trata, no caso deleuziano, de uma ontologia pós-crítica e, assim, no campo do pensável e não do cognoscível. notório identidade pensála pensá la mesma sentido univocidade envergadura texto especulativo cognoscível Kant trata deleuziano póscrítica pós crítica assim

ABSTRACT This paper offers an interpretation of Deleuze’s concept of difference. Deleuze has sought to think difference without its traditional subordination to identity, trying to think difference for itself. In this regard, Deleuze concludes that difference is being itself in the famous thesis of the univocity of being. What would be the status of this claim? What elements make possible such a sounding ontological statement? In this paper, we shall answer these questions by interpretating the concept of difference as a speculative one, arguing that difference is only thinkable, but not cognoscible. In order to do so, we analyze Deleuze’s critical engagement with Kant to demonstrate that there is a post-critical ontology in Deleuze’s thinking. Deleuzes s identity regard claim statement one thinkable cognoscible so postcritical post thinking

ABSTRACT In this paper I attempt to show how an important traditional line of interpretation of Kantian philosophy went astray by the fact that Kant works in its practical philosophy with two distinct and apparently conflicting conceptions of the freedom of human will, namely, freedom as noumenal causality and freedom as the power of choice between alternative possibilities. Firstly, I argue that no conception of freedom in Kant`s philosophy can possibly conflict with that asserted in his most foundational works on practical philosophy, which defines freedom as the actual exercise of moral rationality. I next endeavor to show, by means of both textual and conceptual arguments, the inconsistency of the dominant adoption of a wrong version of the second alternative, namely that of freedom of choice as a supposed free power of choosing for or against morality. Finally, I defend that the only consistent way of conceiving Kant’s freedom of choice in accordance with his freedom as the actual exercise of morality reveals a real conceptual difficulty in Kant`s practical philosophy, namely, the problem of the accountability of immoral decisions. The guiding-thread of this exposition is an interpretation of Karl Ameriks’s article of 2002: “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”.

RESUMO Neste artigo, analiso o modo como uma importante tradição interpretativa do kantismo se deixou desencaminhar pelo fato de Kant trabalhar, em sua filosofia prática, com duas acepções distintas e aparentemente conflitantes da liberdade da vontade humana em sentido positivo: como causalidade numênica e como poder de escolha entre possibilidades alternativas. Em primeiro lugar, defendo que nenhuma acepção de liberdade na filosofia kantiana pode ser conflitante com aquela que, afirmada nas mais importantes obras fundacionais do filósofo, a define como o efetivo (e não meramente potencial) exercício da racionalidade moral. Em seguida, procuro mostrar, por argumentos tanto textuais quanto conceituais, a impertinência da adesão predominante a uma versão equivocada da segunda delas: a liberdade de escolha como o poder de escolher a favor ou contra a moralidade. Finalmente, sustento que a única maneira consistente de se entender a liberdade de escolha em consonância com a liberdade como efetivo exercício da moralidade implica uma real dificuldade conceitual no kantismo, que é o problema da imputabilidade das decisões imorais. O fio condutor desta exposição é uma interpretação das passagens mais importantes do artigo de Karl Ameriks de 2002 intitulado “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”.

Resumen Nietzsche considera, al igual que Kant, que la sumisión a tutores y prejuicios restringe el ejercicio del pensar. Sin embargo, cree necesario extender la crítica hasta los valores morales. La emancipación que promueve Kant no es realizable a menos que se someta a crítica la moral occidental. Someterla a examen es preguntar por el origen del valor de la moral. En este artículo se revisa el modo en que la emancipación tiene lugar en la crítica de los valores. Se propone que el ejercicio de la crítica permite el fortalecimiento y desarrollo del espíritu humano, pues da lugar a una ruptura con valores y principios heredados. El espíritu es apertura y transformación, y se debilita y petrifica si se le constriñe a un conjunto fijo de principios. Dicha ruptura crea las condiciones necesarias para el crecimiento y ampliación del espíritu. El proceso de emancipación conlleva una serie de transfiguraciones del espíritu que se experimenta como un extrañamiento ante los valores tradicionales. Este extrañamiento es afín al sentimiento de lo siniestro (Umheimlich).

Abstract Nietzsche considers, like Kant, that submission to tutors and prejudices restricts the exercise of thinking. However, he also believes it necessary to extend the critique to moral values. The emancipation that Kant promotes is not achievable unless Western morality is subjected to criticism. To subject it to examination is to ask about the origin of the value of morality. This article reviews the way in which emancipation takes place in the critique of values. It is proposed that the exercise of critique allows for the strengthening and development of the human spirit, as it results in a rupture with inherited values and principles. The spirit is openness and transformation, and it weakens and dies if it is constrained to a fixed set of principles. Such a rupture creates the necessary conditions for the growth of the spirit. The process of emancipation entails a series of transfigurations of the spirit that is experienced as an estrangement from traditional values. This estrangement is akin to the feeling of the sinister (Umheimlich).

Abstract The Kantian approach to the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is based on an antagonism between two faculties, Imagination and Reason. In order to understand this conflict under new conceptual coordinates, pursuing a triple exegetical, aesthetical and political interest, the aim of the present text is to develop the brutal character proper to the conceptual dynamics deployed in such an approach. Reconstructing this mouvement from the incidences of the term Gewalt, under a brutalism of the sublime, we focus on the inquiry of the violence that the Imagination experiences in its mathematical determination and, on the other hand, the power that Reason holds according to the dynamic determination of the sublime. Thus, under such a perspective, violence, power and subjective impotence appear as constitutive characters of the genesis of the feeling of the sublime within the horizon of transcendental philosophy.

Resumen: El abordaje kantiano del sentimiento de lo sublime en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar se fundamenta en un antagonismo entre la imaginación y la razón. En vistas de comprender este conflicto bajo nuevas coordenadas conceptuales, y persiguiendo un triple interés exegético, estético y político, el presente texto busca desarrollar el carácter brutal propio a la dinámica conceptual desplegada en tal abordaje. Reconstruyendo el itinerario kantiano a partie de las incidencias del término Gewalt, bajo un brutalismo de lo sublime se indaga tanto la violencia que la imaginación experimenta en la determinación matemática de lo sublime como el poder que la razón detenta de acuerdo con la determinación de lo sublime dinámico. Así, bajo tal perspectiva, la violencia, el poder y la impotencia subjetiva aparecerán como caracteres constitutivos de la génesis del sentimiento de lo sublime dentro del horizonte de la filosofía trascendental.

Resumen La doctrina de la imposibilidad del error total (DIET) es una expresión de la profunda confianza en las posibilidades de la razón humana que Kant suscribe de modo radical y original. La apuesta por la razón exige detenerse ante todo aquello que vaya contra el orden de nuestras disposiciones racionales a fin de descubrir el fundamento del error, la apariencia ilusoria y el vicio. Si el conflicto cosmológico gatilla la meditación sobre el error como paradoja del entendimiento, la solución de la antinomia permite reconocer el fundamento de la DIET en la Crítica de la razón pura ―en el principio de concordancia de la razón consigo misma― el cual se habría ido explicitando tempranamente en diálogo con la filosofía moral.

Abstract The doctrine of the impossibility of total error (DITE) is an expression of the profound confidence in the possibilities of human reason that Kant subscribes to in a radical and original way. The commitment to reason requires us to stop before everything that goes against the order of our rational dispositions in order to discover the basis of error, illusory appearance and vice. If the cosmological conflict triggers the meditation on error as a paradox of the understanding, the solution of the antinomy allows us to recognise the basis of DITE in the Critique of pure reason (in the principle of the concordance of reason with itself( which would have been made explicit early on in dialogue with moral philosophy.

Resumen. Este artículo se enfoca en la concepción kantiana de un derecho de guerra, en particular en la controversial figura del enemigo injusto del apartado “Derecho de gentes” de la Rechtslehre, que ha dado pie a que se considere a Kant un teórico de la guerra justa (e. g. Carl Schmitt y B. Orend). Rechazo dicha interpretación y defiendo que al filósofo alemán no se le puede colocar esta etiqueta sin desvirtuar su visión crítica de la guerra, lo que supone comprender, por una parte, la función de esta en el progreso de la humanidad, y, por otra, aceptar el veto de la razón práctica que la prohíbe. Con ese propósito retomo la defensa que hace Howard Williams frente a B. Orend e intento imprimir mayor fuerza a su argumento incorporando la noción de “ley permisiva” al derecho de guerra que se emprende contra el enemigo injusto.

Abstract. This paper focuses on the Kantian conception of a law of war, in particular on the controversial figure of the unjust enemy from the “Right of nations” of the Rechtslehre, which has given rise to Kant being considered a just war theorist by some (e.g. Carl Schmitt and B. Orend). I reject this interpretation and defend that Kant cannot be assigned this label without distorting his critical view of war, which means understanding, on the one hand, its role in the progress of humanity, and, on the other hand, to accept the veto of practical reason that prohibits it. For this purpose, I return to Howard Williams’s argument against B. Orend and try to add force to his argument by incorporating the notion of “permissive law” into the right to war when dealing with an unjust enemy.

Resumen. La relación que Ricœur establece entre lo bueno, lo justo y la convicción permite postular un círculo hermenéutico -semejante al que Heidegger propone en su ontología fundamental, y que Gadamer complementa en Verdad y método- en la filosofía práctica, conformado por tres momentos: lo bueno, lo justo y su aplicación al contexto que lo demanda. Con su “pequeña ética”, mediada por esta reformulación, Ricœur pretende terciar en la discusión entre la ética de la argumentación de Habermas y el comunitarismo e historicismo de C. Taylor, A. MacIntyre y H.-G. Gadamer.

Abstract. The relationship that Ricœur establishes between the good, the just, and conviction enables the postulation of a hermeneutical circle -similar to the one proposed by Heidegger in his fundamental ontology, complemented by Gadamer in Truth and Method- in practical philosophy, consisting of three moments: the good, the just, and their application in context. With his “small ethics”, mediated by this reformulation, Ricœur intends to intervene in the discussion between the argumentative ethics of Habermas and the communitarianism and historicism of C. Taylor, A. MacIntyre and H.-G. Gadamer.

Abstract The article analyzes the position that Habermas called “realism without representation”, which is based on Kantian pragmatism and weak naturalism. Habermas grants to quotidian action the role that Kant assigns to transcendental conditions. Habermas assumes the linguistic turn, but wants to avoid contextual interpretations of reason such as Rorty’s, for whom an antirepresentationalism is necessarily an antirealism. For Habermas, our learning practices are a continuation of the evolutionary, and presuppose a reality that is independent of our descriptions and common to all forms of life, although we must not identify such reality with any conceptual representation that we have of it.The article questions if Habermasian realism offers a significant alternative with respect to Rorty’s Pragmatism.

Resumen El artículo analiza la postura que Habermas llamó realismo sin representacionismo, cuyo fundamento es el pragmatismo kantiano y el naturalismo débil. Habermas otorga a la acción cotidiana el papel que Kant asigna a las condiciones trascendentales. Asume el giro lingüístico, pero evita una interpretación contextualista de la razón como Rorty, para quien el anti-representacionalismo es necesariamente anti-realista. Para Habermas, nuestros aprendizajes continúan el proceso evolutivo, y suponen una realidad independiente y común a todas las formas de vida, aunque no debemos identificar esta realidad con ninguna conceptualización de ella. El artículo cuestiona si este realismo ofrece una diferencia significativa con el pragmatismo de Rorty.

Abstract Critical Study. Gottfried Gabriel: Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn. Brill/ Schöningh, 2022.

Abstract This paper defends a constructive interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is built in analogy with an experimental construction that Kant believes to characteristic of chemistry. I also argue for a way to reconcile the methodological perspective of the constructivist method with that of transcendental reflection. I therefore provide a constructive explanation for what Kant describes as being pure reason and the argument of the transcendental deduction. I propose to frame the different perspectives in such a way that the experimental construction is the ratio cognoscendi of pure reason, while pure reason is the ratio essendi of the experimental construction. O’Neill (1989, 2015) is one of the most important scholars that have argued for a constructivist reading of the Critique of pure reason (CPR). In this paper I develop and explore new aspects of this line of interpretation. One of the main criticisms raised against constructivist readings of Kant’s philosophy is an alleged commitment to subjectivism or voluntarism (cf. Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019). This concern led some scholars to rename their position as constitutivist instead (Korsgaard 2009; Sensen 2013, 2017; Formosa 2011). Constitutivism, is intended to be a sort of constructivism capable of avoiding voluntarism. However, it becomes difficult, sometimes, to differentiate between the constitutivist and foundationalist positions, which are based on transcendental reflection and imply a sort of realist perspective on reason. The same preoccupation applies to the constructivist interpretation of the CPR. In order to deal with this issue, the following questions must be addressed: how can constructivism justify the necessity and universality of transcendental principles of pure reason without compromising the normative and procedural aspects of the construction? How to reconcile arguments based on the analysis of representations and faculties with a constructivist procedure? Or even, how may transcendental reflection, as a view of the possibility of a priori cognition, be rendered compatible with a constructive procedure? This paper is divided into three sections, followed by brief final remarks. The first section outlines the main characteristics of constructivism and relates them to Kant’s positions about the nature of philosophy and its method. The second part argues for a type of experimental constructivism that might serve as a guiding analogy to understand the method underlying the CPR. Thirdly, I will show how the transcendental subject and pure reason are derived from this experimental construction. The conclusion briefly points out some advantages of this position.

There is insufficient knowledge on the influence of monetary and fiscal policies elements on the construction sector output in Tanzania. Monetary and fiscal policies elements are paramount in decisions pertaining to project viability or feasibility. The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship of monetary and fiscal policies elements with the construction sector output in Tanzania. Accordingly, this study adopts a correlational research design to examine the extant relationship between various elements of fiscal and monetary policies and construction output. Time-series data was obtained from Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Tanzania, covering a period of twenty-three (23) years from 1998 to 2021. The data obtained was tested for stationarity, followed by correlation and regression analysis. Results reveal that construction output is negatively related to commercial bank's weighted interest and inflation rates. On the other hand, construction output is positively related to exchange rate, government expenditure on construction, and total tax on product. Multiple regression analysis revealed similar results, with the exception of exchange rate which has turned out to be negatively related to construction output. Nevertheless, the relationship of construction output and all elements of monetary and fiscal policies is not statistically significant. The study provides knowledge on the nexus between monetary and fiscal policies on the construction sector output within a previously unexplored Tanzanian context. This can help developers make informed decisions on investments in times of high or low inflation and interest rates, and during an upsurge of exchange rates. It also informs the public on how the government regulates the construction output by increasing or decreasing expenditure on construction.

Daar is onvoldoende kennis oor die invloed van monetêre en fiskale beleidselemente op die konstruksiesektor se uitset in Tanzanië. Monetêre en fiskale beleidselemente is deurslaggewend in besluite wat verband hou met projek lewensvatbaarheid of haalbaarheid. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die verwantskap van monetêre en fiskale beleidselemente met die konstruksiesektor se uitset in Tanzanië te bepaal. Gevolglik gebruik hierdie studie 'n korrelasionele navorsingsontwerp om die bestaande verband tussen verskeie elemente van fiskale en monetêre beleid en konstruksie-uitset te ondersoek. Tydreeksdata is verkry van Tanzanië Nasionale Buro vir Statistiek en Bank van Tanzanië, wat 'n tydperk van drie-en-twintig (23) jaar van 1998 tot 2021 dek. Die data is getoets vir stasionariteit, gevolg deur korrelasie- en regressie-analise. Resultate toon dat konstruksie-uitset negatief verband hou met kommersiële banke se geweegde rente- en inflasiekoerse. Aan die ander kant is konstruksie-uitset positief verwant aan wisselkoers, staatsbesteding aan konstruksie en totale belasting op produk. Meervoudige regressie-analise het soortgelyke resultate aan die lig gebring, met die uitsondering van wisselkoers wat negatief met konstruksie-uitset verband hou. Nietemin is die verband tussen konstruksie-uitset en alle elemente van monetêre en fiskale beleid nie statisties betekenisvol nie. Die studie verskaf kennis oor die verband tussen monetêre en fiskale beleid oor die konstruksiesektor se uitset binne 'n voorheen onontginde Tanzaniese konteks. Dit kan ontwikkelaars help om ingeligte besluite oor beleggings te neem in tye van hoë of lae inflasie en rentekoerse, en tydens 'n oplewing van wisselkoerse. Dit lig ook die publiek in oor hoe die regering die konstruksie-uitset reguleer deur uitgawes aan konstruksie te verhoog of te verminder.