Abstract My interest is in the relationship between the contemporary account of the epistemology of religious belief, known as quasi-fideism, and the sceptical fideism that has been so important, historically, in motivating fideistic ideas. I argue that we can profitably construe quasi-fideism along sceptical fideist lines, in that it is a proposal that is naturally understood as both arising within the context of a sceptical investigation and as exhibiting core features that it shares with Pyrrhonian scepticism. Moreover, I suggest that sceptical fideism, properly rendered, is inclined towards the kind of restricted fideism that is essential to quasi-fideism.

Resumen. Se afirma que el problema del escepticismo radical, en el que se centra gran parte de la discusión epistemológica contemporánea, se divide en dos formulaciones lógicamente distintas: una basada en el principio de clausura, y otra en el principio de infradeterminación. Primero, vamos a exponer la propuesta de Wittgenstein acerca de la estructura de la evaluación racional, y mostraremos cómo puede tratar con el escepticismo radical basado en el principio de clausura, al menos cuando dicha explicación se formula adecuadamente. Sin embargo, también aseveramos que esta propuesta no logra dar cuenta del escepticismo radical basado en la infradeterminación. El antídoto para esta última forma de escepticismo radical se encuentra en otra parte, sugerimos que en el seno del disyuntivismo epistémico.

Abstract. It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epis- temological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct subproblems-a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal-at least when properly formulated-can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere-with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.