Cet article traite des développements de l’élection de 2022. Dans un premier temps, il soutient que, dans un second mandat, Bolsonaro pourrait accroître son pouvoir d’attraction sur les partis du centre et de droite au Congrès pour ensuite avancer sur les instances judiciaires, mettant la démocratie brésilienne à risque risque. Il montre ensuite que la victoire de Lula n’a pas empêché les partis de droite de maintenir une trajectoire de croissance, de consolider une position majoritaire tant à la Chambre des députés qu’au Sénat fédéral, et en analyse les raisons. Sur la base de cette croissance de la droite et des changements dans les relations entre les pouvoirs exécutif et législatif constatés ces dernières années, il est avancé que le défi de Lula sera plus grand qu’il y a 20 ans. La performance de la coalition gouvernementale lors des scrutins les plus importants du 2023 en témoigne et signale les limites de “Lula 3”. lélection l élection 2022 temps mandat dattraction d attraction judiciaires na n quau qu fédéral raisons années quil 2 ans 202 3. 3 . 3”

This article deals with the developments of the 2022 election. Initially, it argues that, in a second term, Bolsonaro could increase his power of attraction over the center and right-wing parties in Congress to then advance on the justice bodies, putting Brazilian democracy at risk. It then shows that Lula’s victory did not prevent the right-wing parties from maintaining a growth trajectory, consolidating a majority position in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, and analyzes the reasons for this. Based on this growth of the right and on the changes in the relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers verified in recent years, it is argued that Lula’s task will be more difficult than the one started 20 years ago. The government coalition’s performance in the most important votes held in 2023 is evidence in this regard and signals the limits of “Lula 3”. 202 election Initially term rightwing wing bodies risk Lulas Lula s trajectory Senate 2 ago coalitions coalition 3. 3 . 3”

Esse artigo trata dos desdobramentos da eleição de 2022. Inicialmente argumenta que, em um segundo mandato, Bolsonaro poderia aumentar seu poder de atração sobre os partidos de centro e de direita no Congresso para então avançar sobre os órgãos de justiça, colocando em risco a democracia brasileira. Na sequência, mostra que a vitória de Lula não impediu que os partidos de direita mantivessem uma trajetória de crescimento, consolidando uma posição majoritária tanto na Câmara como no Senado, e analisa as razões para tanto. Tomando como base esse crescimento da direita e nas mudanças na relação entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo verificadas nos últimos anos, argumenta-se que a empreitada de Lula será mais difícil do que a iniciada 20 anos atrás. O desempenho da coalizão de governo nas votações mais importantes realizadas em 2023 é uma evidência nesse sentido e sinaliza para os limites de “Lula 3”. 2022 mandato justiça brasileira sequência Senado argumentase se 2 atrás 202 3. 3 . 3”

RESUMO Este artigo compara o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a Frente Ampla (FA) e o Partido Socialista do Chile (PS) no que se refere ao grau de autonomia adquirido por suas lideranças. Para tanto, considera quatro fatores explicativos, todos vinculados ao desenvolvimento organizacional de cada partido: a influência das bases no processo decisório; o balanço de poder entre os diversos grupos no interior de cada partido; a distância ideológica entre esses grupos; e a existência ou não de uma única liderança capaz de servir como ponto de referência e aglutinação do partido. A análise mostra que a maneira como estes fatores se combinaram na trajetória da FA permitiu que o partido mantivesse uma dinâmica consociativa e uma forte responsividade da liderança perante sua base, o que não foi verificado nos outros dois casos.

ABSTRACT This article compares the Workers’ Party (PT), the Broad Front (FA) and the Socialist Party of Chile (PS) with regard to the degree of autonomy acquired by their leaders. To this end, it considers four explanatory factors, all linked to the organizational development of each party: the influence of the bases in the decision-making process; the balance of power between the different groups within each party; the ideological distance between these groups; and the existence (or not) of a single leadership capable of serving as the party’s point of reference and agglutination of the party. The analysis shows that the way these factors were combined in the FA’s trajectory allowed the party to maintain a consociative dynamic and a strong responsiveness of the leadership to its base, which was not the case in the other two parties.

RESUMEN Este artículo compara el Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), el Frente Amplio (FA) y el Partido Socialista de Chile (PS) en lo que se refiere al grado de autonomía adquirido por sus líderes. Para eso, son considerados cuatro factores explicativos, todos vinculados al desarrollo organizacional de cada partido: la influencia de las bases en el proceso de toma de decisiones, el equilibrio de poder entre los diversos grupos al interior de cada partido, la distancia ideológica entre tales grupos y la existencia (o no) de un único liderazgo capaz de servir como punto de referencia y aglutinación del partido. El análisis muestra que la manera como estos factores se combinaron en la trayectoria del FA permitió que el partido mantuviera una dinámica de consociación y una fuerte sensibilidad del liderazgo frente a su base.

RÉSUMÉ Cet article compare le Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), la Frente Amplio (FA) et le Partido Socialista de Chile (PS) en ce qui concerne le degré d’autonomie acquis par leurs dirigeants. Pour cela, quatre facteurs explicatifs sont considérés, tous liés au développement organisationnel de chaque parti: l’influence des bases dans le processus décisionnel; l’équilibre des pouvoirs entre les différents groupes au sein de chaque parti; la distance idéologique entre ces groupes; et l’existence (ou non) d’une direction unique capable de servir de point de référence et d’agglutination du parti. L’analyse montre que la manière dont ces facteurs ont été combinés dans la trajectoire de la FA a permis au parti de maintenir une dynamique consociative et une forte réactivité du leadership envers sa base.

ABSTRACT The year 2016 was marked by the deepening of the crisis that interrupted two decades of unusual political stability in Brazil. Although it has been the most significant event, Dilma Rousseff's impeachment did little to “stop the bleeding,” as was shown by the subsequent arrest of the former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), and the unfolding of Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato). Besides the economic problems, the Brazilian political system also faced a serious crisis of legitimacy: the main parties were put in check, and a period of uncertainty regarding electoral and partisan competition opened up. In this article, we will review the sequence of the events, exploring some of the factors that explain it, and, aware of the fact that we are in the middle of process with an undefined outcome, we would like to take advantage of the opportunity to resume the debate on the performance of Brazilian democracy as well its perspectives.

RESUMEN El año 2016 estuvo marcado por la profundización de una crisis que interrumpió dos décadas de inusual estabilidad política en Brasil. A pesar de ser el acontecimiento político más significativo del año, el enjuiciamiento de Dilma Rousseff hizo poco para detener el “sangrado,” como lo demostró la posterior detención del ex presidente de la Cámara de Diputados, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), y el despliegue de la Operación Coche Lavado (LavaJato). Sumado a los problemas económicos latentes en el país, el sistema político brasileño se enfrenta a una grave crisis de legitimidad: los principales partidos están cuestionados lo que facilita un período de incertidumbre en términos de competencia electoral y partidista. En este artículo, revisamos la secuencia de los eventos ocurridos en 2016, explorando algunos de los factores que los explican, conscientes que estamos aún inmersos en un proceso con un resultado indefinido. Aprovechamos esta oportunidad para reanudar el debate sobre el desempeño de la democracia brasileña y sus perspectivas a futuro.

ResumoEste artigo parte do suposto de que existe expressiva variação nos vínculos estabelecidos entre legisladores e partidos no Brasil e procura explicá-la a partir de estudo realizado em 12 estados brasileiros. A variação é mensurada com o auxílio de um índice de partidarismo, construído com base em um conjunto de perguntas feitas aos representantes eleitos para as Assembleias Legislativas nas legislaturas 2007-2011 e 2011-2015. A variação encontrada é explicada em dois níveis. O primeiro remete a uma das dimensões da institucionalização dos diversos sistemas partidários estaduais: a estabilidade da competição eleitoral. O segundo remete a uma série de características individuais dos deputados, entre as quais se destaca o tempo de filiação ao partido. Ideologia, grau de particularismo no exercício do mandato e grau de progressismo relativamente a temas contemporâneos também apresentam impacto significativo e no sentido esperado sobre a variável dependente - o grau de partidarismo do deputado. As hipóteses aqui apresentadas haviam sido testadas com base em dados relativos à primeira das legislaturas acima. Ao agregar uma segunda legislatura, o presente estudo confirma e dá maior robustez aos resultados encontrados.

AbstractThis article starts from the assumption that there is significant variation in the relationship between legislators and parties in Brazil and seeks to explain it from a study conducted in twelve states. The variation is measured with the aid of an index of partisanship, built on a set of questions asked the elected representatives to the Legislative Assemblies in 2007-2011 and 2011-2015 legislatures. The variation found is explained on two levels. The first refers to one of the dimensions of institutionalization of various state party systems: the stability of electoral competition. The second refers to a series of individual characteristics of the deputies, among which stands out the time to party affiliation. Ideology, degree of particularism in office and degree of progressivism in relation to contemporary issues also have significant impact on the dependent variable - the degree of partisanship. The hypotheses presented here had been tested based on data for the first of the above legislatures. By adding a second term, this study confirms and gives more robust results found.

The Brazilian party system presents a paradox. Although the Workers Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) have controlled presidential elections for the last 20 years, their force at the other levels of electoral competition has not grown. The objective of this study is to undertake a discussion of this situation through the 2014 general elections. After attempting to explain why successive challengers have not been able to change the structure of competition for the Brazilian presidency, I will analyze the relation established between the pattern observed at this level and the other “connected” electoral disputes—both those for state executive and federal legislative office. The general conclusion is that even if the pattern continues, it is quite improbable that this will significantly impact the other levels of national political party competition.

In this article, the authors: (1) argue that the structure of the Brazilian Presidential race represents the decisive factor in the recent consolidation of the country's party system; (2) identify three distinct party blocs based on an analysis of the strategies developed by the parties within the Presidential race; (3) examine the blocs' positions based on surveys conducted in the Chamber of Deputies in 2005 and 2010; and (4) demonstrate that the situation in the electoral sphere has its correlate at the Congressional level, allowing an ideological distinction between two of these blocs, while the third bloc calculates its moves exclusively on the disconnect between government and opposition.

Dans cet article, (1) on propose que la structure adoptée par la course à la Présidence de la République représente le facteur décisif dans les récents mécanismes de consolidation du système brésilien des partis; (2) on a relevé trois blocs différents de partis d'après l'analyse des stratégies qu'ils mettent en œuvre au sein de cette compétition; (3) on a examiné leurs positions à partir de sondages effectués dans la Chambre des Députés en 2005 et 2010; et (4) on constate dans la sphère électorale un cadre équivalent à celui du parlement, ce qui permet d'établir une distinction d'ordre idéologique entre ces deux blocs, tandis qu'un troisième conduit ses actions en ne tenant compte que de la disjonctive gouvernement/opposition.

O artigo procura explicar a variação na relação entre deputados e partidos em doze estados brasileiros. Tal variação é mensurada com o auxílio de um índice de partidarismo, construído com base em um conjunto de perguntas feitas aos representantes eleitos para as Assembleias Legislativas em 2006. A variação encontrada é explicada em dois níveis. O primeiro remete a uma das dimensões da institucionalização dos diversos sistemas partidários estaduais: a estabilidade da competição eleitoral. O segundo diz respeito às características dos deputados, tais como tempo de filiação, tipo de partido pelo qual foi eleito, grau de particularismo no exercício do mandato, grau de progressismo relativamente a temas contemporâneos e polêmicos.

The article seeks to explain the variation of the relationship between legislators and parties in twelve Brazilian states. This variation is measured with the aid of an index of partisanship, built on a set of questions made to elected representatives of the Legislative Assemblies in 2006. The variation observed is explained in two levels. The first one refers to one dimension of the institutionalization of the various state party systems: the stability of electoral competition. The second one refers to features of the legislators such as period of affiliation, type of party by which he/she was elected, degree of particularism in the exercise of mandate, the degree of progressive thought in relation to controversial, and contemporary issues.

L'article tente d'expliquer la variation dans la relation entre les députés et les partis dans douze états brésiliens. Cette variation est mesurée à l'aide d'un indice de sectarisme, construit sur la base d'un ensemble de questions posées aux représentants élus aux Assemblées Législatives en 2006. Elle s'explique sur deux niveaux. Le premier renvoie à l'une des dimensions de l'institutionnalisation des divers systèmes partidaires des états: la stabilité de la compétition électorale. Le second se rapporte aux caractéristiques des députés, tels le temps de filiation, le genre de parti politique par lequel il s'est élu, le degré de particularisme dans l'exercice du mandat, le degré de progressisme par rapport à des thèmes contemporrains et polémiques.

This article analyzes Brazilian social security reform during the Fernando Henrique and Lula Administrations. After comparing the contexts in which the different Constitutional Amendment proposals (PECs) were submitted and the behavior by Members of Congress during the two periods, we argue that a contextual change (namely a switch in places between government and opposition) affected the distribution of preferences and resources between the players and impacted the government in the various arenas in which the game was being played, and that as a result the reformist agenda has made more progress under the current Workers' Party administration.

Dans cet article, on analyse la réforme de la Sécurité Sociale brésilienne sous les gouvernements de Fernando Henrique et de Lula. Après avoir établi une comparaison entre les contextes où ont été avancées les différentes PECs (Propositions d'Amendement Constitutionnel) et le comportement des parlementaires à ces deux moments, on soutient qu'un changement de type contextuel, c'est-à-dire l'inversion entre majorité et opposition, en modifiant la distribution des préférences et des moyens entre les acteurs et en bouleversant la majorité dans les diverses arènes où se déroulait le jeu politique, a contribué pour que, en somme, le programme réformiste progresse davantage sous le gouvernement du président Lula.

This article analyzes Brazilian social security reform during the Fernando Henrique and Lula Administrations. After comparing the contexts in which the different Constitutional Amendment proposals (PECs) were submitted and the behavior by Members of Congress during the two periods, we argue that a contextual change (namely a switch in places between government and opposition) affected the distribution of preferences and resources between the players and impacted the government in the various arenas in which the game was being played, and that as a result the reformist agenda has made more progress under the current Workers' Party administration.

Dans cet article, on analyse la réforme de la Sécurité Sociale brésilienne sous les gouvernements de Fernando Henrique et de Lula. Après avoir établi une comparaison entre les contextes où ont été avancées les différentes PECs (Propositions d'Amendement Constitutionnel) et le comportement des parlementaires à ces deux moments, on soutient qu'un changement de type contextuel, c'est-à-dire l'inversion entre majorité et opposition, en modifiant la distribution des préférences et des moyens entre les acteurs et en bouleversant la majorité dans les diverses arènes où se déroulait le jeu politique, a contribué pour que, en somme, le programme réformiste progresse davantage sous le gouvernement du président Lula.

This contribution to the recent debate on political parties in Brazil focuses on party migration by members of Brazil’s Lower House from 1985 to 1998. The assumption is that shifts in party membership tell us something about the ties between parties and their members. Data reveal an apparent paradox in this regard. As the literature has made clear, although members of Brazilian political parties indeed follow the vote of their party leader in session, parties tend to display little cohesion in the Chamber, with members rarely remaining in the same party through which they were elected. The article explains the apparent paradox by showing how the rules by which everyone plays in the Lower House make loyal voting in session and party migration compatible and even fitting behaviors.

Cet article a pour but de contribuer à la récente discussion sur les partis politiques brésiliens. Son point de départ sont les changements de tête de liste effectués par les législateurs pendant leur mandat à la Chambre des Députés entre les années 1985 et 1998. On suppose que les migrations d’un parti à l’autre peuvent expliquer les liens entre ceux-ci et leurs membres. Or, selon les données obtenues, on se trouve devant une situation paradoxale: les partis politiques brésiliens qui, tels que la littérature le fait remarquer, montrent une bonne discipline lors des séances plénières, sont ceux qui, à la fois, choisissent et soutiennent, à peu d’exceptions près, des groupes de représentants aux avis divergents à la Chambre des Députés. On souhaite montrer ici que ce paradoxe peut s’expliquer si l’on tient compte des règles en vigueur à la Chambre des Députés, lesquelles rendent compatibles et appropriés les deux types de comportement: la discipline pendant les séances et les changements de parti.