A visual stimulus (e.g., a letter, word, or object) may have a lasting effect on the processing of subsequent stimuli. The present study verified the priming effect of a figure (i.e., five-petal daisy) on manual reaction time (MRT) to another equal or different five-petal daisy. Two distinct groups were tested. One group was instructed that the five-petal daisy represented a human hand. The other group was instructed that the five-petal daisy represented a flower. The figures in the pairs of stimuli could share or not share some features such as handedness and view. In both groups, after being informed whether the five-petal daisy represented a flower or human hand, an uninformative flower was presented for 200 ms in the center of the screen. After 1000 ms, a second flower was presented in the same location until the observer responded by pressing a left or right switch. The results showed that prior presentation of the five-petal daisy affected MRT only when the figure represented a human hand. Furthermore, an opposite effect of view on MRT was found. The shorter MRT to the back (dorsal) view of the figure that represented a human hand could be attributable to a faster response to the dorsal view of a hand figure made with a prone posture of the participants' hand than to a front (palm) view. The longer MRT to the back view of the figure that represented a flower may be due to a mental rotation of the object along its vertical axis before selecting the correct response because the response was based on the position of the asymmetrical petal in the canonical front view of the daisy.

O presente estudo focaliza as questões sobre a ontologia da cor, essencialmente a discussão entre Fisicalismo e Subjetivismo. Analisando estes debates, entre uma concepção físicalista, que considera a cor uma propriedade física dos objetos externos, e uma concepção subjetivista, em que a cor é identificada com um processamento mental, encontrou-se argumentação diversa, desde questões silogísticas até evidências experimentais. Entretanto, uma hipótese alternativa é oferecida, o Psicofisicalismo, em que evidências da psicofísica da cor e modelos evolucionários fornecem uma descrição da essência da cor. A cor deve ser considerada uma propriedade dual, com uma vertente física e uma psicológica estreitamente relacionadas.

The present study focuses on ontological issues about color, essentially the debate between Physicalism and Subjectivism. Analyzing those discussions, between a physical conception, considering color as a physical property of external objects, and a subjectivist one, which identify color with mental processing, we found syllogistical problems, experimental evidences, and other kinds of arguments supporting the conceptions. Nevertheless, an alternative hypothesis is offered, Psychophysicalism, in which psychophysical experimental support and evolutionary models provide a description of color ontology. Color must be considered a dual property, owning a physical and a psychological feature that are tightly related.