ABSTRACT This article offers a genealogy of Álvaro Vieira Pinto’s philosophy of development and argues that populism and democracy can interact in complementary or antithetical terms. A contextualized reading of Vieira Pinto’s work indicates that populism strengthens democracy when it resists neocolonialism and expands popular participation. However, populism goes against democracy if it adopts an exclusionary conception of the people that denies pluralism. Pintos Pinto s terms participation However pluralism

RESUMO O artigo oferece uma genealogia da filosofia do desenvolvimento de Álvaro Vieira Pinto e argumenta que populismo e democracia podem se relacionar de maneira complementar ou antitética. Uma leitura contextualizada da obra de Vieira Pinto indica que o populismo fortalece a democracia quando combate o neocolonialismo e amplia a participação popular. O populismo, contudo, vai contra a democracia se adota uma concepção exclusivista do povo que nega o pluralismo. antitética popular contudo pluralismo

Resumo O artigo busca elaborar um conceito de liberdade democrática como desenvolvimento de si, resistência à opressão e à injustiça epistêmica, mediante engajamento crítico com as obras de Paulo Freire, Amílcar Cabral e Augusto Boal. No pensamento dos três autores, democracia, liberdade e desenvolvimento de si constituem uma tríade de mútua influência, de sorte que o pleno exercício de quaisquer desses itens é impossível, na ausência de qualquer um dos outros dois. Trata-se de mostrar, ademais, a maneira pela qual a opressão é compreendida nos trabalhos dos três pensadores como o oposto da liberdade, e a injustiça epistêmica, como uma dimensão psíquica da opressão.

Abstract In this article, the author engages with the works of Augusto Boal, Amílcar Cabral, and Paulo Freire in order to elaborate a concept of democratic freedom understood as a process of self-development that requires resistance against oppression and epistemic injustice. In the political theories of these three authors, democracy, freedom, and self-development constitute a triad of elements that are mutually reinforcing. In addition, the author explains in what ways oppression curtails democratic freedom and why epistemic injustice corresponds to a psychic dimension of oppression.

Abstract This article seeks to contribute to the debate in contemporary democratic theory on how democracy can be reconciled with political representation by analyzing the Chamber in the Square, a proposal advanced by Augusto Boal in Legislative Theatre and put into practice when he was elected city councilor. After reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s reconceptualization of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgment, we partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that democratic representation requires citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere to be invested with the power not only to judge but also to decide about political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can decide the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square offers a scheme that can reconcile democracy and representation. councilor Urbinatis Urbinati s judgment Landemores Landemore citizens affairs assembly

Resumo O artigo busca contribuir para o debate na teoria política contemporânea sobre democracia e representação por meio de uma análise da Câmara na Praça, proposta elaborada por Augusto Boal na obra Teatro legislativo e praticada quando o autor foi eleito vereador. Após reconstruir a conceptualização de Nadia Urbinati da representação democrática como uma diarquia resultante da circularidade entre os juízos dos representados e as decisões dos representantes eleitos, endossamos parcialmente a crítica de Hélène Landemore e afirmamos que a representação democrática exige mecanismos de participação direta que concedam poder decisório à troca de juízos dos representados. É isto o que a Câmara na Praça faz ao conceder aos representados o poder de julgar e decidir os termos gerais dos projetos de lei propostos pelos representantes. vereador eleitos

John Stuart Mill and José de Alencar lived at the same time and wrote about the same issues, and yet the connections between their political theories remain unexplored. Seeking to offer a comparison of both theories, this article argues that reading Mill's “Considerations on Representative Government” (1977b) vis-à-vis Alencar's “Systema representativo” (1868) brings to the fore two aspects of Mill's political theory that Mill scholars usually overlook: 01. political representation is endowed with constructivist power; 02. epistemic democracy and agonistic democracy can be mutually reinforcing. A comparative reading between Mill and Alencar reveals that representation does not simply reproduce or mirror pre-given ideas and identities, but also constructs them. In addition, it reveals that epistemic democracy is not at odds with agonistic democracy. To be sure, both Alencar and Mill were agonistic democrats precisely because they were epistemic democrats. They recognized conflict as a fundamental aspect of democracy because they believed political disagreement weeds out inaccurate information, expands the knowledge of politicians, and leads to the construction of more reasonable, wiser decisions. Thus, Alencar and Mill thought political parties were crucial to democracy insofar as they injected conflict into political debate.

Resumo Este artigo propõe uma defesa contingente da concepção epistêmica da democracia a partir de uma reconstrução do conceito de verdade elaborado por John Stuart Mill e William James. Ao contrário do que os detratores da democracia epistêmica afirmam, a aproximação entre verdade e democracia não necessariamente torna esta inóspita ao conflito e ao pluralismo. A verdade pode ser reinterpretada, de modo a tornar-se compatível com uma política democrática que aprecia o conflito e o dissenso. Em algumas circunstâncias, asserções com pretensão de verdade são relevantes para a política, devendo, portanto, ser objeto de deliberação democrática.

Abstract This article seeks to offer a contingent defense of the epistemic conception of democracy by recovering the concept of truth espoused by John Stuart Mill and William James. Contrary to what the critics of epistemic democracy claim, the association between democracy and truth does not necessarily make the former inhospitable to conflict and pluralism. Truth can be reinterpreted in such a way as to make it compatible with a democratic politics that appreciates conflict and dissent. In some circumstances, truth-claim assertions are politically relevant and should become the object of democratic deliberation.