ABSTRACT We sought to develop a typology describing structural, production, and socioeconomic characteristics of dairy systems that produce artisanal cheese and compare it with that of systems that produce only raw milk. Data on 204 raw milk producers and 58 artisanal cheese producers in Paraná State, Brazil, were collected through on-site surveys and subjected to descriptive analysis, factor analysis, and means tests. Descriptive analyses were applied to characterize the sample and artisanal cheese production processes. Factor analysis identified the following three typological components: system production capacity, herd breed and milking characteristics, and farmer social characteristics. Farmers were divided into two groups, as follows: non-cheese producers (NCP) and artisanal cheese producers (ACP). Groups of farmers were compared in terms of typological components. It was found that ACP have smaller structure and production scale and focus less on herd breed and practices for improving milk quality than NCP. These results suggest that artisanal cheese production is a strategy to add value to milk that does not meet institutional or market requirements for transactions with the dairy industry, providing a foothold for producers to remain in the dairy business. Groups of farmers (ACP and NCP) do not differ in social indicators of typology. structural 20 5 State Brazil onsite site tests processes components capacity groups follows noncheese non NCP (NCP ACP. . (ACP) industry business 2

Abstract Purpose The purpose of this study is to understand the effect of governance structure alignment, property rights protection, and reputation in generating efficiency in dairy agro-industrial system in Paraná, Brazil, and Midi-Pyrénées, France. Design/methodology/approach Descriptive qualitative research, comprising semi-structured interviews with producers, processors and key agents of the dairy agrindustrial system in Brazil and France, in 2016/2017. Findings As a result, it was identified that measurement generates information about transacted dimensions and when it is shared can generate affect reputation in transactions that leads to system improvement. It was also observed that, in the dairy agro-industrial system, reputation acquired does not reduce all the measurement costs, as the product requires measurement in each all collection, regardless of the reputation created. Research limitations/implications As a limitation of the study, there is a difference in the moments when the interviews were done. In 2016, in France, the context was low prices, while in 2017, in Brazil, there was a rise in prices. This difference could have influenced some responses to the interviews, mainly about efficiency by producers. Practical implications Reputation, protecion of property rights by measurement and information sharing allows reduction costs (transaction, measurement and negotiation costs). This efficiency implies improvement to the system, in cases of milk producers and processors. Social implications Improvements in the dairy system can have repercussions on several other improvements such as better distribution of income among agents in the chain; better-paid producers, which implies the improving quality of lives of these people; better products offered to consumers. Originality/value From a complementary perspective of transaction cost economics and measurement cost economics, reputation and protection of property rights are discussed with a focus on efficiency. Empirically, the paper contains heterogeneous data collected from two countries: Brasil and France.

A maior complexidade da competitividade global e as novas estratégias dos oligopólios industriais incentivaram estudos sobre a eficácia dos modos de coordenação empresarial dos negócios que são distintos do mercado spot, como propriedades contratuais, influências em redes, compartilhamentos de recursos, formas distintas de liderança, etc. Estes mecanismos são tratados por Menard (2004) como complementares aos contratos e são denominados de governanças híbridas. O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de mostrar a governança híbrida empregada em transações entre organizações juridicamente independentes e que optaram por coordenar uma parte das atividades realizadas em conjunto. O setor escolhido é a cadeia do comércio justo internacional de suco de laranja (tradicional e orgânico) e os principais atores envolvidos são organizações de produtores brasileiros de laranja, compradores europeus e certificadores internacionais do comércio socialmente justo. Um interesse maior é dado aos mecanismos de coordenação que são complementares aos contratos e que foram ressaltadas inicialmente por Menard (2004). Esses mecanismos de coordenação se concretizam em uma autoridade privada que é voluntariamente aceita pelas partes envolvidas. Essa autoridade, que pode ser mais ou menos formal, passa a coordenar diversos fatores ligados às transações, envolvendo um tipo misto de governança entre controles e incentivos.

The increased complexity of global competitiveness and the new strategies of the industrial oligopolies have stimulated studies on the effectiveness of business coordination mechanisms that are different from spot market and include contractual properties, influence on networks, resource sharing, distinct forms of leadership, etc. According to Menard (2004), these mechanisms are complementary to contracts and are called hybrid governance structures. This work has the objective of showing the employment of the hybrid governance in transactions between legally independent organizations that chose to coordinate part of their joint activities. The sector chosen was the chain of fair trade orange juice (traditional and organic), and the main actors involved are Brazilian orange growers' organizations, European buyers, and international certifiers of fair trade. Particular emphasis was given to the coordination mechanisms that are complementary to contracts and which were firstly highlighted by Menard (2004). Those mechanisms of coordination are assured by a private certifier that is accepted voluntarily by the actors involved. This certifier authority, which can be more or less formal, coordinates several factors involved in transactions involving a mixed type of governance that includes control and incentives.