Resumo Nesta nota técnica apresentamos um dos principais legados empíricos da pesquisa sobre propaganda das candidatas/dos candidatos a Deputado Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro no Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral (HGPE) no período de 1998 a 2018. Trata-se de introduzir e descrever o processo de coleta dessa base de dados, os procedimentos utilizados ao longo do tempo para a sistematização das informações e os possíveis usos de dois bancos de dados vinculados à pesquisa: o primeiro possui como unidade de análise os programas eleitorais gravados no período; e, o segundo, possui como unidade de análise os/as candidatos/candidatas, contabilizando o tempo (em segundos) de aparição no HGPE; desempenho eleitoral de cada candidata/candidato (votos e resultado final); financiamento de campanha e outras características políticas, sociais e demográficas. O banco apresentado abarca nada menos do que 9.433 programas eleitorais gravados à noite, dos quais participaram 1.774 candidatos/candidatas. candidatasdos candidatas HGPE (HGPE 199 2018 Tratase Trata se segundo osas as candidatoscandidatas candidatos/candidatas em segundos candidatacandidato candidata candidato votos final final) políticas demográficas 9433 9 433 9.43 noite 1774 1 774 1.77 19 201 943 43 9.4 177 77 1.7 20 94 4 9. 17 7 1. 2

Résumé Dans cette note technique, nous présentons l’un des principaux legs empiriques de la recherche sur la publicité télévisée des candidats à la députation fédérale de l’État de Rio de Janeiro dans le cadre de la période de 1998 à 2018. Il s’agit d’introduire et de décrire le processus de collecte de cette base de données, les procédures utilisées au fil du temps pour la systématisation des informations et les utilisations possibles de deux bases de données liées à la recherche : la première ayant pour unité d’analyse les programmes électoraux enregistrés pendant la période ; et la seconde ayant pour unité d’analyse les candidats , comptabilisant le temps (en secondes) d’apparition dans le HGPE ; la performance électorale de chaque candidat (votes et résultat final) ; le financement de la campagne et d’autres caractéristiques politiques, sociales et démographiques. La base de données présentée couvre pas moins de 9 433 programmes électoraux enregistrés pendant la période nocturne, auxquels ont participé 1 774 candidatures. technique lun l un lÉtat État 199 2018 sagit s agit dintroduire d introduire danalyse analyse en secondes dapparition apparition votes final dautres autres politiques démographiques 43 nocturne 77 candidatures 19 201 4 7 20 2

Resumen En esta nota técnica, presentamos uno de los principales legados empíricos de la investigación sobre la publicidad televisiva de las candidatas/de los candidatos a diputado federal en el Estado de Río de Janeiro en los Horarios Gratuitos de Publicidad Electoral (HGPE) en el periodo de 1998 a 2018. El objetivo es presentar y describir el proceso de recopilación de esta base de datos, los procedimientos utilizados a lo largo del tiempo para sistematizar la información y los posibles usos de dos bases de datos vinculadas a la investigación: la primera tiene como unidad de análisis los programas electorales registrados durante el periodo; y la segunda tiene como unidad de análisis las candidatas/los candidatos, contabilizando el tiempo (en segundos) que aparecieron en el HGPE; el rendimiento electoral de cada candidato/candidata (votos y resultado final); la financiación de la campaña y otras características políticas, sociales y demográficas. La base de datos presentada incluye no menos de 9.433 programas electorales grabados por la noche, en los que participaron 1.774 candidatas/candidatos. técnica candidatasde candidatas HGPE (HGPE 199 2018 candidataslos segundos candidatocandidata candidato candidata votos final final) políticas demográficas 9433 9 433 9.43 noche 1774 1 774 1.77 candidatascandidatos candidatas/candidatos 19 201 943 43 9.4 177 77 1.7 20 94 4 9. 17 7 1. 2

Abstract In this technical note, we present one of the main empirical legacies of the research on the electoral campaign of candidates for Federal Deputy in the state of Rio de Janeiro during the free time granted by the government for electoral propaganda (Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral − HGPE) from 1998 to 2018. The aim is to introduce and describe the process of data collection for this database, the procedures used over time for the systematization of information, and the potential uses of two databases linked to the research: the first analyzes the electoral programs recorded during the period and the second the unit of analysis is the individual candidates, coding the time (in seconds) of appearance in the HGPE, the electoral performance of the candidates (votes and final result), campaign financing, and other political, social, and demographic characteristics. The database includes 9,433 electoral programs broadcasted in the evening, in which 1,774 candidates participated. note Horário HGPE 199 2018 information seconds votes result, result , result) financing political social characteristics 9433 9 433 9,43 evening 1774 1 774 1,77 participated 19 201 943 43 9,4 177 77 1,7 20 94 4 9, 17 7 1, 2

RESUMO O artigo discute a recente crise política brasileira. A crise reabriu o debate institucional, levando um retorno às teses que veem na combinação entre presidencialismo e multipartidarismo a raiz de todas as crises políticas experimentadas pelo país. O artigo critica essa interpretação, retomando a produção acadêmica dos últimos anos que aponta para a capacidade do sistema brasileiro em produzir decisões. Como conclusão, o artigo chama atenção para a importância das estratégias políticas na conformação da crise política atual.

ABSTRACT The paper addresses the current Brazilian political crisis. It first discusses the return to traditional interpretations that see the combination between a presidential regime and a multiparty system as the main cause of the crisis. The paper criticizes this view and reasserts the more positive view about the Brazilian political system that merged from more recent scholarly work. As a conclusion, the paper notes the importance political strategies played in the current political crisis.

The view that minority governments are anomalies in the Parliamentary system has been abandoned for some time. However, in Presidential systems, minority governments are still seen as problematic, especiallywhen combined with unilateral Presidential agenda-setting powers. This article analyzes the formation of governments (or cabinets), defined by their party composition and not by Presidential mandates, in 14 Latin American countries from 1979 to 2011. We test various hypotheses on the impact of institutional and political factors on the formation of minority governments. Our findings contradict predictions based on the prevailing theories. Specifically, we observed that the probability of minority governments increases proportionally with the strength of the President's veto power. We also observed that the President's agenda-setting power and party fragmentation both have a negative effect on the formation of minority governments.

La vision selon laquelle les gouvernements minoritaires sont des anomalies dans le systeme parlementaire a été abandonnées depuis un certain temps. Dans les systemes présidentialistes, toutefois, les gouvernements minoritaires sont encore considérés comme problématiques, spécialement quand s'y ajoutent des pouvoirs dont llagenda est détenu de façon unilatérale par le président. Cet article analyse la formation de gouvernements (ou de cabinets) définis selon la logique des partis qui y sont inclus et non selon ce pour quoi le président a été mandaté. 11 concerne 14 pays latino-américains surune période qui va de 1979 a 2011. Nous avons testé plusieurs hypotheses concernant l'impact de facteurs institutionnels et politiques sur la formation de gouvernements minoritaires. Les données obtenues contredisent les prédictions dérivées de théories en vigueur. Nous avons démontré en particulier que la probabilité de gouvernements minoritaires s'accrolt en fonction de la force du pouvoir de veto du président. Nous avons aussi démontré que les pouvoirs de l'agenda du président et la fragmentation des partis a un effet négatif sur la formation de gouvernements minoritaires.

Este artigo procura identificar o papel desempenhado pelo Estado durante os anos 1990 para assegurar a satisfação das "necessidades básicas" da população pobre no Brasil. Com base em dois surveys sobre o acesso dos 40% domicílios mais pobres da cidade de São Paulo a serviços públicos e políticas sociais, demonstra-se que a atuação do Estado continua determinante e que o quadro da situação da população mais pobre de São Paulo pouco se alterou em relação aos anos 1980.

This article seeks to identify Brazilian State’s efficiency in supplying "basical needs" for the poor population. Taking as a guideline two surveys concerning the access to public services and social policies of the 40% poorest homes in the city of São Paulo, it suggests that State action remains crucial and that the general social condition of the poor has not improved significantly since the 1980’s.

Este artigo procura identificar o papel desempenhado pelo Estado durante os anos 1990 para assegurar a satisfação das "necessidades básicas" da população pobre no Brasil. Com base em dois surveys sobre o acesso dos 40% domicílios mais pobres da cidade de São Paulo a serviços públicos e políticas sociais, demonstra-se que a atuação do Estado continua determinante e que o quadro da situação da população mais pobre de São Paulo pouco se alterou em relação aos anos 1980.

This article seeks to identify the Brazilian State's efficiency in supplying "basic needs" to the poor. Taking as a guideline two surveys concerning social policies and access to public services among the poorest 40% of households in the city of São Paulo, it suggests that state action remains crucial and that the general social condition of the poor has not improved significantly since the 1980's.

This article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation. We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself. Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive. Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations. We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account. Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition. In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties’ relations with the Executive. Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part.

Dans cet article, on discute les interprétations sur la participation des législateurs au processus budgétaire centrées sur les incentives que les lois électorales produisent. On y voit que les normes et règlements qui fixent le processus budgétaire incident sur la répartition des moyens entre les différents pouvoirs et à l’intérieur même du législatif. Des formes constitutionnelles et légales préservent la proposition d’origine envoyée par le pouvoir exécutif. Dans le parlement, les normes institutionnelles privilégient la participation collective des parlementaires par la présentation, par exemple, d’amendements signés par des groupes représentant les États brésiliens. On voit aussi que la participation du législatif au processus budgétaire ne peut être comprise que si les partis politiques sont pris en considération. C’est alors que la coordination des actions que les partis exercent débouche sur la formation de deux grands blocs - "situation" et opposition. C’est dire que la participation des partis au processus budgétaire dépend de leurs rapports avec le pouvoir exécutif. Ainsi, la stratégie adoptée par la majorité qui appuie l’exécutif tient compte de la contribution de celle-ci en vue du succès des politiques déjà menées par le gouvernement auquel cette majorité appartient.

The article presents an analysis of the parliamentary committees investigations formed in the lower house from 1946 to 1999. It examines the incidence of this type of oversight action under different political regimes and the use of other kinds of oversight activities in the period after the 1988 constitution. The article aims to show how institutional and political variables interact in accounting for congressional activation of existing oversight mechanisms and to discuss the conditions under which these actions may succeed. The author argues that the control of the agenda and the legislative process by the president and party leaders affects negatively congress members’ incentives and their chances of success in oversight activities. The empirical focus is Brazil, but the conclusions can be more generally applied to countries with similar institutional design.

Dans cet article, on analyse les commissions parlementaires d’enquête créées à la Chambre des Députés entre 1946 et 1999. On y voit l’incidence de ce genre d’acte de contrôle dans des régimes politiques de différentes natures ainsi que l’usage d’autres mécanismes de contrôle dans la période qui a suivi la Constitution de 1988. On cherche à y montrer de quelle façon des variables institutionnelles et politiques peuvent aider à expliquer l’initiative du Congrès de déclencher les mécanismes de contrôle existants et de discuter dans quelles conditions cette action peut réussir. Selon l’auteur, le contrôle de l’organigramme et de la procèdure législative exercé par le président et par les dirigeants des partis gêne les initiatives des parlementaires et les chances de succès dans leur action de contrôle. Bien que l’étude ne concerne que le Brésil, ses conclusions peuvent servir à d’autres pays à structure institutionnelle semblable.

The article examines the effects of changes in constitutional and internal legislative regulations on the performance of the House of Representatives in law making. It presents an analysis of the flow of bills in the Lower House and the legal output in the post 1988 Constitution period, showing, on the one hand, the importance of the executive in the definition of the legislative agenda and its preponderance in legislative outcomes and, on the other hand, the role of the college of leaders, to the detriment of the standing committees, in the organization of the legislative work. The authors argue, against the conventional wisdom on Brazilian politics, that the legislature cannot be viewed as an obstacle to executive action.

O artigo analisa o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso como parte de um padrão mais geral de relações Executivo-Legislativo que se caracteriza por forte concentração de poder nas mãos do Presidente da República e dos líderes partidários. A centralização decisória que se observa nesse governo tem bases institucionais, distinguindo-se do chamado "presidencialismo imperial", de base personalista. Os poderes institucionais de agenda e o controle sobre o processo legislativo têm forte impacto na produção legal e na capacidade do governo em obter apoio para a sua agenda legislativa.

This article tries to analyses the government of FHC as part of a more general pattern of Executive-Legislative relationship which are featured by a strong concentration of power in the hands of the President and the Party leaders as well. The centralization of the decisions that is noticed in this government has institutional basis, distinguishing itself from the called "imperial presidencialism", with personalistic basis. The institutional power and the control over the legislative process have a strong impact in the legal production and in the capacity of the government in obtaining the support for his legislative agenda.

O artigo sugere uma forma de vincular duas coisas que têm sido tratadas separadamente pela literatura: a discussão filosófica sobre princípios de justiça e a avaliação de políticas sociais.

The article proposes a way of putting together two things which usually are dealt with separatedly: the philosophic discussion on principles of justice and the evaluation of social policies.