It is well known that during times of social unrest, replacing the constitution is one of the first proposals to emerge, at least in Latin America, as if this constitutional shift could resolve any problem. Constitutional substitution is not a new phenomenon in Latin America; it actually began after the region’s redemocratization. However, it is striking that, despite similar conditions of social unrest, many other countries in the region have not undergone such an encompassing constitutional reform. Our main focus here is to analyze the persistence of constitutions in Latin American countries. We thus ask: What conditions lead democratic countries to keep their constitutions? Using a configurational approach, our preliminary results are promising. Together, four pathways explain why some countries have not replaced their constitutions in democratic contexts, with special emphasis on the number of rights enshrined in these fundamental laws. unrest emerge America problem regions s redemocratization However reform ask approach promising Together contexts laws

RESUMO Introdução: Trazemos para o debate da Ciência Política brasileira uma discussão sobre a utilidade de formatos alternativos de votação para fazer frente a episódios conjugados de isolamento social e baixa da participação eleitoral. Quais são as vantagens, condições e desafios para a inclusão do formato de votação eletrônica remota (i-voto) no Brasil? Materiais e métodos: Após levantamento exaustivo da literatura sobre voto remoto e voto remoto eletrônico, fizemos um inventário das modalidades de adoção do i-voto e das características dos países e localidades que adotaram esse modelo analisando a relação do i-voto com os níveis de participação eleitoral. Em seguida, mediante uma análise PEST/SWOT, avaliamos a factibilidade da adoção desse sistema de votação no Brasil. A análise PEST investiga mudanças nas esferas Políticas (P), Econômicas (E), Sociais (S) e Tecnológicas (T) que ocorrem em determinado ambiente e que podem exigir mudanças ou inovações. A análise SWOT elenca as Forças (Strength), Fraquezas (Weaknesses), Oportunidades (Oportunities) e Ameaças (Threats) pré-existentes à implementação de uma determinada política pública. Resultados: A análise PEST/SWOT aponta resultados mistos sobre viabilidade e segurança do i-voto. A adoção de votação remota através da internet envolve vantagens e desvantagens. O Brasil é um país pronto tecnologicamente para dar esse salto. Os cidadãos brasileiros tendem a confiar nos mecanismos eletrônicos já existentes (máquinas eleitorais). No entanto, aspectos sociais e geracionais constituem os principais desafios para a implementação do i-voto. Discussão: O avanço no uso de mecanismos de governo eletrônico, a adoção de urnas eletrônicas e a ampliação de redes de internet com maior acesso por populações excluídas são fontes de esperança para os apoiadores da ideia do i-voto. Sugerimos que se adotem práticas de implantação piloto em certas localidades do Brasil como um primeiro passo para a ampliação gradual do uso desses mecanismos, tal como tem sido feito em outros países. A Estônia é um exemplo paradigmático. Introdução eleitoral ivoto i (i-voto métodos eletrônico seguida PESTSWOT P, P , (P) E, E (E) S (S T (T inovações Strength, Strength (Strength) Weaknesses, Weaknesses (Weaknesses) Oportunities (Oportunities Threats (Threats préexistentes pré pública Resultados ivoto. voto. desvantagens salto máquinas eleitorais. eleitorais . eleitorais) entanto Discussão paradigmático (P (E (Strength (Weaknesses

ABSTRACT Introduction: We hope to contribute to the Brazilian Political Science debate with a study on the viability of alternative voting methods in addressing the dual challenges of social isolation and low voter turnout. What are the benefits, prerequisites, and obstacles for the inclusion of the remote electronic voting format (e-vote) in Brazil? Materials and methods: After a thorough literature review on remote and electronic voting, we devised an inventory of e-voting implementation and the characteristics of the countries and locations that have adopted this model, analyzing the correlation between e-voting and electoral participation. Then, through a PEST/SWOT analysis, we evaluated the feasibility of adopting this voting system in Brazil. The PEST analysis examines shifts in the Political (P), Economic (E), Social (S) and Technological (T) landscapes within a specific context that may require changes or innovations. The SWOT analysis lists the Strengths (Strength), Weaknesses (Weaknesses), Opportunities (Opportunities), and Threats (Threats) associated with the prospective implementation of a given public policy. Findings: The PEST/SWOT analysis revealed mixed results on feasibility and safety. The introduction of internet-based remote voting entails both advantages and disadvantages. Brazil has the necessary technology to take this leap and Brazilian citizens tend to trust existing electronic mechanisms (voting machines). Nonetheless, social and generational factors remain the major impediments to the implementation of the e-vote format. Discussion: Supporters of e-vote find cause for optimism in the increased use of electronic government mechanisms, the adoption of electronic ballot boxes, and the broadening of internet access to excluded populations. We propose starting with pilot projects in certain locations in Brazil, a strategy that has been used in other countries (Estonia being a paradigmatic example), for the gradual implementation of these mechanisms. Introduction turnout benefits prerequisites evote e vote (e-vote evoting model participation Then PESTSWOT P, P , (P) E, E (E) S (S T (T innovations Strength, Strength (Strength) Weaknesses, (Weaknesses) Opportunities, (Opportunities) (Threats policy Findings safety internetbased based disadvantages machines. machines . machines) Nonetheless Discussion boxes populations Estonia example, example example) (P (E (Strength (Weaknesses (Opportunities

This paper focuses on the timing of coalition formation under presidential systems. While elections in parliamentary regimes have recently been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty both in the results and the formation of cabinets, this is not the case for presidential politics. As a result, we argue that coalition cycles differ across systems of government. As a matter of fact, we argue that the process of coalition formation under presidentialism is more complicated. To test our claim, we look at forty-four multiparty governments in Latin America and Asia. We find that presidentialism — with its fixed mandate and its specific institutional mechanism for selecting the president — directly affects the ‘coalition life cycle’ and fosters a stronger propensity to pre-electoral agreements. cabinets politics result government fact complicated claim fortyfour forty four Asia cycle preelectoral pre electoral agreements

Resumo Os estudos sobre a repartição das pastas ministeriais no contexto do presidencialismo de coalizão têm crescido enormemente nos últimos vinte anos. No entanto, um elemento comum à quase totalidade desses estudos é a realização do cálculo da proporcionalidade entre cadeiras e ministérios somente em função da câmara baixa. Embora isso possa fazer sentido para países unicamerais, essa premissa não tem fundamentação teórica para os bicamerais. Assim, o principal objetivo desta pesquisa é inserir as câmaras altas na discussão sobre como são construídos os gabinetes presidenciais. Com base em 91 gabinetes de cinco países sul-americanos nos últimos 30 anos, os principais achados deste trabalho apontam para o fato que os presidentes também se importam com o equilíbrio induzido pelas câmaras altas. Mais ainda, mostramos que a força do Legislativo e a hierarquização do Executivo referente à própria construção do gabinete também influenciam a proporcionalidade dos gabinetes presidenciais.

Abstract Studies on the distribution of ministerial portfolios in coalitional presidentialism have grown enormously in the last 20 years. However, computing the proportionality between seats and ministries only as a function of the lower house is one element common to virtually all of these studies. While this calculation may make sense in unicameral countries, it has no theoretical foundation within bicameral ones. Thus, the main goal of this research is to bring upper chambers into the discussion on the formation of presidential cabinets. Based on 91 cabinets from 5 South American countries over the last 30 years, the main findings point out that presidents also care about the balance upper chambers induce. Furthermore, we show that the strength of the legislative branch and the hierarchy within the executive concerning cabinet formation also influence the proportionality in presidential cabinets.

Resumen Los estudios sobre la repartición de los ministerios en el contexto del presidencialismo de coalición han crecido enormemente en los últimos veinte años. Sin embargo, un elemento común a la casi totalidad de estos estudios es la realización del cálculo de la proporcionalidad entre curules y ministerios solamente en función de la cámara baja. A pesar de que eso pueda tener sentido para países unicamerales, esa premisa no tiene fundamentación teórica para los bicamerales. Así, el principal objetivo de esta investigación es incluir a las cámaras altas en la discusión sobre cómo son construidos los gabinetes presidenciales. Con base en 91 gabinetes de cinco países suramericanos en los últimos 30 años, los principales resultados de este trabajo apuntan al hecho de que los presidentes también se preocupan por el equilibrio inducido por las cámaras altas. Inclusive, mostramos que la fuerza del Legislativo y la jerarquización del Ejecutivo referente a la propria construcción del gabinete también influyeron en la proporcionalidad que tenían los gabinetes presidenciales.

Résumé Les études sur la répartition des portefeuilles ministériels dans le cadre du présidentialisme de coalition se sont énormément développées ces vingt dernières années. Cependant, un élément commun à la quasi-totalité de ces études est le calcul de la proportionnalité entre chaires et ministères uniquement au niveau de la chambre basse. Bien que cela puisse avoir un sens pour les pays monocaméraux, cette hypothèse n’a aucun fondement théorique pour les bicaméraux. Ainsi, l’objectif principal de cette recherche est d’insérer les chambres hautes dans la discussion sur la construction des bureaux présidentiels. S’appuyant sur 91 cabinets de cinq pays d’Amérique du Sud au cours des 30 dernières années, les principales conclusions de ce travail indiquent que les présidents se soucient également de l’équilibre induit par les chambres hautes. De plus, nous montrons que la force du Législatif et la hiérarchie de l’Exécutif concernant la construction du cabinet influencent également la proportionnalité des cabinets présidentiels.

Abstract This work aims to answer the question: Which are the condition for the autonomization of social movements vis-à-vis political parties, in Latin America? Through a study of eigth cases, using a configurational analysis (QCA), I set and test four hypotheses. The findings highlight the relevance of the conditions of State intervention and the identification of political options.

Resumen Este trabajo procura contestar a la pregunta acerca de cuáles son las condiciones para el desapego entre movimientos sociales y representación política en América Latina. Mediante el estudio de ocho casos, y recurriendo al método configuracional Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) se elaboran y testean cuatro hipótesis, con lo que se evidencia la relevancia de condiciones como la presencia del Estado y la identificación de las ofertas políticas como condiciones de la autonomización de los movimientos sociales vis-à-vis de los partidos políticos.

Presidential legislative majorities under bicameral congresses have seldom been considered in the literature on coalition cabinets. However, this combination is far from being an isolated or irrelevant topic. Bicameral congresses comprise a double round of negotiation for the executive, increasing the shadow of the unexpected. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for a president to guarantee the approval of policies. In this case, what if a government does not control both houses? How are coalition cabinets affected by the non-control of one or both chambers? I will focus analysis on the 25 cases of coalition cabinets in Latin America since the return of democracy and present a bicameral framework. Through mvQCA, I find that, contrary to common belief, the controlling of a bicameral majority is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure stable coalitions.

Mainstream literature in political science confers to institutions a key role in the formation, performance and fall ofgovernments. In the meantime, studies on coalition theories did not, in their majority, escape from this neo-institutionalist approach. Based on the late Mexican constitutional reform which made the formation of coalition governments in the country possible, we shall compile and test most of the arguments on the institutional impacts on coalitions, and test them through the Latin American experiments, using a configurational comparative approach (QCA). As a result, we expect to add nuance to most of the neoinstitutionalist arguments.

La literatura dominante en ciencia política ha tendido, en los últimos años, a conferirle a las instituciones un papel central en la formación, el desempeño y la caída de gobiernos. Los trabajos acerca de coaliciones de gobierno no escapan, en su gran mayoría, a esa influencia neoinstitucionalista. A la luz de la reciente reforma constitucional aprobada en México, y que abre la posibilidad inédita de formar coaliciones de gobierno, nos empeñaremos en recompilar los principales argumentos respecto del supuesto impacto de las instituciones y los testearemos, mediante las experiencias latinoamericanas de gobiernos de coalición, usando un método de análisis configuracional (QCA). De esta forma podremos matizar los impactos de las instituciones en los gobiernos de coalición.

This work proposes to update the coalition theories, by studying closely the Latin American presidentialism. It concentrates the analysis on the Southern Cone and demostrates that the coalitions have huge repercussions on the governance process and fulfilled profound realignments on party systems.

Este trabajo se propone realizar una actualización de las teorías de las coaliciones aplicándolas a los presidencialismos latinoamericanos. Para ello se concentra en las experiencias del Cono Sur y trata de demostrar que las coaliciones inciden en la gobernanza y el quehacer político, al tiempo que conducen a un reordenamiento sustantivo en los sistemas partidarios.

In the late 1980's we observed a profound shift in the political systems of Latin America. The most visible consequences of this changes were the more or less progressive deconstruction of bipartisanship. Through the study of Colombian, Argentinean and Uruguayan cases, the present work shall demonstrate that this shift consisted in a profound realignment of the patterns of representation within party systems.

Durante los años ochenta y noventa se observó en América Latina un reordenamiento concomitante a toda la región de los sistemas de partidos, cuya principal consecuencia fue la deconstrucción de los bipartidismos. A través del estudio de los casos de Colombia, Argentina y Uruguay, se observa que aquello consistió más bien en un realineamiento de los patrones de representación dentro de los sistemas de partidos.