RESUMO: O artigo foca no relacionamento entre o Judiciário e o Executivo em uma política pública específica: a educação infantil. Analisamos as estratégias adotadas pela Prefeitura de São Paulo diante dos litígios envolvendo as demandas por vagas em creches, a fim de refletir sobre a influência da estratégia judicial nas políticas públicas de educação do município. Esse caso evidenciou a capacidade do Judiciário de interferir na agenda de governo, bem como no próprio processo de implementação. Pôde-se observar que o Executivo age por meio da “estratégia política”, lidando tanto com o atendimento individual como com o coletivo, gerando, assim, ganhos individuais e erga omnes, isto é, para a sociedade como um todo.

ABSTRACT: The article focuses on the relationship between the Judiciary and the Executive in a specific public policy: the early childhood education. We analyze the interactions between the Municipality of São Paulo and judicial actors (public defenders, prosecutors and judiciary) on litigations involving demands for places in kindergartens and pre-schools, to reflect on the influence of judicial strategy in education public policies. This case highlighted the Judiciary’s ability to control the government agenda, as well as the implementation process itself. It could be observed that the Executive acts through the “political strategy”, dealing with both individual and collective service, thus generating individual gains and erga omnes, that is, for society as a whole.

RÉSUMÉ: L’article discute la relation entre le pouvoir judiciaire et le pouvoir exécutif de la municipalité dans le contexte d’une politique publique spécifique: l’éducation de l’enfant. Nous analysons les interactions entre la Municipalité de São Paulo et les acteurs judiciaires (défenseurs publics, procureurs et magistrats) sur les litiges concernant la demande pour des places disponibles dans les crèches, pour réfléchir sur l’influence de la stratégie judiciaire dans le contexte des politiques publiques de l’éducation de la municipalité. Le cas de São Paulo montre que la Justice peut contrôler l’agenda du gouvernent, aussi que le procès d’implémentation de la politique publique elle-même. De son côté, le Pouvoir exécutive intervient tant sur les demandes des individus que sur les demandes collectives, ce que produit des bénéfices pour les individus et erga omnes, i.e., pour la société dans son ensemble.

Electoral governance has increasingly more frequently been the object of study of the comparative politics literature. This article examines the electoral governance institutional model adopted in Brazil and its consequences for political/electoral competition. It is argued herein that Brazil's Electoral Justice System, motivated by the institutional design, has ended up becoming one of the main actors of the country's recent democratic consolidation, being decisive not only with regard to rule adjudication and application, but also to rulemaking. With the purpose of assessing this governance model in action, three important recent rulings by Brazil's Electoral Justice System are analysed here: verticalization of the coalitions, reduction in the number of councillors, and party loyalty. literature politicalelectoral political competition Brazils s design countrys country consolidation application rulemaking action here coalitions councillors loyalty

Há uma extensa literatura que se debruça sobre os efeitos do poder judiciário no funcionamento dos sistemas políticos. Estaríamos assistindo à judicialização da política? O argumento apresentado é que o entendimento acerca da influência do direito na dinâmica dos sistemas políticos supõe uma noção mais ampla sobre o lócus e o momento em que ocorre sua interferência no funcionamento das democracias contemporâneas. A proposta é discutir a judicialização no que diz respeito à definição das regras da competição político-eleitoral. Para isso, analisaremos a decisão do TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) referente à verticalização das coligações. O argumento é que o TSE não apenas interpretou uma legislação, mas também estabeleceu um novo regulamento no lugar do poder legislativo. Nossa análise demonstra que a regulamentação das coligações eleitorais é fruto de interação estratégica entre o TSE e o poder legislativo.

There is an extensive literature to study the effects of the judiciary power on how political systems work. Is there a judicialization of politics? Our point is that the answer to that question is connected to theoretical questions about the ways to prove and where scholars should look in order to detect the effect of judiciary in democratic systems. In this work we analyze the judicialization of politics under the perspective of the definition of the rules of electoral competition. In order to prove our argument, this article studies how TSE (brazilian judiciary court) rules coalitions in Brazil's political system, known as "verticalização" _the uniformity of party coalitions at state and federal levels. Our case study shows that TSE, in fact, not only interprets the law but, actually, establishes rules, taking the place of the legislative body _which, in turn, made another move. The analysis suggests that the question of judiciary of politics should be seen as an strategic interaction between the two powers.

This article introduces the debate on electoral governance and examines the main criteria for distinguishing between the different models in comparative terms. The models adopted by various Latin American democracies, highlighting the Brazilian model and its peculiarities will also be discussed in the work. The conclusion is that the prevailing system of electoral governance in Brazil is an atypical combination of elements, such as: concentration of governance activities in a single electoral commission; exclusion of the Legislative Branch from naming and selecting members of the electoral commission and adoption of the "rule of intersection" with the Constitutional Court. This combination creates a favorable institutional climate for the judicialization of partisan political competition, since it allows legal readings of the rules of the competitive game to include interpreting the Constitutional wording.

On cherche ici à discuter la question de la gouvernance électorale, en présentant les critères principaux pour distinguer les différents modèles. Ensuite, on examine les modèles adoptés par quelques-unes des démocraties latino-américaines, présentant surtout le modèle adopté par le Brésil, et ses particularités. On conclut que, au Brésil, il existe dans la gouvernance électorale une composition atypique d'éléments tels que: concentration des activités de cette gouvernance dans un seul Organisme Électoral (OE); exclusion du pouvoir législatif quant à l'indication et à la sélection des membres de l'OE, ainsi que l'adoption de la "règle d'intersection" avec la Cour Constitutionnelle. Cette composition crée un cadre institutionnel favorable à la judicialisation lors des élections, car elle permet que les interprétations juridiques sur les règles du jeu compétitif passent par l'interprétation du texte constitutionnel.