RESUMO Argumenta-se que uma “atitude filosófica cética”, encontrada originalmente na abordagem socrática e, discutivelmente, no tratamento da discordância pirrônica, deveria ser considerada uma atitude epistemicamente positiva no sentido de que promove um exame filosófico sério do que é considerado verdade, sem que isso implique no ceticismo radical frequentemente associado a ela. Argumentamos que se os dois lados de uma discordância são equivalentes (naquele momento, dadas as evidências disponíveis), não é necessário considerar a discordância como indecidível sem qualificação e, portanto, suspender o julgamento indefinidamente. Se isto for assim, afirmamos, a posição baseada na discordância pirroniana será significativamente restringida como uma forma de ceticismo e deve ser vista como promovendo uma atitude cética epistemicamente propícia. Argumentase Argumenta cética, , cética” discutivelmente pirrônica verdade ela naquele momento disponíveis, disponíveis disponíveis) portanto indefinidamente assim afirmamos propícia

ABSTRACT It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude. attitude, , attitude” Pyrrhonists Pyrrhonist s true at moment available, available available) doesnt doesn t indefinitely claim disagreementbased based

Abstract A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. Indeed, some want to give a significant role to ignorance in epistemological theorizing. In this paper, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realized the relevance of what we call ‘Socratic ignorance’ in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labor that we find in our society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others and with others. theory Indeed theorizing paper ignorant society clear hold stubborn

Resumen Las injusticias epistémicas causan un mal a alguien en su condición de sujeto epistémico; es decir, como sujeto que participa en la producción, mantención y transmisión de bienes epistémicos. Asumiendo que una de las metas, pero no ciertamente la única, del sistema judicial es promover decisiones que sean razonablemente plausibles, las injusticias epistémicas interfieren con dicha meta. Un objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer un par de recomendaciones institucionales que contribuyen a disminuir las injusticias epistémicas que los jueces pudieran cometer. Estas recomendaciones se basan en data empírica proveniente de las ciencias sociales. Otro objetivo es argumentar, en parte en base a esas intervenciones, que ni el enfoque individualista ni el estructuralista, que ubican el problema y los cambios necesarios para remediarlo en la mente del individuo o las estructuras de nuestro entorno (respectivamente), son adecuadamente concebidos. En particular, el artículo responde a la pregunta: ¿qué tipo de intervenciones, dada la data empírica disponible, es más probable que sea eficiente?, mostrando que esas intervenciones son híbridas, combinando lo individual y lo estructural, dada la interdependencia de lo individual y lo estructural, y ofreciendo dos ejemplos ilustrativos de distintas estrategias de este tipo de intervenciones. epistémico decir producción epistémicos metas única plausibles meta cometer sociales argumentar estructuralista respectivamente, respectivamente , (respectivamente) concebidos particular pregunta qué disponible eficiente, eficiente eficiente? híbridas estructural (respectivamente

Abstract Epistemic injustices concern a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as an epistemic subject; that is, as a subject that participates in the production, maintenance and transmission of epistemic goods. Assuming that one of the goals, but certainly not the only one, of the judicial system is to promote decisions that are reasonably plausible, epistemic injustices interfere with such goal. One aim of this paper is to offer a couple of institutional recommendations that contribute to mitigate the epistemic injustices that judges could commit. These recommendations are based on empirical data from the social sciences. Another aim is to argue, partly on the basis of those interventions, that neither the individualist approach nor the structuralist approach, which locate the problem and the necessary changes to remedy it in the individual’s mind or the structures of our environment (respectively), are adequately understood. In particular, this article answers the question: what kind of interventions, given the empirical data available, is more likely to be efficient?, showing that such interventions are hybrid, combining the individual and the structural, given the interdependence of the individual and the structural, and offering two illustrative examples of diverse strategies of this sort of interventions. production goods goals plausible goal commit sciences argue individuals s respectively, respectively , (respectively) understood particular question available efficient, efficient efficient? hybrid structural (respectively

Abstract: The aim of the present research study is to describe professor beliefs and their role in the teaching of argumentative skills in higher education. An explorative-descriptive study with a qualitative approach is performed. The population surveyed is composed of 16 professors that taught the first two years of philosophy and law undergraduate degrees at a private Chilean university in 2019. Interviews are performed with thematic analysis. The results show high agreement between professors in their beliefs: argumentation is valued as a key competence, but it is suggested that argumentation should be taught once knowledge of the discipline is acquired. Although professors report to promote argumentative practices in their teachings, they do not do it to develop argumentative skills. Learning evaluations implies knowing how to argue, but no assessment argumentation guidelines are provided. It is concluded that surveyed philosophy and law professors do not differ radically in their beliefs about the value of argumentation in professional practice.

Resumen: El objetivo de este estudio es describir las creencias de docentes y su rol en la enseñanza de habilidades de argumentación en la formación universitaria. Se realiza un estudio exploratorio-descriptivo con enfoque cualitativo, en el que participaron 16 docentes que enseñaron los primeros dos años de carreras de filosofía y derecho de una universidad privada chilena en el año 2019. Se realizaron entrevistas en profundidad realizando codificación temática. Los resultados muestran alta coincidencia en las creencias docentes: se valora la argumentación como competencia clave, pero se plantea que debe enseñarse una vez se asienten conocimientos teóricos. Si bien los docentes reportan promover prácticas de argumentación en su enseñanza, no lo hacen para desarrollar argumentación. La evaluación de aprendizaje supone saber argumentar, pero no se entregan pautas que orienten esta línea. Se concluye que los docentes de carreras de filosofía y derecho no difieren radicalmente en sus creencias acerca del valor de la argumentación para el ejercicio profesional.

ABSTRACT The use of intuitions as evidence is widespread in epistemology, but not uncontroversial. For over a decade and a half, some experimental epistemologists have called into question this appeal to epistemic intuitions. These philosophers bring the methods of experimental psychology, in particular survey methods, to bear on epistemological theorizing. Given their commitment to the relevance of empirical work to philosophical theory construction, they qualify as methodological naturalists. But some methodological naturalists who also recommend giving up appeals to intuition as evidence do not base their case on experimental surveys. In this article I consider two main challenges to the standard practice of appealing to intuitions posed by these naturalist philosophers and argue that a Craig-style epistemological project can allow the methodological naturalist to address them. Anyway I conclude that, regardless of the truth of the Craigian approach, intuitions still have a role to play in epistemological theorizing in the adjudication between approaches.

RESUMEN El uso de las intuiciones como evidencia es ubicuo en la epistemología, pero no poco controvertido. Por más de una década y media, algunos epistemólogos experimentales han cuestionado esta apelación a las intuiciones epistémicas. Estos filósofos explotan los métodos de la psicología experimental, en particular métodos de encuestas, para poner a prueba cuán ampliamente compartidas son algunas intuiciones. Dado su compromiso con la relevancia de la investigación empírica a la construcción de teorías filosóficas, estos filósofos califican como naturalistas metodológicos. Pero algunos naturalistas metodológicos que también recomiendan renunciar a esa apelación de la intuición como evidencia no basan su caso en encuestas. En este artículo considero dos desafíos fundamentales a la práctica estándar de apelar a las intuiciones que estos filósofos naturalistas plantean y argumento que un proyecto epistemológico inspirado en el trabajo de Edward Craig le permite, en principio, al epistemólogo que comparte ese naturalismo metodológico lidiar con ellos. De todas formas concluyo que, independientemente del éxito del enfoque Craiguiano, las intuiciones tienen un rol que jugar en el teorizar epistemológico en relación a la adjudicación entre enfoques.

ABSTRACT In contemporary epistemology, there are a number of particular internalism/externalism debates. My concern here is with the internalism/externalism controversy about some specific positive epistemic status required for knowledge which is normally understood in terms of epistemic responsibility. I argue that, given our pervasive epistemic interdependence, such particular debate needs to be reformulated in anti-individualistic terms if it is to be an interesting one.

O conhecimento parece precisar de uma combinação de confiabilidade de facto e responsabilidade epistêmica. Mas os filósofos têm tido grande dificuldade tentar combiná-las para alcançar uma teoria satisfatória do conhecimento. Este trabalho tenta encontrar uma solução baseada no fenômeno humano real e onipresente que é a dispersão social do trabalho epistêmico através do tempo. Mais precisamente, o objetivo central deste artigo é entregar uma teoria social de responsabilidade epistêmica nova e plausível e considerar os méritos de a combinação de confiabilidade e responsabilidade proposta relativas a certos casos de indivíduos epistemológicos não reflexivos.

Knowledge seems to need the admixture of de facto reliability and epistemic responsibility. But philosophers have had a hard time in attempting to combine them in order to achieve a satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I attempt to find a solution by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time. More precisely, the central objective of the paper is to deliver a novel and plausible social account of knowledge-relevant responsibility and to consider the merits of the proposed combination of reliability and responsibility with respect to certain cases of unreflective epistemic subjects.