Resumo Este artigo faz uma análise sobre a política externa do governo Bolsonaro e os interesses da burguesia interna brasileira. A hipótese é que a burguesia interna teria apoiado o Golpe de 2016 e a eleição de Jair Bolsonaro em 2018, mas, ao longo dos anos, passaram a apresentar resistências em relação às práticas políticas do governo e às pressões externas sobre a política ambiental e as ameaças contra a democracia. Realizamos uma pesquisa empírica nos documentos de posição das principais entidades patronais da burguesia interna com foco nas seguintes pautas: i) acordo Mercosul-UE; ii) ingresso na OCDE; iii) reforma da Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC) do Mercosul; e iv) política ambiental. Conclui-se que ao longo do mandato existiram conflitos no interior da burguesia interna, e ao final, passou a existir uma mudança dos interesses dessa fração que, ao lado de outros elementos, podem explicar a derrota eleitoral de Jair Bolsonaro em 2022. brasileira 201 2018 mas anos democracia pautas i MercosulUE Mercosul UE Mercosul-UE ii OCDE iii TEC (TEC iv Concluise Conclui se final elementos 2022 20 202 2

Abstract This article analyses the Bolsonaro government’s foreign policy and the interests of the Brazilian internal bourgeoisie. The hypothesis is that the internal bourgeoisie supported the 2016 coup d’état and the 2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro but, over the years, they started to exhibit resistance to the government’s political practices and responded to the external pressures related to environmental policy and threats to democracy. The empirical research analysed the position papers of the internal bourgeoisie’s main employer organisations, focusing on the following agendas: i) the Mercosur-EU agreement; ii) entry into the OECD; iii) reformulation of Mercosur’s Common External Tariff (CET); and iv) environmental policy. The study concludes that there were conflicts within the internal bourgeoisie throughout the Bolsonaro administration and, in the end, there was a change in their interests that, alongside other elements, can explain Jair Bolsonaro’s 2022 electoral defeat. governments government s 201 détat d état but years democracy bourgeoisies organisations agendas i MercosurEU Mercosur EU agreement ii OECD iii Mercosurs CET (CET) iv end elements Bolsonaros 202 defeat 20 (CET 2

Abstract This article aims to present the Marxist theoretical framework based on Nicos Poulantzas’s thought to analyse regionalism in Latin America. We propose that regionalism is determined by the interests of the bourgeois hegemonic fraction in the power bloc. The originality of the theoretical proposal presented lies in the thesis that regionalisms are the fruit of relations between power blocs of the member states. The article illustrates the recent processes of regionalism in Latin America that, from this theoretical proposal’s point of view, can vary among the following models: open regionalism (related to the interests of comprador bourgeoisie); multidimensional regionalism (linked to internal bourgeoisie interests); and anti-imperialism (related to a national bourgeoisie project). We conclude that the dependency of these social formations, the presence of foreign capital, and the role of US imperialism should be considered in the analysis of regionalism in Latin America.

O presente artigo trata da relação entre as classes sociais e a política econômica, a política social e a política externa nos governos Lula e Dilma. Durante esses governos houve uma mudança no interior do bloco no poder: a grande burguesia interna brasileira ascendeu politicamente e passou a apoiar-se em uma ampla frente política que abarca, inclusive, classes populares. Denominamos "neodesenvolvimentismo" o programa político dessa frente - a política de desenvolvimento possível nos marcos do capitalismo neoliberal. Os governos Lula e Dilma não romperam com esse modelo de capitalismo, mas introduziram, em decorrência das classes sociais que representam e nas quais se apoiam, mudanças importantes na economia, na política e na atuação internacional do Estado brasileiro.

The article discusses the relationship between, on the one hand, the interests of class and class fractions present in Brazilian society and on the other hand, the political economic, social and foreign policy in governments Lula and Dilma Rousseff. The establishes a connection between the political and social classes, clashing thus institutionalists and neoelitistis theoretical orientations, that dominate the Brazilian political science; Besides, our analysis uses secondary and documentary sources. The main thesis is that, in the passage from FHC to Lula era, it was a change within the power bloc: the great international financial capital lost strength and big bourgeoisie Brazilian domestic ascended politically, leaning forward on a broad policy that covers inclusive classes. Governments Lula and Dilma did not break with the neoliberal capitalist model, but introduced major changes in the economy, in politics and international activities of the State Brazilian, as a result of the fraction of the capitalist class they represent and also as a result of the classes in which they support. This finding is important because most of the literature on the PT governments ignores the complex relationships of these governments with social class, and those analysts that come to treat these relationships ignore or overlook the importance of the big internal bourgeoisie in the current Brazilian policy.