Abstract It is often argued that constitution and causation are different kinds of dependence relations. Some have argued for a distinction between constitutive explanation of causal capacities that explain what a system would do in specific situations from causal or etiological explanations that explain why an event such as a change in the property of a system happened. In what follows we argue against the claim that causation and constitution are always distinct metaphysical relations. This paper develops a temporal account of constitution. We call this species of constitution, diachronic constitution. We show how diachronic constitution is a consequence of a common type of causation in the empirical sciences: continuous reciprocal causation, a variety of causal production instantiated in complex dynamical systems. Hence, this paper seeks to establish that constitution does not only resemble causation in certain respects. We argue for the stronger claim that constitution can be analysed in terms of causation understood as production of change. Temporalizing the constitution relation is neither as remarkable nor as problematic as it might initially seem. The idea of diachronic constitution will appear almost inevitable in the context of complex dynamical systems, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states in such systems. relations happened sciences systems Hence respects seem

Abstract From the outset of Western philosophy most occidental philosophers held that both existence and knowledge depended on stability - what is genuinely changing does not have a clear essence or identity and is thus not an object for knowledge, nor can it be expressed in language. This is the case even though change touches all areas of life, shaping both the self and world, in subjective experience as well as scientific discoveries. In this contribution I will consider why precisely change is seen as such a vexing problem for knowledge and I will look at what that means for our ability to know a world that is fundamentally characterised by change. In part 1, I discuss how the assumption that change can neither be known nor put into words, led to the development of epistemologies and ontologies that bypass the problem of change by understanding it in terms of its opposite. I will show how this strategy limits our ability to come to terms with concrete reality. In part 2, I point towards possible ways out of this predicament. I will use the Aristotelian tode ti to propose a novel way to encounter change on its own terms. language life discoveries 1 words opposite reality 2 predicament

Abstract In this paper we present novel conceptions of identity arising in and motivated by a recently emerged branch of mathematical logic, namely, Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). We consider an established 2013 version of HoTT as well as its more recent generalised version called Directed HoTT or Directed Type theory (DTT), which at the time of writing remains a work in progress. In HoTT, and in particular in DTT, identity is not just a relation but a mathematical structure which admits for an interpretation in terms of Homotopy theory (directed Homotopy theory in the case of DTT), which in its turn is supported by common intuitions concerning identity of material objects through time, change and locomotion. The DDTbased conception of identity presented in the paper is nonsymmetric: here identity is “directed” or has a “sense”. We compare the HoTT-based conceptions of identity with standard theories of identity based on the Classical Predicate calculus, and show how the HoTT-based identity helps to treat traditional logical and philosophical problems related to identity and time. In the concluding part of the paper we explore some ontological implications of the HoTT-based identity and show how HoTT and DTT can serve for designing formal process ontologies. The paper is self-contained and comprises expositions and informal explanations of all relevant philosophical, logical and mathematical contents. logic namely HoTT. . (HoTT) 201 , (DTT) progress directed DTT) locomotion nonsymmetric “directed sense. sense “sense” HoTTbased calculus ontologies selfcontained self contained contents (HoTT 20 (DTT “sense 2

Abstract Truthmaking (2023), by Jamin Asay, is part of the “Elements in Metaphysics” series, published by the Cambridge University Press. The book is an excellent brief introduction to truthmaking theory: accessible, clear, and enjoyable, covering the most fundamental problems of the field. One of the highlights of the book is the chapter on truthmakers for truths concerning social constructions. It successfully shows that truthmaking theory is not only related to abstract metaphysical problems but is also tied to central puzzles in ethics and political philosophy (more specifically philosophies of race and gender). 2023, 2023 , (2023) Asay Elements Metaphysics series Press accessible clear enjoyable field constructions more gender. gender . gender) 202 (2023 20 (202 2 (20 (2 (

Abstract In the literature, there are several claims about the centrality of a pro- cess ontology. It has often proved difficult, however, to understand what a process is supposed to be, and what the central difference to thing-based ontologies amounts to. It would be useful to see what an abstract account of this difference consists in. This paper provides a sketch of what logic we should use for a process-based ontology, and argues that intuitionistic logic, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, provide a useful basis for process ontology. A brief sketch of probability for processes is made. literature pro ontology difficult however thingbased thing based in processbased analysis made

Abstract Process metaphysics is both internally coherent and coherent with what we know about the basic ‘what there is’ of the world, whereas a particle-as-particular metaphysics is neither. One consequence of a process metaphysics is that metaphysical emergence becomes explicable, and, in turn, normative emergence. This point is developed with models of the emergence of normative function and of representation. These are steps toward an integrated naturalistic understanding of the world. world particleasparticular particle as particular neither explicable turn representation

Abstract The aim of this paper is to delve into the epistemological challenge surrounding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of belief and credence through a decision-theoretic framework: belief emerges as a cognitive process balancing the urge for information and the fear of error. The first part is primarily historical, and delves into the philosophy of science and its concern about the acceptance of probabilistic hypothesis. In the second part, the focus shifts from the philosophy of science to contemporary epistemology, specifically the rationality of belief and credence. The main outcome of this paper lies in highlighting how the decision-theoretic approach illuminates the nature of belief rationality, exploring the connection between belief and credence, the context-dependent nature of belief, and the significance of deductive closure as rational requirements. decisiontheoretic decision theoretic framework error historical hypothesis epistemology contextdependent context dependent requirements

Abstract Mauro Dorato's "Science and Representative Democracy" argues for the essential link between science and democracy. He posits both as problem-solving systems, advocating for representative democracy to integrate scientific knowledge into policy and emphasizing scientific literacy for informed citizen participation. Revisiting the Lippmann-Dewey debate, he champions education and utilizes Condorcet's jury theorem to highlight the potential of informed decision-making. He tackles challenges like scientific disinformation and advocates for scientific literacy. By comparing the principles of science and democracy, he reveals their interconnectedness. While further exploration of practical challenges and direct democracy's potential would be beneficial, the book remains a valuable contribution to understanding the vital relationship between science and democracy in the modern world. Doratos Dorato s Science Democracy problemsolving problem solving systems participation LippmannDewey Lippmann Dewey debate Condorcets Condorcet decisionmaking. decisionmaking decision making. making decision-making interconnectedness democracys beneficial world

Abstract In his development of an ontology for mathematics in line with Fregean abstractionism, Øystein Linnebo proposes criteria of identity as a mechanism for reference. This proposed mechanism appears to conflict with Saul Kripke's historical theory of names. However, Linnebo, distinguishing between semantic and metasemantic domains, asserts that no real conflict exists; while Kripke's theory is semantic, his is metasemantic. This paper posits a counter-argument, contending that Linnebo's account, contrary to his claim, indeed conflicts with Kripke's historical theory of names. The paper underscores that, in Kripke's framework, the reference relation transcends the individual, inhabiting a social domain. abstractionism Kripkes Kripke s names However domains exists counterargument, counterargument counter argument, argument counter-argument Linnebos account claim framework individual domain

Abstract The objective of this article is to introduce the debate regarding how to organize the competing definitions of intellectual humility. Some of the main accounts will be presented, but the focus will be on the categorizations of these conceptions, i.e., the ways to organize them. Two categorizations will be examined: the epistemic categorization and the dispositional categorization. I will offer a detailed examination of both, clarifying their differences and highlighting their relevance to understanding intellectual humility. Furthermore, I will explore how these categorizations relate to key topics in the ongoing debates surrounding the analyses. I will suggest four criteria for evaluating the categorizations and apply them to the discussion about how to categorize intellectual humility accounts, arguing that the epistemic categorization is superior to the dispositional categorization. In doing so, I also emphasize the relevance of these taxonomic matters to the first order philosophical debate concerning the definition of intellectual humility. presented conceptions ie i e i.e. examined both Furthermore analyses so i.e

Abstract This article presents a challenge concerning the causal efficacy of causal processes, distinct from the much-discussed causal-exclusion problem. The new challenge is to consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in some specific way. This broad, diverse class includes prominent theories such as the Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge arises because the causal pattern is not itself required for the effects the processes have on the organism’s other aspects. Hence, the processes’ property of being conscious is dispensable in accounting for those effects. The theories are challenged to show how this does not constitute an operational problem for individual organisms or a problem as regards explaining the evolution of consciousness. The paper explains how the challenge can be met by the radical move of introducing meta-causation: causation that acts on causation instances themselves. This allows the instances of causation in conscious processes, as entities in their own right, to be causes of effects elsewhere. The paper also summarizes the author’s previously published motivation for proposing meta-causation, as the basis of consciousness itself. The present paper further supports this view. muchdiscussed much discussed causalexclusion exclusion way broad Theory HigherOrder Higher Order theory organism s aspects Hence metacausation meta meta-causation themselves right elsewhere authors author metacausation, causation, view

Abstract The logical formalization of sentences containing adverbial modification, e.g., “John walks slowly”, remains demanding. According to Bennett (1988, 2002), as facts are exemplifications of properties, they are abstract and not basic items in the universe, whereas events constitute a special subcategory of facts. The names of facts are complete, but the names of events are incomplete. This paper aims to provide an alternative logical formalization of facts and events, reflecting Bennett’s metaphysical and semantic insights better than his formalization based on Davidson (1967a, 1985) and Parsons (1990). After discussing Bennett’s theory, I will develop my logical formalization based on Clark’s (1970) predicate modifiers theories. Using the abstraction operator will allow different modifiers to have the same scope and simultaneously guarantee the unicity of the fact or event. There is no quantification over facts or events. The resulting formalization will have advantages in coping with verb dependent and nonstandard adverbs and allowing for easier conjunctive formalization. The semantic insight that the names of facts are complete describers, and the names of events are not will manifest in the distinct formalization of events. Multigrade predicates will enable further logical entailments. As a result, we get a formalization fitting into Bennett’s theory. modification eg e g e.g. John slowly, slowly , slowly” demanding 1988, 1988 (1988 2002, 2002 2002) properties universe incomplete Bennetts s 1967a, 1967a (1967a 1985 1990. 1990 . (1990) theory Clarks Clark 1970 (1970 theories event describers entailments result e.g 198 (198 200 199 (1990 197 (197 19 (19 20 (199 1 (1 2 (

Abstract This is a critical analysis of Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers, by Michel Ghins. Nature Powers Ghins

Abstract When we engage with fictions, we are, in effect, pretending to deal with reports of actual events. After all, numerous fictional works are explicitly designed to facilitate this kind of pretense. This was the prevailing understanding of fiction in both analytic philosophy and classical narratology for decades. However, there is a significant problem with this view: many fictional narratives routinely portray scenarios that could not possibly be the subject of anyone’s reporting. Currie’s 'mindless fictions' are one such example. This issue can be referred to as the problem of unreportability. The standard solution to this challenge has been to argue that fictions are not pretend reports, but rather direct authorial stipulations to imagine specific scenarios. This paper contends, however, that such an explanation fails to provide a satisfactory account of fiction. By drawing on Walton’s notion of ‘silly questions’, it instead argues for a revised version of the report model-one that doesn’t necessarily depend on ubiquitous fictional reporters. effect events all pretense decades However view anyones anyone s reporting Curries Currie mindless example unreportability contends however Waltons Walton silly questions, questions , questions’ modelone model doesnt doesn t reporters