ABSTRACT This article addresses the study of economic abuse in the context of intimate heterosexual partnerships as a form of violence against women. In particular, it analyzes how the simulated contract has been used as a tool for this purpose. Thus, this research contributes to the determination of the interface between contract law and gender violence. Its methodology is based on the analysis of relevant jurisprudence of the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice. This examination allows the conclusion that the simulated contract could be one of many strategies to abuse women's property rights. In this sense, the simulation scheme has been an instrument to keep in force de facto the property-related dimensions of the marital power institution that was abolished almost a century ago in the country.

RESUMEN Este artículo aborda el estudio del abuso económico en el contexto de las parejas heterosexuales como una forma de violencia en contra de las mujeres. En particular, analiza la manera en que el contrato simulado ha sido utilizado como una herramienta para este fin. Así, esta investigación contribuye a la determinación de la intersección entre derecho privado de contratos y violencia de género. Su metodología se basa en el análisis de jurisprudencia pertinente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia colombiana. Este examen permite concluir que el negocio simulado puede ser una de tantas estrategias para abusar de los derechos patrimoniales de las mujeres. En este sentido, la maniobra simulatoria ha sido un expediente para mantener vigente de facto la dimensión patrimonial de la potestad marital que fuera derogada hace casi un siglo en el país.

Abstract In this article we investigate neopaganism as a cultural imprint of contemporary Western societies. Closely related to the opposition to Christianity, neopaganism is configured as a philosophy that, consciously and radically, is reluctant to all types of dualism. In this order of ideas, God and the world become two different, separate and irreducible ontological levels. The main objective of the work is to demonstrate that neopaganism is another form of nihilism, through a qualitative approach typical of the human sciences, and will use both the hermeneutical phenomenological method and documentary analysis since it seeks to deepen the rupture with the popular religious traditions, to return to the old sacred conception of the world as a place full of gods, in which there are no more moral demands than those indicated by man as the center of this neopagan metaphysical and anthropological scheme. The main result obtained is the verification of the nihilism that the neopagan proposal contains in the religious, moral, anthropological and political order with a detailed characterization of the phenomenon and its relativistic consequences in Western thought.

Resumen En el presente artículo investigamos acerca del neopaganismo como una impronta cultural de las actuales sociedades occidentales. Relacionado estrechamente con la oposición al cristianismo, el neopaganismo se configura como una filosofía que, de manera consciente y radical, se muestra reacia a todo tipo de dualismo. En este orden de ideas, Dios y el mundo devienen dos niveles ontológicos distintos, separados e irreductibles. El objetivo principal del trabajo es el de demostrar que el neopaganismo constituye una forma de nihilismo, mediante un enfoque cualitativo propio de las ciencias humanas, y se servirá tanto del método fenomenológico hermenéutico como del análisis documental, puesto que busca profundizar en la ruptura con las tradiciones religiosas populares, para retornar a la vieja concepción sagrada del mundo como un lugar lleno de dioses, en el que no hay más exigencias morales que las que señale el hombre como centro de este esquema metafísico y antropológico neopagano. El principal resultado obtenido es la comprobación del nihilismo que encierra la propuesta neopagana en el orden religioso, moral, antropológico y político con una detallada caracterización del fenómeno y sus consecuencias relativistas en el pensamiento occidental.

Abstract. This paper examines Nietzsche’s theory of language, which has an essential connection with other epistemological, aesthetic, and social claims present in his work. It is argued that language is the result of perspectival and relative constructions of human beings. For this reason, one cannot speak of absolute or universally valid truths within language, but only of conventional forms and interpretations: accounts of reality, but not objective facts. It is shown that this Nietzschean claim takes important elements from the philosophy of Friedrich Lange, a famous 19th-century philosopher of science and founder of neo-Kantianism in Germany. Nietzsche takes Lange’s concepts of Organisation and Dichtung for some central developments of his own theory of language in the early stages of his thought.

Resumen. Este artículo examina la teoría del lenguaje de Nietzsche, la cual tiene una conexión esencial con postulados epistemológicos, estéticos y sociales de su pensamiento. Se argumenta que el lenguaje es el resultado de construcciones perspectivísticas y relativas de los seres humanos. Por esta razón, no se puede hablar de verdades absolutas o válidas universalmente dentro del lenguaje, sino únicamente de formas convencionales e interpretaciones: relatos de la realidad, mas no hechos objetivos. Se muestra que esta tesis de Nietzsche toma elementos importantes de la filosofía de Friedrich Albert Lange, reconocido filósofo de la ciencia del siglo XIX y fundador del neokantismo en Alemania. En particular, Nietzsche toma los conceptos de Organisation y Dichtung de Lange para algunos desarrollos centrales de su propia teoría del lenguaje en la etapa juvenil de su pensamiento.

Abstract. This paper establishes a dialogue between hermeneutic phenomenology-specifically that of Heideggerian inspiration-and discourse studies to reflect on the phenomenon of metaphor and its essential functioning in the production of meaning and truth, as well as in its conceptual/discursive (re)production of ideologies. There is a relative isomorphism between the operational and structural modalities of what Heidegger calls “fundamental metaphysical positions” and ideology understood according to Althusser and Van Dijk. Between the two lies the metaphor as a way of accessing the dynamics of these heterogeneous but complementary dimensions. Understanding its systematic and significant character will allow us to better understand the way in which the truth grounds our world and our factual life.

Resumen. El presente artículo entabla un diálogo entre la fenomenología hermenéutica -particularmente aquella de cuño heideggeriano- y los estudios del discurso para reflexionar sobre el fenómeno de la metáfora y su funcionamiento esencial en la producción de sentido y verdad, así como en la (re)producción conceptual/discursiva de ideologías. Existe un relativo isomorfismo entre las modalidades operativas y estructurantes de lo que Heidegger llama “posiciones metafísicas fundamentales” y la ideología entendida de acuerdo con los trabajos de Althusser y Van Dijk. Entre ambas se ubica la metáfora como vía de acceso a las dinámicas propias de estas dimensiones heterogéneas pero complementarias. Comprender su carácter sistemático y significativo nos permitirá entender mejor la manera que tiene la verdad de fundamentar nuestro mundo y nuestra vida fáctica.

Abstract Current online information flows have taken on immeasurable dimensions, thereby influencing the masses, both positively and negatively, thus allowing decision-making and the generation of ways of thinking, which on many occasions turn out to be unfounded and cause misinformation. The analysis is based on the need to generate an epistemic contribution around online information processes for the purposes of classification and general characterization with a special focus on emerging countries (especially Latin American) through documentary research. This proposal identifies the construction of a taxonomy of information evaluation processes, consisting of three general groups: (1) structured ones (coming from formal education and through systematic content that causes explicit learning); (2) unstructured ones (deliberately acquired, through non-formal processes, which generate tacit learning that is not necessarily correct or well-founded); and (3) complementary ones (referring to alternative methodologies for diagnosing misinformation situations). The paper concludes by presenting proposals for various forms of intervention and identifying best practices in order to avoid biases in misinterpretation, especially when the information is false.

Resumen Los flujos actuales de información en línea han tomado dimensiones inmensurables, logrando con ello influir en las masas, tanto de forma positiva como negativa, permitiendo así la toma de decisiones y la generación de formas de pensar, que en diversas ocasiones resultan infundadas y provocan la desinformación. El análisis parte de la necesidad de generar una contribución epistémica en torno a los procesos de información en línea con fines de clasificación y caracterización general con especial enfoque hacia países emergentes (especialmente latinoamericanos) a través de la investigación documental. Esta propuesta identifica la construcción de una taxonomía de procesos de evaluación de la información, constituida en tres grupos generales: (1) los estructurados (provenientes de la educación formal y por medio de contenidos sistemáticos que provocan un aprendizaje explícito); (2) los no estructurados (adquiridos de forma deliberada, por medio de procesos no formales, que generan un aprendizaje tácito que no necesariamente es correcto o fundamentado); y (3) los complementarios (referidos a metodologías alternativas de diagnóstico sobre situaciones de desinformación). Se concluye presentando propuestas de diversas formas de intervención e identificación de mejores prácticas en razón de evitar sesgos en la mala interpretación, especialmente cuando la información es falsa.

Abstract: This article examines how the narrative of the plurinational state provided the common symbolic framework for the conflict over the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (Tipnis) in Bolivia in 2011. The central dispute, one of the most important in Bolivia’s recent history, was whether or not to construct a highway through this area, a debate that has led to a major rift between peasant and indigenous social organizations that shared common reivindicative imaginaries but ultimately experienced profound divisions. This discussion serves as a key observation point to understand how decolonization imaginaries actually function, which I consider a anchoring point (point du capiton) in the narrative of the plurinational state. Through discourse analysis, review of chronicles, press statements, and accounts of the VIII Indigenous March, I aim to identify the discursive threads that framed the debates on decolonization, showing that it can be used as a rhetorical tool to mask extractivism or defend “national sovereignty,” or as an argument to uphold the self-determination of indigenous peoples. I also examine how the repertoire of the indigenous march was constructed discursively and symbolically, and the impact it left on Bolivia’s recent history. I intend for this analysis to contribute to understanding how Bolivian social perceptions are shaped in relation to the narrative of the plurinational state and its potential for social transformation as a new regime of truth.

Resumo: Neste artigo, são exploradas as maneiras pelas quais a narrativa do Estado plurinacional foi a base simbólica comum em que se desenvolveu o conflito no Território Indígena e no Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (Tipnis), em 2011, na Bolívia, cujo desacordo central era a construção ou não de uma estrada que o atravessaria. Esse é um dos problemas mais importantes da história recente da Bolívia, pois representou uma grande discordância entre organizações sociais camponesas e indígenas que compartilhavam demandas imaginárias comuns e que terminou em grandes rupturas. Essa discussão é apresentada como um espaço de observação fundamental para entender como os imaginários da descolonização operam na realidade, que considero ser um ponto de basta (point du capiton) na narrativa do Estado plurinacional. Por meio da análise do discurso, de uma revisão de crônicas, declarações à imprensa e relatos da VIII Marcha Indígena, procuro estabelecer os fios discursivos que suscitaram debates sobre a descolonização. Assim, é possível observar como a descolonização pode ser um artifício retórico para encobrir o extrativismo ou defender a “soberania nacional”, ou um argumento para preservar a autodeterminação dos povos indígenas. Além disso, discuto como o repertório da marcha indígena foi construído discursiva e simbolicamente e que traços deixou na história recente da Bolívia. Com esse exercício, espero contribuir com elementos para as formas pelas quais as percepções sociais bolivianas são construídas com relação à narrativa do Estado plurinacional e suas possibilidades de transformação social como um novo regime de verdade.

Resumen: Este artículo indaga las formas en que la narrativa del Estado plurinacional fue el marco simbólico común en el cual se desarrolló el conflicto del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (Tipnis) en 2011 en Bolivia, cuyo desacuerdo central era la construcción o no de una carretera que lo cruzaría. Este es uno de los problemas más importantes en la historia corta de Bolivia, pues representó un gran desencuentro entre organizaciones sociales campesinas e indígenas que compartían imaginarios reivindicativos comunes y que terminaron en grandes rupturas. Tal discusión se presenta como un espacio de observación clave para entender cómo operan en la realidad los imaginarios de la descolonización, a la que considero un punto nodal (point du capiton) en la narrativa del Estado plurinacional. Desde el análisis del discurso, la revisión de crónicas, las declaraciones de prensa y los relatos sobre la VIII Marcha Indígena busco establecer los hilos discursivos que plantearon debates sobre la descolonización. Así, podrá observarse cómo la descolonización puede ser un recurso retórico para encubrir el extractivismo o defender la “soberanía nacional” o en un argumento para preservar la autodeterminación de los pueblos indígenas. Por otro lado, hablaré sobre la manera como el repertorio de la marcha indígena se construyó discursiva y simbólicamente y qué huellas dejó en la historia corta de Bolivia. Con este ejercicio espero aportar elementos a los modos en que se construyen las percepciones sociales bolivianas en relación con la narrativa del Estado plurinacional y sus posibilidades de transformación social en tanto nuevo régimen de verdad.

Abstract: With its signing of the Havana Peace Agreement in 2016, Colombia sought to end an armed conflict that had lasted more than sixty years and had left nearly nine million victims. The agreement led to the establishment of a transitional justice (TJ) framework, including the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CEV). This study identifies how the CEV incorporated the legacies of colonialism into its analytical framework. The research is based on in-depth interviews with twenty scholars specializing in colonialism and/or TJ, nineteen peacebuilders, informal conversations with CEV members, and a review of various volumes of the final report. The findings highlight that the commission adopted a long-term historical perspective, revisiting aspects of Spanish colonialism (including structural racism and the hacienda system as an institution of territorial, political, and economic order) as explanatory factors for the various forms of violence experienced during the armed conflict. Additionally, several volumes of the final report emphasize the ongoing impact of colonial legacies, viewing them more as continuities or “ruins,” using Stoler’s concept (2008). While the possibility of dismantling colonial legacies on a material level due to the CEV’s work is debated, its symbolic significance must be highlighted, especially in a context where the State had sought to erase the colonial past. This article contributes to the emerging literature that examines TJ from a decolonial perspective, providing an empirical analysis of the CEV in Colombia, which we believe can become a key reference for this field.

Resumo: Em 2016, com a assinatura do Acordo de Paz de Havana, a Colômbia procurou pôr fim a um conflito armado que durou mais de 60 anos e que deixou quase 9 milhões de vítimas. Como resultado do acordo, foi gerado um sistema de justiça de transição (JT), que incluiu a Comissão para o esclarecimento da verdade, do convívio e da não repetição (CEV). O objetivo deste estudo é identificar como a CEV incorporou os legados do colonialismo em sua estrutura de análise. A pesquisa baseia-se em entrevistas aprofundadas com 20 acadêmicos especializados em colonialismo e/ou JT e 19 construtores da paz, bem como em conversas informais com membros da CEV e na revisão de vários volumes do relatório final. A observação destaca que a comissão adotou uma perspectiva histórica de longo prazo, além de revisitar algumas facetas do colonialismo espanhol (incluindo o racismo estrutural e a fazenda como instituição de organização territorial, política e econômica) como fatores explicativos para as várias formas de violência sofridas no contexto do conflito armado. Além disso, vários volumes do relatório final enfatizam o efeito dos legados coloniais no presente, ou seja, a CEV os entende mais como continuidades ou “ruínas”, para usar o conceito de Stoler (2008). Embora a possibilidade de desarticular os legados coloniais em nível material como resultado do trabalho da CEV seja questionada, sua importância em nível simbólico deve ser enfatizada, em um contexto em que o Estado procurou apagar o passado colonial. Este artigo procura contribuir para a literatura emergente que examina a JT a partir de um quadro decolonial, com uma análise empírica da CEV na Colômbia, que, acreditamos, pode se tornar um caso de referência obrigatório para o campo.

Resumen: En 2016, con la firma del Acuerdo de Paz de La Habana, Colombia buscó poner fin a un conflicto armado de más de sesenta años de duración, que había dejado casi nueve millones de víctimas. Como resultado del acuerdo se generó un andamio de justicia transicional (JT), que incluyó la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición (CEV). El objetivo del estudio es identificar cómo la CEV incorporó los legados del colonialismo en su marco de análisis. La investigación se basa en entrevistas en profundidad realizadas a veinte académicos especialistas en el colonialismo y/o la JT, y diecinueve constructoras de paz, además de conversaciones informales con integrantes de la CEV y una revisión de diversos tomos del informe final. La observación resalta que la comisión tuvo una perspectiva histórica de larga duración, además de retomar algunas facetas del colonialismo español (incluyendo el racismo estructural y la hacienda como institución de ordenamiento territorial, político y económico), a modo de factores explicativos de las diversas violencias vividas en el marco del conflicto armado. Asimismo, en varios tomos del informe final se hace hincapié en el efecto de los legados coloniales en el presente; es decir, la CEV los comprende más como continuidades o “ruinas”, para emplear el concepto de Stoler (2008). Si bien se pone en tela de juicio la posibilidad de desarticulación de los legados coloniales en un plano material a raíz del trabajo de la CEV, se debe destacar su importancia en un plano simbólico, en un contexto en el que el Estado había buscado borrar el pasado colonial. Este artículo busca hacer un aporte a la literatura emergente que examina la JT desde un encuadre decolonial, con un análisis empírico de la CEV en Colombia que, consideramos, puede convertirse en caso de referencia obligatoria para este campo.

Abstract Hamlet’s character has been the benchmark against which a large part of the European philosophy has had to measure. Various authors, such as Pavel Florenskij, Lev S. Vygotskij, and Carl Schmitt, have seen in Hamlet the contradiction inherent to an unresolved epochal transition, characterized by the endless pain of an interim. My article explores the possibility of interpreting Hamlet’s time in this light, in relation to Walter Benjamin’s ideas on the German Trauerspiel. Unlike Florenskij, who reads Hamlet in a tragic manner, I follow Benjamin’s thesis that places Hamlet as the end of the modern Trauerspiel. Within this framework, the nature of modern consciousness and its relationship with truth is revealed, highlighting how Hamlet embodies the aporetic traits of modern politics, in contrast to Carl Schmitt’s premodern visión.

Resumen El personaje de Hamlet ha sido un punto de referencia para gran parte de la filosofía europea del siglo xx, representando el espíritu y destino de Europa. Diversos autores, como Pavel Florenskij, Lev S. Vygotskij y Carl Schmitt, han visto en Hamlet la contradicción inherente a una transición epocal no resuelta, caracterizada por el dolor interminable de un interim. Mi artículo explora la posibilidad de interpretar el tiempo de Hamlet bajo esta luz, en relación con las ideas de Walter Benjamin sobre el Trauerspiel alemán. A diferencia de Florenskij, que lee a Hamlet de manera trágica, sigo la tesis benjaminiana que sitúa a Hamlet como el fin del Trauerspiel moderno. En este marco, se revela la naturaleza de la conciencia moderna y su relación con la verdad, destacando cómo Hamlet encarna los rasgos aporéticos de la política moderna, en contraste con la visión premoderna de Carl Schmitt.

In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Resumen El presente estudio examina la forma en que algunas empresas responden al daño reputacional causado por una crisis. A través del análisis cualitativo de una compañía colombiana de medicina natural enfrentando un evento disruptivo que amenazaba su producto insignia y negocio, el estudio de caso explora la respuesta de la empresa ante sospechas mediáticas de manipulación de un producto fitoterapéutico. Los hallazgos revelan inconsistencias significativas en las respuestas organizacionales de la empresa, así como las repercusiones de dichas inconsistencias en los stakeholders y la industria. Este estudio arroja luz sobre el uso estratégico de respuestas desvinculadas de la realidad en escenarios de crisis para proteger la reputación. Además, destaca que la empresa analizada se apartó de las estrategias establecidas en teoría para la gestión de crisis. La empresa no empleó la estrategia consistente en ‘tomar la iniciativa’ al no revelar proactivamente la crisis. Además, priorizó respuestas instrumentales sobre consideraciones normativas o éticas. El análisis de las desviaciones identificadas de los principios establecidos de gestión de crisis resalta aún más la importancia de los hallazgos de este trabajo y sus implicaciones teóricas y prácticas para el desarrollo de estrategias de comunicación de crisis más efectivas basadas en la búsqueda de la verdad.

Abstract This study examines how businesses respond to reputational damage caused by reputation crises. Drawing on the qualitative analysis of a Colombian natural medicine company facing a disruptive event that threatened its flagship product and business, the case study explores the company’s response to media suspicions of tampering with a phytotherapeutic product. The findings reveal significant inconsistencies in the firm’s organizational responses and their repercussions on stakeholders and the industry. This study sheds light on the strategic use of responses detached from reality in crisis scenarios to protect reputation. In addition, the study highlights that the analyzed company deviated from established crisis management strategies outlined in theory. The company did not implement the ‘steal the thunder’ approach, as it failed to proactively disclose the crisis. Moreover, the company prioritized instrumental responses over normative or ethical considerations. The analysis of the identified deviations from established crisis management principles further emphasizes the importance of the work’s findings and their theoretical and practical implications for developing more effective crisis communication strategies grounded in truth-seeking.

Abstract: The concept of tradition has been deeply criticised from the French Enlightenment to the present day. Everything that refers to the past, the uses and concepts in the fields of philosophy, aesthetics, politics, and society have undergone great changes in pursuit of emancipation and a quest to be themselves in a new and original way, without depending on antecedent instances. However, from the thought of Luigi Pareyson (1918-1991), we discover the need for a revitalisation of the concept of tradition to be able to develop a revelatory thought about truth, being, and human experience. The Italian philosopher's itinerary starts from aesthetics and the analysis of the role of matter in it to go back to the conception of philosophy as hermeneutics as an interpretation of truth. Tradition will constitute a fundamental notion for aesthetics and hermeneutics and, therefore, for philosophy in general.

Resumen: El concepto de tradición ha sido profundamente criticado desde la Ilustración francesa hasta nuestros días. Todo lo que refiere al pasado, los usos y los conceptos en el ámbito de la filosofía, de la estética, de la política y de la sociedad han experimentado grandes cambios en pos de una emancipación y una búsqueda de ser ellos mismos de manera novedosa y original, sin depender de instancias antecedentes. Sin embargo, desde el pensamiento de Luigi Pareyson (1918-1991) descubrimos la necesidad de una revitalización del concepto de tradición para poder desarrollar un pensamiento revelativo sobre la verdad, el ser y la experiencia humana. El itinerario del filósofo italiano parte de la estética y el análisis del papel de la materia en esta para remontarse a la concepción de la filosofía como hermenéutica en tanto que interpretación de la verdad. La tradición constituirá una noción fundamental para la estética y la hermenéutica y, por ende, para la filosofía general.

ABSTRACT This article seeks to address the intellectual crossover between the contemporary French thinkers Michel Foucault and Raymond Aron, concerning their respective views on history and truth. Both hold a view of history that departs from the Hegelian perspective. Instead, they emphasize, each in his own system of thought, the intra-historical character of the observer of history, the scientist or philosopher. Despite this affinity, they differ regarding the consequences that this premise has for the existence of general truths that can serve as a guide for human reason, and ethical and political action. While Foucault maintains a radical skepticism, Aron is committed to the search for truth. The different attitudes imply profound differences in each author's views on the meaning of political action.

RESUMEN El presente artículo busca abordar el cruce intelectual entre los pensadores franceses coetáneos Michel Foucault y Raymond Aron, en lo concerniente a sus respectivas visiones sobre la historia y la verdad. Ambos sostienen una visión de la historia que se aleja de la perspectiva hegeliana. En cambio, subrayan, cada uno en su propio sistema de pensamiento, el carácter intrahistórico del propio observador de la historia, del científico o del filósofo. A pesar de esa afinidad, se distancian respecto de las consecuencias que esta premisa tiene para la existencia de verdades generales, susceptibles de servir de guía a la razón humana y el actuar ético y político. Mientras Foucault se mantiene en un escepticismo radical, Aron se compromete con la búsqueda de la verdad. Las diferentes actitudes implican luego diferencias profundas en las visiones de cada autor respecto del sentido de la acción política.

Resumo: O presente estudo analisa a disposição para pensamento crítico de 205 estudantes de escolas públicas de ensino médio em relação à aprendizagem da língua inglesa. Uma escala Likert de 6 pontos foi aplicada aos participantes para coleta de dados por meio da Escala de Disposição de Pensamento Crítico que consistia em 26 questões. Além do mais, foram coletadas características sociodemográficas dos participantes. A Escala de Disposição para o Pensamento Crítico compreendia sete dimensões: busca da verdade, mente aberta, analiticidade, sistematicidade, autoconfiança, pensamento crítico, curiosidade e maturidade cognitiva. O primeiro método de análise dos dados foi a estatística descritiva, esta análise abordou a pontuação média e o desvio padrão dos dados, seguida de uma análise de correlação de Spearman para encontrar relações entre o conjunto de dados, que mostrou correlações entre as sete dimensões, mas não entre as dimensões e as informações sociodemográficas. Finalmente, uma análise hierárquica de cluster foi realizada para dividir os dados e os respondentes em quatro grupos semelhantes, de acordo com suas respostas. Os resultados mostram que os estudantes de ensino médio não apresentam uma disposição forte nem fraca para o pensamento crítico; sua disposição é bastante indefinida.

Resumen: El presente estudio analiza la disposición hacia el pensamiento crítico de 205 estudiantes chilenos de colegios secundarios públicos en torno al aprendizaje del inglés. Una escala Likert de 6 puntos fue aplicada a los participantes para la colección de datos usando la Escala de Disposición hacia el Pensamiento Crítico que consistió en 26 preguntas; además de esto, las características sociodemográficas de los participantes fueron recopiladas. La Escala de Disposición hacia el Pensamiento Crítico contenía siete dimensiones: búsqueda de la verdad, amplitud mental, capacidad de análisis, sistematicidad, confianza en el razonamiento, curiosidad y por último madurez cognitiva. El primer método de análisis de datos fue la estadística descriptiva, este análisis abordó la media y desviación estándar de los datos, seguido por un análisis de correlación de Spearman para encontrar relaciones entre el conjunto de datos, que mostró correlaciones entre las siete dimensiones, pero no entre las dimensiones y la información sociodemográfica. Finalmente, un análisis clúster jerárquico fue efectuado para dividir los datos y encuestados en cuatro grupos similares, de acuerdo con sus respuestas. Los resultados muestran que los estudiantes secundarios no presentan una fuerte ni débil disposición hacia el pensamiento crítico; su disposición es más bien indefinida.

Abstract: The present study analyzes the critical thinking disposition of 205 students from public high schools regarding English language learning. A 6-point-Likert scale was applied to the participants to collect data using the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale, which consisted of 26 questions; moreover, participants’ sociodemographic characteristics were gathered. The Critical Thinking Disposition Scale comprised seven dimensions: Truth- seeking, Open-mindedness, Analyticity, Systematicity, Self-confidence Critical Thinking, Inquisitiveness, and Cognitive Maturity. The first method of data analysis was descriptive statistics, this analysis addressed the data’s mean score and standard deviation, followed by a Spearman correlation analysis to find relationships among the dataset, which showed correlations among the seven dimensions but not between the dimensions and the sociodemographic information. Finally, a hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted to divide the data and respondents into four similar groups, according to their answers. The findings show that high school students present neither a strong nor weak disposition to critical thinking; their disposition is rather undefined.

ABSTRACT The objective of this research is to describe the forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions during the Stronist dictatorship (1954-1989) in Paraguay. It consists of the systematization of the data found in Volume VIII, Part 3 of the Truth and Justice Commission in index card format. The methodology applied was of documentary design, empirical-quantitative type of descriptive scope considering the characterization of forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions in the Paraguayan State. The results show that in a period of 35 years of dictatorship there were 336 cases of forced disappearances and 59 cases of extrajudicial executions. Most of the victims were Paraguayan nationals, with a smaller percentage of foreigners. The victims did not know the reason for their detention or how long they would be detained; they were detained on the mere suspicion of belonging to a certain association linked to communism.

RESUMEN El objetivo de la presente investigación consiste en describir las desapariciones forzadas y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales durante la dictadura stronista (1954-1989) en el Paraguay. Consiste en la sistematización de los datos que se encuentra en el Tomo VIII, Parte 3 de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia en formato de fichas. La metodología aplicada fue de diseño documental, tipo empírico-cuantitativa de alcance descriptivo considerando la caracterización que se realiza de las desapariciones forzadas y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en el Estado paraguayo. Los resultados demuestran que en un periodo de 35 años de dictadura se produjeron 336 casos de desapariciones forzadas y 59 casos de ejecuciones extrajudiciales. En su mayoría las personas son de nacionalidad paraguaya y porcentaje menor de extranjeros. Las víctimas no conocían la causa de su detención y tampoco el tiempo que iban a permanecer detenidas; eran detenidas por la sola sospecha de pertenecer a una determinada asociación vinculada con el comunismo.

Levinas mainly deals with the notion of eschatology in the preface of Totalité et infini (1961). There it appears in the context of his agreement with an entire tradition of philosophers claiming that the very nature of being is one of violence and war, which becomes manifest in the pervasive waging of political battles and wars. He further contends that a conception of morality based on the "pure subjectivism of the I" is powerless to shield humankind against such violence. The alternative he offers to such an impotent morality is an ethics of alterity. Eschatology is Levinas's answer to how such an ethics of alterity would be capable of insulating humankind against calculative reason and the pressures of politics and war. To understand how eschatology succeeds in doing so and how Levinas fills in the notion, I argue that it should be understood within the context of his conceptualisation of time. Levinas offers novel analyses of the forms and the work of time. Time, in Levinas, is the very inner structure of an existent's movement of existing - I refer in this regard to the inherent chronological inconsistency of the human condition. In Levinas's ethical metaphysics this inherent chronological inconsistency is theorised as the other (autre) within the self, an affective infection that dates back to a past that has never been present - it hails from the diachronic time of the Other - and is opened to the future, "to the newness of the unknown". While this past is impossible to grasp, it nevertheless concerns me. I cannot remain unaffected in relation to it; it has left a trace. This alterity within the self becomes manifest as an inherent Desire for time, time that can only be given by the other person, which for Levinas is the Other (l'Autrui). This means that the singular time of my being is not yet time, does not yet have time, but the singular I bears an inherent Desire for time within. This Desire for time, then, emanates from the inherent chronological inconsistency which typifies the existent being "out of sync" with itself, a diastasis or a "standing apart from itself. To be sure, this Desire is not a need to be filled, but as Desire, it is essentially insatiable. This Desire conquers the ecstatic time of need and satisfaction and the inevitable return to the self, the collapse back upon oneself that follows when needs are satiated, and the return of the unbearable heaviness of being that it signals. The early Levinas (De l'évasion, 1935) was looking for an escape from this irremediable Being. Only four decades later in Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (1974) will Levinas come to fully plot out "a new path out of being," a temporal path that he started to chart in Le temps et l' autre (1948), which forges a fundamental link between time and ethics. The time that the future brings is not merely the recurrence of the present instant or its continuation, but the possibility of another instant or a new beginning. How can an existent in the instant recommence otherwise? The coming of the future announces another original instant that cannot be approached but that comes; that cannot be assumed, since it appears as an epiphany. The existent is able to welcome the absolutely strangeness of the epiphany of the future because of the inherent susceptibility to fraternity and sociality, which is made possible by time. This, however, is not time that the existent has like a possession but a capacity to welcome time that springs from an existential chronological inconsistency - a being temporally out of joint. To further specify, this "capacity" is not a power that the individual instant is endowed with. Quite to the contrary, faced with the radical strangeness of the future, with the alterity of the face of the Other, the existent is reduced to a "radical passivity. " Passivity is the radix or root of ethical agency. The capacity that time gives, is the capacity for generosity, the power to be able to give of the riches accumulated. This is not to turn away from one's egotistical selfish life once and for all, but a being turned to be able to welcome the Other without being obliterated in the face of an absolute Mystery. The instant as an interruption announces the possibility of a new beginning, which is not the effacement of the past, but the pardon that purifies the past and the injustices committed. Pardon consists in a retroactive action that inverts the natural temporal order of things and implies the "reversibility of time". Now the past instant has not passed but can be lived again, differently. In Levinas we find a non-teleological conception of time. Truth, Levinas contends, requires both an infinite time and a completed time conceived as "messianic time". Messianic time, more precisely, may be conceived as the "extreme vigilance of the messianic consciousness", since it is only such vigilant consciousness that can protect us against the revenge of evil -which infinite time cannot do. This notion of "messianic consciousness" is encapsulated in Levinas's conceptualisation of eschatology, which is the infinity beyond totality or beyond history, without denying history. The eschatological is not realised at the end of time but rather in each instant in which our responsibility vis-a-vis the Other is realised. If this responsibility exempts us from the jurisdiction of history and the future, salvation is not to be found at the end of history but remains at each moment possible. When Levinas speaks of eschatology in Totalité et Infini he does not refer to a doctrine but to a vision: "the eschatological vision" that consummates moral experience. It is not a spiritual relationship; it leads to action. To see (envision) is already to act. This action is evoked in feeling responsible in the face of the future one hopes for others. The future one hopes for others - a better future - is the eschatological vision realised in the eruption of the present as a purified past.

In hierdie essay word die plek van eskatologie in Levinas se tydsbegrip krities onder die loep geneem. Daar word aangevoer dat Levinas se nadruklike aandrang in Totalité et infini (1961), naamlik dat eskatologie etiese verantwoordelikheid fasiliteer, nie onafhanklik van sy konsep-tualisering van tyd verstaan kan word nie. Eskatologie in Levinas is nie die leer van die laaste dinge nie, maar die verklaring wat Levinas bied vir hoe 'n etiek van alteriteit daartoe in staat is om die mensdom teen die geweld van berekende rede en die druk van politiek en oorlog te beskerm. Hoe eskatologie presies hierin slaag, word uiteengesit aan die hand van Levinas se oorspronklike analises van die vorms en werk van tyd.