Resumen El artículo plantea distintas concepciones que algunas tradiciones filosóficas y religiosas, tanto de Oriente como de Occidente, han mantenido en torno a lo que es el espíritu y la manera de concebirlo. Se analiza la noción de Alianza entre Dios y el hombre y la personalización del espíritu que deriva de ello en el judaísmo; además, se exponen los argumentos que confrontan tal posición y se debate en torno al finalismo espiritual, aludiendo tanto a Spinoza como a Nagarjuna. Con todo ello, se observará que la filosofía, ya sea como herramienta o modo de vida, constituye un antecedente necesario para considerar la meta-filosofía, la cual se alude en la tercera parte del texto.

Abstract The article analyzes different conceptions that some philosophical and religious traditions, both from the East and from the West, have maintained about what the spirit is and the way of conceiving it. The notion of Alliance between God and man and the personalization of the spirit that derives from it in Judaism is analyzed; In addition, the arguments that confront such position are exposed and the spiritual finalism is discussed, alluding to both Spinoza and Nagarjuna. It will be observed that philosophy, either as a tool or a way of life, constitutes a necessary antecedent to consider metaphilosophy, which is alluded to in the third part of the text.

Resumo A maioria das abordagens da ética ambiental que contemplam a normatividade dos valores intrínsecos se baseia na ideia de amor ou reverência pela natureza. Este artigo questiona a necessidade de amar a natureza para respeitá-la como um valor em si (ou seja, como um valor intrínseco). Nesse sentido, as principais perguntas a serem respondidas são: há necessidade de considerar a natureza como sagrada para respeitá-la (ou seja, atribuir-lhe valor intrínseco)? Que tipo de coincidência existe entre Deus e o mundo natural? A resposta a essas perguntas exige uma investigação profunda sobre as ideias cosmológicas ou metafísicas (ou conceções de divindade) subjacentes a elas. Este artigo analisa, portanto, três ideias teológicas, cosmológicas ou metafísicas (ou seja, panteísmo, teísmo e conceção teleológica da natureza) relativas a valores intrínsecos: algumas delas (por exemplo, o panteísmo) contemplam a ideia da sacralidade da natureza, que tem uma clara inspiração religiosa. Esses paradigmas cosmológicos também implicam diferentes comportamentos humanos em relação à vida: 1. O panteísmo implica reverência pela Vida, uma vez que a natureza é sagrada (Deus coincide principalmente com a natureza). Assim, o ser humano faz parte de uma comunidade estendida (mais que humana). 2. O teísmo reafirma que toda forma de vida é boa, pois foi criada por Deus. Isso implica que os seres humanos são os responsáveis da criação. 3. A ideia finalística da natureza sustenta que a vida é um fim em si mesma (ou seja, tem valor intrínseco) e que nossa responsabilidade emerge tanto do valor da vida quanto do nosso impacto no meio ambiente. respeitála respeitá la seja intrínseco. intrínseco . sentido atribuirlhe atribuir lhe natural divindade elas analisa portanto teológicas exemplo religiosa 1 Vida Assim mais humana. humana humana) 2 boa criação 3 ambiente

Abstract Most approaches in environmental ethics that contemplate the normativity of intrinsic values rely on the idea of love or reverence for nature. This paper challenges the need to love nature in order to respect it as a value in itself (i.e., as an intrinsic value). In this regard, the main questions to answer are: is there a need to regard nature as sacred in order to respect it (i.e., to ascribe intrinsic value to it)? What kind of coincidence is there between God and the natural world? The response to these questions calls for a deep inquiry into the cosmological or metaphysical ideas (or conceptions of divinity) underlying them. This paper analyses, thus, three theological, cosmological, or metaphysical ideas (i.e., pantheism, theism, and teleological conception of nature) concerning intrinsic values: some of these (e.g., pantheism) contemplate the idea of the sacredness of nature, which has a clear religious inspiration. These cosmological paradigms also imply different human behaviors towards life: 1. Pantheism implies reverence for Life since nature is sacred (God mainly coincides with nature). Thus, the human being is part of the extended more-than-human community. 2. Theism reaffirms that every form of life is good since it has been created by God. This implies that human beings are the steward of creation. 3. The finalistic idea of nature sustains that life is an end in itself (i.e., has intrinsic value) and that our responsibility emerges from both the value of life and our impact on the environment. i.e., ie i e (i.e. value. . it) world divinity them analyses thus theological pantheism theism e.g., eg g (e.g. inspiration 1 Thus morethanhuman more than community 2 creation 3 environment i.e. (i.e e.g. (e.g i.e e.g

Resumen La mayoría de los enfoques en la ética ambiental que consideran la normatividad de los valores intrínsecos se basan en la idea del amor o la reverencia por la naturaleza. Este artículo cuestiona la necesidad de amar la naturaleza para respetarla como valor en sí misma (es decir, como valor intrínseco). En este sentido, las principales preguntas a las que se debe que responder son: ¿existe la necesidad de considerar la naturaleza como sagrada para respetarla (es decir, atribuirle un valor intrínseco)? ¿Qué tipo de coincidencia existe entre Dios y el mundo natural? Responder a estas preguntas exige una investigación en profundidad de las ideas cosmológicas o metafísicas (o concepciones de la divinidad) subyacentes. Por ello, este artículo analiza tres ideas teológicas, cosmológicas o metafísicas (a saber, el panteísmo, el teísmo y la concepción teleológica de la naturaleza) relativas a los valores intrínsecos; algunas de ellas (por ejemplo, el panteísmo) contemplan la idea de la sacralidad de la naturaleza, que tiene una clara inspiración religiosa. Estos paradigmas cosmológicos también implican diferentes comportamientos humanos en relación con la vida: 1. El panteísmo implica reverencia por la Vida, ya que la naturaleza es sagrada (Dios coincide principalmente con la naturaleza). Así, el ser humano forma parte de una comunidad extendida (o más que humana). 2. El teísmo reafirma que toda forma de vida es buena porque fue creada por Dios. Esto implica que los seres humanos son responsables de la creación. 3. La idea finalista de la naturaleza sostiene que la vida es un fin en sí misma (es decir, tiene un valor intrínseco) y que nuestra responsabilidad se deriva tanto del valor de la vida como de nuestro impacto en el medio ambiente. decir intrínseco. intrínseco . sentido Qué natural divinidad subyacentes ello teológicas saber ejemplo religiosa 1 Vida Así humana. humana humana) 2 creación 3 ambiente

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God's power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures' inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists' notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity.

This research focuses, firstly, on a farewell from a certain manifestation of traditional, reformed 'tamed' theism (that is in this case, theism which neglects or represses the authentic biblical insight into the triune God, who reveals himself in unfathomable hiddenness or 'masking'). The latter dimension of genuine theism was a central rediscovery of the 16th century Reformation which, however, was widely neglected and even 'nearly totally forgotten', according to H. Bavinck, in post-Reformation scholasticism. Reformed theism thus participated to a large measure, in the general rationalistic climate of the modern paradigm and its dogmatic domestication of the living God, into a cerebrally manageable idea of a God who forms the apex of a world system, constructed by sovereign Western man. The research also focuses, in the second place, on a farewell towards recovering the 'always greater God', who hides himself, as it were behind a mask, in dazzling, impenetrable light. He reveals himself obliquely from the backside, as to Moses, only after he had passed. In the fullness of time, he revealed himself in the hiddenness of Jesus Christ, culminating in the deformed humanity of a wretched criminal dying on a cross. This resurrected and exalted Crucified is now hidden in God. On the way to the final eschaton, he reveals himself in 'the garb' of his Spirit-energised Word and sacraments. Two examples of a tamed theism, possibly neglecting Divine hiddenness, are taken from our Afrikaans-reformed ambience: Afrikaner nationalism, and the sporadic encouragement to erect signs of the kingdom of God in our world. CONTRIBUTION: This research, firstly, contributes to the diagnosis and discarding of a kind of distorted reformed theism that has 'domesticated' the inscrutable hiddenness of the living triune God (still so vital to the magisterial Reformers) through a post-Reformation process of recovered scholasticism. In some ways, this frequently blended into rationalism in such a way that it did not escape accommodation to post-Enlightenment bourgeois or civil theism. Bourgeois theism is currently collapsing rapidly in many Christian theologies and churches of the West. Secondly, it contributes to the quest of many - also reformed - Christians to arrive at a renewed confession and experience in the faith of truly biblical theism. This is theism of the Deus semper major, which gives due honour to the ineffable triune God as absconditus et revelatus. Lastly, it contributes to the self-searching of Afrikaans-reformed believers as to the presence, -only traces - of tamed theism in our nationalistic heritage, and in our rightly valued theology of the kingdom of God.

Abstract Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.

Abstract According to The Evidentialist problem of Evil, the existence of disproportionate, prima facie gratuitous evil and suffering in the world is enough evidence against the existence of the Omnipotent, Perfectly Loving, Omniscient God of Classical Theism. A contemporary way of dealing with this argument is Skeptical Theism , for which the very fact that there is an huge amount of evil that looks gratuitous to us does not mean that we can reasonably believe whether this evil is indeed gratuitous or not . In this paper, I present and discuss a number of influential criticisms against this view according to which a proponent of Skeptical Theism will be forced to accept a number of unpalatable skeptical conclusions. I argue that this is not the case.

Resumen Este artículo pretende evaluar el alcance del vínculo entre el problema evidencial del mal y el papel de las intuiciones como un caso de acceso epistémico sui generis. Para ello, se analizarán en primer lugar los supuestos teóricos presentes en la comprensión de lo que es una intuición y, en consecuencia, lo que es una creencia intuitiva como caso de creencia no inferencial y a priori. Siguiendo a Church et al. (2020), un punto principal de esta investigación es resaltar el vínculo entre las intuiciones y el evidencialismo, tal y como se considera en el problema evidencial del mal. Esto permitirá un análisis racionalista moderado y empíricamente informado de lo que se entiende como evidencia respecto a la posible (o probable en algunas lecturas) no existencia de Dios, si es el caso de que hay al menos una instancia de mal gratuito (mal injustificado) en el mundo. Para fortalecer esta interpretación a favor de un vínculo a priori - a posteriori como una forma de responder al argumento del mal y su papel derrotista (Oliveira, 2019), se considerarán dos supuestos presentes en la discusión, y su plausibilidad: i) que las razones a priori no se entienden estrictamente como pruebas para la creencia religiosa de una proposición p; ii) que la irracionalidad de la creencia religiosa surge de la ausencia de justificación de la ocurrencia de un evento de maldad. Sostengo que existe una tensión entre i) y ii), específicamente en lo que respecta a la ausencia de evidencia que permita sostener la incompatibilidad entre el mal gratuito y la inexistencia de Dios.

Abstract This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, consequently, what an intuitive belief as a case of non-inferential and a priori belief is. Following Church et al (2020), one main point of this research would be to highlight the link between intuitions and evidentialism, as it is considered in the evidential problem of evil. This will allow a moderate and empirically informed rationalist analysis of what is understood as evidence regarding the possible (or probable, in some readings) non-existence of God, if it is the case that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil (pointless evil) in the world. To strengthen this interpretation in favor of an a priori - a posteriori link as a way of responding to the argument of evil and its undercutting defeater role (Oliveira, 2020), two assumptions present in the discussion and their plausibility will be considered: that a priori reasons are not strictly understood as evidence for religious belief of a proposition p; and that the irrationality of religious belief arises from the absence of justification for the occurrence of an event of evil. I maintain that there is a tension between i) and ii), specifically regarding the absence of evidence that allows us to sustain the incompatibility between gratuitous evil and the non-existence of God.

Resumo: O presente artigo pretende destacar a tese de que a natureza, conforme Feuerbach, é um existente autônomo e independente e possui primazia ante o espírito. Para ele, a natureza material, que existe, em sua diferencialidade qualitativa, independente do pensar, é, diante do espírito, o original, o fundamento não deduzível, imediato, não criado de toda existência real, que existe e consiste por si mesmo. Feuerbach opõe a natureza ao espírito, pois ele a entende não como um puro outro, que só por meio do espírito foi posto como natureza, mas, como o primeiro, a realidade objetiva, material, a qual existe fora do entendimento e é dada ao homem por meio de seus sentidos como fundamento e essência de sua vida. Trata-se, portanto, primeiro daquela essência (luz, ar água, fogo, plantas, animais etc.), sem a qual o homem não pode nem ser pensado nem existir. A natureza é, para Feuerbach, a pluralidade de todos os objetos e essências que realmente são. Sob essa condição, é possível conceber a natureza como a garantia da exterioridade mesma, como que um existente fora de nós, que nada sabe de si e é em si e por si mesmo; por conseguinte, ela não deve ser vista como aquilo que ela não é, isto é, nem como divina, nem como humana. A natureza sempre existiu, quer dizer, ela existe por si e tem seu sentido apenas em si mesma; ela é ela mesma, ou seja, nenhuma essência mística, pois, por trás dela, não se esconde nenhum absoluto, nada humano, nada divino, transcendental ou ideal.

Abstract: This article tries to delineate the proposition that to Feuerbach nature is an autonomous and independent being that comes first in comparison to the spirit. To him, material nature, that exists in its qualitative differentness, independent from thinking, is the original source, the immediate, not deductible, uncreated fundament of all real existence, that exists and consists in itself, when put vis-a-vis the spirit. Feuerbach sets nature against the spirit, for it is his understanding that nature is not a pure other that only through the spirit was set as nature, but as the first source, the objective material reality that exists outside reason and is given to man by means of his senses as fundament and essence of his life. Therefore, one is dealing first with that essence (light, air, water, fire, plants, animals etc) without which man does not exist or could be thought of as existing. To Feuerbach nature is all objects and essences put together. Under this condition it is possible to conceive nature as guarantor of externality itself as if it could exist independently from us, an entity that is unaware of itself and which exists in itself and by itself; for this reason it shall not be seen as something which it is not, i.e., neither divine nor human. Nature always existed, i.e., it exists in itself and has only meaning in itself; it is itself, i.e., it has no mystical essence, it does not hide behind it any absolute being whether human, divine, transcendental or ideal.

Science, technology, commerce and consumerism have set humankind on a trajectory towards a catastrophe of inestimable proportions. To respond appropriately to this danger, theology must replace obsolete contextualisations of its message with currently relevant ones. 'Creation out of nothing' is a case in point. Will God create a new and perfect world 'out of nothing' after we have messed up the one we have? Probably not! In Part I, I show that 'creation out of nothing' is not a relevant issue in the biblical tradition. In Part II, I argue that the concept is based on the unsupported metaphysical postulate of 'divine perfection'. In Part III, I try to find an equivalent for the concept in science that theology could link up with. 'Creation' can be equated with a cosmic evolution proceeding in levels of emergence. But 'out of nothing' cannot be supported by science. Even at the most fundamental level, energy and the way it operates, are presupposed. At lower levels, the process is guided by causality and (embedded) contingency. Intentionality and agency only appear at the personal and social levels. Dealing with existential needs, faith (appropriately) intuits a personal transcendent Source and Destiny of reality, but (inappropriately) absolutizes the personal at the expense of the impersonal aspects of reality. The laws of nature are also of God; they are essential; they are valid. They leave sufficient space for novelty and agency, but God works as much through regularity as through contingency. CONTRIBUTION: The dynamic nature of the biblical tradition demands constant re-contextualisations of its central message. 'Creation out of nothing' is part of the contextualisation of the message into the ancient Hellenistic worldview, which does not fit into the modern scientific worldview and must be replaced with a contemporarily more appropriate alternative.

When Covid-19 first broke out in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, no one suspected it would go beyond an epidemic. Within less than three months it had become a worldwide pandemic. In the first 15 months since it broke out in Wuhan, the disease grew exponentially, manifesting itself in different variants: Alpha (UK); Beta (South Africa); Gamma (Japan and Brazil); and Delta (India). In August 2021, confirmed cases were 204 million people worldwide, with about 4 million people deceased. Although the mortality rate has halted in China and slightly abated in continental Europe, Canada, Asia and South America, due to medical and social intervention strategies, it is steadily climbing in the USA and Africa. The first vaccine was ready only 12 months after the pandemic broke out, making it one of the quickest manufactured vaccines. For those who operate within a theistic framework, an avalanche of existential questions surfaced: Is this the end of the world? If so, does God, the omnipotent, omniscient and loving Divine being, not care about what seems to be the decimation of human beings on Planet Earth? If the Divine being cares, has it lost its power perhaps? Or, if it is still powerful, has it lost its affectivity? This article gives a theo-philosophical exploration of these questions to make "sense" of what seems like God's silence amid the loud noise of the Corona virus. The article asks whether God could be blamed in what may seem like silence, and argues on the meaning of God's "silence." It then constructs a theodicy that dispenses God of any wrongdoing in the current pandemic.

Abstract: On the basis of the treatment given to modern poetry in the essay Writing Degree Zero, by Roland Barthes, this work proposes a dialogue between the respective meanings of death contained in the poetic work of Walt Whitman and Pablo Neruda. This dialogue allows us to conclude, comparatively, that in both cases their works contain a heterodox eschatological poetics (regarding the Western Christian tradition, when assuming pantheistic features) and soteriological poetics (destined to save humanity), but they differ in the theistic idealism that is perceived in Whitman’s poetic itinerary in regard to Neruda’s atheist materialism.

Resumen: Sobre la base del tratamiento dado a la poesía moderna en el ensayo El grado cero de la escritura, de Roland Barthes, este trabajo propone un diálogo entre las respectivas acepciones de la muerte contenidas en la obra poética de Walt Whitman y Pablo Neruda que permite concluir, comparativamente, que en ambos casos sus obras contienen una poética escatológica heterodoxa (con respecto a la tradición occidental cristiana al asumir rasgos panteístas) y soteriológica (destinada a salvar a la humanidad), pero que difieren en cuanto al idealismo teísta que se percibe en el itinerario poético whitmaniano con respecto al materialismo ateísta nerudiano.

There has been a so called renaissance in theological studies on the Trinity in the last century. The basic outlines of many of these contributions have been pointed out as revisionist projects that are very much in line with postmodern critiques of rationality and hierarchy. This study gave an initial response by providing leading names who are critical of the revisionist proposals and who are doing important work in various areas regarding the Trinity. Some points of contention between the classical view and the personalist view of the Trinity have been pointed out in the process. These critical contributions show the importance and vibrancy of a third wave of publications on the Trinity and they advocate for a deeper appreciation of ressourcement theology. In line with these retrievement projects, two reformed theologians' recent work have been summarised in order to give an idea of the stimulating contributions that can come from the reformed base and the classical view in conversation with the personalist view. Some suggestions have also been given at the end on important aspects such as the simplicity of God that need further investigation. Some possible political implications of the classical view have also been pointed out. This whole discussion could contribute to a more definite debate on methodology and metaphysical considerations as well as the role of correlation theology in the so called personalist and social approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity. It could also provide new energy for a resurgence of ressourcement theology and retrievement projects regarding the doctrine of the Trinity among theologians in the reformed tradition in South Africa.

Abstract This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside the debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I shall first examine Plantinga’s argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between the theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I defend that Plantiga’s argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I shall argue that if such notion is replaced by James’s pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible to conclude 1 and 2.

Resumen Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Resumen En este artículo pretendo mostrar que el teísmo escéptico (TE) implica el rechazo del escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío (ELA). Lo anterior resulta debido a que TE sostiene el denominado argumento evidencial del mal contra el teísmo. Dicho argumento presupone el libre albedrío (como una premisa oculta), conduciendo hacia una conclusión escéptica sin cuestionar si quiera la posibilidad de ELA. Afirmo, entonces, que este tipo de conflicto entre dos escenarios escépticos remueve la validez tanto de TE como de ELA: resulta ad hoc asumir un escenario escéptico E1 (TE), el cual apoya la tesis T1, y que implícitamente rechaza las consecuencias de otro escenario escéptico E2 (ELA) que descarta T1. Lo anterior implica el rechazo de la denominada parálisis moral (PM) y revela una tensión entre el escepticismo moral (EM), TE y ELA. Adicionalmente, se discuten las conexiones entre escepticismo, dogmatismo y ateísmo como un caso de refutabilidad epistémica.

Abstract In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as a hidden premise), conducting this way to a skeptical conclusion without questioning the plausibility of FWS in the first place. I argue that this kind of conflict between two skeptical scenarios removes the validity of ST and FWS: It is ad hoc to assume a skeptical scenario S1 (ST) that supports thesis T1, and implicitly rejects the consequences of another skeptical scenario S2 (FWS) that discards T1. This implies the rejection of the so-called Moral Paralysis (MP) and shows a tension between Moral Skepticism (MS), ST and FWS. Moreover, the links between skepticism, dogmatism and atheism, as a case of epistemic defeasibility, are discussed.

Resumo Nesse artigo tento demostrar que o teísmo cético (ST por sua sigla em inglês) implica a rejeição do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS por sua sigla em inglês). Isso devido a que o teísmo cético (ST) admite um suposto argumento evidente do mal contra o teísmo. Esse argumento pressupõe o livre alvedrio (como premissa oculta), para conduzir desse modo a uma conclusão cética sem problematizar, primeiramente, a legitimidade do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS). A meu ver, esse tipo de conflito entre dois cenários céticos elimina a validade do teísmo cético (ST) e do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS): isto é assumir ad hoc um cenário cético S1(teísmo cético) que afirma a tese T1, mas implicitamente rejeita as consequências do outro cenário cético S2 (ceticismo do livre alvedrio) que desconsidera T1. Isso indica a rejeição da suposta Paralisia Moral (MP) e aponta à tensão entre o ceticismo moral (MS), o teísmo cético (ST) e o ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS). Além disso, problematizam-se as relações entre ceticismo, dogmatismo e ateísmo, como um caso de improbabilidade epistêmica.

ABSTRACT The First National Congress of Philosophy held in the province of Mendoza (Argentina) in 1949, was an important event of the argentine philosophical culture. The relevance of this Congress and the international hierarchy of its expositors allow an approach to it as a historical event in which converge theories and cultural discourses circulating at that time. Thus we can access to the objective manifestations of the dominant conceptions. Indeed, that philosophical assembly in many ways reflected the tensions and debates present at that time in the world philosophical horizon. One of those debates is given into the existentialism and has as its focus of interest the possibility of reconciling this new philosophical perspective with theistic conceptions, predominantly christians conceptions. This contribution aims to visualize how and in which way this debate is presented at our congress, reflecting of unique manner one of the great philosophical tensions of that time.

RESUMEN El Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía llevado a cabo en la provincia de Mendoza (Argentina) en el año 1949, fue un acontecimiento culmen de la cultura filosófica argentina. Su relevancia y la jerarquía internacional de sus expositores permiten aproximarse a él en tanto acontecimiento histórico en el que confluyen las teorías y discursos culturales circulantes en la época. De este modo podemos acceder a las manifestaciones objetivas de los enfoques dominantes. En efecto, aquella asamblea filosófica reflejó en muchos sentidos las tensiones y los debates presentes a la sazón en el horizonte filosófico mundial. Uno de tales debates es el que se da al interior del existencialismo y que tiene como foco de interés la posibilidad de conciliar esta nueva perspectiva filosófica con concepciones teístas, predominantemente cristianas. La presente contribución tiene como objeto visualizar cómo y de qué manera dicho debate se hace presente en nuestro congreso, espejando de modo singular una de las grandes tensiones filosóficas de la época.