El presente trabajo pretende investigar las interacciones entre policías y Outsiders en flagrantes de drogas y las negociaciones de mercancía política, su evolución y enmascaramientos, destacando cómo tales dinámicas moldean la aplicación de la ley y las percepciones de justicia en la ciudad de Río de Janeiro. Además de que la etiquetación de los individuos vistos como externos es una construcción política, el trabajo también profundiza en el concepto de “sujeción criminal”, que abarca tanto los procesos de criminalización preventiva de los tipos sociales potencialmente criminales como los de subjetivación de las etiquetas que se les asignan (Grillo, 2008, p. 146), es decir, la creación de clasificaciones subjetivas de quién es “bandido” y quién no lo es. Así se moldean los conflictos urbanos y las diferentes abordajes según los marcadores sociales de los individuos y los lugares de flagrante, exponiendo las manifestaciones de violencia urbana y sociabilidad violenta, incluso en el Sistema de Justicia con el fundamento de la subjetividad de la Ley de Drogas.

This paper aims to investigate the interactions between police officers and outsiders in drug trafficking and political commodity negotiations, their evolution, and masking, highlighting how such dynamics shape law enforcement and perceptions of justice in Rio de Janeiro. In addition to the labeling of individuals seen as Outsiders being a political construction, the paper also delves into the concept of “criminal subjection”, which encompasses both the processes of preventive criminalization of potentially criminal social types and the subjectivization of the labels attributed to them (Grillo, 2008, p. 146), causing subjective classifications of who is a “bandido” and who is not. Thus, urban conflicts and different approaches are shaped according to the social markers of individuals and locations of the act, exposing the manifestations of urban violence and violent sociability.

O presente trabalho pretende investigar as interações entre policiais e outsiders em flagrantes de drogas e as negociações de mercadoria política, sua evolução e mascaramentos, destacando como tais dinâmicas moldam as aplicações da lei e as percepções de justiça na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Além da rotulação nos indivíduos vistos como Outsiders ser uma construção política, o trabalho também se aprofunda no conceito de “sujeição criminal”, que abrange tanto os processos de criminalização preventivo dos tipos sociais potencialmente criminosos, quanto os de subjetivação dos rótulos que lhe são atribuídos (Grillo, 2008, p. 146), isto é, fazendo que classificações subjetivas de quem é “bandido” e quem não é, nasçam. Moldando assim os conflitos urbanos e abordagens diferentes de acordo com os marcadores sociais de indivíduos e locais de flagrante, expondo as manifestações de violência urbana e sociabilidade violenta, inclusive no Sistema de Justiça com o alicerce da subjetividade da Lei de Drogas.

In King v De Jager (CCT 315/18) [2021] ZACC 4 (19 February 2021), the Constitutional Court considered whether a discriminatory out-and-out disinheritance clause in a private will could be declared unenforceable in terms of public policy. This opened private wills with disinheritance clauses to the scrutinising evaluation of public values despite freedom of testation. Although public policy has always been an elusive concept, South African public policy is infused with constitutional values to give more clarity on the content of public policy. In King a conflation emerged between constitutional rights, legislative violations and public policy values, however. The court grappled with the question of whether to apply the Constitution directly based on a violation in terms of section 9(4) or whether the section 8 of the Equality Act should be applied directly through the subsidiarity principle, or whether the discriminatory clause should be evaluated through the public policy lens. Where the conflicting values were weighed up there seem to be hints of subjective views to tip the scales in favour of one value over another. This is a concern when public policy is used to advance a subjective view of what the community values more, especially when it involves the disruption of the devolvement of a deceased's estate. This underlines the difficult application of public policy values, even in a constitutional democracy, when competing values are at play.

RESUMEN En el presente artículo se analiza la actual inclinación del legislador ecuatoriano, de identificar al dolo como una situación interna del autor del injusto penal, mediante la definición expresa del conocimiento y la voluntad en el Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP). Esta definición expresa ha generado dos consecuencias opuestas: por una parte, el retroceso en el avance del dolo al actual tráfico social (negativa), y por otra, la seguridad jurídica que se le brinda al autor del injusto penal (positiva). Del análisis de estas dos consecuencias se reconoce que el derecho penal ecuatoriano opta por la seguridad jurídica, en detrimento del avance del dolo y del derecho penal. Al respecto, se invita a la reflexión sobre este particular con el objetivo de encontrar una forma de legitimar este avance del dolo en el tráfico social, sin violentar derechos constitucionales. Para lograr esto, como primer paso, se debe cambiar la actual inclinación del legislador, mediante la normativización del dolo. Así, mediante el empleo de una metodología inductiva y hermenéutica, se emprende una labor de legitimación de esta normativización en el derecho penal ecuatoriano, llegando finalmente a concluir en su viabilidad. Esto se lo hace sin reconocer una normativización plenamente estandarizada, sino también tomando en cuenta criterios que respeten la dignidad humana, mediante la evitabilidad individual.

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the current inclination of the ecuadorian legislator, to identify mens rea as an internal situation of the perpetrator, through the definition of knowledge and will in the Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP). This definition has generated two opposite consequences, on the one hand, the regression in the advance of mens rea to the current social traffic (negative), and on the other, the legal certainty afforded to the perpetrator (positive). From the analysis of these two consequences, it is recognized that ecuadorian criminal law opts for legal certainty. In this regard, a reflection on this particular issue is invited, with the aim of finding a way to legitimize this advance of mens rea in social traffic, without violating constitutional rights. To achieve this, as a first step, mens rea must be changed, through its normativization. Thus, through the use of an inductive and hermeneutic methodology, a work of legitimization of this normativization is undertaken, finally concluding in its viability. This is done without recognizing a fully standardized normativization, but also taking into account criteria that respect human dignity, through individual avoidability.

Abstract: This work proposes to reclaim the concept of human duties in contemporary constitutional theory. To achieve this goal, it analyzes the technical concept of subjective duty, distinguishes duties from other legal categories related to it, and accounts for the excess of human rights and the corresponding absence of human duties. A proposal is also made to have a catalog of human duties that could be incorporated into the Mexican constitution. So, supported by the philosophy of law, it is asseverated that the defense and protection of freedoms requires both the participation of human rights and human duties.

Resumen: Esta obra propone recuperar en la teoría constitucional contemporánea el concepto de deberes humanos. Para lograr ese objetivo, analiza el concepto técnico de deber, distingue los deberes de otras categorías jurídicas que le están vinculadas y da cuenta del exceso de derechos humanos y la correspondiente ausencia de los deberes humanos. También se hace una propuesta para contar con un catálogo de deberes humanos que pudieran incorporarse a la Constitución mexicana. Con el apoyo de la filosofía del derecho, se afirma que la defensa y protección de las libertades requieren tanto del concurso de los derechos como de los deberes humanos.

Abstract This article challenges four basic and intertwining assumptions informing orthodox comparative law: that a comparatist can exactly represent foreign law; that he can write about foreign law objectively; that he can state the truth regarding foreign law; and that he enjoys the subjective agency to overcome the obstacles on the way to the achievement of these goals. Comparatists-at-law being oblivious to their structural cognitive weakness, which makes the pursuit of these realizations irredeemably preposterous, a strong contrarian programme is necessary so as to bring comparative law to its epistemological senses and, in the process, to heighten the scholarly integrity and reliability of comparative interventions. This article succinctly formulates such an oppositional stance. objectively goals Comparatistsatlaw Comparatists at weakness preposterous process interventions stance

Resumo Este artigo desafia quatro pressupostos básicos e entrelaçados que informam o Direito Comparado ortodoxo: que um comparatista pode representar exatamente o Direito estrangeiro; que ele pode escrever sobre Direito estrangeiro objetivamente; que ele pode declarar a verdade sobre o Direito estrangeiro; e que ele desfruta do arbítrio subjetivo para superar os obstáculos no caminho para a realização desses objetivos. Sendo os comparatistas do Direito alheios à sua fraqueza cognitiva estrutural, que torna a busca dessas realizações irremediavelmente absurda, um forte programa contrário é necessário para trazer o Direito Comparado a seus sentidos epistemológicos e, no processo, aumentar a integridade acadêmica e confiabilidade de intervenções comparativas. Este artigo formula sucintamente tal postura de oposição. ortodoxo objetivamente objetivos estrutural absurda processo comparativas oposição

Abstract This paper aims to study the article 398 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure according to the parameters of the offense principle. For this purpose, we will proceed as follows. In the first sections of the article, we will analyze the nature of petty crimes in the Chilean legal system. Then, we will study the subjective teleological content of the suspension of the sentence and its effects. Finally, we will study the criteria to differentiate the principle of offense and harm, focusing on the need to implement a reading that avoids excessive criminalization of misdemeanors in the Chilean criminal system. 39 purpose follows system Then effects Finally harm 3

Resumen Este trabajo busca estudiar la disposición del artículo 398 del Código Procesal Penal chileno según los parámetros del principio de ofensa. Para esto procederemos de la siguiente forma. En las primeras secciones del artículo, analizaremos la naturaleza de los delitos de bagatela en el ordenamiento jurídico chileno. Luego, estudiaremos el contenido teleológico subjetivo de la suspensión de la pena y sus efectos. Finalmente, presentaremos los criterios para diferenciar el principio de ofensa y del daño, enfocados en la necesidad de implementar una lectura desde la noción de ofensa que evite una sanción excesiva de faltas en el ordenamiento penal chileno. 39 forma Luego efectos Finalmente daño 3

In King v De Jager (CCT 315/18) [2021] ZACC 4 (19 February 2021), the Constitutional Court considered whether a discriminatory out-and-out disinheritance clause in a private will could be declared unenforceable in terms of public policy. This opened private wills with disinheritance clauses to the scrutinising evaluation of public values despite freedom of testation. Although public policy has always been an elusive concept, South African public policy is infused with constitutional values to give more clarity on the content of public policy. In King a conflation emerged between constitutional rights, legislative violations and public policy values, however. The court grappled with the question of whether to apply the Constitution directly based on a violation in terms of section 9(4) or whether the section 8 of the Equality Act should be applied directly through the subsidiarity principle, or whether the discriminatory clause should be evaluated through the public policy lens. Where the conflicting values were weighed up there seem to be hints of subjective views to tip the scales in favour of one value over another. This is a concern when public policy is used to advance a subjective view of what the community values more, especially when it involves the disruption of the devolvement of a deceased's estate. This underlines the difficult application of public policy values, even in a constitutional democracy, when competing values are at play.

Abstract Recently, production and consumption waste has been recognized as a distinct legal category in the environmental law of the Russian Federation. This regulatory category has been changed several times within a short period. The study evidences that these changes were ontological, resulting from a change in approach to the distinction of waste from other results of economic activity. In practice, these changes introduced new characteristics into the concept of waste, each of which is related to one of the approaches to understanding the essence of waste identified by the authors of the article. The article reveals handicaps of earlier and contemporary approaches to understanding the legal essence of waste in Russia. Based on the results of the study, a new subjective approach is proposed. This approach can serve as a starting point for shaping a new conceptual understanding of waste able to improve environmental law and promote quality enforcement. Recently Federation period ontological activity practice Russia proposed enforcement

Resumo Os resíduos de produção e consumo passaram a ser considerados uma categoria legal separada na lei ambiental da Federação Russa há relativamente pouco tempo. E o regulamento da categoria foi várias vezes alterado nesse curto período. O estudo demonstra que tais mudanças foram ontológicas, fundamentadas pela mudança de abordagem da diferenciação dos resíduos em relação aos demais resultados das atividades econômicas. Na prática, tais mudanças introduziram novas características ao conceito de resíduos. Cada uma delas está relacionada a uma das abordagens de compreensão da essência dos resíduos identificadas pelos autores do artigo. O artigo revela deficiências das abordagens anteriores e contemporâneas para a compreensão da essência jurídica dos resíduos que se formaram na Rússia. Pelos resultados do estudo, é proposta uma nova abordagem subjetiva, que pode servir como ponto de partida para moldar uma nova compreensão conceitual dos resíduos que melhorará a qualidade da lei ambiental e da fiscalização. tempo período ontológicas econômicas prática Rússia subjetiva fiscalização

The doctrine of subjective rights forms part of South African jurisprudence. This is not the case in English law, which, for instance, does not clearly distinguish between property, as a legal object, and property rights. However, if one considers Sir William Blackstone's famous definition of property in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, it does contain some features of the doctrine: the definition is about the "right of property" and its features. Property as object, and right of property as a right, are distinguished. A right of property has entitlements and operates against third parties. A property right involves a legal relationship between a person and a thing, as well as a legal relationship between a person and third parties. In conclusion, the Blackstonian definition contains features of the doctrine of subjective rights that are useful when analysing property rights in English common law systems. "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job." - Winston Churchill

Resumen: El análisis del daño moral permite reflexionar en torno a lo que debemos entender conceptualmente por él sea desde una perspectiva subjetiva como objetiva. En el primero de los ámbitos la doctrina en general ha tratado el daño moral bajo la perspectiva de perturbaciones extrapatrimoniales de bienes, cosas o derechos; en circunstancias que, desde el segundo, se refleja un esfuerzo por analizarlo desde el prisma de la afectación a intereses, postura que defendemos. A su turno, la aproximación conceptual repercute en estándar probatorio de los presupuestos que lo configuran, aspecto que debiera incidir en la cuantificación del agravio. Así, el daño moral subjetivo supone mayor relajo en el estándar, mientras que el daño moral objetivo o anclado en el interés, exige un reforzamiento en el mismo. Ambos aspectos si bien son susceptibles de distinguirse tanto en el plano contractual como en el extracontractual, se constriñen en el primero básicamente por razones de régimen, el cual exige la identificación de interés protegido dentro del ámbito del contrato. Resumen objetiva bienes derechos segundo intereses defendemos turno configuran agravio Así mismo extracontractual régimen contrato

Abstract: The analysis of moral damages must lead us to reflect upon the boundaries of such a concept, either from a subjective or an objective standpoint. In the case of the first approach, the specialized literature has understood moral damages, in general, under the idea of non-pecuniary disturbances on goods, things or rights. While, in the case of the second, efforts have been focused on analyzing the infringement of certain interests, which is actually the standpoint we defend here. Additionally, it should be noted that the respective conceptual approach has major implications on the evidentiary standard when it comes to proving moral damages, as well as it also impacts on the quantification of torts. Accordingly, subjective moral damages imply a more relaxed standard, while objective moral damages (or those anchored to interests) call for a stricter one. Although these two aspects can be distinguished according to the corresponding sphere, whether it be contractual or non-contractual, they remain limited in the former mainly because of its own legal regime, which requires identifying a protected interest within the scope of a contract. Abstract concept general nonpecuniary non pecuniary goods rights While second interests here Additionally torts Accordingly one sphere noncontractual, noncontractual contractual, non-contractual regime contract

Abstract Legal dogmatics needs to philosophically examine its own problems. This text illustrates this through the cases of Kant and Stoicism, in which we can see how the modern idea according to which property also falls reflexively on oneself does not prevent the idea that since ancient times it was thought that one’s own body or life could be totally or partially disposable. With support from the secondary literature on Kant, here it is argued that, despite Kant’s contrary expressions, the human being is not only master of himself, but also owner of himself. It is also argued that such a property is only Kantian reasonable in a non-libertarian sense dependent on pure subjective whim, but broad and eo ipso circumscribed. In addition, an attempt is made to show that the duty towards oneself to preserve one’s life can coexist with self-ownership and even with an exceptional admission of suicide, which is an extreme manifestation of human self-ownership. Finally, it ends by suggesting that in this last question Kant seems to welcome some Stoic reflections.

Resumen La dogmática jurídica necesita examinar filosóficamente sus propios problemas. Este texto lo ilustra a través de los casos de Kant y el estoicismo, en los cuales se aprecia cómo es que la idea moderna según la cual la propiedad también recae reflejamente sobre sí mismo no obsta a que desde antiguo se pensara que el cuerpo o vida propias pudiese ser total o parcialmente disponible. Con apoyo en la literatura secundaria sobre Kant, aquí se argumenta que, pese a las expresiones contrarias de Kant, el ser humano es no solo señor de sí mismo, sino a la vez propietario de sí. También se arguye que tal propiedad solo es kantianamente razonable en un sentido no libertario dependiente del puro antojo subjetivo, sino amplio y eo ipso circunscrito. Además, se intenta hacer ver que el deber para con uno mismo de conservar la propia vida puede coexistir con una propiedad de sí e incluso con una admisión excepcional del suicidio, que es una manifestación extrema de la autopropiedad humana. En fin, se termina sugiriendo que en esta última cuestión Kant parece acoger algunas reflexiones estoicas.

Abstract The risk theory or objective liability dispenses proof of guilt or intent and requires only the occurrence of damage and the causal link. Although the constitution establishes the responsibility for work accidents as subjective, it has been observed in the doctrine and in the judiciary the adoption of objective liability in some cases of accidents and occupational diseases. This study aims to analyze the decisions of the Regional Labor Court of the 15th Region - São Paulo to know in which situations the court has used objective liability. The quantitative-qualitative, exploratory and descriptive research was developed based on document analysis and literature review. The document research was carried out in judgments that contained the descriptor “work accident,” available in the database of the Regional Labor Court of the 15th Region, judged between 11/11/2015 and 10/11/2017. The results indicated that, of the total of 559 cases judged, in 275 the decision was founded, being 15% by objective liability. Considering only the founded cases, objective liability appeared in 30.5% of them. This percentage reveals that decision-making based on the notion of objective liability is already expressive in this court, and that such adoption has the potential to affect accident prevention practices. link subjective diseases th quantitativequalitative, quantitativequalitative quantitative qualitative, qualitative quantitative-qualitative review accident, 11112015 11 2015 11/11/201 10112017 10 2017 10/11/2017 55 27 15 305 30 5 30.5 them decisionmaking making practices 1111201 1 201 11/11/20 1011201 10/11/201 2 3 30. 111120 20 11/11/2 101120 10/11/20 11112 11/11/ 10112 10/11/2 1111 11/11 1011 10/11/ 111 11/1 101 10/11 11/ 10/1 10/

Resumo A teoria do risco ou da responsabilidade objetiva dispensa a comprovação da culpa ou do dolo e tem como requisitos a ocorrência do dano e o nexo causal. Embora a constituição disponha a responsabilidade por acidente de trabalho como subjetiva, se tem observado na doutrina e no judiciário a adoção da responsabilidade objetiva em alguns casos de acidentes e doenças ocupacionais. Este estudo tem por objetivo analisar decisões do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 15ª Região - São Paulo para conhecer em que situações a corte tem utilizado a responsabilidade objetiva. A pesquisa quanti-qualitativa, de caráter exploratório e descritivo, foi desenvolvida com base em análise documental e revisão bibliográfica. A pesquisa documental foi realizada em acórdãos que continham o descritor “acidente de trabalho”, disponíveis na base de dados do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 15ª Região, julgados no período entre 11/11/2015 e 10/11/2017. Os resultados indicaram que, do total de 559 casos julgados, em 275 a decisão foi de procedência, sendo 15% por responsabilidade objetiva. Considerando apenas os casos procedentes, a responsabilidade objetiva apareceu em 30,5% deles. Esse percentual revela que já é expressiva nessa corte a tomada de decisão com base na noção de responsabilidade objetiva, e que tal adoção tem potencial para afetar práticas de prevenção de acidentes. causal subjetiva ocupacionais ª quantiqualitativa, quantiqualitativa quanti qualitativa, qualitativa quanti-qualitativa descritivo bibliográfica trabalho, , trabalho” 11112015 11 2015 11/11/201 10112017 10 2017 10/11/2017 55 27 procedência 15 procedentes 305 30 5 30,5 deles 1111201 1 201 11/11/20 1011201 10/11/201 2 3 30, 111120 20 11/11/2 101120 10/11/20 11112 11/11/ 10112 10/11/2 1111 11/11 1011 10/11/ 111 11/1 101 10/11 11/ 10/1 10/

In its judgment in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2022 2 BCLR 129 (CC), the Constitutional Court declared section 10(1) of the Equality Act unconstitutional and invalid to the narrow extent that section 10(1)(a) refers to the intention to be "hurtful". The prohibition on hate speech passed constitutional muster in all other respects. In addition, the court purposively interpreted aspects of the application of section 10(1) so as to limit its impact on the right to freedom of expression. This contribution firstly welcomes the court's reliance on the transformative goals of the Constitution and the Equality Act as its primary framework in interpreting section 10(1). The severance of section 10(1)(a) and the conjunctive reading of sections 10(1)(b) and (c) ("be harmful or to incite harm" and "promote or propagate hatred" respectively) also seem sensible considering the court's broad definition of "harm". The article further emphasises that the terms of section 10 call for a proper consideration of context. In this regard, the court rightly considered the extreme homophobia in the society addressed by Mr Qwelane, the particular vulnerability of the target group and the real threat of devastating imminent consequences to conclude that Qwelane's words were clearly intended to "incite harm" and "propagate hatred". Yet the court's view that the speaker's subjective intention is irrelevant in performing the requisite objective reasonableness assessment from the ambit of section 10(1) is arguably less judicious, as is the categorical exclusion of expression in private. Ultimately, the objective case-by-case reasonableness inquiry under section 10(1) should be whether a reasonable person in the speaker's position should have refrained from making the impugned harmful discriminatory utterances. This inquiry involves a determination of wrongfulness based on the constitutional duty not to discriminate unfairly. It invokes all the aspects of the Equality Act's definition of discrimination as well as all the elements of fairness analysis set out in section 14 of the Equality Act. Factors to be considered include the value of the particular expression, and the extent of the (potential) harm to individual members of a protected group and to society as a whole, as well as justification considerations such as the respondent's legitimate and bona fide exercise of the right to freedom of expression and to privacy.

RESUMEN: Teniendo a la vista diversos desarrollos dogmáticos comparados que justifican la generalización del control de contenido de cláusulas no negociadas, se examina el ámbito subjetivo de aplicación del referido control en el Derecho chileno, revisando tanto las disposiciones que se refieren expresamente a él como las reglas y principios de Derecho civil que permitirían su generalización. Se sostiene que las reglas que expresamente permiten alguna medida de control no son especiales, sino más bien concreciones de una regla general presente en el Derecho civil.

ABSTRACT: Taking into view various compared dogmatic developments that justify the generalization of the fairness control of non-negotiated terms, the subjective scope of application of the referred control in Chilean Law is examined, reviewing both the provisions that expressly refer to it as well as the rules and principles of civil law that would allow its generalization. It is argued that the rules that expressly allow some measure of control are not special, but rather concretions of a general rule present in civil law.

RESUMEN El artículo se enfoca en la aspiración de movilidad social subjetiva y relativa de jóvenes del último año de las licenciaturas de Administración, Derecho e Ingeniería de dos universidades consolidadas de la Ciudad de México, una pública y otra privada, que se distinguen por su configuración sociocultural.1 Ante la pregunta: ¿aspiran los estudiantes universitarios mexicanos de universidades públicas y privadas consolidadas a la movilidad social? comparamos su percepción de clase social familiar y su aspiración de posición social en lo laboral, lo económico y de prestigio, por género y carrera. Encontramos que aspiran a moverse subjetiva e intergeneracionalmente con diferencias entre quienes estudian en la universidad pública y la privada, porque las configuraciones entre variables juegan de diferente manera.

ABSTRACT The article focuses on the aspiration of subjective and relative social mobility of young people in their last year of Administration, Law and Engineering degrees from two consolidated universities in Mexico City, one public and the other private, distinguished by their sociocultural configuration. . Faced with the question: do Mexican university students from consolidated public and private universities aspire to social mobility? We compared their perception of family social class and their aspirations for social position in employment, economic and prestige, by gender and career. We found that they aspire to move subjectively and intergenerationally with differences between those who study at the public and private universities, because the configurations between variables play in different ways.