Resumo: Diagora e Teodoro sono due degli atei ricordati in vari cataloghi sugli atei dell’antichità, il primo dei quali risalente al II sec. a.C., e da allora in poi ricordati, dagli antichi fino ai giorni nostri, immancabilmente con la qualifica di atei. In effetti l’ateismo condannato ad Atene affondava le sue radici nella cultura filosofica e scientifica presocratica, la cui impronta fondamentalmente “materialistica” è autorevolmente testimoniata da Aristotele (Metafisica I 983b5-10). Le filosofie di Anassimandro, Anassimene, Senofane, Eraclito, Anassagora, Diogene di Apollonia, e naturalmente degli atomisti e dei sofisti offrirono, sia pure in maniere diverse, non solo un supporto importante alla critica delle divinità tradizionali, ma anche le fondamenta filosofiche dell’ateismo. Con questa tradizione Diagora non ha nulla a che vedere; anche alcune vicende della sua vita possono al massimo meritargli l’accusa di empio, ma non di ateo. Di altra tempra culturale appare Teodoro, vicino non solo alla cultura della scuola cirenaica, ma anche dei cinici e dei sofisti. Di lui abbiamo non solo dei riferimenti a dottrine filosofiche, ma anche chiare testimonianze del suo ateismo, essendosi dedicato a «eliminare radicalmente le comuni credenze negli dèi». In conclusione, mentre il nome di Diagora può tranquillamente cancellarsi dai cataloghi degli atei, quello di Teodoro a buon diritto vi fa parte. Resumo dellantichità, dellantichità dell antichità, antichità dell’antichità sec aC C a.C. nostri lateismo l ateismo presocratica materialistica “materialistica Metafisica 983b510. 983b510 b 983b5 10 . 983b5-10) Anassimandro Anassimene Senofane Eraclito Anassagora Apollonia offrirono diverse tradizionali dellateismo. dellateismo ateismo. dell’ateismo vedere laccusa accusa empio ateo cirenaica eliminare dèi dèi» conclusione parte a.C 983b51 983b 1 983b5-10 983b5-1 983b5-

Abstract: Diagoras and Theodorus are two of the atheists remembered in several catalogues of atheists in Antiquity, the first of which dates back to the 2nd century BC, and from then on invariably referred to by the ancients and to the present day as atheists. In fact, the atheism condemned in Athens had its roots in the pre-Socratic philosophical and scientific culture, whose fundamentally "materialistic" imprint is authoritatively testified to by Aristotle (Metaphysics I 983b5-10). The philosophies of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and of course the Atomists and Sophists offered, albeit in different ways, not only some important support for the critique of traditional divinities, but also for the philosophical foundations of atheism. Diagoras has nothing to do with this tradition; even some events in his life may at most merit the accusation of being impious, but not of being an atheist. Theodore appears to be of a different cultural temperament, close not only to the culture of the Cyrenaic school, but also to that of the Cynics and the Sophists. We have not only references to his philosophical doctrines, but also clear evidence of his atheism, having dedicated himself to "radically eliminating common beliefs in the gods". In conclusion, while Diagora's name can safely be removed from the catalogues of atheists, Theodore's is rightly included. Abstract Antiquity nd BC fact preSocratic pre Socratic materialistic "materialistic Metaphysics 983b510. 983b510 b 983b5 10 . 983b5-10) Anaximander Anaximenes Xenophanes Heraclitus Anaxagoras Apollonia offered ways divinities tradition impious atheist temperament school doctrines radically gods. gods gods" conclusion Diagora s Theodores included 983b51 983b 1 983b5-10 983b5-1 983b5-

Résume: Héliodore est connu pour sa technique narrative élaborée. Cet effet est dû à l’ekphrasis, une ressource largement employée par les sophistes et recommandée dans les manuels de rhétorique (Progymnasmata). Dans le premier bloc de l’œuvre, Héliodore utilise cette ressource, mais pas au hasard. Il y a une image, littéral ou métaphoriquement se répète : le labyrinthe. Notre intention est de démontrer que les répétitions ont un point commun, en plus d’un fort attrait herméneutique. De plus, les labyrinthes sont introduits dans la partie où le récit est habilement écrit in medias res. C’ést précisément dans ce passage que le lecteur, comme dans un labyrinthe, est sinueusement conduit par plusieurs chemins, jusqu’à ce qu’il atteigne la compréhension de la scène d’ouverture, à l’embouchure du Nil. L’analyse des procédures utilisées par Héliodore permet de conclure que la succession de labyrinthes textuels ou imagethiques place le lecteur dans un jeu, dont il ne pourra sortir qu’à la fin du cinquième livre. Résume élaborée lekphrasis, lekphrasis l ekphrasis, ekphrasis l’ekphrasis Progymnasmata. Progymnasmata . (Progymnasmata) lœuvre, lœuvre œuvre, œuvre l’œuvre hasard image labyrinthe commun dun d herméneutique res Cést C ést chemins jusquà jusqu quil qu douverture, douverture ouverture, ouverture d’ouverture lembouchure embouchure Nil Lanalyse L analyse jeu quà livre (Progymnasmata

Abstract: Heliodorus is known for his elaborate narrative technique. This effect is due to ekphrasis, a resource widely used by sophists and recommended in textbooks of rhetoric (Progymnasmata). In the first block of the work, Heliodorus uses this resource, but not randomly. There is an image, literally or metaphorically repeating itself: the labyrinth. Our intention is to demonstrate that the repetitions have a commonality, in addition to a strong hermeneutical appeal. Moreover, the labyrinths are introduced in the part where the narrative is skillfully written in medias res. It is precisely in this passage that the reader, as in a labyrinth, is meanderingly led by several paths, until he reaches the understanding of the opening scene, at the mouth of the Nile. The analysis of the procedures used by Heliodorus leads to the conclusion that the succession of textual or imagethic labyrinths places the reader in a game, from which he can only emerge at the end of the fifth book. Abstract technique ekphrasis Progymnasmata. Progymnasmata . (Progymnasmata) work randomly image itself labyrinth commonality appeal Moreover res paths scene Nile game book (Progymnasmata

Abstract: Starting from the hunting treatise Cynegeticus, assigned to Xenophon, this article seeks to reflect on the way in which the construction of the ideal hunter of the polis described by the Attic author. This aim will aboard both practical terms - equipment, prey, methods of hunting conducting etc - and moral terms, taking in account the numerous attacks made against the sophists throughout the booklet. To accomplish this aim, the present text includes a brief recapitulation of Xenophon's life, the most important historiographical interpretations on the Cynegeticus and its dating, and, finally, the way in which the Attic author describes his ideal Greek hunter. Abstract Xenophon equipment prey booklet Xenophons s life dating finally

Resumo: Partindo do tratado de caça Cinegético, de autoria atribuída a Xenofonte, este artigo busca refletir sobre a maneira como se dá a construção do caçador ideal da pólis descrito pelo autor ático. Este objetivo se dará tanto em termos práticos - equipamentos, presas, métodos de condução da cinegética etc - quanto em termos morais, em vista dos inúmeros ataques desferidos contra os sofistas ao longo do opúsculo. Para cumpri-lo, o presente texto comporta uma breve recapitulação da vida de Xenofonte, as interpretações historiográficas mais importantes relativas ao Cinegético e à sua datação, e, por fim, a forma como o autor ático descreve seu caçador grego ideal. Resumo Xenofonte equipamentos presas morais opúsculo cumprilo, cumprilo cumpri lo, lo cumpri-lo datação fim

Resumo: A tradução apresenta ao público de língua portuguesa o texto “A história da dialética”, de Herbert Marcuse. Publicado como parte do verbete “Dialética”, na enciclopédia Marxism, Communism, and Western Societies: A Comparative Encyclopaedia (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), este trabalho fornece uma análise acadêmica relativamente detalhada do “Significado da dialética na Filosofia Antiga”, iniciando em Zenão, nos sofistas e Sócrates, passando por Platão e Aristóteles e concluindo com uma abordagem sobre os estoicos e Plotino; na sequência, volta-se para o horizonte da Filosofia Moderna, a que Marcuse dedica a seção “Significado da dialética em Kant, Fichte e Hegel”; o texto é finalizado com uma análise sobre o “Significado e o alcance da dialética em Marx”, único filósofo privilegiado com uma seção própria. De modo geral, esta publicação revela Marcuse como um estudioso de primeira classe do conceito de dialética e oferece ao leitor uma análise abrangente e extremamente qualificada da história da dialética, no plano filosófico.

Abstract: This translation provides a Portuguese version of “The History of Dialectics”, written by Herbert Marcuse. The original was published as an encyclopedia entry on “Dialectics”, in Marxism, Communism, and Western Societies: A Comparative Encyclopaedia (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). It starts by presenting a detailed analysis of “The Significance of Dialectics in Ancient Philosophy”, since Zeno, the Sophists and Socrates to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus. Further on, Marcuse writes a section on “The Significance of Dialectics in Kant, Fichte and Hegel”; he finally concludes with an approach to “The Meaning and Significance of Dialectics in Marx”, the only philosopher who was bestowed with a whole section. Overall, this text exhibits a very comprehensive, qualified analysis of the history of dialectics and reveals Marcuse as a first-rated philosophical scholar in the concept of dialectics.

Abstract: Plato’s division of the soul (Republic Book IV) into three parts - the rational, the spirited and the appetitive - had significant precedents in the works of the pre-Socratic philosophers. The Pythagoreans began a more systematic reflection, compared to previous authors, on the tensions and desires of the human soul, linked partly to the ethics of καιρός and harmony. The tripartite division of the soul also appears in the works of Diogenes Laertius and Iamblichus and would become the core doctrine of Platonic ethics and politics. Heraclitus’ position is emblematic. Although he may appear to be a “rigorist” due to his outspoken critique of worldly pleasures, there is a fairly enigmatic fragment that clearly highlights the complexity of his ideas. With the writings of Empedocles, and subsequently the Sophists and the Atomists, and especially Democritus, the terms that distinguish the three parts of the soul and their functions also took on other features which would be set within the theoretical framework of Plato.

Abstract: In this paper I would like to challenge the received account according to which Plato’s conception of the sophist is either novel, distinct or derogatory. I propose that Plato uses common conceptions of the intellectual to create a rather loose identity for the sophist. Through the available evidence, I hope to show that Plato does not assign a new meaning to the label, but rather uses conventional conceptions of the sophist to create his main argument. I claim that apart from the Sophist, in other dialogues there is no clear conception of what and who the sophist is, no clarity as to what their activity is, and therefore (although there are reasons to suspect about them and their activity), there are no grounds to condemn them. Stemming from a conceptualization of σοφία in terms of knowledge, the σοφιστής is mainly described as someone who knows many things, or an expert in ‘all matters’—a description, we shall see, that precludes finding a single definition. My proposal is that Plato does not construct the hostility against sophists, as some accounts claim, but rather represents this hostility against experts and intellectuals by appealing to popular attitudes against the σοφοί. Importantly, Plato is critical of popular representations of sophists mainly because they are the result of people’s misjudgement or ignorance, from which the prejudice against philosophers also stems.

Resumen: En este artículo me gustaría desafiar el relato admitido según el cual la concepción de Platón del sofista es novedosa, distinta o despectiva. Propongo que Platón utiliza concepciones comunes del intelectual para crear una identidad bastante flexible para el sofista. A través de la evidencia disponible, espero mostrar que Platón no asigna un nuevo significado a la etiqueta, sino que utiliza concepciones convencionales del sofista para crear su argumento principal. Afirmo que, aparte de El Sofista, en otros diálogos no hay una concepción clara de qué y quién es el sofista, no hay claridad en cuanto a cuál es su actividad, y por lo tanto (aunque hay razones para sospechar sobre ellos y su actividad), hay no hay motivos para condenarlos. Partiendo de una conceptualización de σοφία en términos de conocimiento, el σοφιστής se describe principalmente como alguien que sabe muchas cosas, o un experto en “todos los asuntos”; una descripción, como veremos, que impide encontrar una única definición. Mi propuesta es que Platón no construye la hostilidad contra los sofistas, como afirman algunos relatos, sino que representa esta hostilidad contra los expertos e intelectuales apelando a las actitudes populares contra los σοφοί. Es importante destacar que Platón es crítico de las representaciones populares de los sofistas principalmente porque son el resultado del error de juicio o la ignorancia de la gente, de la que también se deriva el prejuicio contra los filósofos.

RESUMEN ¿Por qué cuando Platón quiere justificar su definición del sofista como un «fabricante de imágenes» (Sofista, 236c), se apoya sobre dos versos auténticos de Parménides (fr. 7.1-2) que aluden, sin duda alguna, al camino recorrido por los «mortales que nada saben» (fr. 6.4)? ¿Quiere acaso sugerir que esos «mortales», que son en realidad «fabricantes de opiniones» (doxaí), son un antecedente de los sofistas, que son «fabricantes de imágenes»?

ABSTRACT Why, when Plato wants to justify his definition of the sophist as an "image maker"(Sopfest, 236c), he quotes two authentic verses of Parmenides (fr. 7.1-2) that undoubtedly allude to the path taken by the "mortals who know nothing" (fr. 6.4)? Does he want to suggest that these "mortals", who are actually "opinions (doxaí) makers" are ancestors of the sophists, who are "image makers"?

ABSTRACT This article aims to carry out a review and analysis of the relationship and influence of sophist thought and epistemology in modern Brief strategic psychotherapy, Nardone model. The particular interest of this research revolves around the epistemological aspects and the questioning of objective reality and how this may have influenced the praxis of brief therapy. The epistemological, theoretical, and philosophical contributions of the sophists promoted a cultural change in the Hellenic world their legacy continues to this day, greatly influencing various fields of knowledge, from philosophy to psychotherapy. A review of the preliminary evidence published in the philosophical and psychological literature is presented, examining sophist epistemology and its influence on brief strategic therapy, analyzing its epistemological approach related to relativism and skepticism, at the same time showing a philosophy that continues to this day that influences contemporary thinking and modern psychotherapy, especially Brief Strategic Therapy. From the review and analysis, is evidenced the influence of the sophists thinking on epistemology, the questioning of objective reality, and the clinical practice of brief strategic therapy.

RESUMEN El presente artículo pretende realizar una revisión y análisis de la relación e influencia del pensamiento y epistemología sofista en la moderna psicoterapia breve estratégica, modelo de Giorgio Nardone. El interés particular de la investigación gira en torno a los aspectos epistemológicos y el cuestionamiento de una realidad objetiva y cómo esta puede haber influido en la praxis de la terapia breve. Los aportes epistemológicos, teóricos y filosóficos de los sofistas promovieron un cambio cultural en el mundo helénico, su legado llega hasta nuestros días influyendo enormemente en diversos campos del conocimiento, desde la filosofía hasta la psicoterapia. Se presenta una revisión de la evidencia preliminar publicada en la literatura filosófica y psicológica examinando la epistemología sofista y su influencia en la terapia breve estratégica, analizando su enfoque epistemológico relacionado al relativismo y el escepticismo, dando muestras al mismo tiempo de una filosofía que llega hasta nuestros días y que influye en el pensamiento contemporáneo y en la psicoterapia moderna especialmente en la terapia breve estratégica. A partir de la revisión y análisis se evidencia la influencia de los sofistas y su pensamiento en la epistemología, el cuestionamiento de una realidad objetiva y la praxis clínica de la terapia breve estratégica.

Resumo: Este artigo analisa a metáfora como estratégia discursiva destinada a explicar e a difundir os conceitos que sustentam as doutrinas em geral e as doutrinas educacionais em particular. Examina a metáfora cultivo como metáfora fundamental da educação, bem como a sua suposta origem na Sofística, e propõe substituí-la pela metáfora navegação. Esta substituição permite atribuir novos significados tanto à prática dos sofistas quanto ao ofício de educar no decorrer da história e na atualidade, impondo desafios à formação inicial e continuada de professores.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the metaphor as a discursive strategy to explain and disseminate the concepts that support doctrines in general and educational doctrines in particular. It examines the Cultivation metaphor as a fundamental metaphor for education, as well as its supposed origin in Sophistry, and proposes to replace it with the Navigation metaphor. This substitution makes it possible to assign new meanings both to the practice of the sophists and to the profession of educating today and throughout history, imposing challenges on the training and continuing education of teachers.

Resumo A principal hipótese deste trabalho é que Platão utiliza o riso como uma ferramenta pedagógica no diálogo Eutidemo. Procuramos evidenciar como o autor busca despertar no leitor a atenção para o comportamento risível dos dois irmãos sofistas, Eutidemo e Dionisodoro. Trata-se de evidenciar o resgate que o autor faz do personagem cômico de Sócrates para contrastar com esses sofistas, pois isso possui uma razão simultaneamente pedagógica e filosófica. O intuito é demonstrar que, na maior parte das vezes, as interpretações tradicionais tendem a subestimar os elementos cômicos nos diálogos platônicos, sobretudo ao tratar o autor como uma espécie de “domesticador do riso”.

Abstract The main hypothesis of this work relies on how Plato uses laughter as a pedagogical tool in the dialogue Euthydemus. We emphasize how the author draws the reader’s attention to the risible behavior of the sophist brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. We intend to evince how Plato retrieves Socrates’ comic character in order to contrast him with the sophists. The explanation for this is simultaneously pedagogical and philosophical. The aim is to demonstrate that traditional interpretations always tend to underestimate the comic elements in Platonic dialogues, especially when treating the author as a kind of “tamer of laughter”.

Resumen La principal hipótesis de ese trabajo es que Platón utiliza la risa como una herramienta pedagógica en el diálogo Eutidemo. Procuramos resaltar como el autor busca despertar en el lector la atención para el comportamiento risible de los dos hermanos sofistas, Eutidemo y Dionisodoro. Se tratase de evidenciar el rescate que el autor hace del personaje cómico de Sócrates, para ser contrastado con estos sofistas. Esto hay una razón simultáneamente pedagógica y filosófica. El objetivo es demostrar que, en la mayoría de los casos, las interpretaciones tradicionales tienden a subestimar los elementos cómicos en los diálogos platónicos, especialmente cuando se trata al autor como una especie de “domesticador de la risa”.

Résumé L’hypothèse principale de ce travail consiste à montrer que Platon utilise le rire comme un atout pédagogique dans le dialogue Euthydème. Nous soulignons comment l’auteur attire l’attention du lecteur au comportement risible des frères sophistes, Euthydème et Dionysodore. Il s’agit de mettre en évidence comment l’auteur récupère le personnage comique de Socrate afin de le contraster avec les sophistes. Cela a une explication simultanément pédagogique et philosophique. Le but est de démontrer que les interprétations traditionnelles ont toujours tendance à sous-estimer les éléments comiques des dialogues platoniciens, surtout quand on traite l'auteur comme une sorte de «dompteur du rire».

Abstract: The ancient Greek novel was not detached from the literary tendencies of its times, such as the Second Sophistic with its constant tendency towards innovation. Sophists often declared the “novelty” of their deeds, as did the novel which, been a fictional narrative, strived for the entertainment of its public looking for the surprising, new and unexpected. Taking a closer look into the novels, we can see that each author tried to excel due to the extraordinary facts included in his work. In my exposition, I will consider the novels of Longus, Xenophon of Ephesus and Charito, that deal with extraordinary facts or situations, trying to attract the attention of their public. By analyzing a specific vocabulary related to the extraordinary (parádoxon), surprising (kainón) or incredible (ápiston), we will find that Charito, who is the author that refers less to extraordinary deeds, qualifies some of them as such.

Resumen: La novela griega antigua no estuvo desligada de las tendencias literarias de su época, como la Segunda Sofística, con una constante tendencia hacía la innovación. Los sofistas frecuentemente declaraban la “novedad” de su obra, lo mismo que la novela, la cual, por ser una narrativa de ficción, buscaba entretener al lector incluyendo en su trama hechos de carácter maravilloso o increíble. Al analizar las novelas griegas, podemos observar cómo cada uno de los autores intentaban sobresalir mediante una serie de sucesos extraordinarios que incluye en su obra. En este artículo consideraré las novelas de Longo, Jenofonte de Éfeso y Caritón, que narran acontecimientos o situaciones extraordinarios en el desarrollo de la trama, buscando atraer la atención de su público. Mediante el análisis de un vocabulario específico, relacionado con lo maravilloso (parádoxon), sorprendente (kainón) o increíble (ápiston), encontraremos que Caritón, quien es el autor que menos acontecimientos extraordinarios ofrece, califica ciertos hechos como tales.

Abstract This work proposes an interpretation of Euthydemus 283c-288b taking into account the problem of the false in the Sophist. My hypothesis will be that the second eristic demon- stration of the Euthydemus can be understood as a representa- tion of Sophist 236d-239b: while in this passage there it is the Stranger is the one who states what the sophist would say to defend himself from the seventh definition, in which he is ac- cused of producing falsehoods, in the Euthydemus two sophists are who use the notions of non-being and falsehood to refute such accusation. The work has three parts. Firstly, I shall analyze Sophist 236d-239b and contextualize it within the framework of the seventh definition. Secondly, I focus on the characterization of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as sophists. Finally, I analyze the three arguments that organize the second demonstration of the Euthydemus, trying to understand its structure and its role in the drama of the dialogue.

Resumen Este trabajo lleva a cabo una lectura de Eutidemo 283c-288b a la luz del problema de la falsedad en el Sofista. Mi hipótesis será que la segunda demostración erística del Eutidemo puede ser interpretada como una representación de Sofista 236d-239b: mientras que allí es el Extranjero el que evoca lo que el sofista diría para defenderse de la séptima definición, donde se le acusa de producir falsedades, en el Eutidemo son dos sofistas quienes emplean las nociones de no-ser y falsedad para refutar dicha acusación. La exposición tendrá tres partes. En la primera analizaré Sofista 236d-239b y lo contextualizaré en el marco de la séptima definición. En la segunda me concentraré en la caracterización de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro en tanto sofistas. En la tercera analizaré los tres argumentos que organizan la segunda demostración del Eutidemo, intentando dar cuenta de su estructura y su rol en la economía dramática del diálogo.

Abstract: Protagoras’ discourse on the good in the Protagoras (334a3-c6) has not been correctly interpreted. In general, it is assumed that the sophist presents there a sort of relativism about the good, which does not receive any response by Socrates. In this paper I defend a different interpretation, according to which, the philosophical position that Protagoras introduces in the speech is a pluralist position. Moreover, I hold that Socrates does respond to the speech. This response is in Socrates’ development of a hedonist thesis, which is subsequently accepted by Protagoras. Indeed, this sort of hedonism is a monism about the good and, therefore, is inconsistent with the previous Protagorean pluralist position. The moral of this exchange is, then, that the sophist does not know what the good is, the goal of education, for he is led to an inconsistent position about it.

Resumen: El discurso de Protágoras sobre el bien en el Protágoras (334a3-c6) no ha sido correctamente interpretado. Generalmente se asume que el sofista expone en éste un tipo de relativismo sobre el bien, el cual aparentemente no recibe una respuesta por parte de Sócrates. En este trabajo defiendo una interpretación distinta, según la cual, la posición filosófica que Protágoras expone en dicho discurso es una posición pluralista. Asimismo, sostengo que Sócrates sí responde al discurso. Esta respuesta se encuentra en la elaboración que Sócrates hace de una tesis hedonista, la cual Protágoras termina aceptando. En efecto, dicho hedonismo es un monismo sobre el bien y, por tanto, es inconsistente con la posición pluralista protagórica previa. La moraleja de este intercambio es, entonces, que el sofista de no sabe lo que es el bien, el fin de la educación, pues es llevado a una posición inconsistente sobre el mismo.

Abstract What is generally not perceived by philosophers, because of the original denigration of sophistry by philosophy, is that sophistry is not merely a word, but also a thought, and that this thought is critical. That it does not only propose a figure of man (anthropology), but also that it develops a reflection on the categories of this representation (philosophical anthropology). The man of sophistry is not content with being an ethico-political being, he is also a critical thinker. Taking into account this validity, we will endeavor to show the specificity of most of the great representatives of this movement.

Resumé Ce qui généralement n’est pas perçu par les philosophes, du fait même du dénigrement originaire de la sophistique par la philosophie, c’est que la sophistique n’est pas simplement une parole, mais qu’elle est aussi une pensée, et que cette pensée est critique. Qu’elle ne se contente pas de proposer une figure de l’homme (anthropologie), mais encore qu’elle développe une réflexion sur les catégories de cette représentation (anthropologie philosophique). L’homme de la sophistique ne se contente pas d’être un être éthico-politique, il est aussi un penseur critique. En prenant en compte cette valoration, nous nous attacherons à montrer la spécificité de la plupart des grands représentants de ce mouvement.

Abstract Several scholars have suggested that Isocrates’ speeches Against the Sophists and Encomium of Helen attack some of Socrates’ followers, mainly Plato, Antisthenes and Euclid. Nonetheless, most of these authors do not see the overall nature of Isocrates’ criticism of the Socratics, which not only includes the figures mentioned above, but it is aimed at the group as a whole. This article seeks to defend that hypothesis. In order to do so, I will reconstruct, firstly, Isocrates’ attack on the first group criticized in Against the Sophists and on the intellectuals from the prologue of Encomium of Helen. I will defend that both groups must be identified and that Isocrates attributes a set of shared doctrines and practices to all of them, among which he highlights an eristic methodology of argumentation and an intellectualist ethical position. Secondly, I will argue that these elements were practiced and defended by many of first-generation Socratics.

Resumen Numerosos especialistas han sugerido que los discursos de Isócrates, Contra los sofistas y Encomio de Helena, atacan a algunos discípulos de Sócrates, principalmente a Platón, Antístenes y Euclides. No obstante, muchos de estos autores no vislumbran el carácter integral de la crítica de Isócrates a los socráticos, la cual no sólo incluye a las figuras mencionadas, sino que también se dirige al grupo como un todo. El artículo se propone defender esta última hipótesis. Para ello, reconstruiré, en primer lugar, el ataque que Isócrates realiza al primer grupo criticado en Contra los sofistas y a los intelectuales del proemio del Encomio de Helena. Defenderé que ambos conjuntos deben ser identificados y que Isócrates les adjudica a todos ellos una serie de doctrinas y prácticas compartidas, entre las cuales destacan una metodología erística de argumentación y una posición ética intelectualista. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que estos elementos fueron practicados y defendidos por muchos de los socráticos de primera generación.