Abstract I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism. realismrealism modelsshowing models showing antirealist idealization underdetermination contextuality multiplicity metainduction. metainduction meta induction. induction meta-induction physics atom orthodox substanceparadigmatic substance paradigmatic substance-paradigmatic thingrealism. thingrealism thing thing-realism Therefore empiricism

Resumo: Nascido em Helsinque, em 1946, Ilkka Niiniluoto fez mestrado em matemática, em 1968, e doutorado em filosofia teórica, em 1974, na Universidade de Helsinque. Foi Professor Associado de Fundamentos de Matemática, entre 1973 e 1977, e Professor de Filosofia Teórica, de 1977 a 2014. Sua prolífica carreira acadêmica inclui posições como presidente de importantes sociedades filosóficas e reitor da Universidade de Helsinque. Tem, como obras principais: Is Science Progressive? (1984), Truthlikeness (1987), Critical Scientific Realism (2002), Truth-Seeking by Abduction (2018) e Beauty, Truth, and Justice (2022). Sua pesquisa explora as interfaces entre Filosofia da Ciência, Epistemologia, Lógica, Teoria da Verdade e Axiologia da pesquisa científica. Em Critical Scientific Realism, Niiniluoto aborda o problema do valor da ciência, refutando uma concepção instrumentalista utilitária e defendendo um cognitivismo socialmente responsável, em que a ciência é concebida como uma atividade culturalmente valiosa por si mesma, sem a necessidade de satisfazer critérios impostos por necessidades práticas de ordem política e econômica. Resumo Helsinque 1946 matemática 1968 teórica 1974 Matemática 197 Teórica 2014 Tem principais Progressive 1984, 1984 , (1984) 1987, 1987 (1987) 2002, 2002 (2002) TruthSeeking Truth Seeking 2018 (2018 Beauty 2022. 2022 . (2022) Ciência Epistemologia Lógica científica responsável mesma econômica 194 196 19 201 198 (1984 (1987 200 (2002 (201 202 (2022 1 20 (198 (200 (20 (202 2 (19 (2 (1 (

Abstract: Born in Helsinki in 1946, lkka Niiniluoto received a master’s degree in mathematics in 1968 and a doctorate in theoretical philosophy in 1974 from the University of Helsinki. He was Associate Professor of Foundations of Mathematics from 1973 to 1977 and Professor of Theoretical Philosophy from 1977 to 2014. His prolific academic career includes positions as president of important philosophical societies and rector of the University of Helsinki. His main works are Is Science Progressive? (1984), Truthlikeness (1987), Critical Scientific Realism (2002), Truth-Seeking by Abduction (2018) and Beauty, Truth, and Justice (2022). His research explores the interfaces between Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Logic, Theory of Truth and Axiology of scientific research. In Critical Scientific Realism Niiniluoto addresses the problem of the value of science, refuting a utilitarian instrumentalist conception and defending a socially responsible cognitivism in which science is conceived as a culturally valuable activity in its own right, without the need to satisfy criteria imposed by practical political and economic needs. Abstract 1946 masters master s 196 197 2014 Progressive 1984, 1984 , (1984) 1987, 1987 (1987) 2002, 2002 (2002) TruthSeeking Seeking 2018 (2018 Beauty 2022. 2022 . (2022) Epistemology Logic right needs 194 19 201 198 (1984 (1987 200 (2002 (201 202 (2022 1 20 (198 (200 (20 (202 2 (19 (2 (1 (

Resumen La discusión acerca de la capacidad de nuestra inteligencia para acceder al conocimiento de la realidad en sí es y sigue siendo una de las más antiguas y apasionantes de la filosofía. Piaget revolucionó la historia de la psicología y la pedagogía a partir de sus descubrimientos científicos relativos al modo en que el ser humano conoce. Sin embargo, por su misma inclinación filosófica, su constructivismo pedagógico quedó fuertemente arraigado en tradiciones filosóficas inmanentistas, a punto tal que la asociación entre constructivismo pedagógico y antirrealismo constituye una suerte de lugar común y un cierto presupuesto dogmático. Este trabajo intentará demostrar que esta asociación no constituye la única alternativa posible y que, hasta cierto punto, ni siquiera parece responder cabalmente a los principios o consecuencias últimas de los hallazgos del constructivismo de Piaget. Es posible justificar el constructivismo pedagógico desde posiciones realistas, siempre y cuando se revisen algunos supuestos que la modernidad ha instalado de manera no muy crítica en los círculos educativos y filosóficos. La revisión de la noción de representación, concebida según la tradición aristotélica y aggiornada por los aportes del constructivismo, permite abrir un camino de conciliación entre el constructivismo pedagógico y un tipo de realismo que sea, como sugiere Charles Taylor, a la vez robusto y plural.

Abstract The discussion about the ability of our intelligence to access reality in itself remains one of the oldest and most exciting questions in philosophy. Piaget reinvented the history of psychology and pedagogy from his scientific discoveries regarding the understanding of the process of knowledge. However, due to his own philosophical inclination, his pedagogical constructivism remained strongly rooted in an immanentist philosophical tradition, to such an extent that the association between pedagogical constructivism and anti-realism constitutes a kind of commonplace and a certain dogmatic assumption. This paper states that this association is not the only possible alternative and that, to a certain extent, it does not even seem to fully respond to the ultimate principles or consequences of Piaget’s constructivist findings. It is possible to justify pedagogical constructivism from realistic positions, as long as we reconsider some assumptions that modernity has installed in educational and philosophical circles in an uncritical way. The revision of the notion of representation, conceived according to the Aristotelian tradition and updated by the contributions of constructivism, allows to find a pathway of reconciliation between pedagogical constructivism and a kind of realism that be, in the words of Charles Taylor, at the same time robust and plural.

Abstract The aim of this article is to propose a yet underexplored reading of the article "A nova geração," by Machado de Assis, from the perspective of style, a recurrent notion in the rhetoric and poetics manuals of nineteenth-century Brazil, through which the critic analyzes the work of poets in tune with the most diverse aesthetic-literary tendencies, from the late romantics, the realists-naturalists, the socialists, to the supporters of the so-called scientific poetry. A geração, geração Assis style nineteenthcentury nineteenth century Brazil aestheticliterary aesthetic literary tendencies romantics realistsnaturalists, realistsnaturalists realists naturalists, naturalists realists-naturalists socialists socalled so called poetry

Resumo O artigo tem por objetivo propor uma leitura ainda pouco explorada do artigo "A nova geração", de Machado de Assis, na perspectiva do estilo, noção recorrente nos manuais de retórica e poética do Brasil oitocentista, por meio da qual o crítico analisa a obra de poetas afinados com tendências estético-literárias as mais diversas, desde os românticos retardatários, os realistas-naturalistas, os socialistas até os adeptos da chamada poesia científica. A geração, geração , geração" Assis estilo oitocentista estéticoliterárias estético literárias diversas retardatários realistasnaturalistas, realistasnaturalistas realistas naturalistas, naturalistas realistas-naturalistas científica

The Greenlandic visual artist Nuka K. Godtfredsen and his literary and scientific collaborators have produced a series of four graphic narratives to represent distinct moments in Greenland's history, spanning the pre-colonised and colonial period. These narratives employ aspects of magic realism and adopt an approach to narrative that focuses on the supernatural and presents modes of being that contrast with their audiences' understanding of realities that are ordinarily (only) visible. I argue that these graphic narratives use strategies from speculative fiction that frame the modern European presence in Greenland and the narrative of colonialism as one of several multiple realities in the Arctic, rather than its central axis, leaving open the possibility for indigenous Greenlanders to speak on their own terms. This enables these graphic narratives to illuminate aspects of knowledge (including features of oral legend and supernatural encounters) that were previously discredited in colonial discourse. Furthermore, I show that attending to how embodied aspects of Greenlandic Inuit storytelling traditions can be captured in the graphic narrative medium may be an effective decolonial strategy, which could be employed by speculative fiction. I thus advocate methodologies for speculative fiction that strategically broaden its boundaries in order to address its intractable colonial legacy. Informed by approaches that focus attention on form - such as Marks's haptic visuality (2000) and visual theories of the power of hand-drawn comics (Groensteen 2010, Chute 2008) to engage the reader/viewer in both an embodied and reflective way - I assert that including graphic narratives which employ strategies of speculative fiction may present a unique opportunity for the genre to mount a powerful challenge to a colonial knowledge production.

Resumen: En trabajos recientes, Christopher Peacocke ha defendido una especie de realismo (o antirreduccionismo) sobre magnitudes como la temperatura y la distancia espacial. El argumento de Peacocke es que las magnitudes son un compromiso ineliminable de las explicaciones científicas y cotidianas (incluidas las explicaciones de alto nivel), y que son las candidatas naturales para los valores semánticos de nuestro discurso ordinario sobre magnitudes y para los contenidos de nuestros estados mentales. Critico estos argumentos, centrándome en particular en si el realista tiene una explicación satisfactoria de cómo los hechos de magnitud de alto nivel están fundamentados en hechos de más bajo nivel. Argumento que es preferible, o al menos viable, un enfoque menos realista (es decir, más reduccionista). También pretendo aclarar sustancialmente lo que está en juego en el debate.

Summary: In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.

Resumen: Presento un argumento en contra de la opinión de que la aditividad de masa (la propiedad según la cual la masa de un objeto compuesto es la “suma” de la de sus partes) es metafísicamente independiente de las leyes de la dinámica que gobiernan los cuerpos masivos. En particular, considerar a la aditividad como independiente de la dinámica nos compromete con correlaciones generalizadas no explicadas entre las propiedades de masa de los compuestos y el comportamiento dinámico de los cuerpos masivos. La segunda mitad del artículo amplía esta preocupación explicativa, mostrando que las mismas consideraciones se aplican a aspectos de la estructura cuantitativa de la masa. Esto da lugar a una nueva y poderosa objeción en contra de ciertas influyentes teorías acerca de la estructura fundamental de las cantidades físicas, en particular, el realismo de la magnitud de Peacocke (2019) y las explicaciones absolutistas de segundo orden defendidas por Mundy (1987) y Eddon (2013b).

Summary: I present an argument against the view that the additivity of mass (i.e., the property according to which a composite object’s mass is the “sum” of its parts’) is metaphysically independent of dynamical laws governing massive bodies. In particular, taking additivity to be independent of dynamics commits you to widespread unexplained correlations between the mass properties of composites and the dynamic behavior of massive bodies. The second half of the paper extends this explanatory worry, showing that the very same considerations apply to aspects of mass’s quantitative structure. This gives rise to a new and powerful objection to certain influential theories about the fundamental structure of physical quantities -most notably the magnitude realism of Peacocke (2019) and the second-order absolutist accounts defended by Mundy (1987) and Eddon (2013b).

Abstract Human Geography developed knowledge that allowed to analyse the spatial differentiation of relationships between natural and social aspects from a systemic point of view. At its core are maps and modelling through which the spatial perspectives of its analyses are expressed. The present work will go through the definitions of Geography, scientific realism, the systemic perspective, Quantitative Geography and causal inference to conclude with an applicative analysis based on the procedures of cartographic modelling, a central methodology in the current spatial analysis based on Geographic Information Systems. In this way, the complete path from pure disciplinary definitions to Applied Geography is covered, where the role of spatial models as articulators of the different scales between the highest levels of abstraction and concretion is evident.

Resumen La Geografía Humana desarrolló conocimientos que permitieron analizar desde un punto de vista sistémico la diferenciación espacial de las relaciones entre los aspectos naturales y sociales. En su núcleo se encuentran los mapas y la modelización, ya que es a través de ellos con el que consigue expresar la perspectiva espacial de sus análisis. El presente trabajo realiza un recorrido por las definiciones de Geografía, el realismo científico, la perspectiva sistémica, la Geografía Cuantitativa y la inferencia causal para confluir con un análisis aplicativo a partir de los procedimientos del modelado cartográfico, metodología central en el análisis espacial actual basado en Sistemas de Información Geográfica. De esta manera cubre el camino completo que transita desde las definiciones disciplinarias puras hasta la Geografía Aplicada donde se evidencia el papel de los modelos espaciales como articuladores de las diferentes escalas entre los mayores niveles de abstracción y concreción.

Abstract: This article advances towards the specification of the operative constructivism of Niklas Luhmann, by identifying a series of key ontological and epistemological principles to characterize his means of coping with tensions between realism and constructivism. First, it exposes the bases of the theory of the observer, then it examines Luhmann’s approach to addressing a series of ontological problems, and third, it observes the way reflection on the scientific system leads to operative constructivism. Subsequently, it contrasts it with radical constructivism, fifth, it specifies its function in modern society, and, finally, the results obtained are described in the conclusions.

Resumen El presente trabajo avanza hacia la especificación del constructivismo operativo de Niklas Luhmann, identificando una serie de principios ontológicos y epistemológicos claves para caracterizar su modalidad de lidiar con la tensión realismo/constructivismo. Para ello, primero se introducen algunos fundamentos de la teoría del observador; luego, se examina la modalidad luhmanniana de afrontar una serie de problemas ontológicos; tercero, se observa cómo la reflexión del sistema científico conduce al constructivismo operativo; posteriormente, se lo contrasta con el constructivismo radical; quinto, se precisa su función en la sociedad moderna; finalmente, las conclusiones exponen los resultados obtenidos.

Abstract: Pluralistic approaches in the philosophy of biological individuality suggest that reality is divisible into multiple types of biological individuals (evolutionary, genetic, physiological, etc.). In this research I will argue in favor of this pluralistic ontology. Inspired mainly by John Dupré's processual metaphysics, Ronald Giere's perspectivism, and Hasok Chang's active realism, I will suggest that: (i) biological individuals are temporarily stable nexuses in a flow of causal processes, (ii) individuations in biology represent real individuals only under the scientific perspectives that support them, (iii) biology’s ability to recognize diverse types of individuals comes from epistemically successful individuation practices. These practices not only contact us with multiple sites of reality, but also invite us to embrace pluralism as an effective way to increase our scientific knowledge of nature.

Resumen: Los enfoques pluralistas en filosofía de la individualidad biológica sugieren que la realidad es divisible en múltiples tipos de individuos biológicos (individuos evolutivos, genéticos, fisiológicos, entre otros). En la presente investigación argumentaré a favor de dicha ontología pluralista. Inspirado en la metafísica procesual de John Dupré, el perspectivismo de Ronald Giere y el realismo activo de Hasok Chang, sugeriré que: (i) los individuos biológicos son nexos temporalmente estables en un flujo de procesos causales, (ii) las individuaciones en biología representan individuos reales solo bajo las perspectivas científicas que las sustentan, (iii) la capacidad de la biología para reconocer diversos tipos de individuos proviene de prácticas de individuación epistémicamente exitosas. Estas prácticas no solo nos contactan con múltiples sitios de la realidad, sino que también nos invitan a adoptar el pluralismo como una forma eficaz de incrementar nuestro conocimiento científico de la naturaleza.

RESUMO Tradicionalmente, ser realista sobre algo significa crer na existência independente desse algo. Em termos ontológicos, isto é, acerca do que há, o realismo científico pode ser entendido como envolvendo a adoção de uma ontologia que seja cientificamente informada. Mas, segundo alguns filósofos, a atitude realista deve ir além da ontologia. A forma como essa exigência tem sido entendida envolve fornecer uma metafísica para as entidades postuladas pela ciência. Discutimos como duas abordagens em voga encaram o desafio de fornecer uma metafísica para a ciência: uma forma de naturalismo e a abordagem Viking/Toolbox. Por fim, apresentamos uma terceira via, que adota o melhor das duas abordagens: o método metapopperiano, que foca em descartarmos quais as alternativas erradas, ou melhor dizendo, os perfis metafísicos incompatíveis com certas teorias. Apresentamos o método metapopperiano, um método de metametafísica capaz de avaliar objetivamente quais os perfis metafísicos que são incompatíveis com certas teorias científicas. Para isso, usaremos como estudo de caso a mecânica quântica, mostrando resultados obtidos previamente. Com esse método, podemos ver como a ciência pode ser usada para evitar o erro em questões metafísicas. Essa seria, na nossa opinião, uma forma de desenvolver uma relação produtiva entre ciência e metafísica.

ABSTRACT Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.

Resumen El Nuevo Realismo Jurídico (NRJ) es una perspectiva teórica que promueve una relación colaborativa entre el derecho y las ciencias sociales. Esta teoría amplía el horizonte de los estudios legales al situar las problemáticas jurídicas en sus contextos sociales más amplios y asegurar un estudio científico del derecho. Este artículo reflexiona sobre la utilidad de adoptar el NRJ en los estudios legales sobre la implementación del derecho y, especialmente, el derecho internacional. A partir de una revisión de literatura, se discuten cuatro características del NRJ: carácter centrado en las normas jurídicas; promoción de la investigación interdisciplinaria; promoción de la investigación empírica; y promoción de la investigación activa y crítica en el derecho. Este artículo concluye que adoptar la perspectiva del NRJ en los estudios sobre la implementación del derecho internacional es importante para analizar no solo su implementación mediante textos legales o de política, sino también por medio de prácticas sociales. Esto requiere analizar el contexto social más amplio en el que el derecho opera, es decir, el "derecho en la práctica". El propósito final de este artículo es invitar a la acción colaborativa entre investigadores de las áreas jurídicas y sociales. Dicha acción implica para los juristas investigadores, el reto de incorporar teorías novedosas como el NRJ en sus estudios, a fin de adelantar un análisis normativo que tome en cuenta perspectivas más amplias y holísticas sobre el derecho. Finalmente, y dado el actual campo de investigación de la autora, se incluye una breve reflexión sobre la utilidad de adoptar el NRJ en los estudios sobre la implementación de la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad (CDPD). Esta es un área de investigación por explorar.

Resumo O novo realismo jurídico (NRJ) é uma perspectiva teórica que promove uma relação colaborativa entre o direito e as ciências sociais. Essa teoria amplia o horizonte dos estudos legais ao situar as problemáticas jurídicas em seus contextos sociais mais amplos e garante um estudo científico do direito. Neste artigo, reflete-se sobre a utilidade de adotar o NRJ nos estudos legais sobre a imple mentação do direito e, em especial, do direito internacional. A partir de uma revisão da literatura, são discutidas quatro características do NRJ: caráter centralizado nas normas jurídicas, promoção da pesquisa interdisciplinar, promoção da pesquisa empírica e promoção da pesquisa ativa e crítica no direito. Conclui-se que adotar a perspectiva do NRJ nos estudos sobre a implementação do direito internacional é importante para analisar não somente sua implementação por meio de textos legais ou de política, mas também, mediante práticas sociais. Isso requer analisar o contexto social mais amplo no que o direito opera, isto é, o "direito na prática". O objetivo deste artigo é fazer um chamamento à ação colaborativa entre pesquisadores das áreas jurídicas e sociais. Essa ação implica para os juristas pesquisadores o desafio de incorporar teorias novas como o NRJ em seus estudos a fim de realizarem uma análise normativa que considere perspectivas mais amplas e holísticas sobre o direito. Finalmente, tendo em vista o atual campo de pesquisa da autora, é apresentada uma breve reflexão sobre a utilidade de adotar o NRJ nos estudos sobre a implementação da Convenção sobre os Direitos das Pessoas com Deficiência. Esta é uma área de pesquisa a ser explorada.

Abstract New Legal Realism (NLR) is a relevant theoretical strand advancing a constructive relationship between law and the social sciences. NLR broadens the 'scene' in legal studies by placing legal issues in their broader social contexts and follows the aspiration of the scientific study of law. Based on the literature review, this article presents a brief discussion on NLR. It argues that an NLR approach might be useful for carrying out research on compliance with (international) law in practice, i.e., the 'law-in-action'. This article finds that four main characteristics of NLR, mainly its law-centred, interdisciplinary, empirical, and constructive legal action character yields useful results to analyse States' compliance with the law. It concludes that an NLR approach contributes to moving from exploring law in books to investigate 'law-in-action'. This involves analysing compliance with the (international) law through domestic law and policy instruments, as well as compliance through social practices. This means to explore the social context within which the law operates. In other words, to investigate the impact of the law at the point of delivery (or the 'law-in-action'). The underlying purpose of this article is thus to call for collaborative action among legal and social scientific researchers by considering to adopt novel theories, such as NLR, to mix normative legal analysis with consideration of broader and holistic perspectives on the law. Lastly, due to the current research interests of the author, this article includes a brief reflection on adopting an NLR approach to analyse State Parties' compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD). Notably, in the available literature, this is an underexplored issue.

RESUMEN La postulación de la existencia de receptores bioquímicos permite brindar una explicación satisfactoria para muchos procesos biológicos a nivel celular, como, por ejemplo, el mecanismo de acción de la mayoría de las drogas de acción específica. No obstante, el concepto de receptor fue considerado durante mucho tiempo como carente de referente objetivo, e incluso avanzada la segunda mitad del siglo XX aún existía escepticismo acerca de su existencia. A partir del debate filosófico entre realistas y antirrealistas científicos, indagaremos si la cuestión del realismo permite arrojar luz sobre la historia del concepto de receptor bioquímico. Evaluaremos qué posiciones particulares en el marco del debate permiten comprender tanto la evolución del concepto de receptor como la práctica científica sobre los receptores. Argumentaremos que el caso de los receptores puede ser elucidado aceptando un realismo científico de entidades que considera la manipulabilidad como criterio de existencia -siguiendo a Ian Hacking-. Guiará nuestro trabajo una pregunta estrictamente filosófica: ¿existen los receptores bioquímicos?

ABSTRACT The postulation of the existence of biochemical receptors provides a satisfactory explanation for many biological processes at the cellular level, such as the mechanisms of action of most drugs with specific action. However, the concept of receptor was long considered as lacking an objective referent, and even into the second half of the 20th century, there was still skepticism about its existence. By means of the philosophical debate between scientific realists and anti-realists, we will investigate whether the question of realism can shed light on the history of the concept of biochemical receptor. We will evaluate which particular positions within the debate allow us to understand both the evolution of the concept of receptor and the scientific practice on receptors. We will argue that the case of receptors can be elucidated by accepting a scientific realism of entities, which considers manipulability as a criterion of existence -following Ian Hacking-. Our work will be guided by a strictly philosophical query: Do biochemical receptors exist?

RESUMO O problema das alternativas não concebidas (ou a Nova Indução Pessimista) afirma que, dado que cientistas do passado falharam recorrentemente em conceber alternativas teóricas relevantes para certos domínios da ciência, então cientistas atuais provavelmente falham do mesmo modo. Portanto, podem haver teorias que ainda estão além da imaginação dos cientistas, e não devemos endossar uma atitude realista perante a ciência atual. Neste artigo, desenvolvo um enigma conceitual para a formulação desse problema: o que significa dizer que os cientistas falharam em conceber uma teoria relevante? O enigma é agravado, porquanto nenhuma noção simples de relevância é capaz de manter a Nova Indução tão plausível quanto ela parece inicialmente. Considero três interpretações mais óbvias de relevância: relevância como probabilidade objetiva; relevância como probabilidade epistêmica avaliada pelos cientistas atuais; e relevância como probabilidade epistêmica avaliada pelos cientistas do passado. Argumento que assumir qualquer dessas três interpretações resulta em dificuldades para a Nova Indução, e por isso seus proponentes não devem tomar a noção de relevância como dada. Uma definição mais precisa de relevância é essencial para compreender quais dificuldades circundam o problema das alternativas não concebidas enquanto um problema epistêmico. Até então, tal definição não existe.

ABSTRACT The problem of unconceived alternatives (or the New Induction) states that, since scientists have recurrently failed to conceive relevant theoretical alternatives for some domains of science, current scientists are probably also failing to do so. Therefore, there may be theories which still exceed the grasp of scientists’ imagination, and one should not endorse a realist stance towards current science. In this paper, I raise a conceptual worry for the formulation of this problem: what does it mean to say that scientists failed to conceive a relevant theory? What aggravates the problem is that no simple notion of relevance makes the New Induction as strong as it initially seems. I consider the three more obvious interpretations of relevance: relevance as objective probability; relevance as epistemic probability assessed by current scientists; and relevance as epistemic probability assessed by past scientists. I argue that assuming any of these three notions implies difficulties for the New Induction, hence their proponents shouldn’t take the notion of relevance for granted. A more precise definition of relevance is essential to understand what are the difficulties surrounding the problem of unconceived alternatives as an epistemic worry. Until now, such notion is missing.

Abstract The are text provides a depiction of science from the perspective of scientific realism. Special attention is paid to details that are sometimes left aside when talking informatively about science, such as the notion of truth, reality and the distinction between the observable and the unobservable, which are inherent aspects of scientific practice. In this sense, it is intended that what is presented here constitutes a first approach to the general nature of science, as well as to scientific realism.

Resumen Se provee una caracterización de la ciencia a partir de la postura conocida como realismo científico. Se pone especial atención a detalles que algunas veces son dejados de lado al hablar divulgativamente sobre la ciencia como la noción de verdad, realidad y la distinción entre lo observable y no observable, aspectos todos inherentes a la práctica científica. En este sentido, se pretende que lo expuesto constituya una primera aproximación a la naturaleza general de la ciencia, así como al realismo científico.