This article examines the church as a trinitarian hermeneutical community through the insights of Vanhoozer and the speech act theory. Vanhoozer explained that through the speech act theory, the church should accept the Bible as a communication act of the Triune God and interpret the Triune God in it, and the church should live a life representing the Triune God. This article agrees with his argument, but as there is a point to revise and supplement his discussion from the speech act theory, it re-examines the church as a trinitarian interpretive community. This explains the unification of the epistemological (revelational), ontological and relational perspectives of the Triune God by not separating the immanent Trinity from the economic Trinity. Also, Trinitarianism as a communicator is used to account for the relationship and activity of the Triune God's perichoresis in the church community and the church in the interpretive community. CONTRIBUTION: This article engages the church as a trinitarian hermeneutical community of Vanhoozer, and it redeems and reconsiders his argument in the speech act theory. By explaining the communication behaviour of the Trinity and the church, it describes the activities of the Triune God and the appearance of the church, living and working in the church community

Resumen Últimamente, la educación se ha visto desafiada por el contexto digital que beneficia a las plataformas virtuales que contienen creaciones de youtubers o influencers, los cuales se enfocan en entretener más que en formar integralmente al estudiante. En este sentido, este artículo considera a las paradojas como recursos didácticos que pueden ayudar al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico del estudiante durante su formación. Esta investigación es documental y se basa en la consulta de fuentes escritas y de internet. Comienza aclarando los conceptos de falacia y reducción al absurdo, pues las paradojas han sido vistas como falacias muy sutiles por algunos estudiosos como Bertrand Russell y, además, hay quienes utilizan las paradojas para realizar deducciones, como ocurre en la reducción al absurdo que se aplica en el argumento ontológico de San Anselmo de Canterbury. Enseguida, se analiza una lista de paradojas, pero con el objetivo de que puedan ser utilizadas en un aula de clase. Así, se trata sobre algunas paradojas como la paradoja de Aquiles y la Tortuga, la de Galileo, la del hotel de Hilbert, la de Tristam Shandy, la de Protágoras, etc. Este trabajo se cierra tratando de explicitar el aspecto afectivo y emocional que un estudiante experimenta cuando trata con esta clase de problemas.

Abstract Lately, education has been challenged by the digital context that benefits virtual platforms that contain creations of youtubers or influencers, which focus on entertaining rather than comprehensively educating the student. In this sense, this article considers paradoxes as didactic resources that can help the development of students’ critical thinking during their education. This research is documentary and is based on the consultation of written sources and the Internet. It begins by clarifying the concepts of fallacy and reductio ad absurdum, since paradoxes have been seen as very subtle fallacies by some scholars such as Bertrand Russell and, in addition, there are those who use paradoxes to make deductions, as occurs in the reductio ad absurdum applied in the ontological argument of St. Anselm of Canterbury. Next, a list of paradoxes is analyzed, but with the objective that they can be used in a clssroom. Thus, some paradoxes such as the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, Galileo’s paradox, Hilbert’s hotel paradox, Tristam Shandy’s paradox, Protagoras’ paradox, etc. are discussed. This work closes by trying to make explicit the affective and emotional aspect that a student experiences when dealing with this kind of problems.

Abstract This article shows the connections between Anglophone anthropology and the political philosophy of interculturality, to which little attention has been given in Latin America. Specifically, the contributions of the so-called ‘ontological turn’ are detailed in order to develop a theory of interculturality that addresses the differences between Indigenous peoples and Western societies. It is argued that the concept of “culture” constitutes an “ambivalence”, and that from this turn and its critics one can understand better interculturality as a positive proposal from Indigenous intellectuals. The debates on the representation of difference that followed the ontological turn point toward the importance of intracultural diversity; therefore, it is crucial to develop nuanced representations of Indigenous and Western cultures, considering different characteristics that distinguish the communities and individuals of each group. This argument is developed based on intercultural health through the case study of health practices and preferences in the shuar population of the Ecuadorian province of Zamora-Chinchipe. It is concluded that an interculturality is required that does not mean the ethnicization of public policies, but rather their localization and adaptation to the preferences of people in every distinct zone within national territories.

Resumen En este artículo se exponen aquellas conexiones entre la antropología anglosajona y la filosofía política de la interculturalidad, a las que se han prestado poca atención en América Latina. Específicamente, se detallan los aportes del llamado giro ontológico para desarrollar una teoría de la interculturalidad que abarque las diferencias entre pueblos indígenas y sociedades occidentales. Se argumenta que el concepto de “cultura” constituye un “equívoco”, y que a partir de dicho giro y sus críticas se logra un entendimiento más adecuado de la interculturalidad como propuesta positiva de la intelectualidad indígena. Los debates sobre la representación de la diferencia, que siguieron al giro ontológico, apuntan a la importancia de la diversidad intracultural; por tanto, es imprescindible matizar tales representaciones de las culturas indígenas y la occidental, al considerar los rasgos disímiles que distinguen a comunidades e individuos de un mismo grupo. Este argumento se desarrolla con base en la salud intercultural, a través del estudio de caso de las prácticas y preferencias sanitarias de la población shuar de la provincia ecuatoriana de Zamora-Chinchipe. Se concluye que se requiere una interculturalidad que no signifique la etnitización de las políticas públicas, sino su localización y adaptación a las preferencias de la gente en cada una de las zonas particulares de los territorios nacionales.

Abstract The main objective of the present research is to expose a problem of coherence in which the theories according to which there are mereological wholes that are prior to the parts that compose them incur. The central argument consists in showing that the dependence of identity that the parts have with the wholes they compose, which defines the ontological priority of the whole with respect to its parts, implies a principle of identity from which it can be established that, at the same time, the wholes depend for their identity on their parts, so that the parts are ontologically prior to the whole they compose. Thus, the theory collapses in a vicious circle that threatens the very notion of identity dependence. For this reason, the theory cannot coherently sustain the thesis according to which the wholes are ontologically prior to their parts.

Resumen La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal exponer un problema de coherencia presente en las teorías que plantean que los todos mereológicos son prioritarios a las partes que lo componen. El argumento central consiste en mostrar que la dependencia de identidad que las partes tienen con los todos que componen —que define la prioridad ontológica del todo respecto a sus partes— implica un principio de identidad a partir del cual se puede establecer que los todos, a su vez, dependen para su identidad de sus partes, por lo tanto las partes son ontológicamente prioritarias respecto al todo que componen. Así, la teoría colapsa en un círculo vicioso que atenta contra la noción misma de dependencia de identidad. Por esta razón, la teoría no puede sostener de manera coherente la tesis de que los todos son ontológicamente prioritarios a sus partes.

ABSTRACT Objective: This is a debate about the ethical and onto-epistemological effects of the concept of tautism (neologism between tautology and autism), elaborated by Lucien Sfez in the scope of Information Theory, as a criticism of the so-called confusional communication, where disinformation and the end of communication would be its immediate products. Without disregarding the legitimacy, relevance and timeliness of the problem presented by Sfez, the article reflects on the appropriation of the term autism for the construction of metaphors, based on temporal and contextual definitions of the spectrum, a domain still under development. Based on critical informational and language studies, it is argued that the Western hegemonic Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction strengthens the use of the Greek prefix -autos in the institution of autistic identity as an individual alien to reality, consequently, a non-subject endowed with logos , opening a gap for ableist and epistemic representations of the evaluated population, their knowledge and practices. Methods: Basic, descriptive study, with a qualitative approach, bibliography and hermeneutic analysis. The theoretical-methodological route examines Lucien Sfez's concepts of tautism and confusional communication, in opposition to Barbara Cassin's sophistic reading of language. Results: Based on critical informational and language studies, it is argued that the Western hegemonic Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction strengthens the use of the Greek prefix -autos in the institution of autistic identity as an individual alien to reality, consequently, a non-subject endowed with logos, opening a gap for empowering and epistemic representations of the assessed population, their knowledge and practices. Conclusions: As information scientists, we check the terminological footprints that do not reflect the universal, but point to historicity. The ontological gesture of exclusion founds tautism, whose negative metaphorology safeguards a legitimate problem: the physical, mental and political effects emerging from the digitization of activities and processes, captured and managed by companies and governments with their own interests. Although Sfez develops a critical argument towards communication as a symbolic and ideological form, he reinforces an autonomous technical rationality in the figure of Frankenstein.

RESUMO Objetivo: Trata-se de um debate sobre os efeitos ético e ontoepistemológico do conceito de tautismo (neologismo entre tautologia e autismo), elaborado por Lucien Sfez no escopo das Teorias da Informação e Comunicação, como crítica à chamada comunicação confusional, onde a desinformação e o fim da comunicação seriam seus produtos imediatos. Sem desconsiderar a legitimidade, relevância e atualidade do problema apresentado por Sfez, o artigo reflete sobre a apropriação do termo autismo para construção de metáforas embasadas nas definições temporais e contextuais do espectro, domínio ainda em desenvolvimento. Métodos: Estudo de natureza básica, descritivo, abordagem qualitativa e bibliográfica e análise hermenêutica. O percurso teórico-metodológico examina os conceitos de tautismo e comunicação confusional, de Lucien Sfez, em contraponto à leitura sofista acerca da linguagem, em Barbara Cassin. Como fio condutor, o conceito de justiça informacional de Kay Mathiesen. Resultado: Com base nos estudos críticos informacionais e de linguagem, sustenta-se que o princípio ocidental de não-contradição aristotélico hegemônico fortalece o uso do prefixo grego - autós na instituição de identidade autista como indivíduo alheio à realidade, consequentemente, não-sujeito dotado de logos, abrindo brecha para representações capacitistas e epistemicidas da população avaliada, seus saberes e suas práticas. Conclusões: Como cientistas da informação, averiguamos as pegadas terminológicas que não espelham o universal, mas apontam historicidade. O gesto ontológico de exclusão funda o tautismo, cuja metaforologia negativa resguarda um problema legítimo: os efeitos físicos, mentais e políticos emergentes da digitalização de atividades e processos, capturados e agenciados por empresas e governos com interesses próprios. Apesar de Sfez desenvolver argumentação crítica à comunicação enquanto forma simbólica e ideológica, reforça uma racionalidade técnica autônoma na figura de Frankenstein.

RESUMO A crítica que o jovem Marx dirige contra a religião, em geral, e contra o argumento ontológico, em particular, constitui um ponto de intersecção entre a filosofia marxiana e a fenomenologia radical de Michel Henry. Ao rejeitar a noção de um Deus transcendente, bem como as provas racionais da sua existência, o Marx de Henry refuta, por um lado, todas as críticas da religião que se situam na esfera da pura racionalidade como permite, por outro, conceber uma religiosidade assente na noção de um Deus radicalmente imanente. geral ontológico particular transcendente existência refuta lado permite outro imanente

ABSTRACT The critique that the young Marx addresses against religion, in general, and against the ontological argument, in particular, constitutes a point of intersection between the Marxian philosophy and Michel Henry’s radical phenomenology. On the one hand, by rejecting the notion of a transcendent God as well as the rational proofs of his existence, Henry’s interpretation of Marx refutes all critiques of religion that lie in the sphere of pure rationality. On the other hand, from this hermeneutic of Marx arises a conception of a religiosity based on the notion of a pure immanent God. general argument particular Henrys Henry s phenomenology hand existence rationality

RESUMEN Este trabajo analiza el problema técnico en el que ha devenido el discurso de la educación inclusiva a través de la falta de responsabilidad ética de la provisión educativa, argumento liberal que refuerza la defensa permanente de derechos, al tiempo que las condiciones de opresión y dominación concebidas en términos de injusticias continúan operando con fuerza en la vida de cada persona y comunidad. El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en documentar cómo las políticas educativas, de producción del conocimiento y de formación del profesorado se colocan el traje retórico de lo especial o, más bien, de lo neoespecial, para justificar el sentido de lo inclusivo. Si bien lo especial es una forma de inclusión, la inclusión no es necesariamente una forma de lo especial, es una revolución cultural, un espacio de producción de otros mundos, de fractura y desafío permanente del saber pedagógico. La falta de rigor analítico de estas políticas educativas y decisiones intelectuales las hace incapaces de deshacerse del problema del género, de la raza, del multiculturalismo y de la interculturalidad en la escuela desde una perspectiva individual, opresiva y negativa de la diferencia. La educación inclusiva debe pensar junto a la zona del no-ser sus problemas y, con ello, consolidar una pragmática que beneficie la experiencia vital de la subalternidad. Es un intento de escapar al monologismo y monocéntrismo analítico devenido en seudoprácticas y conciencias de resistencias para transformar el mundo. Los sujetos en la zona del no-ser viven en el propio cuerpo y en su conciencia la experiencia de opresión y dominación; hay un código de regulación que debemos destrabar para que la inclusión y los formatos de justicia puedan dislocar las formas institucionalizadas de frenos al autodesarrollo. La dimensión técnica del argumento inclusivo refuerza el problema ontológico de los grupos sociales, es decir, un corpus de argumentos entronizados a través del humanismo clásico en el que la diferencia sume un atributo negativo ligado a la identidad de cada ser y colectividad de adherencia. La política ontológica de la educación inclusiva consiste en producir un sistema de reapropiación de las fuerzas de singularización y sus devenires, sin atender a la complejidad sígnica de cada ser, inaugurando un corpus de políticas públicas que no hacen otra cosa que reproducir un efecto de asimilación y un problema multicategórico para justificar su tarea en torno a los significantes pasivos de la inclusión. Se concluye identificando la necesidad de ofrecer una comprensión positiva de la diferencia que puntualice en la pluralidad individual de cada ser para superar la presencia retórica y pragmática de la diversidad como índice de asimilación en la intimidad de las condiciones de escolarización.

ABSTRACT This work analyzes the technical problem in which the discourse of inclusive education has become through the lack of ethical responsibility of educational provision, a liberal argument that reinforces the permanent defense of rights while the conditions of oppression and domination conceived in terms of injustice continue to operate strongly in the life of each person and community. The objective of this work is to document how educational policies, knowledge production and teacher training, put on the rhetorical costume of the special or rather, the neospecial, to justify the sense of the inclusive. Although the special is a form of inclusion, inclusion is not necessarily a form of the special, it is a cultural revolution, a space for the production of other worlds, of fracture and permanent challenge of pedagogical knowledge. The lack of analytical rigor of these educational policies and intellectual decisions makes them unable to get rid of the problem of gender, race, multiculturalism and interculturality in the school from an individual, oppressive and negative perspective of difference. Inclusive education must think along with the zone of not-being its problems and, with it, consolidate a pragmatics that benefits the vital experience of subalternity. It is an attempt to escape the analytical monologism and monocentrism turned into pseudopractices and resistance consciousnesses to transform the world. The subjects in the zone of non-being live in their own body and in their consciousness the experience of oppression and domination, there is a code of regulation that we must unlock so that inclusion and justice formats can dislocate the institutionalized forms of brakes on self development. The technical dimension of the inclusive argument reinforces the ontological problem of social groups, that is, a corpus of arguments enthroned through classical humanism in which difference adds a negative attribute linked to the identity of each being and adherence collectivity. The ontological policy of inclusive education consists of producing a system of reappropriation of the forces of singularization and their futures, without paying attention to the symbolic complexity of each being, inaugurating a corpus of public policies that do nothing but reproduce an effect of assimilation and a multicategorical problem to justify its task around the passive signifiers of inclusion. It concludes by identifying the need to offer a positive understanding of the difference that points to the individual plurality of each being to overcome the rhetorical and pragmatic presence of diversity as an index of assimilation in the intimacy of schooling conditions.

Abstract In this article, I analyse common arguments raised against historical determinism. I refer to the treatment given to the topic by Ernest Nagel in “Determinism in History” (1959). Nagel identifies five different arguments which allegedly show that history is not deterministic and argues that they fall short. I revisit, re-evaluate, and make amendments to these arguments. Special attention is given to one of them: The argument that the emergence of novelties in human affairs would be incompatible with the standard view of determinism. I use the theory of convergent evolution to clarify why novelties cannot be used against the deterministic assumption, especially if by determinism we mean only the ontological sense of the doctrine - which I call uniqueness of evolution - and not predictive determinism. I conclude that common attacks on the possibility of historical determinism are grounded on incomplete human knowledge of the historical world.

Universities globally are facing enormous governmental pressure to increase postgraduate output, and in turn, contribute to the knowledge economy. This pressure is transferred to research supervisors, who have to navigate the complexities of research supervision to not only meet postgraduate output targets set by the university in particular, but postgraduate output targets set by government in general. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, research supervision mostly followed the traditional apprenticeship or group model approach to supervision, where engagement took the form of face-to-face interactions. With the COVID-19 pandemic came social distancing, which forced research supervision to move to online platforms. The core objective of this article was to peruse selected research supervision models or approaches to determine which model or approach would be most suited to an online supervision context, if any. This article advances a re-imagined view of research supervision in higher education. The author proposes an argument for an alternative approach to research supervision, most appropriate to the online supervision environment. The ontological stance, from the perspective of constructivism, underpinned the interrogation of selected research supervision models or approaches with the view to engender a different understanding of what the core components of a research supervision framework could be in the context of COVID-19, with due regard to the "pedagogy of supervision". This article will be of value to emerging South African research supervisors and scholars in the higher education realm.

Resumen El artículo aborda algunas variantes recientes de los argumentos a favor de un posible derecho de los animales. Para lograr este objetivo se hizo una muestra por conveniencia de artículos en los que apareciesen ambos conceptos desde el año 2017 hasta el presente, usando el buscador Google Académico (Google Scholar). De la muestra (primeros 40 resultados de búsqueda) se seleccionaron los que resumiesen o presentasen algún argumento novedoso en torno al tema. Después del análisis se encontraron básicamente dos argumentos que pueden presentarse como novedosos pero que, al analizar los presupuestos de los mismos, se concluye que presentan los mismos supuestos ontológicos que los argumentos tradicionales, como los de Peter Singer.

Abstract The article addresses some recent variants of the arguments in favor of possible animal rights. To achieve this objective, a convenience sample was made from 2017 to the present of articles using the Google Scholar that will address both concepts. From the sample (first 40 search results) we selected those that summarized or presented some novel argument around the topic. After the analysis, basically two arguments were found that can be presented as novel, but when analyzing their assumptions, it was concluded that they present the same ontological assumptions as traditional arguments such as those of Peter Singer.

Abstract The Women’s Law discussed in book V of the Republic, known as the first wave, is a notorious example of Socrates’ reformist intention to achieve justice in the polis. The legislation for women, in general, has historically been relegated by the Republic interpreters. This paper aims to analyze this passage, from 449a to 457c, through the arguments provided by Socrates seen as crucial to conceive equality between the sexes (under the ontological foundation of the same human nature) as well as to favor institutional change according to nature, kata physin, thus opening the possibility for women to govern the polis. Before leaving for the external confrontation, Socrates considers it urgent that his interlocutors, Adeimantus, Glaucon, and Polemarchus, agree with each other. Thus, he urges them to start the argument by questioning the human nature of women and their capacity for the same functions (erga) performed by men in the city. The examination of the intelligible enabled the logos on women’s intellectual capacity to support adequate legislation. Such nomos put into practice proves to be the best for the city and its guardians. To that extent, Socrates can conclude the investigation with a consensus on what to do and willingness to confront opposing opinions in the city urgently.

Resumen La Ley de la Mujer discutida en el libro V de la República, conocida como la primera ola, es un ejemplo notorio de la intención reformista de Sócrates de lograr justicia en la pólis. La legislación de la mujer, en general, históricamente ha sido relegada por los intérpretes de la República. El objeto del artículo es analizar este pasaje, del 449a al 457c, a través de los argumentos propuestos por Sócrates al considerarlos cruciales para concebir la igualdad entre los sexos (bajo el fundamento ontológico de la misma naturaleza humana) y favorecer el cambio institucional según su naturaleza, katà phýsin, dejando espacio para que las mujeres gobiernen la pólis. Antes de partir hacia el enfrentamiento externo, Sócrates considera urgente que sus interlocutores, Adimanto, Glaucón y Polemarco, estén de acuerdo entre ellos. Así, los insta a iniciar la discusión cuestionando la naturaleza humana de la mujer y su capacidad para las mismas funciones (érga) que desempeñan los hombres en la ciudad. El examen de lo inteligible permitió que el lógos sobre la capacidad intelectual de las mujeres respaldara una legislación adecuada. Este nómos puesto en práctica demuestra ser lo mejor para la ciudad y sus guardianes. En esa medida, Sócrates puede concluir dicha investigación con un consenso sobre qué hacer y la voluntad de confrontar urgentemente las opiniones opuestas en la ciudad.

A central notion of Ubuntu depicts it as a philosophy unique to African affinity and views Africans as communalistic and Westerners as individualistic. Given the reality of xenophobic practices, this paper advances arguments that question this thesis, arguing that the basis for such peculiarity does not inhere in Ubuntu as a distinctive African philosophy; rather it is reflective of the stage of development on each side of the divide. Pursuant of this argument, the paper distinguishes between ontological and axiological Ubuntu. While ontological Ubuntu (OU) refers to, among other constructs, the 'authentic mode of being African', axiological Ubuntu (AU) is a prescriptive moral ideal to which all humanity ought to aspire in an era of modernity. Using the method of critical analysis, the paper submits that xenophobia and other forms of socio-political exclusions greatly contradict the central tenets or humanism of OU and render it untenable in modern times. Conversely, AU is reflective of modernity with its emphasis on individualistic modes of production. Modernity has come to stay and Africa must approach it, not by OU or a 'narrative of return' to a philosophy uniquely African, but by AU, an ethical theory that must guide our pursuit of a humane society not just as Africans, but as human beings. To this end, and contrary to the argument that Ubuntu has 'reached its end' in its entirety, the paper concludes that something is left of it, though not uniquely African.

Abstract Anselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagnosis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: conceptual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tickets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trap.

Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.

Abstract I consider whether a contradiction may be deducible from the proposition that God does not exist. First, I expose a candidate counterexample to a key premise in Swinburne’s argument against the deducibility of a contradiction from God’s non-existence. Second, I present two new strategies one might use to deduce a contradiction. Both strategies make use of Tarski's T-schema together with developments in other theistic arguments. One argument is a conceptualist argument from necessary truth for a necessary mind, and the other is a two-stage contingency argument for the same conclusion. The purpose of this article is not to decisively defend these arguments, but to expose new territory relevant to investigating the nature of God's necessity (if God exists).