Resumen En este artículo, mediante un abordaje archifilológico, nos proponemos acentuar el devenir de la asociación crítica de Araripe Júnior entre la hiperestesia y los efectos de lectura de los folletines desde sus primeros abordajes de la recepción del naturalismo por parte de escritores jóvenes, en el momento en el que se multiplican exponencialmente las publicaciones periódicas y se constituye un público lector. Reparamos, a su vez, en una asociación recurrente entre una literatura folletinesca considerada descartable y un lector caracterizado como desecho social. El sondeo de su singular concepción de la hiperestesia literaria resulta productivo para trazar nuevos abordajes de su influyente teoría del estilo tropical y de la obnubilación brasílica, proyectada como supervivencia en el canon literario y en los folletines de sus contemporáneos. A su vez, hacemos hincapié en el sentido prescriptivo de los ensayos de Araripe Júnior, dirigidos a los jóvenes escritores de folletines, para conjurar el potencial revulsivo de la literatura hiperestésica naturalista sobre el público masivo y para reconducir su lirismo inervador hacia la constitución de una psicologia do tumulto, que contribuya a una renovación estética y cultural. También en torno a la hiperestesia, la intervención prescriptiva de sus ensayos procura regular la influencia de un Zola monstruoso, en su capacidad de mostrar y hacer sentir la realidad de la vida precaria moderna. Finalmente, observamos su abordaje de la literatura como toxina, en el que resuena una clave farmacológica de la literatura moderna latinoamericana.

Abstract In this article, through an arch-philological approach, we propose to accentuate the becoming of Araripe Júnior's critical association between hyperesthesia and the effects of reading serials from his first approaches to the reception of naturalism by young writers, at the moment in which periodical publications grow exponentially and a reading public is constituted. We notice, in turn, a recurring association between a serialized literature considered disposable and a reader characterized as social waste. The survey of his unique conception of literary hyperesthesia is productive to draw new approaches to his outstanding theory of tropical style and Brazilian obtundation, projected as a survival in the literary canon and in the serials of his contemporaries. At the same time, we emphasize the prescriptive sense of Araripe Júnior's essays, aimed at young serial writers, to ward off the revulsive potential of naturalistic hyperesthetic literature on the mass public and to redirect its innervating lyricism towards the constitution of a psychology of tumult, which contributes to an aesthetic and cultural renewal. Also around hyperesthesia, the prescriptive intervention of his essays seeks to regulate the influence of a monstrous Zola, in his ability to show and make people feel the reality of precarious modern life. Finally, we notice his approach to literature as a toxin, in which a pharmacological key of modern Latin American literature resonates.

Abstract As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.

Resumen Como una forma no-representacionalista de integrar el naturalismo metodológico con el naturalismo ontológico, este trabajo propone una distinción entre intuiciones fenoménicas e intuiciones racionales. Al no ser una distinción estática, ofrece una manera de ver en qué sentido la aparente circularidad entre representaciones mentales y representaciones teóricas no sería viciosa. La plausibilidad del argumento deberá ser reforzada mediante consideraciones sobre la inestabilidad de las ontologías y sobre cómo concebir intuiciones en conflicto.

Resumo: O filósofo neoaristotélico, Alasdair MacIntyre, propõe, em Dependent Rational Animals (1999), uma ética das virtudes naturalista, ancorada na identidade animal do ser humano, juntamente com a vulnerabilidade e dependência às quais estamos submetidos, enquanto animais biologicamente constituídos. Ele reconhece que, ao usar o termo “bem” como referência direta ao florescimento dos membros de algumas espécies animais ou vegetais enquanto membros dessas espécies, está oferendo uma interpretação naturalista do bem, mas não deixa claro com que tipo de naturalismo está comprometido, não fornecendo maiores explicações sobre o que entende por bem natural, nem apresentando detalhes acerca de como resolver essa questão da relação entre o bem e suas propriedades naturais. Assim, cabe interrogar que tipo de naturalismo MacIntyre endossa. Seu naturalismo atende aos requisitos mínimos de uma proposta naturalista neoaristotélico atualizada? Essas são algumas das questões a serem analisadas no decorrer deste texto. Resumo propõe 1999, 1999 , (1999) humano submetidos constituídos “bem comprometido natural naturais Assim endossa atualizada texto 199 (1999 19 (199 1 (19 (1 (

Abstract: Neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, proposes, in Dependent Rational Animals (1999), a naturalistic virtue ethics, anchored in the animal identity of human beings, together with the vulnerability and dependence to which we are subjected, as biologically constituted animals. He recognizes that, by using the term “good” as a direct reference to the flourishing of members of some animal or plant species as members of those species, he is offering a naturalistic interpretation of the good, but he does not make clear what kind of naturalism he is committed to, not providing further explanations about what is understood by natural good and not presenting details about how to resolve this issue of the relationship between the good and its natural properties. So, we must ask what kind of naturalism does MacIntyre endorse. Does his naturalism meet the minimum requirements of an updated neo-Aristotelian naturalist proposal? These are some of the questions that we will analyze throughout this text. Abstract NeoAristotelian Neo Aristotelian philosopher proposes 1999, 1999 , (1999) ethics beings subjected animals “good properties So endorse neoAristotelian neo proposal text 199 (1999 19 (199 1 (19 (1 (

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue for a normative reconstruction, from a decolonial perspective of critical theory in Brazil and Latin America, of a democratic ethos that despite its weaknesses and normative deficits is capable of fostering an increasingly deliberative, participatory, and egalitarian democracy by making extensive use of new digital technologies (comprising both AI systems and digital governance). Its argumentative core boils down to the promotion of intersectional egalitarianism (socio-economic, gender, racial-ethnic, environmental) through digital inclusion, which seems only feasible to us from a perspective capable of accommodating the normative claims of a critical decolonial theory combined with a naturalistic view of sustainability, within a research program that I dubbed “mitigated social constructionism” in response to the phenomenological deficit of normative and naturalistic theories (including critical theory and neurophilosophy). If what matters is normativity, then to avoid the divide between naturalism and non-naturalist normativity one nonfoundationalist alternative is to resort to hermeneutical and procedural accounts of normativity as helpful clues to making sense of the naturalism-normativity problem, avoiding reductionist interpretations of both naturalism (Churchland) and normativism (Parfit). paper reconstruction America deliberative participatory comprising governance. governance . governance) socioeconomic, socioeconomic socio economic, economic (socio-economic gender racialethnic, racialethnic racial ethnic, ethnic racial-ethnic environmental inclusion sustainability mitigated constructionism including neurophilosophy. neurophilosophy neurophilosophy) nonnaturalist non naturalist naturalismnormativity problem Churchland (Churchland Parfit. Parfit (Parfit) (Parfit

RESUMO Neste artigo, defendo uma reconstrução normativa, a partir de uma perspectiva decolonial da teoria crítica no Brasil e na América Latina, de um ethos democrático que, apesar de suas fraquezas e déficits normativos, seja capaz de promover uma democracia cada vez mais deliberativa, participativa e igualitária, fazendo uso extensivo de novas tecnologias digitais (incluindo sistemas de IA e governança digital). O seu núcleo argumentativo resume-se à promoção do igualitarismo interseccional (socioeconômico, de genero, étnico-racial, ambiental) através da inclusão digital, o que só nos parece viável a partir de uma perspectiva capaz de acomodar as reivindicações normativas de uma teoria decolonial crítica combinada com uma visão naturalista da sustentabilidade, no âmbito de um programa de investigação que denominei “construcionismo social mitigado” em resposta ao défice fenomenológico das teorias normativas e naturalistas (incluindo a teoria crítica e a neurofilosofia). Se o que importa é a normatividade, então, para evitar a divisão entre o naturalismo e a normatividade não-naturalista, uma alternativa não-fundacionalista é recorrer a explicações hermenêuticas e processuais da normatividade como pistas úteis para dar sentido ao problema naturalismo-normatividade, evitando interpretações reducionistas tanto do naturalismo (Churchland) quanto do normativismo (Parfit). artigo normativa Latina normativos deliberativa igualitária incluindo digital. digital . digital) resumese resume se socioeconômico, socioeconômico (socioeconômico genero étnicoracial, étnicoracial étnico racial, racial étnico-racial ambiental sustentabilidade construcionismo mitigado neurofilosofia. neurofilosofia neurofilosofia) então nãonaturalista, nãonaturalista não naturalista, não-naturalista nãofundacionalista fundacionalista naturalismonormatividade, naturalismonormatividade naturalismo-normatividade Churchland (Churchland Parfit. Parfit (Parfit) (Parfit

In social identity theory, the in-Christ identity is understood as primarily a socially directed process in which people categorise themselves relative to other groups. Intergroup behaviour would cause them to discriminate against the so-called 'outgroup', favouring the so-called 'ingroup'. Although social identity complexity theory has moved beyond single ingroup-outgroup categorisation, it is a question if social identity theories can fully account for the in-Christ identity, especially within an African context. In African religious identity, identity is linked to both the community and the ruling deities, which are perceived to be real entities that intervene in human affairs and identity, presupposing a supernaturalistic epistemology. CONTRIBUTION: In this contribution, the naturalistic epistemological underpinnings of social identity theories are reconsidered in light of a supernatural aspect that is argued to be constitutive of the 1st century in-Christ identity as well as the African Christian identity. Amid current approaches to the in-Christ identity, which is mainly a Pauline concept, some of the main Pauline texts that have bearing on the in-Christ identity are revisited in light of current theories and epistemologies on identity.

Zusammenfassung: Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Theaterrezensionen Alfred Döblins – zwischen 1921 und 1924 für die Zeitung Prager Tagblatt geschrieben und später unter dem Titel Ein Kerl muß eine Meinung haben zusammengetragen – zu präsentieren. Ausgehend vor allem von der ersten Rezension, „Theater in Berlin”, beabsichtigen wir, die Relevanz dieser Schriften innerhalb des Gesamtwerks Alfred Döblins aufzuzeigen und hervorzuheben, wie Veränderungen des städtischen Raums und gesellschaftliche Ereignisse in die Texte miteinbezogen wurden. Weiterhin streben wir an zu zeigen, dass die Rezensionen die Möglichkeit bieten, verschiedene, dem brasilianischen Publikum weniger bekannte Aspekte der Berliner Theaterszene dieser Jahre zu identifizieren, sowie die Erläuterung von in der Theorie Döblins wiederkehrenden Konzepten – am Beispiel der Debatte um Naturalismus – in seiner Theaterkritik zu beobachten. Zusammenfassung es 192 präsentieren Rezension Theater Berlin, Berlin , Berlin” hervorzuheben wurden zeigen bieten verschiedene identifizieren beobachten 19 1

Abstract: This article aims to present Alfred Döblin’s theater reviews, written for the Prager Tagblatt newspaper between 1921 and 1924, and later published in book form under the title Ein Kerl muß eine Meinung haben. Focusing primarily on the first review, “Theater in Berlin,” we intend to indicate the relevance of these writings to Alfred Döblin’s oeuvre as a whole, highlighting how urban transformations and social events are incorporated textually. We will also try to demonstrate that these reviews provide an opportunity to identify elements less known to the Brazilian public regarding the Berlin theater scene of those years, as well as observe the unfolding of recurrent aspects of Döblin’s theory – such as the question of naturalism – in his theater criticism. Abstract Döblins Döblin s 192 1924 haben review Theater Berlin, whole textually years criticism 19 1

Resumo: Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as resenhas teatrais de Alfred Döblin, escritas para o jornal Prager Tagblatt, entre os anos 1921 e 1924, e reunidas posteriormente sob o título de Ein Kerl muß eine Meinung haben. Partindo sobretudo da primeira resenha, “Theater in Berlin”, pretendemos indicar a sua relevância no conjunto da obra de Alfred Döblin e destacar como as transformações urbanas e os acontecimentos sociais são incorporados textualmente. Procuraremos, também, demonstrar que essas resenhas constituem uma oportunidade para identificar elementos menos conhecidos pelo público brasileiro acerca da cena teatral berlinense daqueles anos, bem como para se observar o desdobramento de aspectos recorrentes da teoria de Döblin – a exemplo da questão do naturalismo – em sua crítica teatral. Resumo Tagblatt 192 1924 haben resenha Theater Berlin, Berlin , Berlin” textualmente Procuraremos também 19 1

Abstract Naturalism is the philosophical thesis that holds the following assumptions: the rejection of the supernatural and the transcendent; the acceptance of science as knowledge of high epistemic value, for some philosophers it is the only valid knowledge, and the rejection of all first or a priori philosophy. The problem addressed is that prima facie it seems problematic to explain the theses of naturalism without violating some of its assumptions. This paper will show that, starting from liberal naturalism and the notions of niche construction, as well as some theses of the articulation of thought through language, it is possible to define naturalism without defending premises that violate its methodology.

Resumen El naturalismo es la tesis filosófica que sostiene los siguientes supuestos: el rechazo a lo sobrenatural y a lo trascendente; la aceptación de la ciencia como un conocimiento de alto valor epistémico, para algunos se trata del único conocimiento válido, y el rechazo a toda filosofía primera o a priori. El problema que se aborda es que prima facie parece problemático explicar las tesis del naturalismo sin violar alguno de sus supuestos. En el presente trabajo se mostrará que, partiendo del naturalismo liberal y de las nociones de construcción de nichos, así como de algunas tesis de la articulación del pensamiento a través del lenguaje, es posible definir el naturalismo sin acudir a premisas que violen su metodología.

Resumen Actualmente, el naturalismo es la postura estándar en la filosofía de corte anglosajón. El rechazo a la existencia de entidades metafísicas, por un lado, y a la epistemología de corte apriorístico y normativo, por el otro, ha dado como resultado una dura crítica a la tarea de la filosofía como descripción esencial del conocimiento. No obstante, el significado del término “naturalismo” está lejos de ser claro. Esto da como resultado la postulación de proyectos de investigación de corte muy distinto. En el presente artículo, se hacen las distinciones relevantes para presentar el espectro de teorías naturalistas que van desde las moderadas hasta las radicales. De igual manera, se muestra que toda teoría naturalista postula alguna tesis uniformista que implica compromisos ontológicos o metodológicos específicos. A partir de estas especificaciones afirmo que bajo la misma etiqueta de “problema de la naturalización” se mezclan cuatro proyectos de investigación diferentes, aunque relacionados. Posteriormente, realizo una crítica de los principios subyacentes en los extremos del espectro naturalista para ofrecer una alternativa de corte interaccionista al problema en cuestión. Hacia el final del artículo propongo el esbozo de una interacción entre filosofía y ciencia de corte no reduccionista, ontológicamente uniformista, pero metodológicamente pluralista.

Abstract Nowadays, naturalism is the standard position in anglo-saxon philosophy. Both the non-acceptance of the existence of metaphysical entities, on the one hand, and to epistemology of aprioristic and normative type, on the other, have resulted in harsh critiques to the role of philosophy as essential description of knowledge. However, the meaning of the term “naturalism” is far from being clear. This results in the postulation of research projects of many different types. In this article, several relevant distinctions are made in order to present the spectrum of naturalistic theories ranging from moderate to radical. Also, it is shown that all naturalistic theories postulate a uniformist thesis involving specific ontological or methodological compromises. Based on these specifications I claim that under the same label of “naturalization problem” four different, though related, research projects are mixed. Next, I conduct a critique of the underlying principles in the extremes of the naturalistic spectrum in order to offer an alternative of interactionist type to the problem in question. Towards the end of the article I propose the outline of an interaction between philosophy and science with a non-reductionist focus, ontologically uniformist, but methodologically pluralist.

Resumen El lugar de Antonio Argerich, autor de ¿Inocentes o culpables? (1884), en la emergencia de la novela nacional y en el contexto de la polémica en torno al naturalismo, ha sido muy estudiado. Menos atendido fue su papel como crítico. A partir de un extenso trabajo de archivo, recuperamos y analizamos una larga serie de intervenciones que van desde 1882 hasta 1886. Reconstruimos las condiciones de producción de su conocida disertación sobre el naturalismo, pero es sobre todo el rescate de una carta de Émile Zola a Argerich –con los antecedentes que la explican y las consecuencias que desencadenó y que arman una compleja red textual– la operación central de nuestro trabajo. Estudiamos, de este modo, las inflexiones del rol clave que le cupo a Argerich en cuanto crítico defensor y promotor del naturalismo, a la vez que reconsideramos determinados caracteres distintivos de este debate, el principal que atravesó la crítica literaria del período.

Resumo O lugar de Antonio Argerich, autor de ¿Inocentes o culpables? (1884), no surgimento do romance argentino, e no contexto da controvérsia em torno do naturalismo, tem sido muito estudado. No entanto, seu papel como crítico tem recebido menos atenção. Com base em um extenso trabalho de arquivo, recuperamos e analisamos uma longa série de intervenções realizadas entre 1882 e 1886. Assim, reconstruímos as condições de produção de sua conhecida dissertação sobre o naturalismo, porém o resgate de uma carta de Émile Zola a Argerich –com o pano de fundo que a explica e as consequências que ela desencadeou, que formam uma complexa rede textual– é a operação central de nosso trabalho. Desta forma, estudamos as inflexões do papel fundamental desempenhado por Argerich como crítico, defensor e promotor do naturalismo, enquanto reconsideramos certos traços distintivos deste debate, o principal que percorreu a crítica literária do período.

Abstract The place of Antonio Argerich, author of ¿Inocentes o culpables? (1884), in the emergence of the national novel and in the context of the controversy surrounding naturalism, has been widely studied. His role as a critic, meanwhile, has received less attention. Based on extensive archival work, in this article we recover and analyze a long series of interventions from 1882 to 1886. In addition to reconstructing the conditions of production of the author’s well-known dissertation on naturalism, the article’s main objective is the recovery and study of a letter by Émile Zola to Argerich, from its background and consequences to the complex textual network that emerged from it. In this way, we study the inflections of the key role that Argerich played as a critic, defender, and promoter of naturalism, while we reconsider certain distinctive features of this central debate in the literary criticism of the period.

Among other things, postcolonialism claims to react against western epistemology. Although postcolonial approaches react to the traditional tendency in colonialism to silence the Other by political, social and economic structures and ideologies, non-western identity is often categorised in a way in which identity formation is argued to be based on a naturalistic process of social construction and myth-making. The way in which identity is perceived in western epistemology, including the in-Christ identity, is largely influenced by a naturalistic stance, which is a prominent tendency in western epistemology. In contrast, non-western epistemologies often perceive spiritual beings and powers to be real, which are considered to intervene in human affairs. The irony within most postcolonial approaches is thus that they critique western power structures but continue to utilise western, naturalistic epistemologies to deconstruct religious experience. In this contribution, this discrepancy is explored and evaluated against the often-misunderstood flesh-Spirit dichotomy in the Pauline corpus. INTRADISCIPLINARY AND/OR INTERDISCIPLINARY IMPLICATIONS: In respect of epistemology, this research overlaps with the field of philosophy, and in respect of identity theory it overlaps with the field of social sciences. The discussion of postcolonial biblical criticism itself is interdisciplinary in that it involves New Testament exegesis, its underlying epistemology as well as its interpretative methodologies

SUMMARY: My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s notion of biological organisms as it appears in his 1929 courses. I will first frame the discussion within Heidegger’s interpretation of naturalism and his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science. Then, I will analyze his interpretation of embryology and ecology through which he provides original insights to philosophy of biology, specially regarding the problem of the identity of biological organisms. Finally, I will show how this interpretation entails a profound critique of substance-oriented ontologies of the organism in favor of relational and processual conceptions.

RESUMEN: En este trabajo ofrezco una interpretación de la concepción heideggeriana del organismo biológico presente en sus cursos de 1929. Para ello, primero enmarcaré la discusión dentro de la interpretación heideggeriana del naturalismo y su manera de entender la relación entre filosofía y ciencia. Luego, analizaré su interpretación de la embriología y la ecología mediante la cual Heidegger esboza aportes originales a la filosofía de la biología, especialmente en torno al problema de la identidad del organismo biológico. Finalmente, mostraré cómo esta interpretación supone una profunda crítica a las concepciones sustancialistas del organismo a favor de una concepción relacional y procesual.

Resumen En el siglo XIX los cambios sociales y los avances en teoría evolutiva y en termodinámica forjaron una trasformación en la mirada. La tensión y la lucha se constituyen en conceptos claves con los que se interpretan distintos aspectos del ser humano y la sociedad. En Estados Unidos esto tuvo sus características propias. El objetivo del presente trabajo es el de mostrar las distintas consecuencias que trajo el desplazamiento de tales teorías y conceptos trazando un hilo conductor que revele su influencia en la cultura, y por ello, en la idea de ser humano. Especialmente en los ámbitos de la política, la economía, la neurología, la literatura, la psicología y la filosofía.

Abstract In the 19th century, social changes and advances in evolutionary theory and thermodynamics forged a transformation in the gaze. Tension and struggle become key concepts with which different aspects of the human being and society are interpreted. In the United States this had its own characteristics. The objective of this paper is to show the different consequences that the displacement of such theories and concepts brought by tracing a guiding principle to reveal its influence on culture and therefore on the idea of human being. Particularly in the fields of politics, economics, neurology, literature, psychology and philosophy.

Abstract: The aim of this article is to interpret the naturalist epistemological project of W. Quine from a problematic nucleus that we can identify in I. Kant, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is expressed in the categories of explanation-justification, experimental psychology and transcendental philosophy. The hypothesis of our work is that the naturalization of epistemology in a psychology by Quine is possible due to a dissolution of the limits of the concepts of explanation and justification, which have in Quine a translation in the notions of concept and doctrine. To account for this, (i) we will propose, in a general way, the Kantian problematic nucleus about the distinction between explanation and justification and its relationship with the experimental psychology of the 18th century; ii) we will analyze some important texts of W. Quine where he bases the project of a naturalization of epistemology. Our focus will be to establish the relationship between concept and doctrine as translations of Quine of the concepts of explanation and justification; (iii) finally; we will describe the psychology as a new epistemology and observational statements as an expression of this epistemological turn of Quine.

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es interpretar el proyecto epistemológico naturalista de W. Quine a partir de un núcleo problemático presente en I. Kant, especialmente en la Crítica de la razón pura, que se expresa en las categorías de explicación-justificación, psicología experimental y filosofía trascendental. La hipótesis de nuestro trabajo es que la naturalización de la epistemología en una psicología por parte de Quine es posible gracias a una disolución de los límites de los conceptos de explicación y justificación, que tienen en Quine una traducción en las nociones de concepto y doctrina. Para dar cuenta de esto, (i) plantearemos, de modo general, el núcleo problemático kantiano sobre la distinción entre explicación y justificación y su relación con la psicología experimental del siglo XVIII; (ii) analizaremos algunos textos importantes de W. Quine donde fundamenta el proyecto de una naturalización de la epistemología. Nuestro foco será establecer la relación entre concepto y doctrina como traducciones quineanas de los conceptos de explicación y justificación; (iii) finalmente, describiremos la psicología como nueva epistemología y los enunciados observacionales como expresión de este giro epistemológico de Quine.

RESUMO Tradicionalmente, ser realista sobre algo significa crer na existência independente desse algo. Em termos ontológicos, isto é, acerca do que há, o realismo científico pode ser entendido como envolvendo a adoção de uma ontologia que seja cientificamente informada. Mas, segundo alguns filósofos, a atitude realista deve ir além da ontologia. A forma como essa exigência tem sido entendida envolve fornecer uma metafísica para as entidades postuladas pela ciência. Discutimos como duas abordagens em voga encaram o desafio de fornecer uma metafísica para a ciência: uma forma de naturalismo e a abordagem Viking/Toolbox. Por fim, apresentamos uma terceira via, que adota o melhor das duas abordagens: o método metapopperiano, que foca em descartarmos quais as alternativas erradas, ou melhor dizendo, os perfis metafísicos incompatíveis com certas teorias. Apresentamos o método metapopperiano, um método de metametafísica capaz de avaliar objetivamente quais os perfis metafísicos que são incompatíveis com certas teorias científicas. Para isso, usaremos como estudo de caso a mecânica quântica, mostrando resultados obtidos previamente. Com esse método, podemos ver como a ciência pode ser usada para evitar o erro em questões metafísicas. Essa seria, na nossa opinião, uma forma de desenvolver uma relação produtiva entre ciência e metafísica.

ABSTRACT Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.

Resumen: En las últimas décadas del siglo XIX se produjo un momento fuerte de emergencia de la crítica literaria en Argentina. La polémica en torno al naturalismo y los juicios sobre la novela nacional ocuparon, en ese proceso, un lugar decisivo. Aquí reconsideraremos las principales intervenciones de Martín García Mérou, a partir de una lectura detenida de su campaña crítica sobre “La novela en el Plata”, pero también de páginas inéditas -e íntimas- en las que cuenta sus experiencias personales (y literarias) con las cocottes de París. Se muestra que las opiniones de García Mérou en torno al naturalismo se organiza en un recorrido menos esquemático que lo que suele señalarse en la bibliografía, y que las tensiones y desfasajes que lo atraviesan responden no solo a su trayectoria personal, sino también a los modos de funcionamiento, entre la moral y la búsqueda de un criterio más autónomo, de la emergente literaria crítica del período.

Abstract: In the last decades of the nineteenth century, there was a strong moment of emergence of literary literature in Argentina. The controversy surrounding naturalism and the judgments on the national novel occupied a decisive place in that process. Here we will reconsider the main assessments of Martín García Mérou, from a careful reading of his critical campaign on “La novela en el Plata” but also from unpublished -and intimate- pages in which he recounts his personal (and literary) experiences with the cocottes of Paris. It is shown that García Mérou's opinions on naturalism are organized in a less schematic way than what is usually indicated in the bibliography, and that the contradictions are explained by his personal career but also by the modes the emerging literary criticism functioned.