In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Abstract. This paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi’s critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant’s thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi’s interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological-transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi’s critique.

Resumen. El presente artículo busca describir la crítica de F. H. Jacobi a la filosofía trascendental en torno al problema de la afección y la cosa en sí. Esta crítica atribuye al pensamiento de Kant un idealismo incompatible con toda noción de realismo. La interpretación de Jacobi, sin embargo, se apoya sobre un desconocimiento de la naturaleza metodológico-trascendental no solo de la terminología involucrada en el problema de la afección, sino de toda la reflexión kantiana acerca del conocimiento. El modelo exegético de la two aspects view ha proporcionado instrumentos que nos permiten una reconstrucción hermenéutica del problema de la afección y ponen en evidencia el extravío metodológico en la crítica de Jacobi.

In the context of a need for finding and enabling alternatives to unequal and extractivist perspectives on development, growth, and human well-being, this positioning paper explores possibilities for STEAM (science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics) education with an education for sustainable development focus that counters disciplinary alienations particularly between the arts and the STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) disciplines. The paper argues that unnecessary alienations between cultural-emblematic and mathematical-logical epistemes, especially those linked to narrow interpretations and restricted developments in dialogism and dialectics, respectively, are influenced by restricted understandings of epistemological, ontological, and praxiological philosophical drivers in meaning making and responsive action. In response, the paper develops a series of philosophical principles that, it argues, could usefully underpin STEAM education practices. These are a) iterations of epistemological expansion and contraction (in response to monologic meaning making), b) an expansive and deepening ontology (in response to ontological collapse in describing the world), c) critical and judgmental rationality (finding a middle ground between radical relativism and dogma), and d) concrete utopianism (in response to idealism and additive holisticism). The emergence of the four philosophical principles is developed through illustrative examples of a broad range of arts (fine art, performance art, photography, film, poetry, prose, and music).

Abstract: Feuerbach is one of the representatives of the young Hegelian. In the book The German Ideology, Marx analyzed the state of German ideology at that time through the comparison between materialism and idealism, and criticized him. Marx criticized Feuerbach’s conception of “human nature”, the limitations of materialism, his understanding of “reality” and his understanding of historical relations, starting from real people and their production. This critique laid the foundation for the development of Marxist materialist historiography. Abstract Hegelian Ideology idealism him Feuerbachs s human nature, nature , nature” reality “reality relations production historiography

Resumen: Feuerbach es uno de los representantes Del joven hegeliano. En el libro la ideología alemana, Marx analizó el estado de la ideología alemana en ese momento a través de la comparación entre materialismo e idealismo, y lo criticó. Marx criticó la concepción de Feuerbach de la “naturaleza humana”, las limitaciones del materialismo, su concepción de la “realidad” y su comprensión de las relaciones históricas, partiendo de las personas reales y su producción. Esta crítica sentó las bases para el desarrollo de la historiografía materialista marxista. Resumen hegeliano idealismo naturaleza humana, humana , humana” realidad “realidad históricas producción marxista

Abstract: Marx and Engels were not born as natural historical materialists, and their historical materialism arose on the basis of criticizing Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian humanistic materialism. In The German Ideology, they first expounded the concept of historical materialism and systematically and elaborately discussed its basic principles, thereby realizing a great transformation in the history of philosophy. This paper selected Marx and Engels’ criticism of Feuerbachian humanistic materialism to illustrate their transcendence of Feuerbach and the birth of historical materialism, thus deepening our understanding of this issue. Abstract materialists Ideology principles philosophy issue

Resumo: Marx e Engels não nasceram como materialistas históricos naturais, e o seu materialismo histórico surgiu com base na crítica ao idealismo hegeliano e ao materialismo humanista feuerbachiano. Em A Ideologia Alemã, eles expuseram pela primeira vez o conceito de materialismo histórico e discutiram sistemática e elaboradamente os seus princípios básicos, realizando assim uma grande transformação na história da filosofia. Este artigo selecionou as críticas de Marx e Engels ao materialismo humanista feuerbachiano para ilustrar a sua transcendência de Feuerbach e o nascimento do materialismo histórico, aprofundando assim a nossa compreensão desta questão. Resumo naturais Alemã básicos filosofia questão

Abstract The notion of transcendental idealism is the result of the Kantian synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. This synthesis constitutes the project of a metaphysics of metaphysics, that is, of a new first Philosophy. In this project, the two senses of First Philosophy, the Socratic and the Aristotelian, become patent through the critical and positive task of the Theory of knowledge. Kantian transcendental idealism shares with Husserl’s philosophy, despite deep differences, the original motive of developing a scientific philosophy capable of supplying humanity with rational and universal ethical norms.

Resumen: La noción de idealismo trascendental se rastrea como un resultado de la síntesis kantiana del racionalismo y del empirismo. Dicha síntesis constituye el proyecto de una metafísica de la metafísica, es decir, de una nueva Filosofía primera. En ese proyecto se vuelven patentes los dos sentidos de filosofía primera, el socrático y el aristotélico, a través de la tarea crítica y positivo de la teoría del conocimiento. Ese idealismo trascendental kantiano comparte con la filosofía de Husserl, pese a profundas diferencias, el motivo originario de elaborar una filosofía científica capaz de suministrar a la humanidad normas éticas racionales y universales.

ABSTRACT In the present work, we will determine the fundamental aspects of Laclau’s thought by considering the central role that the subject and the other have in it, both in the individual and in the collective or political sphere. Although the difference is a condition for unfolding consciousness, we will show that Laclau’s conception of the subject presents certain insufficiencies. They become especially relevant when addressing the political sphere. It is pertinent to warn, as Laclau does, regarding the limits of a political conception whose base is a sovereign individual and collective identity. However, one must pay attention to the unitary meaning that also defines individual and collective existence. To consider the relationship between identity and difference, we will resort to discussions of high significance on this matter, which take place in the context of German idealism and romanticism (in particular, we will attend to Kant Fichte, Hölderlin and Schelling). Having made the caveat about the difficulty mentioned above, we will show in what sense Laclau’s antagonistic political conception is adequate for a non-reductionist understanding of the indeterminacy and otherness that are part of the political sphere and that make its strict reduction to rational parameters impossible and undesirable. work Laclaus s it consciousness insufficiencies warn does However existence matter particular Fichte Schelling. Schelling . Schelling) above nonreductionist non reductionist undesirable

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se intentará determinar los aspectos fundamentales del pensamiento de Laclau a partir de la consideración del papel central que tienen en él el sujeto y lo otro, tanto en el ámbito individual como en el colectivo o político. Si bien las diferencias son condición de la actualización de la consciencia, se mostrará que la concepción del sujeto de Laclau presenta ciertas insuficiencias, las cuales se vuelven especialmente relevantes al momento de abordar lo político. Es pertinente advertir, como hace Laclau, respecto de los límites de una concepción política cuya base es una identidad individual y colectiva soberana. Sin embargo, se ha de reparar en el significado unitario que también define la existencia individual y colectiva. Para la consideración de la relación de identidad y diferencia, se acudirá a discusiones de alta significación en este asunto, y que tienen lugar en el contexto del idealismo y el romanticismo alemán (en particular a Kant Fichte, Hölderlin y Schelling). Hecha la salvedad sobre la dificultad indicada, se tratará de mostrar en qué sentido la concepción política antagonística de Laclau es adecuada para una comprensión no reduccionista de la indeterminación y alteridad que constan con lo político, y que vuelven imposible e indeseable su reducción, sin resguardos suficientes, según parámetros racionales. otro político consciencia insuficiencias advertir soberana embargo diferencia asunto Fichte Schelling. Schelling . Schelling) indicada reducción suficientes racionales

This article reports on a collaborative project for the digital innovation of language teaching in Palestine, and it argues for the necessity of mobile learning to circumvent disruption created by the Israeli occupation causing challenges that result in marginalisation and disenfranchisement of opportunity. This partly occurs through the oppression of a sovereign curriculum that supports Palestinian self-determination. This oppression is against both the United Nations Development Goals protected rights for education and the Palestinian Ministry's vision for a society with an education sector that embraces the use of technology to invigorate the value of its culture, produce knowledge and promote emancipation. The article proposes the integration of digital technologies with student-centred learning to enhance and support transformation through three main elements: 1. Digital competence to develop confidence and agency in teachers; 2. Continuous teacher learning to develop autonomy and collaboration within organisations; 3. Problem-solving competencies, which can result in continuous improvement loops and local solutions to barriers. This article will resonate with those recognising the need for critical theory to challenge policy and practice where it deepens disadvantage. It draws upon the voices of 20 teachers from four higher education institutions in Palestine, who reflect on the barriers to innovation and a reclaiming of educational terrain.

Abstract One can easily argue that since Marx and Engels demise of nineteenth century Utopian socialism, characterizing Utopianism as an “idealism deeply and structurally averse to the Political”, utopia has migrated into fiction. With no surprise, Alain Badiou has famously declared the “passion for the real” as the twentieth century’s “major subjective trait”. The (early) twenty first century has also succumbed helplessly to the eruption of the real. But the times we live today seem to be claiming for something else. Over the past two decades utopian thinking seems to have resurfaced. The severity and monumentality of the issues that afflict the world today are inciting a central question for artists: in the face of an imminent catastrophe, what is the use of utopian imagination at the end of times? What is the purpose of artistic endeavours in a finite world. Utopian (or dystopian) fiction and has always dealt with the envisioning of a future anchored in possible or impossible scenarios, helping the world to correct its wrong doings, to improve, to transform, to threat with dreadful outcomes or to denounce present inequalities. However, if we consider that the world needs to start a new narrative, performing arts can help us to expand imagination, freeing political thinking from the constraints of the real world and wide open to “social dreaming”. In this paper, I aim to combine a speculative reflection grounded on utopian studies and in political theatre considering that performing arts are in a particularly good position to intervene in “social imaginary. This frame incites us to rethink the possibilities of political theatre today and its ontology, fighting for the rooting of (artistic) utopia in the imagination of politics, trusting that art and theatre will be able to help us to invent scenarios that today seem impossible or that we have not yet managed to conceive. socialism idealism Political, Political , Political” surprise passion centurys s major trait. trait . trait” early (early else resurfaced artists catastrophe dystopian doings improve transform inequalities However narrative social dreaming. dreaming dreaming” paper imaginary ontology (artistic politics conceive

Resumo Pode-se facilmente argumentar que desde o desmerecimento do socialismo utópico do século XIX por Marx e Engels, caracterizando o utopismo como um “idealismo profunda e estruturalmente avesso ao político”, a utopia migrou para a ficção. Sem surpresa, Alain Badiou declarou a famosa “paixão pelo real” como o “principal traço subjetivo” do século XX. O (início) do século XXI também sucumbiu impotentemente à erupção do real. Mas os tempos que vivemos hoje parecem exigir outra coisa. Nas últimas duas décadas, o pensamento utópico parece ter ressurgido. A gravidade e a monumentalidade das questões que afligem o mundo hoje suscitam uma questão central para os artistas: face a uma catástrofe iminente, para que serve a imaginação utópica no fim dos tempos? Qual é o propósito dos empreendimentos artísticos em um mundo finito. A ficção utópica (ou distópica) lidou sempre com visões de um futuro ancorado em cenários possíveis ou impossíveis, ajudando o mundo a corrigir os seus erros, a melhorar, a transformar, a ameaçar com resultados terríveis ou a denunciar as desigualdades actuais. No entanto, se considerarmos que o mundo precisa de iniciar uma nova narrativa, as artes performativas podem ajudar-nos a expandir a imaginação, libertando o pensamento político dos constrangimentos do mundo real e abrindo-nos ao “sonho social”. Neste texto, pretendo combinar uma reflexão especulativa baseada em estudos utópicos e no teatro político, considerando que as artes performativas estão numa posição particularmente boa para intervir no “imaginário social”. Este enquadramento incita-nos a repensar as possibilidades do teatro político hoje e a sua ontologia, lutando pelo enraizamento da utopia (artística) no imaginário da política, confiando que a arte e o teatro poderão ajudar-nos a inventar cenários que hoje parecem impossíveis ou que ainda não conseguimos conceber. Podese Pode Engels idealismo , político” surpresa paixão principal subjetivo XX início (início coisa décadas ressurgido artistas iminente finito distópica erros melhorar transformar actuais entanto narrativa ajudarnos ajudar nos abrindonos abrindo sonho social. social . social” texto incitanos incita ontologia artística (artística política conceber

Abstract Financialized capitalism has been criticized for its predatory character, grounding not only a diagnosis that presents personal domination as a characteristic of current society, but the resumption of legal idealism as a strategy of confrontation. From a categorical reading of finance, the aim of this article is to highlight the adequacy of social-legal reproduction to capitalist accumulation, in such a way that the philological study of Marxian critique can contribute to the renewal of marxist critique of law. character society confrontation finance sociallegal social accumulation law

Resumo O capitalismo financeirizado tem sido criticado pelo seu caráter predatório, fundamentando não só um diagnóstico que apresenta a dominação pessoal como uma característica da atual sociedade, mas a retomada do idealismo jurídico como estratégia de enfrentamento. A partir de uma leitura categorial das finanças, o objetivo do presente artigo é destacar a adequação da reprodução sócio-jurídica à acumulação capitalista, de tal modo que o estudo filológico da crítica marxiana possa contribuir para a renovação da crítica marxista do direito. predatório sociedade enfrentamento finanças sóciojurídica sócio jurídica capitalista direito

ABSTRACT Considered as a radical subjectivist who presented the world as a mere product of thought, Fichte had to face charges of atheism, naïve idealism and reductionism. He always reacted identically, repeatedly explaining his system, or redirecting it in order to overcome new challenges. Even though, part of his critics especially the ones who saw in his theories a deficient concept of Nature, like Schelling, who was moved by a bitter personal and conceptual disagreement with him around 1801, would later consider Fichte’s final works as a complete reformulation. Recent historical research, however, shows that Fichte was aware of his lack of clarity concerning natural philosophy already in 1798, and he even admitted being incapable of solving the problem. We argue here that Fichte’s original conception of nature original is not so far from the new one, and that his further presentation is not a mere defensive reaction to the advancement of Schellingian philosophy of nature. thought atheism reductionism identically system challenges though Nature Schelling 1801 Fichtes s reformulation research however 1798 problem one 180 179 18 17 1

RESUMO Caricaturado como criador de uma filosofia subjetivista extrema, que apresenta o mundo como mero produto do pensamento, Fichte teve de confrontar em diferentes fases de sua vida acusações de ateísmo, idealismo ingênuo e simplismo. Reagiu a todas exatamente da mesma forma, reexplicando seu sistema, ou redirecionando-o para cobrir os desafios que se avolumavam. Contudo, parte de seus críticos, particularmente os que viam nele um conceito de natureza muito deficitário, como Schelling, por ocasião do forte desentendimento entre os dois por volta de 1801, crerão que a obra madura de Fichte tenta sanar o erro. A pesquisa histórica recente, no entanto, mostra que Fichte estava bem ciente dos problemas ligados à filosofia natural já por volta de 1798, e admitia ter dificuldade em resolvê-los. Defenderemos que a formulação original do conceito de natureza de Fichte não chega a ser tão distinta de sua versão posterior, e que esta não se resume a uma mera reação defensiva diante do avanço da filosofia da natureza de Schelling. extrema pensamento ateísmo simplismo forma sistema redirecionandoo redirecionando avolumavam Contudo críticos deficitário Schelling 1801 erro recente entanto 1798 resolvêlos. resolvêlos resolvê los. los resolvê-los posterior 180 179 18 17 1

Resumen. Este artículo ahonda en las aportaciones en clave política de la filósofa española María Zambrano durante su juventud (1928-1939) en los albores de la Segunda República española y la posterior Guerra Civil para plantear un posible encaje de estas en el cuerpo teórico del liberalismo conservador. Con esa intención, contrastamos ambas referencias sirviéndonos de sus respectivas críticas del racionalismo e idealismo en cuanto disciplinas incapaces de tratar adecuadamente con la comunidad política entendida como realidad orgánica difícilmente reducible a un plan general. El análisis de este rechazo se lleva a cabo en sus dos expresiones: como denuncia de la imposibilidad teórica que supone la tentativa racionalista de obtener una imagen completa de la realidad y como radical desconfianza en cuanto a la aplicación en el terreno práctico de los esquemas de la idealidad.

Abstract. This article deals with the political contributions of the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano during her youth (1928-1939) at the dawn of the Second Spanish Republic and the subsequent Civil War. We suggest her views may be within the theoretical realm of liberal conservatism. With this aim, we engage with her criticisms of rationalism and idealism as disciplines incapable of adequately dealing with the political community understood as an organic reality, hardly reducible to a general plan. The analysis of this rejection deals with its two expressions: as a critique of the theoretical impossibility of rationalism to obtain a complete picture of reality, and as radical distrust regarding the practical application of ideal schemes.

Abstract Critical Study. Gottfried Gabriel: Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn. Brill/ Schöningh, 2022. Study Gabriel Kant Gesamtwerk Paderborn Brill Schöningh 2022 202 20 2

Abstract The food bike (voedselfiets) project in the city of Hengelo (Netherlands) was designed to stimulate citizens to separate organic from residual waste. The food bikes take standard routes with designated stops to collect food waste from residents in high-rise neighbourhoods, which lack space to separate organic waste in garbage containers. Data were collected by a mix of qualitative research methods, which allowed to develop a holistic and contextualized view of the reasons why citizens joined this environmental initiative. The from literature well-known factors of idealism and self-interest can partly explain participation in the food bike project, but we have found that a habitus of not wasting food and social needs are also important reasons for people to participate. Especially older people take part in the project because the food bikes suit their habitus of frugality. The social interaction -behaving in a desirable way in the eyes of neighbours, and chatting at the bikes- stand in marked contrast to collection of waste by garbage trucks, in which contact is avoided as much as possible. The social aspect was reinforced during the Corona crisis, when indoor social contact was discouraged by the Dutch government. As it is, municipal efforts to promote pro-environmental behaviour build on the idealism and perceived self-interest of citizens, but could also make use of the social and emotional considerations of prospective participants and their attachment to the neighbourhood. voedselfiets (voedselfiets Netherlands (Netherlands highrise high rise neighbourhoods containers methods initiative wellknown well known selfinterest self interest participate frugality behaving neighbours trucks possible crisis government proenvironmental pro neighbourhood

Resumo O projeto Food Bike (voedselfiets) na cidade de Hengelo (Holanda) foi concebido para estimular os cidadãos a separar os resíduos orgânicos dos não orgânicos. As food bikes seguem rotas padronizadas com paradas designadas para coletar resíduos alimentares de moradores de bairros altos, que não têm espaço para separar os resíduos orgânicos em recipientes de lixo. Os dados foram recolhidos através de uma combinação de métodos de investigação qualitativa, o que permitiu desenvolver uma visão holística e contextualizada das razões pelas quais os cidadãos aderiram a esta iniciativa ambiental. Os fatores bem conhecidos de idealismo e interesse próprio da literatura podem explicar parcialmente a participação no projeto da Food Bike, mas descobrimos que o hábito de não desperdiçar alimentos e as necessidades sociais também são razões importantes para as pessoas participarem. Principalmente os idosos participam do projeto porque as Food Bikes atendem ao seu hábito de frugalidade. A interação social - comportar-se de maneira desejável aos olhos dos vizinhos e conversar nas bicicletas - contrasta fortemente com a coleta de lixo por caminhões de lixo, nos quais o contato é evitado tanto quanto possível. O aspecto social foi reforçado durante a crise do Coronavírus, quando o contacto social interior foi desencorajado pelo governo holandês. Atualmente, os esforços municipais para promover o comportamento pró-ambiental baseiam-se no idealismo e no auto-interesse percebido dos cidadãos, mas também podem fazer uso das considerações sociais e emocionais dos potenciais participantes e da sua ligação ao bairro. voedselfiets (voedselfiets Holanda (Holanda altos qualitativa ambiental participarem frugalidade comportarse comportar se possível Coronavírus holandês Atualmente próambiental pró baseiamse baseiam autointeresse auto bairro

Abstract This paper seeks to point out in George Berkeley’s ontology of natural laws theoretical elements related to Charles S. Peirce’s Semiotics and classical Pragmatism, based on the possible identity of purposes between Berkeley’s subjective idealism and Peirce’s objective idealism, both sharing the refutation of a mind-matter dualism of Cartesian origin. On the other hand, there is also a reflection on the role of experience in these authors, when perception in Berkeley, fundamental to his epistemology, would find its homologous condition in Peirce, namely, the necessary cognoscibility of every phenomenical object. Berkeleys Berkeley s S Peirces Peirce Pragmatism mindmatter mind matter origin hand authors epistemology namely object

Resumo Este texto procura apontar, na ontologia das leis naturais de George Berkeley, elementos teóricos afeitos à Semiótica e ao Pragmatismo clássico de Charles S. Peirce, tendo por base a possível identidade de propósitos entre os idealismos subjetivo berkeleyano e o de teor objetivo peirciano, ambos comungando a refutação de um dualismo mente-matéria de extração cartesiana. Por outro lado, reflete-se, também, sobre o papel da experiência nestes autores, em que a percepção em Berkeley, fundamental para sua epistemologia encontraria sua condição homóloga em Peirce, a saber, a necessária cognoscibilidade de todo objeto fenomênico. apontar Berkeley S Peirce peirciano mentematéria mente matéria cartesiana lado refletese, refletese reflete se, se reflete-se também autores saber fenomênico