Resumen Este artículo tiene tres objetivos. El primero es mostrar la ambigüedad inevitable entre el realismo y el idealismo en la obra de Kant. El segundo es mostrar la naturaleza del realismo de Kant como su respuesta al escéptico y una reflexión sobre la distintividad objetiva de las representaciones. Sin embargo, la versión de la realidad empírica propuesta como la respuesta al escéptico tiene elementos manifiestos de antirrealidad: está incorporada en la tensión entre la idea de prueba y la idea de verdad. Kant emplea la teoría de apercepción y juicio, que funcionan generando parámetros conceptuales puros (categorías) para abordar esta tensión. La manera en que la teoría de apercepción y juicio de Kant ofrece soluciones al desafío de alinear la verdad y la prueba está en línea con abordajes epistémicos, antirrealistas, antimetafísicos y no clásicos de la representación lógica (que se alinea con la lógica trascendental de Kant). Por último, presentaremos un resumen del discurso que rodea la naturaleza del realismo empírico de Kant y lo compararemos con la versión de “realidad” defendida por las perspectivas metafísicas, la ciencia empírica y el sentido común.

Abstract This article has three objectives. The first is to show the inevitable ambiguity between realism and idealism in Kant’s work. The second is to show the nature of Kantian realism as his response to the skeptic and a reflection on the objective distinctness of representations. The version of empirical reality proposed as the answer to the skeptic, however, has overt elements of anti-reality: it is built in the tension between the idea of proof and the idea of truth. Kant employs the theory of apperception and judgment, which functions by generating pure conceptual parameters (categories) to address this tension. The manner in which Kant’s theory of apperception and judgment offers solutions to the challenge of aligning truth and proof is in line with epistemic, anti-realistic, anti-metaphysical, and non-classical approaches to logical representation (which aligns with Kant’s transcendental logic). Lastly, we will present an overview of the discourse surrounding the nature of Kantian empirical realism and compare it to the version of “reality” advocated by metaphysical perspectives, empirical science, and common sense.

Resumo Este artigo tem três objetivos. A primeira é mostrar a inevitável ambiguidade entre realismo e idealismo na obra de Kant. A segunda é mostrar a natureza do realismo kantiano como a sua resposta ao cético e uma reflexão sobre o caráter objetivo das representações. A versão da realidade empírica proposta como resposta ao cético, contudo, tem elementos evidentes de anti-realidade: é construída na tensão entre a ideia de prova e a ideia de verdade. Kant aplica a teoria da apercepção e do julgamento, que operam gerando parâmetros conceituais puros (categorias) para se ajustar a essa tensão. A forma como a teoria da apercepção e do julgamento de Kant propõe soluções para o problema de alinhar verdade e prova é consistente com soluções epistêmicas, anti-realistas, antimetafísicas e não clássicas para a representação lógica (que é compatível com a lógica transcendental de Kant). Por fim, ofereceremos um retrato da discussão sobre a natureza do realismo empírico kantiano e compará-lo-emos com a versão da “realidade” apoiada pela visão metafísica, pela ciência empírica pelo senso comum.

Resumen No es posible hablar del pensamiento de Hegel acerca de la inclusión sin hacer, al mismo tiempo, un balance de la alienación que pretende disolver. Ante ello, el pensamiento de la inclusión no deja de ofrecer una salida siempre demasiado apresurada, iluminada por el sectarismo y el esoterismo que lo caracterizan. En virtud de ello, la exclusión de uno -no como exclusión del otro, sino como elevación de la exclusión de sí a condición de libertad para los otros- se convierte en el verdadero paradigma del entusiasmo del espíritu. La formación o Bildung de un individuo refiere esta tensión entre la operación de autoenajenación y el esfuerzo por forjar comunidad, en la base de todo el proceso. Intento aquí exponer la manera en que Hegel se interrogó acerca de la inteligibilidad universal de la ciencia como conclusión de la lucha entre estos dos polos. El sistema de posibilidad de la experiencia, que conforma la Fenomenología del espíritu, ejemplifica así una superación del sectarismo inclusivo inspirada en la enigmática promesa de una ilusión de libertad absoluta, alcanzada por medio del conocimiento.

Abstract It is not possible to speak of Hegel’s thought on “inclusion” without at the same time having to take stock of the alienation that it seeks to dissolve. But, in the face of this, the thought of inclusion does not fail to offer a way out that is always too hasty, illuminated by the sectarianism and esotericism that characterize it. By virtue of this, the exclusion of one, not as exclusion of the other, but as elevation of the exclusion of oneself to the condition of freedom for others, becomes the true paradigm of the enthusiasm of the spirit. The “formation” or Bildung of an individual refers to this tension between the operation of self-estrangement and the effort to forge community, which is at the basis of the whole process. I try to expose here the way in which Hegel questioned himself about the “universal intelligibility” of science as the conclusion of the struggle between these two poles. The system of possibility of experience that makes up the Phenomenology of Spirit thus exemplifies an overcoming of inclusive sectarianism inspired by the enigmatic promise of an illusion of absolute freedom achieved through knowledge.

In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Abstract One of the most attractive aspects of Theoretical Physics is that its implications are often more fascinating than fiction. Both Philosophy and Physics often use logical reasoning that involves experiments that cannot be carried out in practice, but that through imagination allow us to explore and understand non-experimental aspects of the Universe. Einstein popularized the term “thought experiment” for conceptual approaches explored only in the field of ideas. In this work, we discuss how knowledge is possible through reflections that lead the subject from a simple logic to a transcendental logic from Kantian Transcendental Idealism. Subsequently, we present an initially simple experiment to be carried out in practice, involving folding a sheet of paper. Then, after verifying the existence of an experimental limit for its continuity, we performed it through a theoretical-mental extension and proceeded in a guided way to explore the Universe.

Resumen. El presente artículo busca describir la crítica de F. H. Jacobi a la filosofía trascendental en torno al problema de la afección y la cosa en sí. Esta crítica atribuye al pensamiento de Kant un idealismo incompatible con toda noción de realismo. La interpretación de Jacobi, sin embargo, se apoya sobre un desconocimiento de la naturaleza metodológico-trascendental no solo de la terminología involucrada en el problema de la afección, sino de toda la reflexión kantiana acerca del conocimiento. El modelo exegético de la two aspects view ha proporcionado instrumentos que nos permiten una reconstrucción hermenéutica del problema de la afección y ponen en evidencia el extravío metodológico en la crítica de Jacobi.

Abstract. This paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi’s critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant’s thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi’s interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological-transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi’s critique.

RESUMEN El presente artículo ofrece una breve confrontación entre el realismo especulativo de Meillassoux y el idealismo trascendental/realismo empírico de Kant, así como la crítica que el primero dirige al segundo. Meillassoux afirma que Kant es incapaz de pensar el objeto independientemente del sujeto, lo que llama «correlacionismo». Nuestra hipótesis es que una separación tan radical como la que demanda Meillassoux hace imposible el conocimiento de lo real. Metodológicamente, ofrecemos un análisis conceptual en ambos autores, así como de las implicaciones de sus posiciones para la epistemología y la ontología. Concluimos que una separación sujeto-objeto no logra explicar el vínculo entre cosas y pensamientos. Kant, por el contrario, ofrece las bases para comprender el contacto entre cosas, intuiciones y conceptos. Esto implica un análisis más sutil del mundo y la subjetividad, que ofrece diferentes niveles que se cruzan entre sí. Dichos niveles se vinculan recíprocamente de manera diversa y brindan una imagen de un mundo hiperconectado, en lugar de una división simple sujeto-objeto.

ABSTRACT The present paper offers a brief confrontation between Meillassoux’s speculative realism and Kant's transcendental idealism/empirical realism, as well as the critique the former addresses to the later. Meillassoux claims that Kant cannot think the object independently of the subject, what he calls «correlationism». Our hypothesis is that the radical separation demanded by Meillassoux renders knowledge of the real impossible. Methodologically, we offer a conceptual analysis in both authors as well as their corresponding implications for epistemology and ontology. We conclude that a subject-object separation fails to explain the link between things and thoughts. Kant, on the contrary, delivers the grounds to explain the contact between things, intuitions, and concepts. This entails a more subtle analysis of the world and subjectivity offering different intersecting levels. These different levels are linked differently, offering the picture of a hyperconnected world, instead of a simple subject-object divide.

Abstract Background: Reduction of maternal death rate is a Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in Mexico. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to ascertain if there is a relationship among maternal death rates and variables in the economic-social field (7), health-demographic (16), work (6), home (3) infrastructure and housing assets (8). Material and method: three multiple linear regression models were estimated using data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI): Vital Statistics, Population and Housing Census and National Population Council (CONAPO). Results: Expectation in schooling and postpartum care are variables that influence the rate of maternal death in Mexico. In statistical terms, the rate of maternal death could be reduced up to 15% if the number of women receiving postpartum care increased by one percentage point. Conclusions: Mexico City exhibits the highest rate of maternal deaths. Even though modernization assumptions are widely spread in the city, and women would seek hospital care during pregnancy, childbirth or the postpartum period, the truth is that the healthcare system does not incorporate strategies to reduce the level of maternal mortality. Concrete actions rather than sole dissemination of knowledge, must be taken if Mexico is to comply with this SDG of UNO’s 2030 agenda. Which shows limitations of development idealism to explain maternal death, the mere dissemination of knowledge and values without a drive for concrete actions complicates the panorama. The above could hinder Mexico's compliance with the established goal of the SDGs established in the 2030 Agenda.

Resumen Antecedentes: la reducción de muerte materna constituye uno de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) en México. Propósito: el propósito de este artículo consiste en analizar la relación que puede existir entre la razón de muerte materna y variables del ámbito económico-social (7), salud-demográfico (16), laboral (6), hogar (3) e infraestructura y bienes de la vivienda (8). Materiales y método: se estimaron tres modelos de regresión lineal múltiple a partir de datos que provienen del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI): Estadísticas vitales, Censos de Población y Vivienda y Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO). Resultados: la esperanza de escolaridad y la condición de revisión posparto son variables que influyen en la razón de muerte materna en México. En términos estadísticos, se podría reducir hasta 15% la razón de muerte materna si se incrementa en un punto porcentual la cantidad de mujeres con atención posparto. Conclusiones: la Ciudad de México, capital del país, es una de las entidades federativas con mayor ocurrencia de defunciones maternas. A pesar de que en este lugar se encuentran ampliamente extendidos los supuestos de la modernización, es una práctica recurrente que las mujeres busquen atención hospitalaria durante el embarazo, parto o puerperio en esa ciudad; sin embargo, no se observan estrategias de atención para reducir el nivel de mortalidad materna. Lo que muestra limitaciones del idealismo del desarrollo para explicar la muerte materna, la mera difusión de conocimientos y valores sin un impulso de acciones concretas, complica el panorama. Lo anterior, podría obstaculizar el cumplimiento de México de la meta establecida de los ODS establecidos en la Agenda 2030.

In the context of a need for finding and enabling alternatives to unequal and extractivist perspectives on development, growth, and human well-being, this positioning paper explores possibilities for STEAM (science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics) education with an education for sustainable development focus that counters disciplinary alienations particularly between the arts and the STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) disciplines. The paper argues that unnecessary alienations between cultural-emblematic and mathematical-logical epistemes, especially those linked to narrow interpretations and restricted developments in dialogism and dialectics, respectively, are influenced by restricted understandings of epistemological, ontological, and praxiological philosophical drivers in meaning making and responsive action. In response, the paper develops a series of philosophical principles that, it argues, could usefully underpin STEAM education practices. These are a) iterations of epistemological expansion and contraction (in response to monologic meaning making), b) an expansive and deepening ontology (in response to ontological collapse in describing the world), c) critical and judgmental rationality (finding a middle ground between radical relativism and dogma), and d) concrete utopianism (in response to idealism and additive holisticism). The emergence of the four philosophical principles is developed through illustrative examples of a broad range of arts (fine art, performance art, photography, film, poetry, prose, and music).

BACKGROUND: Consumers are not always aware of how their purchase decisions may harm other humans and the environment. Green customer helping behaviours could aid in solving this problem. AIM: The study aims to develop a research model, advancing knowledge of the extent to which idealism (an ethical philosophy) may influence green attitudes and promote green customer helping behaviours that could aid other customers in avoiding harmful brands. The study further aims to gain clarity regarding the moderating role of customer helper cynicism within the proposed model. SETTING: A self-administered questionnaire was fielded amongst consumers in South Africa and the United States of America (US). METHOD: Mplus 8.5 and PROCESS macro in RStudio were used to analyse and compare the survey data obtained from the two samples RESULTS: All direct relationships assessed were positive and significant for South Africa and the US samples. Varying results were uncovered between the two samples concerning the moderating role of customer helper cynicism. CONCLUSION: The identified model confirms the important role of idealism in influencing green customer helping behaviours, as mediated by green attitudes and moderated by customer helper cynicism. CONTRIBUTION: Novel insight is provided into the contribution of ethical philosophy in promoting green customer helping behaviours. Additionally, direction is provided for the deployment of strategies that could promote green customer helping behaviours in diverse green contexts and across continents and that effectively may aid other customers in avoiding brands harmful to society.

Abstract The notion of transcendental idealism is the result of the Kantian synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. This synthesis constitutes the project of a metaphysics of metaphysics, that is, of a new first Philosophy. In this project, the two senses of First Philosophy, the Socratic and the Aristotelian, become patent through the critical and positive task of the Theory of knowledge. Kantian transcendental idealism shares with Husserl’s philosophy, despite deep differences, the original motive of developing a scientific philosophy capable of supplying humanity with rational and universal ethical norms.

Resumen: La noción de idealismo trascendental se rastrea como un resultado de la síntesis kantiana del racionalismo y del empirismo. Dicha síntesis constituye el proyecto de una metafísica de la metafísica, es decir, de una nueva Filosofía primera. En ese proyecto se vuelven patentes los dos sentidos de filosofía primera, el socrático y el aristotélico, a través de la tarea crítica y positivo de la teoría del conocimiento. Ese idealismo trascendental kantiano comparte con la filosofía de Husserl, pese a profundas diferencias, el motivo originario de elaborar una filosofía científica capaz de suministrar a la humanidad normas éticas racionales y universales.

Abstract Written by Marx and Engels between 1845 and 1846, The German Ideology aimed to settle accounts with hegelian idealist philosophy, including in this settlement its neo-hegelian version and the contemplative materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach. This is the writing in which, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the pillars of historical materialism were explained. In light of reflections around the work in question, the article seeks to bring elements that explain the peculiarity of the materialist conception of the social being established by the pair of German thinkers. To this end, support is sought in the economic-philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in the General Introduction of 1857, and in the arguments of commentators such as György Lukács, José Chasin and Ronaldo Vielmi, aiming to demonstrate that The German Ideology marks the decisive overcoming of Marx and Engels of Hegelian idealism, as well as idealist philosophy in general, inaugurating a new point of view based on social humanity. 184 1846 neohegelian neo Feuerbach which explained question thinkers end economicphilosophical economic philosophical 1844 1857 Lukács Vielmi idealism general humanity 18 185 1

Resumo Escrita por Marx e Engels entre 1845 e 1846, A ideologia alemã teve como objetivo acertar as contas com a filosofia idealista hegeliana, incluindo nesse acerto sua versão neo-hegeliana e o materialismo contemplativo de Ludwig Feuerbach. Trata-se do escrito em que, pela primeira vez na história da filosofia, foram explicitados os pilares do materialismo histórico. À luz de reflexões em torno da obra em questão, o artigo procura trazer elementos que explicitam a peculiaridade da concepção materialista do ser social instaurada pela dupla de pensadores alemães. Para tanto, buscam-se subsídios nos Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos de 1844, na Introdução Geral de 1857, e nos argumentos de comentadores como György Lukács, José Chasin e Ronaldo Vielmi, visando demonstrar que A ideologia alemã marca a superação decisiva de Marx e Engels do idealismo hegeliano, bem como da filosofia idealista em geral, inaugurando um novo ponto de vista baseado na humanidade social. 184 1846 hegeliana neohegeliana neo Feuerbach Tratase Trata se histórico questão alemães tanto buscamse buscam econômicofilosóficos econômico filosóficos 1844 1857 Lukács Vielmi hegeliano geral 18 185 1

Abstract: Marx and Engels were not born as natural historical materialists, and their historical materialism arose on the basis of criticizing Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian humanistic materialism. In The German Ideology, they first expounded the concept of historical materialism and systematically and elaborately discussed its basic principles, thereby realizing a great transformation in the history of philosophy. This paper selected Marx and Engels’ criticism of Feuerbachian humanistic materialism to illustrate their transcendence of Feuerbach and the birth of historical materialism, thus deepening our understanding of this issue. Abstract materialists Ideology principles philosophy issue

Resumo: Marx e Engels não nasceram como materialistas históricos naturais, e o seu materialismo histórico surgiu com base na crítica ao idealismo hegeliano e ao materialismo humanista feuerbachiano. Em A Ideologia Alemã, eles expuseram pela primeira vez o conceito de materialismo histórico e discutiram sistemática e elaboradamente os seus princípios básicos, realizando assim uma grande transformação na história da filosofia. Este artigo selecionou as críticas de Marx e Engels ao materialismo humanista feuerbachiano para ilustrar a sua transcendência de Feuerbach e o nascimento do materialismo histórico, aprofundando assim a nossa compreensão desta questão. Resumo naturais Alemã básicos filosofia questão

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se intentará determinar los aspectos fundamentales del pensamiento de Laclau a partir de la consideración del papel central que tienen en él el sujeto y lo otro, tanto en el ámbito individual como en el colectivo o político. Si bien las diferencias son condición de la actualización de la consciencia, se mostrará que la concepción del sujeto de Laclau presenta ciertas insuficiencias, las cuales se vuelven especialmente relevantes al momento de abordar lo político. Es pertinente advertir, como hace Laclau, respecto de los límites de una concepción política cuya base es una identidad individual y colectiva soberana. Sin embargo, se ha de reparar en el significado unitario que también define la existencia individual y colectiva. Para la consideración de la relación de identidad y diferencia, se acudirá a discusiones de alta significación en este asunto, y que tienen lugar en el contexto del idealismo y el romanticismo alemán (en particular a Kant Fichte, Hölderlin y Schelling). Hecha la salvedad sobre la dificultad indicada, se tratará de mostrar en qué sentido la concepción política antagonística de Laclau es adecuada para una comprensión no reduccionista de la indeterminación y alteridad que constan con lo político, y que vuelven imposible e indeseable su reducción, sin resguardos suficientes, según parámetros racionales. otro político consciencia insuficiencias advertir soberana embargo diferencia asunto Fichte Schelling. Schelling . Schelling) indicada reducción suficientes racionales

ABSTRACT In the present work, we will determine the fundamental aspects of Laclau’s thought by considering the central role that the subject and the other have in it, both in the individual and in the collective or political sphere. Although the difference is a condition for unfolding consciousness, we will show that Laclau’s conception of the subject presents certain insufficiencies. They become especially relevant when addressing the political sphere. It is pertinent to warn, as Laclau does, regarding the limits of a political conception whose base is a sovereign individual and collective identity. However, one must pay attention to the unitary meaning that also defines individual and collective existence. To consider the relationship between identity and difference, we will resort to discussions of high significance on this matter, which take place in the context of German idealism and romanticism (in particular, we will attend to Kant Fichte, Hölderlin and Schelling). Having made the caveat about the difficulty mentioned above, we will show in what sense Laclau’s antagonistic political conception is adequate for a non-reductionist understanding of the indeterminacy and otherness that are part of the political sphere and that make its strict reduction to rational parameters impossible and undesirable. work Laclaus s it consciousness insufficiencies warn does However existence matter particular Fichte Schelling. Schelling . Schelling) above nonreductionist non reductionist undesirable

Resumen Tomando como hilo conductor el tema de la comunidad, el siguiente trabajo intenta reconstruir el itinerario intelectual conjunto que llevó a Friedrich Hölderlin y Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel a postular las bases del idealismo especulativo. A partir de la comparación de las fuentes y textos de ambos autores durante el período que va de 1794 a 1799, el trabajo precisará el origen y el uso de algunos términos compartidos, así como también la relevancia que tuvieron los mismos para la realización de su proyecto conjunto. Finalmente, intentaremos mostrar de qué modo muchas de las ideas presentadas por Hölderlin en las diversas versiones de su Hiperión repercutieron en los trabajos de Hegel.

Abstract Takingthethemeofcommunity as a commonthread, thisworkattemptstoreconstructthejointintellectualjourneythat led Friedrich Hölderlin and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel topositthefoundationsofspeculativeidealism. Bycomparingthesources and textsofbothauthorsfrom 1794 to 1799, thisworkwillclarifytheorigin and use ofsomesharedterms, as well as therelevancetheyhadforcarryingouttheirjointprojects. Finally, wewillattempttoshowhowmanyofthe ideas presentedby Hölderlin in thevariousversionsofhis HyperionhadanimpactonHegel’sworks.

Resumen En este artículo me propongo realizar una defensa del naturalismo como fundamento metafísico de la ciencia, mostrando para ello que el “nuevo realismo” de Markus Gabriel es otra versión contemporánea del relativismo y del idealismo y a pesar de que Gabriel acepta la distinción fregeana de sentido y referencia, sus implicaciones son explícitamente antinaturalistas. En concreto, la defensa al naturalismo que intento ofrecer aquí es una crítica abierta a las consecuencias antinaturalistas y pseudocientíficas del “nuevo realismo” de Gabriel. Otra manera de comprender este trabajo es mostrar que el naturalismo puede ser una pieza clave para entender la discusión contemporánea entre la ciencia y la pseudociencia.

Abstract In this paper, I intend to argue in favour of naturalism as the metaphysical foundation of science, showing that the "new realism" of Markus Gabriel is another contemporary version of relativism and idealism and even though Gabriel accepts the Fregean distinction between sense and reference its implications are explicitly anti-naturalistic. Specifically, the argument of naturalism that I am trying to offer here is an open critique of the anti-naturalistic and pseudoscientific consequences of Gabriel's "new realism". Another way of understanding this work is to show that naturalism can be a key piece to understand the contemporary discussion between science and pseudoscience.