In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Gentrification has led to the eviction and displacement of many people from working-class areas around the world. However, the relationship between gentrification and displacement has sparked much debate in the literature, with some researchers downplaying displacement, while others have argued that gentrification can occur without the displacement of people. These studies have tended to be quantitative in nature. However, there are few qualitative accounts of the experience of displacement and there is little consideration of the affective or phenomenological dimensions of displacement in current debates about gentrification. This is in part because researchers have tended not to engage directly with displaced people as it is often difficult to locate them. The purpose of this article is to describe the essence of displacement from the perspective of a group of individuals who were evicted from their homes in a gentrifying inner-city area of Johannesburg, South Africa. Through the methodology of transcendental phenomenology, five interrelated themes were derived from in-depth interviews with the participants. The findings show that the essence of displacement is one of great pain, loss and trauma, which disrupts the lifeworld of those displaced and impacts their overall health and well-being.

RESUMO A primeira fenomenologia de Husserl, cuja expressão maior é a obra Investigações Lógicas, de 1900/1901, pretende ser uma teoria do conhecimento que opera segundo o princípio da “neutralidade metafísica”. Essa neutralidade metafísica é usualmente interpretada como a delimitação do horizonte temático da fenomenologia ao domínio das vivências, excluindo-se, com isso, a coisa transcendente do seu domínio de investigação. A primeira fenomenologia seria, portanto, uma espécie de “psicologia intencional”. Contra essa interpretação, pretendemos mostrar, com base nos textos do Husserl desse mesmo período, que a teoria do conhecimento fenomenológica das Investigações Lógicas é filosofia primeira, isto é, metafísica. A “neutralidade metafísica” não é, ali, uma proibição do discurso sobre a transcendência, mas um princípio metodológico para que tal discurso possa ser legitimado. Com isso, pretendemos mostrar que a fenomenologia pré-transcendental não é mera “psicologia intencional”, mas filosofia primeira (metafísica) no sentido em que Husserl a compreende: ciência última da realidade. 19001901 1900 1901 1900/1901 . vivências excluindose, excluindose excluindo se, se excluindo-se isso investigação seria portanto psicologia intencional. intencional intencional” interpretação período ali transcendência legitimado prétranscendental pré transcendental intencional, , (metafísica compreende realidade 1900190 190 1900/190 190019 19 1900/19 19001 1 1900/1 1900/

ABSTRACT Husserl’s early phenomenology, whose greatest expression is the work Logical Investigations, from 1900/1901, intends to be a theory of knowledge that operates according to the principle of “metaphysical neutrality”. This metaphysical neutrality is usually interpreted as the delimitation of the thematic horizon of phenomenology to the domain of lived-experiences, thus excluding the transcendent thing from its field of investigation. This early phenomenology would be, therefore, a kind of “intentional psychology”. Against this interpretation, we intend to show, on the basis of Husserl’s texts from this same period, that the phenomenological theory of knowledge of the Logical Investigations is first philosophy, that is, metaphysics. The “metaphysical neutrality” is not, then, a prohibition of the talk of transcendencies, but a methodological principle so that such talk can be legitimated. With this, we intend to show that pre-transcendental phenomenology is not mere “intentional psychology”, but first philosophy (metaphysics) in the sense that Husserl understands it: ultimate science of reality. Husserls s 19001901 1900 1901 1900/1901 neutrality. . livedexperiences, livedexperiences lived experiences, experiences lived-experiences investigation therefore intentional psychology. psychology psychology” interpretation period metaphysics then transcendencies legitimated pretranscendental pre transcendental psychology, , (metaphysics it reality 1900190 190 1900/190 190019 19 1900/19 19001 1 1900/1 1900/

Abstract: The aim of this work is to present the contributing influences for the development of the study of time in Husserlian phenomenology, discussing the relationship between the improvement of science as an episteme and the fundamental method to elaborate studies on temporal perception. The production of studies by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) on temporality was directly influenced by thinkers of the early Christian era - Saint Augustine (354-430) and the idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), from which he inherited the origin of transcendental phenomena. The Cartesian idea of Cogito later enabled the development of the phenomenological method, used in different areas of science and also in Psychology and your segmentation, the Phenomenological Psychology.

Resumo: O trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar as influências contribuintes para o desenvolvimento do estudo do tempo na fenomenologia husserliana, discutindo a relação do aperfeiçoamento da ciência enquanto episteme e do método fundamental para elaborar estudos sobre a percepção temporal. A produção dos estudos de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) sobre a temporalidade foi influenciada diretamente por pensadores do período medieval, em especial Santo Agostinho (354-430) e do filósofo idealista Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), do qual herdará a origem dos fenômenos transcendentais. A ideia cartesiana de Cogito possibilitou mais tarde o desenvolvendo do método fenomenológico, utilizado nas diversas áreas da ciência e também na Psicologia e sua segmentação, a Psicologia Fenomenológica.

Abstract: According to Husserl’s method, overcoming psychologism becomes necessary not only to solve the problem of founding the Theory of Knowledge, but also indicates the need to establish the phenomenological foundation of knowledge as na epistemic basis that reveals the possibility of foundation the ideal sphere of objectivity. Mainly because Phenomenology intends to be the philosophical Science par excellence, insofar as it can be characterized as such in terms of the transcendental constitution of philosophical scientificity. The phenomenological constitution of rigorous Science (strenge wissenschaft) becomes possible due to two criticisms of Husserl to Kant, since this would have a limited concepto of phenomenon: 1) for Husserl, Kant was unable to conceive that the transcendental path could be the secure epistemic basis for the development of philosophical science; 2) and, also, as Kant did not invest in the development of the transcendental sense, unaware of the phenomenological task, he ended up not perceiving the notion of intentionality as necessary to found transcendental subjectivity, as a basis for philosophical Science, and, without it, he did not recognize the ideal sense of intentional experience as a phenomenological field.

Resumo: De acordo com o método de Husserl, a superação do psicologismo torna-se necessária não somente para resolver o problema de fundação da Teoria do Conhecimento, mas também indica necessidade de estabelecer a fundação fenomenológica do conhecimento como base epistêmica que revela a possibilidade de fundar a esfera ideal da objetividade. Principalmente, porque a Fenomenologia pretende ser a ciência filosófica por excelência, na medida em que possa ser caracterizada como tal em função da constituição transcendental da cientificidade filosófica. A constituição fenomenológica da ciência de rigor (strenge wissenschaft) se torna possível em função de duas críticas de Husserl a Kant, posto que este disporia de um conceito limitado de fenômeno: 1) para Husserl, Kant não conseguiu conceber que o caminho transcendental poderia ser a base epistêmica segura para o desenvolvimento da ciência filosófica; 2) e, também, como Kant não investiu no desenvolvimento do sentido transcendental, desconhecendo a tarefa fenomenológica, terminou por não perceber a noção de intencionalidade como necessária para fundar a subjetividade transcendental, como base para a ciência filosófica, e, sem ela, desconheceu o sentido ideal da vivência intencional como campo fenomenológico.

Abstract The notion of transcendental idealism is the result of the Kantian synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. This synthesis constitutes the project of a metaphysics of metaphysics, that is, of a new first Philosophy. In this project, the two senses of First Philosophy, the Socratic and the Aristotelian, become patent through the critical and positive task of the Theory of knowledge. Kantian transcendental idealism shares with Husserl’s philosophy, despite deep differences, the original motive of developing a scientific philosophy capable of supplying humanity with rational and universal ethical norms.

Resumen: La noción de idealismo trascendental se rastrea como un resultado de la síntesis kantiana del racionalismo y del empirismo. Dicha síntesis constituye el proyecto de una metafísica de la metafísica, es decir, de una nueva Filosofía primera. En ese proyecto se vuelven patentes los dos sentidos de filosofía primera, el socrático y el aristotélico, a través de la tarea crítica y positivo de la teoría del conocimiento. Ese idealismo trascendental kantiano comparte con la filosofía de Husserl, pese a profundas diferencias, el motivo originario de elaborar una filosofía científica capaz de suministrar a la humanidad normas éticas racionales y universales.

Résumé Cet article offre une approche du problème de la tempérance dans la philosophie de Ludwig Landgrebe en lien avec son étude Der Begriff des Erlebens, entre autres œuvres. Ainsi, l’objectif de cette étude est de suggérer certains points de connexion et d’interprétation critique du thème de la tempérance dans la phénoménologie de Husserl. Pour traiter ce thème, l’article est divisé en deux parties. La première essaie de démontrer une systématisation préliminaire du problème de la tempérance chez Landgrebe en ce qui concerne leurs influences et les points de continuité avec la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl. La deuxième partie présente une brève révision du thème de la tempérance chez Husserl et suggère quelques points saillants de ses manuscrits de la dernière heure dans lesquels on peut trouver certains liens proches à Landgrebe concernant le traitement du problème.

Abstract The paper approaches to the problem of moods in Ludwig Landgrebe’s Philosophy with regard to his study Der Begriff des Erlebens among other works. Thus, the aim of the study is to suggest some points of connection and critical interpretation of the topic of moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology. In order to address this problem, the paper is divided in two sections. The first section aims to present a preliminary systematization of the problem of moods in Landgrebe’s Philosophy, with regard to his influences and points of continuation of Husserl transcendental Phenomenology. The second section provides a brief overview of the problem of moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology and suggests some points in his manuscripts where it is possible to find some possible proximity to Landgrebe’s account of the problem.

Resumen Este artículo presenta un acercamiento al problema de los temples de ánimo en la filosofía de Ludwig Landgrebe, en relación con su estudio Der Begriff des Erlebens, entre otras obras. Así, el objetivo del estudio es sugerir algunos puntos de conexión e interpretación crítica del tema de los temples de ánimo en la fenomenología de Husserl. Para aproximarse a éste, el artículo está dividido en dos partes. La primera sección intenta proveer una sistematización preliminar del problema de los temples de ánimo en Landgrebe, en lo concerniente a sus influencias y los puntos de continuidad con la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl. La segunda sección presenta una breve revisión del tema de los temples de ánimo en Husserl y sugiere algunas claves en sus manuscritos tardíos, en los cuales es posible encontrar algunos nexos de proximidad con el abordaje del problema desde la perspectiva de Landgrebe.

Resumen La investigación presentada es un punto de partida, y ya no solo metodológico. El estudio quiere señalar que la fenomenología francesa que toma como camino, es decir, la fenomenología de la donación de Jean-Luc Marion, se sitúa más allá/más acá de la metafísica. Es sabido que Marion en sus obras distingue al menos tres modelos metafísicos: el de la substancia y la esencia, el de la causalidad, y el egológico trascendental. Los tres modelos son criticados por el fenomenólogo francés por la insuficiencia para alcanzar lo originario y su inteligibilidad. Lo originario es para Marion la donación. Por ello, siguiendo las huellas de la donación marioniana, el método propuesto, presentado en seis pasos, una suerte de círculo hermenéutico, radicaliza la reducción. Pero no solo lo hace en una variación imaginativa y de posibilidad, sino que se confronta con la descripción de una donación efectiva y no solo posible que se da en las vivencias místicas de Chiara Lubich. Siguiendo la propuesta del fenomenólogo francés, aplica los seis pasos del método propuesto a las contra-categorías kantianas, en que el "yo" es reducido en el evento de esta donación apareciendo como adonado, convocado y, finalmente, testigo, no solo en el nivel de la acción y la praxis, sino más originariamente en el nivel de la afectación o pasión; dicho evento se da en la experiencia mística de Chiara Lubich denominada "cuarta noche".

Abstract The research presented here is a starting point, and not only a methodological one. The study points out that the French phenomenology taken as a path, that is, Jean Luc Marion's phenomenology of donation, is situated beyond/beyond metaphysics. It is well known that Marion distinguishes at least three metaphysical models in his works: that of substance and essence, that of causality, and the transcendental egological. The three models are criticized by the French phenomenologist for their insufficiency in reaching the original and its intelligibility. For Marion, the original is the donation. Therefore, following in the footsteps of Marion's donation, the proposed method -a sort of hermeneutic circle presented in six steps- radicalizes the reduction. Yet, not only does it do it in an imaginative variation and possibility. Rather, it is confronted with the description of an effective and not only possible donation that occurs in the mystical experiences of Chiara Lubich. Following the proposal of the French phenomenologist, it applies the six steps of the proposed method to the Kantian counter-categories, where the "I" is reduced in the event of this donation, appearing as gifted, summoned and finally a witness, not only at the level of action and praxis, but more originally at the level of affectation or passion. This event occurs in Chiara Lubich's mystical experience called «fourth night».

BACKGROUND: Currently nursing education is undergoing major transformation that pose considerable challenges with which nursing education institution (NEI) management must deal. Yet nurse educators displayed behaviour that reflected distrust, loss of respect and loyalty and a paucity of admiration towards NEI management AIM: The article aimed at exploring the lived experiences of nurse educators regarding the management practices at a NEI SETTING: The setting was a public NEI in Gauteng, South Africa that had 11 departments and offered both undergraduate and post-basic studies METHODS: A qualitative, exploratory, descriptive, contextual and phenomenology study was conducted with a purposive sample of 20 qualified nurse educators who were fully employed, taught at the current NEI and were willing to participate. Data were collected from June 2015 to July 2016 through face-to-face, semi-structured individual interviews and analysed using Tesch's protocol. Ethical principles were observed and trustworthiness ensured RESULTS: The themes that emerged were management's dominant use of one leadership style with inconsistent treatment; lack of stimulation to aspire to higher academic levels; and lack of support with minimal resources CONCLUSION: Nurse educators experienced ineffective management practices and this ineffectiveness had negative impact for nurse educators in coping with major transformational changes brought by the dynamic nursing education environment CONTRIBUTION: The recommendations made might assist NEI managers to improve their management practices, therefore assist nurse educators cope with transformation. The findings added to the body of existing knowledge on effective management of NEIs by aiming to achieve institutional and individual goals within a transformative environment

Resumo: Este artigo tentará mostrar como Habermas se afasta de uma perspectiva crítico-fenomenológica para uma compreensão analítica e pragmática da linguagem e da sociedade. Saliento que os elementos fenomenológicos são quase inteiramente abandonados na apropriação do conceito de Lebenswelt por Habermas. Admito que Habermas nos fornece uma reavaliação fascinante de alguns elementos clássicos da filosofia de Edmund Husserl, mas em sua “Crítica da razão funcionalista”, parece abandonar a maioria dos elementos metodológicos que nos permitiriam chamar seu método de “fenomenológico”.

Abstract: This article will attempt to show how Habermas turns away from a critical-phenomenological perspective and towards an analytic and pragmatic understanding of language and society. I want to point out that there is minimal phenomenology in Habermas’ appropriation of the concept of Lebenswelt. I concede that Habermas provides us with a fascinating re-assessment of some classical elements in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, but in his “Critique of Functionalist Reason,” he seems to abandon most of the methodological elements that would allow us to call his own method “phenomenological.”

Resumen: Este artículo intentará mostrar cómo Habermas se aleja de una perspectiva crítico-fenomenológica hacia una comprensión analítica y pragmática del lenguaje y la sociedad. Quiero señalar que hay una fenomenología mínima en el chorro de Habermas del concepto de Lebenswelt. Admito que Habermas nos proporciona una reevaluación fascinante de algunos elementos clásicos de la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, pero en su “Crítica de la razón funcionalista” parece abandonar la mayoría de los elementos metodológicos que nos permitirían llamar su propio método “ fenomenológico ”.

ABSTRACT The relationship between Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and critical transcendental philosophy has often been approached in terms of the bodily and concrete reformulation that the phenomenologist would propose of transcendental consciousness. This paper aims to show that this new definition of the subjective and transcendental conditions of experience implies a different conception of its limits and of that which transcends it, thus evidencing another key contrast between both philosophies. The article examines the different meaning of the “transcendental” dimension in critical and phenomenological philosophies, and more particularly the correlative transformation of the “transcendent” in Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology, which redefines the transcendental conditions of experience in terms of “perspectives”. It is argued that this transformation enables an original realist stand based on phenomenological premises.

RESUMEN La relación entre la fenomenología merleau-pontiana y la filosofía trascendental crítica ha sido frecuentemente abordada en términos de la reformulación corporal y concreta que el fenomenólogo propondría de la conciencia trascendental. Este trabajo procura mostrar que esta nueva definición de las condiciones subjetivas y trascendentales de la experiencia conlleva una diferente concepción de sus límites y de aquello que la trasciende, evidenciándose así otro contraste clave entre ambas filosofías. Se examina así el diferente significado de la dimensión “trascendental” en las filosofías crítica y fenomenológica, y más particularmente la correlativa transformación del sentido de lo “trascendente” en la fenomenología merleau-pontiana, que redefine las condiciones trascendentales de la experiencia en términos de “perspectivas”. Se sostiene que esta transformación habilita una postura realista singular basada en premisas fenomenológicas.

RESUMEN El artículo sostiene que la concepción fenomenològica de la justificación epistémica y su modo de elucidar la objetividad depende de la vigencia de un cierto ideal de racionalidad como ideal ético que orienta nuestras acciones. Se trata de lo que Husserl denomina el ideal de renovación, que cumple una doble función: a) da cuenta de la tendencia normativa a la corrección sobre la que se asienta la comprensión husserliana de la objetividad, y b) da cuenta de la motivación sobre la que se asienta la adopción de una actitud peculiar, la actitud fenomenológica o trascendental, que caracteriza al quehacer filosófico.

ABSTRACT The article argues that the phenomenological conception of epistemic justification and its account of objectivity depends on the validity of an ideal of rationality as the ethical ideal that guides our actions. This is what Husserl calls the ideal of renewal, that fulfills a double function: a) it accounts for the normative tendency to self-correction on which the Husserlian understanding of objectivity is based, and b) it accounts for the motivation for the adoption of the properly philosophical stance, namely, the phenomenological or transcendental attitude.

Resumen Este ensayo propone una reflexión sobre el desarrollo teórico-conceptual de la fenomenología husserliana como filosofía crítica. Consiste en la revisión de obras relevantes de Husserl que explican la estructura conceptual del sistema fenomenológico. Esto, a partir de la crítica que el autor hace a la filosofía y las ciencias europeas de la primera mitad del siglo XX. Husserl plantea la necesidad de una ‘ciencia rigurosa’ y expone la epojé, la reducción trascendental y elementos constitutivos y estructurales de la reducción fenomenológica sobre los datos inmediatos de la experiencia y la percepción hasta llegar a su última obra: Krisis, donde recapitula sobre la importancia de continuar trabajando la fenomenología. Retoma la ‘reducción trascendental’, expone factores antropológicos y axiológicos presentes en sus primeras obras: Las lecciones primeras de ética (1908-1914), Ideas (1923) y los textos de Kaizo (años veinte). El trabajo intenta servir como orientación histórica, metodológica y crítico-conceptual sobre la fenomenología como método científico de aproximación a la realidad, la subjetividad y al sujeto cognoscente basado en la percepción, experiencia e implicaciones culturales. Se intenta responder: ¿Qué es la fenomenología? ¿En qué consiste la estructura de la fenomenología y cómo procede? ¿Cómo podría serle útil al ser humano la crítica fenomenológica?

Abstract The objective of this essay was to reflect on the theoretical-conceptual development of Husserlian phenomenology as a critical philosophy. The methodology consisted of an exhaustive review of the relevant works by Husserl that explained the conceptual structure that makes up the phenomenological system. This based on his review of European science and philosophy in the first half of the 20th century. Where he raises the need for a 'rigorous science 'and exposes the epojé, the transcendental reduction and the constitutive and structural elements of the phenomenological reduction on the immediate data of experience and perception until he reaches his last work: Krisis, where he recapitulates the importance of continuing to work on phenomenology. The ‘transcendental reduction’ is taken up again, exposing anthropological and axiological factors present in his early works, such as The First Lessons in Ethics (1908-1914), Ideas (1923) and the texts by Kaizo (1920s). The work has a historical, methodological and critical-conceptual orientation on phenomenology as a scientific method of approaching reality, subjectivity and the knowing subject based on perception, experience and cultural implications. We will try to answer: What is phenomenology? What is the structure of phenomenology and how does it proceed? Finally,how could phenomenological criticism be useful to humans?

Abstract The main objective in the article is to delve in the experience of torture from a phenomenological stance to elucidate the differences between the possible representations of death that a person can experience and the experience of torture. According to this investigation, first I explain in what sense the phenomenon of death will be understood, to give way to the relation that pain and torture have. In order to show that the terrible nature of torture it is not bound to the affective violent process that is triggered by pain, rather to the helplessness that the human being feels when it knows that he is being tortured by the other. In this way, the tortured breaks any nexus that it may have with the world. Torture does not generate a truly given experience of death, but it does provide the transcendental subject with the closest experience that he may have of his own death.

Resumen El objetivo principal del artículo es ahondar en la experiencia de la tortura desde una postura fenomenológica con la finalidad de dilucidar las diferencias entre las posibles representaciones de la muerte que una persona puede experimentar y la vivencia de la tortura. De acuerdo con esta investigación, primero explicaré en qué sentido se tomará el fenómeno de la muerte, dando paso a la relación que el dolor y la tortura mantienen, para mostrar que la terrible naturaleza de esta actividad no se encuentra ligada al violento proceso afectivo desencadenado mediante el dolor, sino a la impotencia que el ser humano siente al saberse torturado por otro. De esta forma, se rompe cualquier nexo que el torturado pueda tener con el mundo. La tortura no genera una experiencia realmente dada de la muerte, pero sí proporciona al sujeto trascendental la vivencia más cercana que podría tener de su propia muerte.

Abstract The article suggests some aspects of a phenomenological analysis of vulnerability with regard to the condition of bodily vulnerability. In order to describe and make explicit the field of intentional implication of horizons involved in the lived-experiences unity of lived body, the analysis follows a transcendental phenomenological approach with genetic orientation. Afterwards it performs a description of practical horizons of the body and its relation to the genesis of the consciousness of one’s own vulnerability. In this context, the paper points out some relevant reasons of aware anticipation of harm that belongs to the consciousness of being vulnerable with regard to the constitution of the field of values. At the end, the article suggests a reflection on the moral significance of vulnerability.

Resumen El artículo sugiere algunos aspectos de un análisis fenomenológico de la vulnerabilidad con énfasis en la condición del cuerpo vulnerable. El análisis sigue un enfoque fenomenológico trascendental de orientación genética por el cual se describe y explicita el campo de implicación intencional de horizonte involucrado en la unidad vivencial del cuerpo vivido. Inmediatamente después se procede a la descripción de los horizontes prácticos del cuerpo y su relación con la génesis de la conciencia de la propia vulnerabilidad. En este contexto, se destacan algunos motivos relevantes de la conciencia que anticipa el daño, propia de la conciencia de ser vulnerable, para el acceso y constitución del ámbito de los valores. Por último, a partir del marco descriptivo presentado se propone una reflexión sobre la significación moral de la vulnerabilidad.