In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Resumen: Con la teoría de la transmodernidad, Dussel esboza la visión de un mundo multipolar en el que se supera la era de la hegemonía global europea, surgida con la conquista de América en 1492, y las culturas del Sur Global son miembros iguales de una sociedad mundial. En las últimas décadas, sin embargo, han surgido nuevos centros regionales de poder en China, India, Irán, Arabia Saudí y Rusia, que siguen de forma más o menos radical una política antioccidental. Esto significa que ya vivimos en un mundo multipolar, como admiten ahora abiertamente algunos pensadores poscoloniales. Sin embargo, según Dussel, la transmodernidad no es un proyecto antieuropeo, sino que los logros emancipadores de la modernidad europea (en el sentido de la superación de Hegel) deben subsumirse en la transmodernidad. En su ética política, Dussel ha presentado una reinterpretación crítica de los derechos humanos y la democracia bajo el epígrafe de una “política popular”; el derecho internacional, en cambio, es sospechoso de colonialismo, como demuestra su crítica de Francisco de Vitoria. Dado que las nuevas potencias regionales persiguen ahora ellas mismas una política imperial, todos los Estados, incluidos los regímenes poscoloniales de izquierdas, se enfrentan en la actualidad a la decisión entre una política de zonas de influencia imperial o -esta sería la consecuencia de la transmodernidad de Dussel- un ulterior desarrollo crítico del derecho internacional.

Abstract: With the theory of transmodernity, Dussel outlines the vision of a multipolar world in which the era of European global hegemony, which arose with the conquest of America in 1492, is overcome and the cultures of the Global South are equal members of a new global order. In recent decades, however, new regional centres of power have emerged in China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia, which more or less radically pursue an anti-Western policy. This means that we already live in a multipolar world, as some postcolonial thinkers now openly admit. However, according to Dussel, transmodernity is not an anti-European project, but rather the emancipatory achievements of European modernity (in the sense of Hegel's Aufhebung) are to be subsumed in transmodernity. In his political ethics, Dussel has presented a critical reinterpretation of human rights and democracy under the heading of a "popular politics". The doctrine of international law, however, is suspected of colonialism, as his critique of Francisco de Vitoria demonstrates. Since the new regional powers are now themselves pursuing an imperial policy, all states, including left-wing post-colonial regimes, are now faced with the choice between a policy of imperial spheres of influence or - this would be the consequence of Dussel's transmodernity - a further critical development of international law.

Resumo Estas reflexões pretendem explorar os limites da crítica teórica e estabelecer um acordo mínimo acerca dos marcos teóricos envolvidos em uma discussão. Cuida-se de algo aqui denominado Desacordos Compreensivos. Enquanto objetivo geral, propõe-se investigar como uma crítica teórica deve(ria) ser formulada e quais são os limites dessa formulação. Já em se tratando do problema de pesquisa, esclarecer o que se apresenta como indispensável para que uma crítica possa ser considerada coerente como também o que pode fazê-la ser incoerente. A hipótese é a de que discussões teóricas, por vezes, desprezam o próprio conteúdo que visam examinar e faltam com o rigor que a prática exige. Quanto ao “método”, se vale da fenomenologia hermenêutica. Por tudo isso, as reflexões aqui apresentadas se justificam enquanto um esforço de retirada das camadas de sentidos coagulados pela dogmática jurídica.

Abstract These reflections intend to explore the limits of theoretical criticism and establish a minimum agreement about the theoretical frameworks involved in a discussion. It takes care of something here called Understanding Disagreements. As a general objective, it is proposed to investigate how a theoretical critique should be formulated and what are the limits of this formulation. In terms of the research problem, clarify what is essential for a critique to be considered coherent, as well as what can make it incoherent. The hypothesis: theoretical discussions sometimes despise the very content they aim to examine and lack the rigor that practice demands. As for the “method”, it uses hermeneutical phenomenology. For all these reasons, the reflections presented here are justified as an effort to remove the layers of meanings coagulated by legal dogmatics.

In this article Habermas's discourse ethics is critically interpreted. The article starts with a brief intellectual biography of Habermas (section 1), showing that his life and work has always had a strong ethical and political dimension - leading to the concept of discourse ethics. Next, it is indicated how Habermas's work in the 1970s culminated via four steps in his major philosophical work - the Theory of Communicative Action (section 2) published in 1981. In the next two sections Habermas Theory of Communicative Action is applied to ethics and morality in the form of his discourse ethics - the heart of this contribution (section 3). In this process the following four aspects of Habermas's discourse ethics are discussed: Its qualified Kantian deontological dimension, as well as its universalist, cognitivist, and formalist dimensions. In the following section (4) the discussion of discourse ethics is shifted to Habermas's theory of law, deliberative politics, and democracy which is a further application of ideas developed in his Theory of Communicative Action. The contribution then ends with some critical remarks on Habermas discourse ethics and sketch of law and politics (section 5) Three arguments are presented in this regard. First, Habermas argument is judged to be too closely related to abstract rationality. Secondly the distinction that Habermas makes between morality and ethics is critically investigated. Finally, the Habermasian use of justification in his argument is critically compared with the concept of application. These points of criticism, though, indicate that the debate on Habermas's discourse ethics is ongoing. INTRADISCIPLINARY AND/OR INTERDISCIPLINARY IMPLICATIONS: This article deals with the concept of discourse ethics (in the Kantian tradition of ethics) as developed firstly by Karel Otto Apel and later refined by Jurgen Habermas for his own purposes. The line of argumentation developed here has significant relevance for philosophy, moral theory, law, and theology. Discourse ethics can be considered as a contemporary version of Kantian deontological ethics after the linguistic turn

In contemporary contexts, the understanding of corruption is different from what is illustrated in biblical narratives. Conversely, some of the ways in which corruption is contested and addressed in biblical narratives prove to be applicable in contemporary contexts, particularly in the jurisdictions of leadership and governance, politics and community service. Therefore, this article aims to critique how corruption is (re)produced in the Bible. The objective is to underline that whereas the Bible is a primordial narrative, it mirrors some challenges that adversely affect the contemporary contexts, with special reference to corruption. To advance the aim of this article, deontological and virtue ethical codes are applied as theoretical frameworks to uncover corruption within the Bible. This article makes three notable findings. Firstly, corruption undermines public trust, while it erodes self-reliance in the rule of law. Secondly, corruption is depicted as a moral and spiritual decomposition that erodes the foundational values of morality and conformity to God. Thirdly, the Bible depicts corruption as a transgression of the commandments and moral ethos. Nevertheless, in response to corruption, there are instances in which God pronounces verdicts and imposes retribution. The conclusion underlines that the comprehension of corruption is intricately interwoven and requires scholarly dialogues to unmask any covert denotations. INTRADISCIPLINARY AND/OR INTERDISCIPLINARY IMPLICATIONS: This article is interdisciplinary as it elicits discernments from the theological discipline and ethical codes that are interlaced in social, economic and political dimensions. The integration of perceptions from philosophy, ethics and literary critique warrants a worthy discourse that forms juxtaposition.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the most spoken-about topics in the media, academia, government and other platforms. One of the aspects that is often discussed is the ethical implications of AI and approaches to mitigate the risks. Artificial intelligence has an undeniable impact on industries as well as socio-economic structures; however, this article focusses on the impact of AI on three concerns mainly, humanity, spirituality and the environment. This article is an interdisciplinary study of African theological ethics and the philosophy of technology. It discusses the theological implications (doctrinal issues) of emerging technologies, particularly AI. It discusses technology as power which has impacted Africa since the first industrial revolution and emphasises the importance of African ethics in the context of AI in Africa. This article critically discusses ubuntu ethics and its critique. It focuses on AI and its impact on humanity, spirituality and the environment, and proposes a holistic ubuntu AI ethics approach in South Africa. INTRADISCIPLINARY AND/OR INTERDISCIPLINARY IMPLICATIONS: This article is an interdisciplinary study of African theological ethics and the philosophy of technology. Ubuntu ethics in this article derives from African Theology and African Philosophy. Ubuntu AI ethics is important for various disciplines such as theology, law, social sciences, computer sciences and information technology (especially designers and developers).

This article explores the meaning of minor jurisprudence in the work of leading authors on the subject and concludes that the notion of becoming plays a major part in the philosophy of minor jurisprudence as a subtraction from or subversion of the major. The article then connects the preoccupation with becoming in minor jurisprudence to the notion of the hysteric's discourse in the work of Jacques Lacan, after which it moves to a consideration of Froneman, J's minority judgment in the Beadica case. The article suggests that Froneman's minor jurisprudence becomes in three modes: reliance on historical minor jurisprudences, deconstruction and imagination from the margins. As such, this becoming is an instance of hysterical discourse in Lacan's sense of the term.

Resumen: El confucianismo y el legalismo no sólo son las dos escuelas ideológicas más influyentes de la China anterior a Qin, sino también las principales escuelas de pensamiento de la historia intelectual de la antigua China. Esto se debe a su respectiva naturaleza social y a sus valores políticos contrapuestos. En el confucianismo anterior a Qin, arraigado en la creencia en la bondad innata de la naturaleza humana, se hace mucho hincapié en la importancia de las tradiciones históricas. Promueve valores como la benevolencia, la rectitud, el decoro y la sabiduría, y trata de redefinir el “rito” incorporando nuevos valores. Concede gran importancia al imperio de la virtud y aspira a alcanzar un estado de Armonía Universal. El Legalismo Pre-Qin, impulsado por la inherente inclinación humana hacia el interés propio y el beneficio personal, formula una filosofía de gobierno basada en el utilitarismo. Prioriza el presente y aboga por profundas transformaciones mediante la aplicación de una “ley” estricta para alcanzar la prosperidad nacional y la fuerza militar. Como resultado, la antigua China formó diferentes tradiciones del imperio de la virtud y la ley, sentando las bases de la naturaleza complementaria del confucianismo y el legalismo. Este artículo analiza los factores de diferenciación y el proceso de integración en la filosofía política confuciana y legalista, con el objetivo de aportar ideas para la construcción de los sistemas filosóficos políticos contemporáneos.

Abstract: Confucianism and Legalism are not only the two most influential ideological schools in pre-Qin China but also the main schools of thought in ancient Chinese intellectual history. This is due to their respective social nature and contrasting political values. In Pre-Qin Confucianism, rooted in the belief in the innate goodness of human nature, there is a strong emphasis on the significance of historical traditions. It promotes values such as benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and seeks to redefine “Rite” by incorporating new values. It places great importance on the rule of virtue and aspires to achieve a state of Universal Harmony. Pre-Qin Legalism, driven by the inherent human inclination towards self-interest and personal gain, formulates a governance philosophy grounded in utilitarianism. It prioritizes the present and advocates for profound transformations through the implementation of strict “law” to attain national prosperity and military strength. As a result, ancient China formed different traditions of the rule of virtue and law, laying the foundation for the complementary nature of Confucianism and Legalism. This article analyzes the factors of differentiation and the process of integration in Confucian and legalist political philosophy, aiming to provide insights into the construction of contemporary political philosophical systems.

RESUMO: O presente texto visa sistematizar algumas contribuições materialistas e dialéticas para pensarmos a categoria “cidadania” na educação científica sob uma perspectiva emancipatória. Trata-se de um artigo-parecer que possibilita uma continuidade com as reflexões contidas no artigo de Rosa, Lima e Cavalcanti (2023) intitulado “De que cidadania estamos falando? Uma revisão da literatura das pesquisas em educação em ciências com perspectiva de formação para a cidadania”. A partir de mobilização de pensamentos da sociologia, filosofia e psicanálise, elegemos quatro tópicos como contribuições às noções de cidadania e emancipação na educação em ciências: a cidadania como slogan que precisa ser problematizado, a natureza ideológica do Estado de direito democrático, um olhar crítico em relação aos horizontes democráticos e caminhos para a emancipação humana no contexto da educação científica. Trata-se de um convite à educação científica para discutir as bases da nossa sociedade atual e vislumbrar novas formas de socialização e civilização.

ABSTRACT: This text aims to systematize some materialist and dialectical contributions to think about the category “citizenship” in scientific education from an emancipatory perspective. This is an opinion article that allows continuity with the reflections contained in the article by Rosa, Lima and Cavalcanti (2023) entitled “What citizenship are we talking about? A literature review of research in science education with a perspective on training for citizenship”. From the mobilization of thoughts from sociology, philosophy and psychoanalysis, we chose four topics as contributions to the notions of citizenship and emancipation in science education: citizenship as a slogan that needs to be problematized, the ideological nature of the democratic rule of law, a critical look in relation to democratic horizons and paths to human emancipation in the context of scientific education. This is an invitation to scientific education to discuss the foundations of our current society and envision new forms of socialization and civilization.

RESUMEN: Este texto tiene como objetivo sistematizar algunos aportes materialistas y dialécticos para pensar la categoría “ciudadanía” en la educación científica desde una perspectiva emancipadora. Este es un artículo de opinión que permite dar continuidad a las reflexiones contenidas en el artículo de Rosa, Lima y Cavalcanti (2023) titulado “¿De qué ciudadanía estamos hablando? Una revisión de la literatura sobre investigaciones en educación científica con una perspectiva de formación para la ciudadanía”. A partir de la movilización de pensamientos provenientes de la sociología, la filosofía y el psicoanálisis, elegimos cuatro temas como contribuciones a las nociones de ciudadanía y emancipación en la educación científica: la ciudadanía como lema que necesita ser problematizado, la naturaleza ideológica del Estado democrático de derecho, un Mirada crítica en relación a los horizontes democráticos y los caminos de emancipación humana en el contexto de la educación científica. Esta es una invitación a la educación científica para discutir los fundamentos de nuestra sociedad actual e imaginar nuevas formas de socialización y civilización.

Resumo Após um longo processo de discussão, o Regulamento Inteligência Artificial da União Europeia assumirá em breve a posição de diploma pioneiro na disciplina legal da inteligência artificial de forma abrangente. Dentre os usos proibidos dessa tecnologia destacam-se as técnicas subliminares, ou seja, técnicas direcionadas para a percepção de estímulos capturados pelos sentidos sob o limiar da consciência. Essas técnicas podem resultar na manipulação da mente de seres humanos, trazendo riscos para o seu bem-estar e sua segurança. A recente monografia The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: Regulating Subliminal AI Systems (em tradução livre: O Regulamento Inteligência Artificial da UE: regulação de sistemas de IA subliminares), de Rostam J. Neuwirth, debruça-se sobre esse tema de maneira profunda e original, tomando a perspectiva da semiótica jurídica e da filosofia do Direito. Discutindo os conceitos de sinestesia, oxímoro e fuzzy logic, o autor propõe uma visão abrangente, atualizada e flexível do Direito, capaz de acorrer às necessidades dos seres humanos face a essas tecnologias. Em particular, Neuwirth faz uma defesa convincente de um entendimento do direito à liberdade de pensamento que inclua a proibição da manipulação mental. O Brasil tem assumido também um papel pioneiro na regulação de novas tecnologias. Nesse sentido, perspectivas como a de Neuwirth poderão constituir um contributo valioso para o debate em curso.

Abstract After a long discussion process, the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act will soon assume the position of a pioneering step towards the regulation of artificial intelligence in a comprehensive way. Among the prohibited uses of this technology are subliminal techniques, that is, techniques aimed at the perception of stimuli captured by the senses under the threshold of consciousness. These techniques can result in the manipulation of the minds of human beings, bringing risks to their well-being and safety. The recent monograph The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: Regulating Subliminal AI Systems, by Rostam J. Neuwirth, addresses this topic in a profound and original way, taking the perspective of Legal Semiotics and the Philosophy of Law. Discussing the concepts of synaesthesia, oxymoron and fuzzy logic, the author proposes a comprehensive, updated and flexible vision of Law, capable of meeting the needs of human beings in the face of these technologies. In particular, Neuwirth makes a convincing case for an understanding of the right to freedom of thought that includes the prohibition of mental manipulation. Brazil has also taken on a pioneering role in regulating new technologies. In this sense, perspectives such as Neuwirth’s could constitute a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate.

Resumen Después de un largo proceso de discusión, el Reglamento de Inteligencia Artificial de la Unión Europea pronto asumirá la posición de un diploma pionero en la disciplina jurídica de la inteligencia artificial de manera integral. Entre los usos prohibidos de esta tecnología destacan las técnicas subliminales, es decir, técnicas dirigidas a la percepción de estímulos captados por los sentidos bajo el umbral de la conciencia. Estas técnicas pueden resultar en la manipulación de la mente de los seres humanos, trayendo riesgos para su bienestar y seguridad. La reciente monografía The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: Regulating Subliminal AI Systems, de Rostam J. Neuwirth, aborda este tema de una manera profunda y original, tomando la perspectiva, concretamente, de la semiótica jurídica y de la filosofía del Derecho. Discutiendo los conceptos de sinestesia, oxímoron y lógica difusa, el autor propone una visión del Derecho integral, actualizada y flexible, capaz de satisfacer las necesidades del ser humano frente a estas tecnologías. En particular, Neuwirth defiende de manera convincente una comprensión del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento que incluya la prohibición de la manipulación mental. Brasil también ha asumido un papel pionero en la regulación de nuevas tecnologías. En este sentido, perspectivas como la de Neuwirth podrían constituir una valiosa contribución al debate en curso.

Résumé: Les pensées de Marx sur l’histoire du monde est un élément essentiel du matérialisme historique qui se concentre sur les caractéristiques de l’époque. Elle unifie la théorie et la pratique et s’empare correctement de la situation de l’existence humaine et du développement historique. L’approfondissement de la mondialisation a rendu l’environnement du développement mondial plus complexe et a conduit à l’intensification des contradictions sociales. Afin de comprendre en profondeur la loi du développement de l’histoire du monde et de mieux faire face aux problèmes et aux défis posés par la mondialisation, cet article a étudié efficacement la méthodologie de Marx sur les pensées de l’histoire du monde (PHM). Après une analyse approfondie du contenu fondamental, des enjeux principales et des caractéristiques idéologiques des PHM, cet article explore leurs principes méthodologiques et leurs significations. Il accorde une attention particulière à la révélation pratique de la méthodologie des PHM de Marx du point de vue du développement et de la coopération avec l’étranger, du niveau scientifique et technologique, et du choix de la voie de développement. Dans le processus de développement naturel de la réponse à la mondialisation, suivre fermement sa voie de développement joue un rôle et une valeur importants dans le renforcement du développement et de la coopération avec l’étranger, l’avancement des capacités technologiques et l’adoption d’une approche dialectique à l’égard du développement de la mondialisation.

Abstract: Marx’s thoughts on world history (WH) is an essential element of historical materialism, which focuses on the time’s characteristics, unifies theory and practice, and grasps correctly of the situation of human existence and historical development. The deepening of globalization has made the world development environment more complex and led to the intensification of social contradictions. In order to deeply grasp the law of world-historical development and better cope with the problems and challenges brought by globalization, this paper effectively studied the methodology of Marx’s world history thoughts (WHT). After conducting an in-depth analysis of the fundamental content, main issues and ideological features of WHT, this paper explored the methodological principles and significance. It gave full consideration to the practical revelation of the methodology of Marx’s WHT from the perspectives of foreign development and cooperation, scientific and technological level, and the choice of one’s development path. In the natural development process of responding to globalization, firmly following its development path has an important role and value in strengthening foreign development and cooperation, advancing technological capabilities and adopting a dialectical approach towards the development of globalization.

Abstract This article aims to reflect on the evolution of the concept of person, based on the etymological origin of the word, ancient Roman law, the history of philosophy and the contributions of the social and human sciences. This interdisciplinary historical development, by bringing it into dialogue with the new Mental Health Law in Uruguay (2017), it encourages us to generate a theoretical-practical praxis that continues to contribute to the promotion of humanization of Mental Health Nursing care.

Resumen El presente artículo pretende reflexionar sobre la evolución del concepto persona, a partir del origen etimológico de la palabra, del antiguo derecho romano, de la historia de la filosofía y los aportes de las ciencias sociales y humanas. Este desarrollo histórico interdisciplinario, al hacerlo dialogar con la nueva Ley de Salud Mental en Uruguay (2017), nos estimula a ir generando una praxis teórico-práctica, que continúe contribuyendo al fomento de una humanización de los cuidados de la Enfermería en Salud Mental.

Resumo Este artigo tem como objetivo refletir sobre a evolução do conceito de pessoa, a partir da origem etimológica da palavra, do direito romano antigo, da história da filosofia e as contribuições das ciênciassociais e humanas. Este desenvolvimento histórico interdisciplinar, aocolocálo em diálogo com a nova Lei de Saúde Mental do Uruguai (2017), incentiva-nos a gerarumapráxis teórico-prática que continue a contribuir para a promoção da humanização dos cuidados de Enfermagem em Saúde Mental.

Abstract: Habermas has developed a legal Theory based on his communicative action philosophy. Without moving away from the traditional foundations that sustain the Rule of Law, he has innovated a position of legitimation of the law and its exercise, even offering new conceptual tools for the judicial function as it’s the case with what could be called the adequacy that replaces to the well-known proposal for the weighing of rights. This article aims to serve as a guide to get inside the territory of his discursive proposal.

Resumen: Habermas ha elaborado una teoría jurídica a partir de su filosofía de acción comunicativa. Sin alejarse de los fundamentos tradicionales que sustentan al Estado democrático de derecho, ha innovado una posición de legitimación al derecho y a su ejercicio, incluso ofrece nuevas herramientas conceptuales para la función judicial, como es el caso de lo que podría llamarse la adecuación que sustituye a la conocida propuesta de la ponderación de los derechos. El presente artículo pretende servir de guía para adentrase en el territorio de su propuesta.

Abstract: This work proposes to reclaim the concept of human duties in contemporary constitutional theory. To achieve this goal, it analyzes the technical concept of subjective duty, distinguishes duties from other legal categories related to it, and accounts for the excess of human rights and the corresponding absence of human duties. A proposal is also made to have a catalog of human duties that could be incorporated into the Mexican constitution. So, supported by the philosophy of law, it is asseverated that the defense and protection of freedoms requires both the participation of human rights and human duties.

Resumen: Esta obra propone recuperar en la teoría constitucional contemporánea el concepto de deberes humanos. Para lograr ese objetivo, analiza el concepto técnico de deber, distingue los deberes de otras categorías jurídicas que le están vinculadas y da cuenta del exceso de derechos humanos y la correspondiente ausencia de los deberes humanos. También se hace una propuesta para contar con un catálogo de deberes humanos que pudieran incorporarse a la Constitución mexicana. Con el apoyo de la filosofía del derecho, se afirma que la defensa y protección de las libertades requieren tanto del concurso de los derechos como de los deberes humanos.

RESUMO O artigo examina a função da noção de obrigação política no pensamento do filósofo italiano da política e do direito Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves (1902-1985), especialmente em sua relação com o regime democrático e as formas de resistência por parte dos cidadãos. Pela análise dos principais argumentos do autor a esse respeito, o artigo procura demonstrar a flexibilidade do conceito de Estado do autor e a importância da filosofia enquanto ponto de intersecção entre a moral e o direito, constituindo-se como instrumento de abordagem fenomenológica das formas de associação humana.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the role that the notion of political obligation has in the thought of the Italian philosopher of politics and law Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves (1902 - 1985), especially in its relationship with the democratic regime and forms of resistance on the part of citizens. By analyzing the author’s main arguments in this regard, it seeks to demonstrate the flexibility of the author’s concept of State, and the importance of philosophy as a point of intersection between morality and law, constituting itself as an instrument of phenomenological approach to the forms of human association.