Abstract. This paper establishes a dialogue between hermeneutic phenomenology-specifically that of Heideggerian inspiration-and discourse studies to reflect on the phenomenon of metaphor and its essential functioning in the production of meaning and truth, as well as in its conceptual/discursive (re)production of ideologies. There is a relative isomorphism between the operational and structural modalities of what Heidegger calls “fundamental metaphysical positions” and ideology understood according to Althusser and Van Dijk. Between the two lies the metaphor as a way of accessing the dynamics of these heterogeneous but complementary dimensions. Understanding its systematic and significant character will allow us to better understand the way in which the truth grounds our world and our factual life.

Resumen. El presente artículo entabla un diálogo entre la fenomenología hermenéutica -particularmente aquella de cuño heideggeriano- y los estudios del discurso para reflexionar sobre el fenómeno de la metáfora y su funcionamiento esencial en la producción de sentido y verdad, así como en la (re)producción conceptual/discursiva de ideologías. Existe un relativo isomorfismo entre las modalidades operativas y estructurantes de lo que Heidegger llama “posiciones metafísicas fundamentales” y la ideología entendida de acuerdo con los trabajos de Althusser y Van Dijk. Entre ambas se ubica la metáfora como vía de acceso a las dinámicas propias de estas dimensiones heterogéneas pero complementarias. Comprender su carácter sistemático y significativo nos permitirá entender mejor la manera que tiene la verdad de fundamentar nuestro mundo y nuestra vida fáctica.

Abstract: Computational psychiatry (CP), based on artificial intelligence technology, plays an increasingly important role in scientific research and medical diagnosis. Epistemic concerns in the ethics of artificial intelligence have also been at the center of debate in CP, but the different epistemic forms of injustice caused by the internal cultures of CP remain unexplained. We distinguish between data-driven and theory-driven cultures and their research purposes via practical examples of CP models deployed in addiction. A data-driven culture may advance medical understanding of biological categories of mental illness, whereas a theory-driven culture provides better explanatory mechanisms between symptoms and biology. We discuss testimonial injustice caused by the silencing of patient voices in a data-driven culture, and hermeneutic injustice caused by the non-sharing of hermeneutic resources in theory-driven culture based on Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We analyze the factors underlying nuances in epistemic forms between the two, such as naturalistic-dominated medical understanding and the system’s epistemic privileging. The above epistemic risks all indicate the intricacies of mental disorders and require that success be assessed in terms of actual benefit to patients. Finally, we emphasize the importance of the patient’s phenomenology and call for greater inclusion of patients in psychiatric decision-making processes.

Resumen: La psiquiatría computacional (PC), basada en la tecnología de la inteligencia artificial, desempeña un papel cada vez más importante en la investigación científica y el diagnóstico médico. Las preocupaciones epistémicas en la ética de la inteligencia artificial también han estado en el centro del debate en la PC, pero las diferentes formas epistémicas de injusticia causadas por las culturas internas de la PC siguen sin explicarse. Distinguimos entre las culturas basadas en los datos y las impulsadas por la teoría y sus propósitos de investigación mediante ejemplos prácticos de modelos de CP mostrados en la adicción. Una cultura impulsada por los datos puede hacer avanzar la comprensión médica de las categorías biológicas de las enfermedades mentales, mientras que una cultura impulsada por la teoría proporciona mejores mecanismos explicativos entre los síntomas y la biología. Basándonos en el relato de Miranda Fricker sobre la injusticia epistémica, discutimos la injusticia testimonial causada por el silenciamiento de los pacientes en una cultura centrada en los datos y la injusticia hermenéutica causada por el hecho de no compartir estos recursos en una cultura centrada en la teoría, Analizamos los factores que subyacen a los matices en las formas epistémicas entre ambas, como la comprensión médica dominada por el naturalismo y el privilegio epistémico del sistema. Todos los riesgos mencionados indican la complejidad de los trastornos mentales y exigen que el éxito se evalúe en términos de beneficio real para los pacientes. Por último, hacemos hincapié en la importancia de la fenomenología del paciente y pedimos una mayor inclusión de los pacientes en los procesos de toma de decisiones psiquiátricas.

Resumo: Psiquiatria computacional (PC), baseada na tecnologia da inteligência artificial, tem um papel crescentemente importante na pesquisa científica e no diagnóstico médico. Preocupações epistêmicas na ética da inteligência artificial tem também estado no centro das discussões da PC, mas as diferentes formas epistêmicas de injustiça causadas pelas culturas internas da PC permanecem inexplicáveis. Distinguimos entre culturas orientadas por dados e orientada por teorias e seus propósitos de pesquisa via exemplos práticos de modelos de PC empregados em dependências. Uma cultura orientada por dados pode avançar a compreensão médica de categorias biológicas de doença mental, enquanto uma cultura orientada por teorias fornece melhores mecanismos explicativos entre sintomas e biologia. Discutimos injustiça testemunhal causada pelo silenciamento de vozes de pacientes em uma cultura orientada por dados e injustiça hermenêutica causada pelo não compartilhamento de recursos hermenêuticos em cultura orientada por teorias, baseados no relato de Miranda Fricker sobre injustiça epistêmica. Analisamos os fatores subjacentes às nuances nas formas epistêmicas entre os dois, tais como a compreensão médica dominada pelo naturalismo e o privilégios epistêmicos do sistema. Todos os riscos epistêmicos citados anteriormente indicam as complexidades dos transtornos mentais e requerem que sucesso seja avaliado em termos de benefício real aos pacientes. Finalmente, enfatizamos a importância da fenomenologia do paciente e clamamos por maior inclusão de pacientes em processos de tomada de decisão psiquiátrica.

In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Abstract This article discusses the experience of migration through the concept of “migrancia”, thus making it possible to articulate the complex and diffuse category of “experience” in migration analysis. Without a viable concept in Spanish to explicitly reference the experiential repertoire of migration, I propose a new interpretation of the English concept of “migrancy”, through a reflexive conceptual deconstruction, revisited as “migrancia”. To arrive at this, I discuss major phenomenological arguments and the implications of thinking and working from “experience” in migratory contexts in order to highlight the formative role of experiences in migratory processes. In this, I highlight the importance of “de-migrantizing” migration analysis and its importance of articulating experience from a “third way”, that is, hetero-phenomenologically. Next, I address the importance of “thinking through the body”, from feminist epistemic and methodological points of view, in order to corporealize the migratory analysis and thus revisit the concrete of “migrancy” and then introduce “migrancy” as a concept that encompasses the phenomenology, embodied, of migratory experiences. Taking the field of Mexico-US migration as a reference, I frame “migrancy” from a feminist phenomenological perspective that allows not only to return agency to migrant bodies, but to bring phenomenology to migration analysis. Finally, I argue that working with “migrancy” is fundamental to understanding migratory phenomena and promises to make a valuable contribution to the analysis and ways of describing and narrating migratory processes.

Resumen Este artículo trabaja la experiencia de la migración bajo el concepto de migrancia, posibilitando así articular la compleja y difusa categoría de “la experiencia” en los análisis migratorios. Sin un concepto viable en español para referenciar explícitamente el repertorio experiencial de la migración, propongo una nueva interpretación del concepto inglés de “migrancy”, a través de una deconstrucción reflexiva conceptual, revisitada como “migrancia”. Para llegar a esto, discuto grandes argumentos fenomenológicos y las implicaciones de pensar y trabajar desde “la experiencia” en contextos migratorios para así resaltar el papel formativo que tiene las experiencias en los procesos migratorios. Para esto, resalto la importancia de “desmigrantizar” el análisis migratorio y su importancia de articular la experiencia desde una “tercera vía”, es decir, heterofenomenológicamente. A continuación, abordo la importancia de “pensar a través del cuerpo”, desde apuntes epistémicos y metodológicos feministas, para corporeizar el análisis migratorio y así revisitar el concreto de “migrancy” para entonces introducir “migrancia”, como un concepto que abarca la fenomenología, corporeizada, de las experiencias migratorias. Tomando como referencia el campo de la migración México-Estados Unidos, enmarco “migrancia” desde una perspectiva fenomenológica feminista que permite no solamente devolver la agencia a los cuerpos migrantes, sino llevar la fenomenología al análisis migratorio. Por último, argumento que trabajar “migrancia” es fundamental para entender fenómenos migratorios y promete hacer una valiosa contribución al análisis y formas de describir y narrar los procesos migratorios.

This article sets out to explore the problem of the preparedness of lecturers in integrating a gender responsive curriculum in Community Colleges the Eastern Cape. It is essential to understand why lecturers do not incorporate a gender responsive curriculum to help Community Colleges in the Eastern Cape develop fresh approaches that will directly address the specific requirements of both males and females. This article adopts a phenomenological research design to determine lecturer's perceptions and perspectives on how well as they considered themselves ready in ensuring a gender responsive curriculum in the Community Colleges in the Eastern Cape. The methodology considered to be most suitable for grounding this study was a critical research methodology because approaches like positivism and interpretivism do not challenge inferences to increase the value of evidence collected on the ground. The required research data were gathered using semi-structured interview on eight (8) lecturers who volunteered to participate in this study. The research findings revealed that lecturers are not prepared to ensure a gender responsive curriculum in Community Colleges in the Eastern Cape. Their viewpoints therefore suggested that preparedness for the integration of a gender responsive curriculum is essential in Community Colleges.

Abstract The significance of social networks in medical education, particularly in the field of movement disorders, is immeasurable. The current trend revolves around the emergence of new-onset pandemics, such as the COVID-19 virus or the rising use of consumer opioids. This phenomenon is evident across social networks, where non-professional videos depicting individuals experiencing abnormal movement disorders, such as upright postures and gait issues, are widely shared. These videos often feature people living on the streets in various locations throughout the United States and other major cities worldwide. The phenomenology of movement disorders involves closely observing patients in the examination room to identify the clinical phenotype and distinguish between hyperkinetic and hypokinetic disorders. This initial step is crucial in the assessment of any movement disorder. Given the limited availability of literature discussing the clinical features of opioid users, our research strategy involved exploring articles in the PubMed database that met the PRISMA criteria for 2020. Specifically, we sought articles addressing the clinical phenomenology and pathophysiology related to movement disorders from 1980 to the present. Our objective was to investigate cases, propose potential theories regarding implicated mechanisms, and explore the role of opioids in the movement circuits within the basal ganglia.

Resumen La importancia de las redes sociales para el aprendizaje en medicina, especialmente en el campo de los trastornos del movimiento, es incalculable. La tendencia actual es el desarrollo de pandemias de inicio reciente (por ejemplo, el virus COVID-19 o el aumento de opioides entre consumidores) que se observa a través de las redes sociales, donde se suben videos sobre personas que viven en las calles de Estados Unidos y otras ciudades importantes en el mundo, y que muestran trastornos anormales del movimiento, como posturas erguidas y trastornos de la marcha. La fenomenología en trastornos del movimiento se centra en observar al paciente en la sala de examen para determinar el fenotipo clínico (trastornos hiperquinéticos o hipocinéticos) como primer paso en la evaluación de cualquier trastorno del movimiento. Por lo tanto, debido a la escasez de documentos escritos en la literatura médica sobre las características clínicas de los usuarios de opioides, decidimos investigar en la base de datos PubMed artículos seleccionados bajo los criterios PRISMA 2020 sobre la fenomenología clínica y la fisiopatología relacionada con los trastornos del movimiento desde 1980 hasta la actualidad, abordando los casos y la teoría posible sobre el mecanismo implicado y el papel de los opioides en los circuitos del movimiento en los ganglios basales. Nuestro objetivo fue investigar casos, proponer teorías potenciales sobre los mecanismos involucrados y explorar el papel de los opioides en los circuitos de movimiento dentro de los ganglios basales.

Abstract. This paper offers a systematic and doxographical reconstruction of the phenomena of delay and lateness in Martin Heidegger’s thought between 1919 and 1930. In the first section, we trace the ambiguities that permeate the nominalization and formalization of delay in order to thematize immediately after the disruptive structure of four modes of delay understood as constitutive within Heidegger’s early work. We account for the way in which delay carries an illuminating potential that phenomenologically ensures the evidencing of the constituent dimension. In the second section, we descend to the immanent transformations of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for two possibilities of philosophy’s self-understanding on the basis of delay and lateness, precisely from two modes of relation with the constituent dimension of the appearing: on the one hand, a mode marked by crepuscular lateness, and on the other hand, an executive mode based on auroral delay.

Resumen. El presente artículo tiene por fin ofrecer una reconstrucción sistemático-doxográfica de los fenómenos de la demora y de la tardanza en el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger entre 1919 y 1930. En la primera sección de este escrito rastrearemos las ambigüedades que penetran en la nominalización y formalización de la demora, para inmediatamente tematizar la estructura disruptiva de cuatro modos de la demora entendida a título constituyente dentro de la obra temprana de Heidegger. Lo que nos interesará es dar cuenta del modo en que la demora porta un potencial desocultante que asegura fenomenológicamente la evidenciación de la dimensión constituyente. En la segunda sección del ensayo, bajaremos a las transformaciones inmanentes de la filosofía de Heidegger para dar cuenta de dos posibilidades de la auto-comprensión de la filosofía a partir de la demora y de la tardanza, precisamente desde dos modos de relación con la dimensión constituyente del aparecer. Por una parte, un modo marcado por la tardanza crepuscular, y por otra parte, un modo ejecutivo basado en la demora auroral.

ABSTRACT Psychotherapists draw on various theoretical approaches to address the mental health issues with which they work. However, this poses at least two problems: that what is called ‘mind’ is not a homogeneous, clear, and explicit construct in each current and that each conception of ‘the mental’ implies a particular episteme of such phenomena. This article seeks to address such problems; therefore, it aims to delimit and epistemologically analyze the tacit construct of mind present in the fundamental psychotherapeutic currents. Through an exploratory-descriptive qualitative approach, a hermeneutical-analogical analysis is carried out in which the mental construct of each current is delimited and then analyzed under the eaves of a series of epistemological paradigms. The conception of the mind is heterogeneous and presents various epistemological assumptions associated with each current: psychodynamic (rationalism/phenomenology), cognitive-behavioral (empiricism/positivism -rationalism/constructiveness), humanistic (critical theory/constructiveness), and systemic (constructive/rationalism). The mind construct is not transversal or objective, but relative to each psychotherapeutic current, with particular and diverse epistemological assumptions that condition the way in which mental phenomena are known. Finally, we reflect on the implications of the results in psychotherapeutic praxis.

RESUMEN Los psicoterapeutas se nutren de diversas aproximaciones teóricas para abordar los asuntos de salud mental con los que trabajan. Sin embargo, esto supone al menos dos problemas: que aquello llamado ‘mente’ no es un constructo homogéneo, claro y explícito en cada corriente y que cada concepción de ‘lo mental’ implica una episteme particular de los fenómenos de tal índole. Este artículo busca abordar tales problemas, por tanto, su objetivo es delimitar y analizar epistemológicamente el constructo tácito de mente presente en las corrientes psicoterapéuticas fundamentales. Mediante una aproximación cualitativa exploratorio-descriptiva se realiza un análisis hermenéutico-analógico en el que se delimita el constructo mente de cada corriente para luego analizarlo en torno a una serie de paradigmas epistemológicos. La concepción de la mente es heterogénea y presenta supuestos epistemológicos diversos asociados a cada corriente: psicodinámica (racionalismo/fenomenología), cognitivo-conductual (empirismo/positivismo-racionalismo/constructividad), humanista (teoría crítica/constructividad) y sistémica (constructividad/racionalismo). El constructo mente no es transversal ni objetivo, sino relativo a cada corriente psicoterapéutica, contando con supuestos epistemológicos particulares y diversos que condicionan la manera en la que se conocen los fenómenos mentales. Finalmente, se reflexiona sobre las implicancias de los resultados en la praxis psicoterapéutica.

Abstract Currently, the work of universities for gender equality and inclusion is recognized as a necessity. The diversity of the university community, the need to advance in gender and the presence of various manifestations of violence are evident. The aim of this work is to analyze the main achievements, obstacles and challenges in the promotion of gender equality in higher education institutions in the south-southeast of Mexico. The meetings and disagreements when working on social inclusion and the challenges that joint work brings with it are highlighted. The methodology is phenomenology. The techniques were: semi-structured interviews with 5 institutional gender equality representatives from different mexican universities. Additionally, a content analysis of various institutional documents was developed. Various advances in gender equality are evident. The main challenges are linked to the need to ensure progress to mainstream and institutionalize the gender perspective. In relation to inclusion, it is evident that the advances are very incipient. The work has focused on attention to gender violence due to its severity and magnitude. Working on inclusion within universities, under the framework of human rights, is a relatively recent task. The conceptual deficiencies in relation to inclusion, the difficulties in meeting the needs and for the operability in the face of the diversity of problems to be addressed are discussed. Some challenges are posed to favor a comprehensive approach promoting the construction of spaces for reflection, analysis and decision-making.

Resumen En la actualidad, el trabajo de las universidades en materia de igualdad de género y de inclusión se reconoce como una necesidad ante la diversidad que caracteriza a la comunidad universitaria, ante la importancia de seguir avanzando en materia de género y ante la presencia de diversas manifestaciones de violencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los principales logros, obstáculos y retos en la promoción de la igualdad de género en IES del sur-sureste mexicano, destacando los encuentros y desencuentros al trabajar la inclusión social y los retos que el trabajo conjunto trae consigo. La metodología es de corte fenomenológico con técnicas de entrevistas semiestructuradas a 5 responsables institucionales en materia de igualdad de género, de diferentes universidades de la Región sur-sureste mexicano. Adicionalmente, se desarrolló un análisis de contenido de diversos documentos institucionales. Se evidencian avances diversos en materia de igualdad de género, los retos principales se vinculan a la necesidad de asegurar avances para transversalizar e institucionalizar la perspectiva de género. Por su parte, en relación con la inclusión se evidencia que los avances son muy incipientes, debido a que el trabajo se ha centrado en la atención a la violencia de género por su gravedad y magnitud. Trabajar en la inclusión en las universidades, bajo el marco de los derechos humanos, es una labor relativamente reciente. Se discuten las carencias conceptuales en relación con la inclusión, las dificultades para la atención de las necesidades y para la operatividad ante la amplia gama de problemáticas a abordar. Se plantean algunas propuestas para favorecer un abordaje integral, promoviendo la construcción de espacios para la reflexión, el análisis y la toma de decisiones.

RESUMEN El artículo desarrolla una secuencia descriptivo-analítica que identifica las debilidades conceptuales de diversos modelos de comunicación fundados en la subjetividad, la hermenéutica y las teorías del emisor, cuya hegemonía se mantiene estable en las mediaciones antropológicas. Todo ello en medio de los intensos cambios que ha significado el complejo concepto de Antropoceno. En efecto, el centro gravitacional del análisis se sitúa en los postulados del giro anti-hermenéutico, donde la estructura es la base de la sensibilidad humana, y una concepción materialista de los medios que se aparta de la fenomenología y el discurso antropológico. La arqueología de los medios trabaja con materias primas, soportes, infraestructuras, máquinas mediales que distan del análisis cualitativo y los paradigmas complejos del antropoformismo que han sido prominentes en autores de la relevancia de Marshall McLuhan. En el ámbito de la contemporaneidad, esto nos lleva a distinguir entre una geología medial y medios de comunicación, mediante algunas tesis sustanciales de autores como Friedrich Kittler y Jussi Parikka.

ABSTRACT The article develops a descriptive-analytical sequence that identifies the conceptual weaknesses of various communication models based on subjectivity, hermeneutics and the theories of the emitter, whose hegemony remains stable in anthropological mediations. All this in the midst of the intense changes that the Anthropocene has meant. Indeed, the gravitational center of analysis is situated in the postulates of the anti-hermeneutic turn, a task that implies a materialist conception of the media that departs from phenomenology. Here, the so-called media archaeology works with supports, infrastructures, machines and expressive materialities that distance themselves from the qualitative analysis of the discourse and the paradigms of the subject -anthropomorphism- that have been prominent in authors of the relevance of Marshall McLuhan. In the field of contemporaneity, this leads us to distinguish between a medial geology and media, through some substantial theses by authors such as Friedrich Kittler and Jussi Parikka.

RESUMO O artigo desenvolve uma sequência descritivo-analítica que identifica as fragilidades conceituais de diversos modelos de comunicação baseados na subjetividade, na hermenêutica e nas teorias do emissor, cuja hegemonia permanece estável nas mediações antropológicas. Tudo isso em meio às intensas mudanças que o complexo conceito de Antropoceno significou. De fato, o centro gravitacional da análise situa-se nos postulados da viragem anti-hermenêutica, onde a estrutura é a base da sensibilidade humana, e uma concepção materialista dos meios de comunicação que se afasta da fenomenologia e do discurso antropológico. A arqueologia mediática trabalha com matérias-primas, suportes, infraestruturas, máquinas mediáticas que estão distantes da análise qualitativa e dos paradigmas complexos do antropoformismo que têm tido destaque em autores da relevância de Marshall McLuhan. No campo da contemporaneidade, isso nos leva a distinguir entre geologia medial e mídia, através de algumas teses substanciais de autores como Friedrich Kittler e Jussi Parikka.

Abstract These reflections intend to explore the limits of theoretical criticism and establish a minimum agreement about the theoretical frameworks involved in a discussion. It takes care of something here called Understanding Disagreements. As a general objective, it is proposed to investigate how a theoretical critique should be formulated and what are the limits of this formulation. In terms of the research problem, clarify what is essential for a critique to be considered coherent, as well as what can make it incoherent. The hypothesis: theoretical discussions sometimes despise the very content they aim to examine and lack the rigor that practice demands. As for the “method”, it uses hermeneutical phenomenology. For all these reasons, the reflections presented here are justified as an effort to remove the layers of meanings coagulated by legal dogmatics. discussion Disagreements objective formulation problem coherent incoherent hypothesis demands method, method , “method” phenomenology reasons dogmatics “method

Resumo Estas reflexões pretendem explorar os limites da crítica teórica e estabelecer um acordo mínimo acerca dos marcos teóricos envolvidos em uma discussão. Cuida-se de algo aqui denominado Desacordos Compreensivos. Enquanto objetivo geral, propõe-se investigar como uma crítica teórica deve(ria) ser formulada e quais são os limites dessa formulação. Já em se tratando do problema de pesquisa, esclarecer o que se apresenta como indispensável para que uma crítica possa ser considerada coerente como também o que pode fazê-la ser incoerente. A hipótese é a de que discussões teóricas, por vezes, desprezam o próprio conteúdo que visam examinar e faltam com o rigor que a prática exige. Quanto ao “método”, se vale da fenomenologia hermenêutica. Por tudo isso, as reflexões aqui apresentadas se justificam enquanto um esforço de retirada das camadas de sentidos coagulados pela dogmática jurídica. discussão Cuidase Cuida Compreensivos geral propõese propõe deveria deve ria deve(ria formulação pesquisa fazêla fazê la incoerente teóricas vezes exige método, método , “método” hermenêutica isso jurídica “método

Resumen Antes de incorporarse al Institut für Sozialforschung, encabezado por Horkheimer y Adorno, el joven Herbert Marcuse propuso la idea de una fenomenología dialéctica, un diálogo entre el pensamiento de Marx y de Heidegger, elaborado entre 1928 y 1933, en el marco de su habilitación docente. Pero, con su posterior adhesión al naciente programa de teoría crítica, tal propuesta fue abandonada y ensombrecida por la obra posterior de su autor. El presente artículo busca, en primer lugar, mostrar en qué consistía tal fenomenología dialéctica (apropiación de Heidegger), con el objetivo de evaluar si ésta aún puede abonar al desarrollo de los estudios fenomenológicos. En segunda instancia, se indagan las razones filosóficas por las cuales dicho proyecto quedó suspendido (crítica de Heidegger). A partir de los resultados, se proponen algunas líneas de investigación que apuntan a la posibilidad de una reelaboración contemporánea de la fenomenología dialéctica.

Abstract Before joining the Institut für Sozialforschung, headed by Horkheimer and Adorno, the young Herbert Marcuse proposed the idea of dialectical phenomenology, a dialogue between the thought of Marx and Heidegger, elaborated between 1928 and 1933, within the framework of his Habilitation. But, with his subsequent adherence to the nascent program of critical theory, such proposal was abandoned and overshadowed by the later work of its author. This article seeks to show what such dialectical phenomenology consisted of (Heidegger’s appropriation), to evaluate whether it can still contribute to the development of phenomenological studies. Secondly, it searches the philosophical reasons for which such project was suspended (Heidegger’s critique). Based on the results, some lines of research are proposed that point to the possibility of a contemporary reworking of dialectical phenomenology.

Resumen Ortega y Gasset afirmó que “la fenomenología no fue una filosofía para nosotros: fue... una buena suerte”. Esto se debió a que, a través de ella, pudo encontrar una salida del neokantismo. En consecuencia, Ortega entenderá que la fenomenología busca salvar la racionalidad sin ignorar la experiencia, es decir, sin olvidar, que todo sucede en la vida de cada individuo. Sin embargo, desde el principio Ortega se da cuenta de que este individuo no es algo aislado, sino que se forma en relación con el mundo, la circunstancia (“Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia y si no la salvo a ella, no me salvo yo”, dirá hacia 1914) y que la fenomenología debe recuperar el carácter ejecutivo de la vida. El presente ensayo recorrerá desde el encuentro de Ortega con la fenomenología hasta sus intuiciones acerca de la vida como realidad radical.

Abstract Ortega y Gasset had stated that, “phenomenology was not a philosophy for us: it was… a good luck”. This is because through its Ortega was able to find a way out of neo-Kantianism. Consequently, Ortega will understand that phenomenology seeks to save rationality, without ignoring the experience. However, from the beginning Ortega realizes that the individual is not something isolated, but that it is formed in the relation with the world, the circumstance (he will say around 1914, “I am I and my circumstance; and, if I do not save it, I do not save myself”) and that phenomenology must recover the executive character of life. This essay will trace Ortega’s journey from his encounter with phenomenology to his intuitions about life as a radical reality.

Resumen: Las injusticias epistémicas son aquellas formas de trato injusto que se relacionan con la producción, trasmisión o utilización del conocimiento por parte de los sujetos. El encuadre ético-epistémico y socio-epistémico proporcionado por estas injusticias se vincula con temas que atraviesan las principales tradiciones filosóficas como el pragmatismo, la fenomenología y la teoría crítica. Estas injusticias se interrelacionan, además, con movimientos sociales e intelectuales como el feminismo, la teoría crítica de la raza, los estudios críticos de la discapacidad y las epistemologías decolonizadoras. Sin embargo, existe un cuestionamiento a que las personas con discapacidad no han sido suficientemente abordadas. El presente artículo se posiciona en los debates actuales sobre las injusticias epistémicas y la discapacidad, y tiene como propósito aportar el concepto de “injusticias epistémicas normalizadas”. Partiendo de la constatación de las formas en que se reconocen opresivamente los sujetos con discapacidad, como alejados de la “norma”, establece que existen injusticias epistémicas asociadas con esta identificación. Propone que las injusticias epistémicas normalizadas ocurren en la intersección de dos ámbitos: un sistema hermenéutico capacitista y una agencia epistémica restringida en la que se producen al menos tres tipos de configuraciones: no agencia, agencias epistémicas disminuidas y agencias epistémicas en resistencia. Pensar las injusticias epistémicas considerando el peso de la “normalidad” en la constitución como sujetos de las personas con discapacidad permite reconocer una situación crítica de exclusión epistémica para algunas personas, mientras que otras resisten y luchan por ser comprendidas en los recursos hermenéuticos colectivos.

Abstract: Epistemic injustices refer to those forms of unfair treatment that are related to the production, transmission, or use of knowledge by the subjects. The ethical-epistemic and socio-epistemic framework provided by these injustices is linked to themes that cross the main philosophical traditions such as pragmatism, phenomenology, and critical theory. These injustices are further intertwined with social and intellectual movements such as feminism, critical race theory, critical disability studies, and decolonizing epistemologies. However, there is a question that people with disabilities have not been sufficiently addressed. This article is positioned in the current debates on epistemic injustices and disability, and its purpose is to contribute the concept of "normalized epistemic injustices". Starting from the verification of the ways in which subjects with disabilities are oppressively recognized, as far from the "norm", it establishes that there are epistemic injustices associated with this identification. It proposes that normalized epistemic injustices occur at the intersection of two realms: a capacitist hermeneutic system and a constrained epistemic agency where at least three types of configurations are produced: non-agency; diminished epistemic agencies and epistemic agencies in resistance. Thinking about epistemic injustices considering the weight of "normality" in the constitution as subjects of people with disabilities allows us to recognize a critical situation of epistemic exclusion for some people, while others resist and fight to be understood in collective hermeneutical resources.

Resumo: As injustiças epistêmicas referem-se àquelas formas de tratamento injusto que estão relacionadas à produção, transmissão ou uso do conhecimento pelos sujeitos. O enquadramento ético-epistêmico e socioepistêmico proporcionado por essas injustiças está vinculado a temas que atravessam as principais tradições filosóficas como o pragmatismo, a fenomenologia e a teoria crítica. Essas injustiças estão ainda mais entrelaçadas com movimentos sociais e intelectuais como o feminismo, a teoria crítica da raça, os estudos críticos da deficiência e as epistemologias descolonizadoras. No entanto, há uma questão de que as pessoas com deficiência não foram suficientemente abordadas. Este artigo se posiciona nos debates atuais sobre injustiças epistêmicas e deficiência, e seu objetivo é contribuir com o conceito de "injustiças epistêmicas normalizadas". A partir da verificação das formas como os sujeitos com deficiência são opressivamente reconhecidos, como distantes da "norma", constata-se que existem injustiças epistêmicas associadas a essa identificação. Propõe que injustiças epistêmicas normalizadas ocorrem na interseção de dois domínios: um sistema hermenêutico capacitista e uma agência epistêmica restrita onde pelo menos três tipos de configurações são produzidas: não-agência; agências epistêmicas diminuídas e agências epistêmicas em resistência. Pensar as injustiças epistêmicas considerando o peso da "normalidade" na constituição como sujeitos das pessoas com deficiência permite reconhecer uma situação crítica de exclusão epistêmica para algumas pessoas, enquanto outras resistem e lutam para serem compreendidas em recursos hermenêuticos coletivos.

Abstract This paper aims to highlight the recurrence and centrality of the notion of birth in the whole of Merleau-Ponty’s corpus, adopting it as an alternative key for understanding other problems and concepts usually privileged in the study of his philosophy (such as the relationship between perception, language and thought, corporeality, intersubjectivity, nature or temporality). Three senses of birth are schematically distinguished in his work (as origin, intertwining, and institution of novelty and singularity) and the way in which they relate to each other is analyzed, addressing them in con- nection with their phenomenological sources in Husserl. Secondarily, over the course of the article some convergences and contrasts with close theo- retical developments of Arendt, Sartre, Patocka and Bergson are pointed out.

Resumen Este trabajo se propone hacer pa tentes la recurrencia y la centralidad de la noción del nacimiento en el conjunto de la obra de Merleau-Ponty, adoptándola como clave alternativa para la comprensión de otros problemas y conceptos usualmente privilegiados en el estudio de su filosofía (tales como la relación entre percepción, lenguaje y pensamiento, la corporalidad, la intersubjetividad, la naturaleza o la temporalidad). Se dis tinguen esquemáticamente tres sentidos del nacimiento en su obra (como origen, entrelazamiento e institución de novedad y singularidad) y se analiza el modo en que se relacionan entre sí, abordándolos en conexión con sus antecedentes fenomenológicos en Husserl. Secun dariamente, a lo largo del desarrollo se señalan algunas convergencias y contrastes con desarrollos asociados de Arendt, Sartre, Patocka y Bergson.