RESUMEN En este trabajo busco aproximarme a una historia in-finita de la naturaleza en el pensamiento-en-imagen de Paul Klee a partir de una interpretación de los parágrafos 76 y 77 de la Crítica de la facultad de Juzgar de Kant. Para su lectura, propongo considerar como contrapunto uno de los principios del entendimiento puro que Kant considera en la Crítica de la razón pura, este es: el principio de las anticipaciones de la percepción. A saber, el principio que explica la condición de toda sensación. Para preguntar por una historia in-finita de la naturaleza es fundamental atender a la diferencia implicada en la relación entre naturaleza y arte que advierte Klee. Dicha diferencia conlleva considerar el origen de esta historia como fractura por la atención puesta hacia lo que la diferencia, lo cual exige pensar en lo que denomino un cambio de percepción.

ABSTRACT To approach an un-ending history of nature in Paul Klee's thought-in-images , I focus this work on an interpretation of paragraphs 76 and 77 of Kant's Critique of the faculty of Judgment. For its reading, I think that is necessary a counterpoint. This is, the principle of the anticipation of perception, one of the principles of pure understanding that Kant considers in the Critique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, in the in-between of that interpretation of paragraphs 76 and 77 of the Critique of the faculty of Judgment, in a genetical and genealogical manner, it seems fundamental to attend to the difference implied in the relationship between nature and art, which will entail to consider a break in the origin of an un-ending history of nature. This break requires to think what I name as a change of perception.

Abstract. In this paper, I focus on Kant’s notion of God, showing that his critical philosophy changed the meaning and function of traditional concepts. Then I move on to consider a philosopher of the contemporary Arab world, al-Jabri, who has been influenced by Kant: the author of the Critique of Arab Reason shares with Kant a dissatisfaction regarding a certain use of reason which does not inquire about its boundaries. Philosophy must confront its tradition, free it from prejudices, search for reasons and investigate the origin and uses of its concepts, but critically analysing tradition does not imply that the past cannot help charting the path of the future. A fresh reading of tradition could help modernize Islam without losing the cultural elements of identity.

Resumen. En este artículo me centro en la noción de Dios de Kant. Muestro que su filosofía crítica cambió el significado y la función de conceptos tradicionales. Después discuto a un filósofo del mundo árabe contemporáneo, al-Jabri, quien fue influenciado por Kant: el autor de la Crítica de la razón árabe comparte con Kant una insatisfacción respecto a cierto uso de la razón que no indaga sobre sus límites. La filosofía debe enfrentarse a su tradición, liberarse de prejuicios, buscar razones e investigar el origen y los usos de sus conceptos, pero analizar críticamente la tradición no implica que el pasado no pueda ayudar a trazar el camino para el futuro. Una nueva lectura de la tradición podría ayudar a modernizar el Islam sin perder elementos culturales de identidad.

Abstract. In his first work, Kant discusses the possibility that more than one universe exists. Starting from the principle that substances have an essential force to act outside of themselves and that they are linked only in the exercise of this force, Kant concludes that the total set of substances linked to each other forms a universe. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible that a substance exists without being linked to the substances of a certain universe, not being part of it, and that it is linked to other, alien substances, forming a separate universe with these. But the possibility of multiple universes requires that there be spaces of different natures or dimensionalities, so that such universes remain disconnected and are actually different universes and not distant parts of the same universe. This is because the nature of space depends on the kind of force with which the substances interact.

Resumen. En su primera obra, Kant discute la posibilidad de que exista más de un universo. Partiendo del principio de que las substancias tienen una fuerza esencial para actuar fuera de sí y de que ellas se vinculan solo en el ejercicio de esta fuerza, Kant concluye que la totalidad de las substancias vinculadas entre sí conforma un universo. Sin embargo, es perfectamente posible que una substancia exista sin estar vinculada con las substancias de un determinado universo, no formando parte de él, y que lo esté con otras substancias ajenas, conformando con ellas un universo aparte. Pero la posibilidad de múltiples universos requiere que haya espacios de distinta naturaleza o dimensionalidad para que tales universos se mantengan inconexos y sean realmente distintos universos y no partes distantes de un mismo universo. Esto sucede así porque la naturaleza del espacio depende específicamente de la fuerza con la que interactúan las substancias.

In hierdie bydrae sal aangetoon word op welke wyse Hegel in die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1988; hierma FvdG (2013)) betoog dat subjek en objek nie afsonderlik van mekaar bedink kan word nie. Die antwoord op hierdie vraagstuk lê in 'n bepaalde toeëiening van die begrip van die absolute wat as dialektiese bemiddeling tussen subjek en objek dien, waaruit die begrip van selfbewussyn na vore tree. Selfbewussyn is nie alleen 'n hoër vorm van subjektiwiteit nie, maar vorm deel van die groter werklikheid van subjek en objek. Enersyds is die belangrikheid van hierdie vraagstuk van so 'n aard dat dit verdien om geïsoleerd binne Hegel se Phänomenologie bespreek te word, en andersyds moet die vraagstuk gekontekstualiseer word sodat die wyer debatte waarbinne Hegel se antwoord op hierdie aangeleentheid neerslag vind, ook die nodige aandag kry. Ten slotte moet daar ook gewys word op die posisie wat hierdie onderwerp binne Hegel se eie sisteem beklee, naamlik as oorgang tot die begrip van Anerkennung, bloot om die problematiek van denke oor die selfbewussyn as geïsoleerde onderwerp uit te wys. Die debat rondom die verhouding tussen subjek en objek sal vanaf Kant gerekonstrueer word, met die twee sleutelfigure van Fichte en Schelling as verteenwoordigers van uiteenlopende strominge waaruit Hegel geput het. Beide staan egter 'n bemiddelende, spekulatiewe toevoeging tot die subjek-objek-verhouding, die absolute, voor. By Fichte staan die absolute nader aan die subjek en by Schelling die objek, oftewel die natuur. Hegel neem elemente by beide oor maar behou die absolute as bemiddeling. In die eerste drie hoofstukke van Hegel se Fenomenologie van die Gees (FvdG) word die objektiewe aanspraak wat die wetenskap op die waarheid maak ondersoek en word dit as ontoereikend aangebied aan die hand van die inherent weersprekende begrippe (dat 'n ding tegelyk uit 'n eenheid en veelheid van kragte kan bestaan) waarvan dit noodwendig gebruik maak om wetenskap te kan wees. Hiermee wil Hegel nie die wetenskaplike metode as sodanig irrelevant verklaar nie, maar poog om die groter beweging wat die begrip van objektiewe eksterne werklikheid moontlik maak, te identifiseer en uiteindelik te inkorporeer by 'n meer omvangryke begrip van waarheid. Sodanige omvangryke begrip sal noodwendig rekening moet hou met die subjektiewe; die verstandsaktiwiteit waaruit begrippe gevorm word. Anders as by sy voorgangers (Descartes en Kant) beweer Hegel egter nie dat die subjektiwiteit die werklikheid omvat nie, vandaar sy gebruik van die begrip van die fenomenologie, wat op die gebeurtenis van die verskynsels fokus. Die ware is nie 'n afgesonderde noumenale sfeer wat nooit deur die subjek geken kan word nie, maar ontvou as dít wat ten dele deur die subjektiewe, die interpreterende selfbewus-syn, oopgemaak word. Ten slotte dra die besef van die wederkerigheid van subjek en objek by tot die totstandkoming van die selfbewussyn, 'n begrip wat wys op die verweefdheid van bestaan (syn) en self. Drie fases van die objektiewe opvatting van die werklikheid word in die proses van die totstandkoming van selfbewussyn uitgedaag: die aansprake van die sintuiglike sekerheid, die waarneming (gegrond op Hume se sogenaamde "secondary impressions") en ten laaste die begrip van krag as dit wat onderliggend aan alle liggame is. Hegel wys daarop dat die selfbewussyn nie die resultaat, of passiewe waarnemer is van die werklikheid soos dit in die wetenskap voorgestel word nie, maar dat dit 'n noodsaaklike bydrae lewer om die werklikheid van die wetenskap te postuleer sonder om die gewaarwording tot subjektiwiteit te reduseer. Die objektiewe en die subjektiewe is nie twee geskeide domeine van die werklikheid nie, maar gee gelyktydig aan mekaar oorsprong. Laastens sal daarop gewys word dat selfbewussyn nie eenduidig is nie, maar in verhouding staan tot ander selfbewussyne.

This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant S thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here.

Abstract. This paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi’s critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant’s thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi’s interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological-transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi’s critique.

Resumen. El presente artículo busca describir la crítica de F. H. Jacobi a la filosofía trascendental en torno al problema de la afección y la cosa en sí. Esta crítica atribuye al pensamiento de Kant un idealismo incompatible con toda noción de realismo. La interpretación de Jacobi, sin embargo, se apoya sobre un desconocimiento de la naturaleza metodológico-trascendental no solo de la terminología involucrada en el problema de la afección, sino de toda la reflexión kantiana acerca del conocimiento. El modelo exegético de la two aspects view ha proporcionado instrumentos que nos permiten una reconstrucción hermenéutica del problema de la afección y ponen en evidencia el extravío metodológico en la crítica de Jacobi.

Abstract: This article offers a reflection on the notion of progress. A notion that received a special contribution from Immanuel Kant, who gave it the condition of purpose and objective of consciences and human history. A little later, this condition was questioned and reformulated by Charles Darwin who, from a science of life, conceived both for living organisms and for humanity a progress with no other purpose than that of their conservation and reproduction, as a result of what he called “blind variation”. Finally, this quarrel received from Georges Canguilhem care and development that resulted in a new and distinct notion of progress that has as its main content the concept of biological normativity, applicable both to living organisms and to social organizations. A concept that, in the Bachelardian manner, “denies and complements” the notion of progress of its predecessors.

Resumen: Este artículo propone una reflexión acerca de la noción de progreso. Una noción que recibió una contribución especial de Immanuel Kant, quien le otorgó la condición de finalidad y objetivo de las conciencias y de la historia humana. Esta condición, un poco más tarde, fue cuestionada y reformulada por Charles Darwin, quien, desde una ciencia de la vida, concibió tanto para los organismos vivos como para la humanidad un progreso con el fin de su conservación y reproducción, como resultado de lo que él llamó “variación ciega”. Por último, esta querella recibió de Georges Canguilhem cuidados y desarrollos que resultaron en una nueva y distinta noción de progreso que tiene como contenido principal el concepto de normatividad biológica, aplicable tanto a los organismos vivos como a las organizaciones sociales. Un concepto que, a la manera bachelardiana, “niega y complementa” la noción de progreso de sus antecesores.

Abstract In his essay “On the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Moses Mendelssohn uses the term “national happiness” (Nationalglükseligkeit) in a clearly negative sense. However, during the course of Mendelssohn’s reflective work the notion of happiness plays a positive role and is well considered in line with many other philosophical perspectives of the Enlightenment. This essay aims to present some ideas about the nuances that the idea of happiness acquires in Mendelssohn’s work.

Resumen En su ensayo de 1784, “Acerca de la pregunta: ¿Qué significa ilustrar?”, Moses Mendelssohn utiliza el término “felicidad nacional” (Nationalglükseligkeit) con un claro sentido negativo. Sin embargo, durante el propio curso de la obra reflexiva de Mendelssohn, la noción de felicidad juega un rol positivo y es bien ponderada en consonancia con muchas otras perspectivas filosóficas de la Ilustración. Este ensayo pretende acercar algunas ideas acerca de los matices que adquiere la idea de felicidad en la obra de Mendelssohn.

ABSTRACT Under the conjecture that embodied people draw expectations of emancipation on the basis of a certain historical horizon, this work investigates the limits and pressures that the current conditions of existence imprint on the political imagination of those who inhabit the south of the planet, at a time of increase in inequalities between human beings and aggression against the nature that we are and in which we live. This work traces, from a situated and feminist perspective, some significant temporal milestones because these marks in time account made possible a cosmopolitan horizon, in which we can take notice that the world with which we stay, in which we live, is one. Under the sign of the French Revolution, Kant constructed the idea of a cosmopolitan government and imagined a norm for regulating relations between states that would enable a hospitality capable of welcoming the stranger as a full subject of law. Under the imprint of 1848 (and also of 1871) Marx projected, from the terrain of history and class struggle, the possibility of an emancipation that could be international. The world today shows a desolate panorama: the globalization of the world with its aftermath of reification and commodification of nature, with the bet on war in its different versions as a way out of the capitalist crisis, with fierce competition for what has become scarce: fuel, land, water, seeds. Cosmopolitanism, as an ethical and political imperative, invites us to take on the challenge implied by the impossibility of reproducing life on the planet under the current conditions of capitalist globalization. The cosmopolitan horizon can no longer be the realm of abstract freedom, but that of the assumption of the determinations of the realm of necessity: dependence on the nature that we are and in which we live, the importance of the body, the need for food, affection, care that human been can only satisfy in community.

RESUMEN Bajo la conjetura de que las personas encarnadas dibujan las expectativas de emancipación sobre la base de un cierto horizonte histórico, este trabajo indaga por los límites y las presiones que las actuales condiciones de existencia imprimen sobre la imaginación política de quienes habitamos al sur del planeta, en un momento de aumento de las desigualdades entre seres humanos y de brutal agresión sobre la naturaleza que somos y en la cual vivimos. Este trabajo recorre, desde una perspectiva ubicada y feminista, algunos hitos temporales significativos pues esas marcas en el tiempo dan cuenta de momentos que hicieron posible un horizonte cosmopolita, en los cuales se pudo advertir hasta qué punto el mundo con el que nos hallamos, en el que vivimos, es uno. Bajo el signo de la Revolución francesa, Kant construyó la idea de un gobierno cosmopolita e imaginó una norma de regulación de las relaciones entre los Estados que habilitara una hospitalidad capaz de acoger al extranjero como sujeto pleno de derecho. Bajo la impronta de 1848 (y también de 1871) Marx proyectaba, desde el terreno de la historia y de la lucha de clases, la posibilidad de una emancipación que no podía sino ser internacional. El mundo muestra hoy un panorama desolador: la globalización del mundo con sus secuelas de cosificación y mercantilización de la naturaleza, con la apuesta a la guerra en sus distintas versiones como salida a la crisis capitalista, con la competencia feroz por lo que ha devenido escaso: los combustibles, la tierra, el agua, las semillas. El cosmopolitismo, como imperativo ético y político, nos invita a asumir el desafío que implica la imposibilidad de reproducción de la vida en el planeta bajo las actuales condiciones de globalización capitalista. El horizonte cosmopolita ya no puede ser el reino de la libertad abstracta, sino el de la asunción de las determinaciones del reino de la necesidad: la dependencia de la naturaleza que somos y en la cual vivimos, la importancia del cuerpo, la necesidad de alimento, afecto, cuidado que las personas solo podemos satisfacer en comunidad.

Abstract: The article explores the development of the concept of revolution in modernity. We start from the hypothesis, formulated by Lazzarato, who claims that the abandonment of the idea of revolution is the reason for the political and theoretical defeat of critical thinking after May 68. Next, we trace a brief genealogy of the concept of revolution, focusing on the legacy of the French Revolution. In this part we use the analyzes of the classic study by Koselleck, but also from the Foucauldian reading of Kant. A third moment is dedicated to the critique between the conception of time and its relationship with history in the work of Giorgio Agamben. The Italian, supported by Walter Benjamin, argues that Marxism lacked a radical understanding of time as relevant as its conception of history. Finally, we explore the dichotomy of uprising and revolution in an attempt to open other argumentative hypotheses to critical thinking from the idea of suspension of historical time present in a study by another Italian, Furio Jesi. Abstract modernity hypothesis Lazzarato 68 Next Revolution Koselleck Kant Agamben Italian Benjamin Finally Jesi 6

Resumo: O artigo explora o desenvolvimento do conceito de revolução na modernidade. Parte-se da hipótese, formulada por Lazzarato, que afirma ser o abandono da ideia de revolução a razão da derrota política e teórica do pensamento crítico pós-maio de 68. A seguir, traça-se uma breve genealogia do conceito de revolução, detendo-se na herança da Revolução Francesa. Nesta parte, utilizam-se as análises do clássico estudo de Kosseleck, mas também a leitura foucaultiana de Kant. Um terceiro momento é dedicado à crítica entre a concepção de tempo e sua relação com a história, na obra de Giorgio Agamben. O italiano, amparado em Walter Benjamin, argumenta que faltou ao marxismo uma compreensão radical do tempo, à altura de sua concepção de história. Para finalizar, explora-se a dicotomia revolta e revolução, na tentativa de abrir outras hipóteses argumentativas ao pensamento crítico, a partir da ideia de suspensão do tempo histórico presente num estudo de outro italiano, Furio Jesi. Resumo modernidade Partese Parte se hipótese Lazzarato pósmaio pós maio 68 seguir traçase traça detendose detendo Francesa parte utilizamse utilizam Kosseleck Kant história Agamben italiano Benjamin finalizar explorase Jesi 6

Abstract: One of the challenges of the Kantian research is to deal with the different meanings of the term critique, as well as to ask about the author’s possible motivation in choosing this term to title his main works. Through the emphasis on the fecundity of meaning of the term critique, we will show in this article that its connection with the establishment of limits to metaphysics was a sinuous process, which is capable of encompassing interests of heterogeneous natures. For this purpose, we will first problematize, in particular, the appearance of the concept of critique in NEV of 1765 and, later, based on the Reflections (1765-1770), we will identify how its equivocality, more than an obstacle, favored the construction of its protagonist role in the Kantian corpus. Thus, the critical thinking for Kant, instead of a position facing only the problem of metaphysics, is explained as a position facing the most diverse problems of the modern subject. Abstract authors author s works process natures purpose problematize particular 176 and later 17651770, 17651770 1770 , (1765-1770) equivocality obstacle corpus Thus Kant subject 17 1765177 177 (1765-1770 1 176517 (1765-177 17651 (1765-17 (1765-1 (1765- (1765 (176 (17 (1 (

Resumo: Um dos desafios do comentário à filosofia kantiana é lidar com as possíveis acepções do termo “crítica”, juntamente com a possível motivação do autor na escolha desse termo, para intitular suas principais obras. Neste artigo, enfatizando a fecundidade de significado do termo “crítica”, mostra-se que a sua ligação com o estabelecimento de limites à metafísica foi um processo sinuoso, o qual perpassou preocupações de naturezas heterogêneas. Para tanto, problematiza-se, primeiramente, o aparecimento do conceito de crítica, em especial, em NEV de 1765 e, posteriormente, com base nas Reflexões até 1770, identifica-se como a sua equivocidade, mais do que um empecilho, favoreceu a construção de seu protagonismo, no corpus kantiano. Assim, o pensamento crítico em Kant, em vez de uma posição diante do problema da metafísica, explicita-se como uma posição diante dos mais diversos problemas do sujeito moderno. Resumo crítica , “crítica” obras artigo mostrase mostra se sinuoso heterogêneas tanto problematizase, problematizase problematiza se, problematiza-se primeiramente especial 176 e posteriormente 1770 identificase identifica equivocidade empecilho protagonismo kantiano Assim Kant explicitase explicita moderno “crítica 17 177 1

ABSTRACT Objective: This retrospective study aimed to assess the predictability of Invisalign® aligners regarding rotational, mesio-distal and buccal-lingual tip movements. Methods: Two materials were included in the analysis - EX30, used until 2013; and SmartTrack, in current use. The study comprised 56 adult patients treated with Invisalign Comprehensive. Data sample were assessed on three sets of digital models; model 1 - initial, model 2 - predicted, and model 3 - achieved. Sixty reference points were marked in each dental arch, and two reference planes assisted the superimposition. The degree of rotation, mesio-distal and buccal-lingual tip was obtained via trigonometric calculations, through a previously published validated method. The accuracy of outcomes was compared according to the types of tooth movement and teeth groups,and the influence of predetermined variables on movement accuracy was also investigated. Results: Rotation and mesio-distal tip did not present any significant difference when comparing EX30 and SmartTrack groups. Only buccal-lingual tip presented a significant difference, incisor and canine groups treated with EX30 aligners presented an increase in accuracy (p= 0.007 and p = 0.007, respectively). For each additional degree planned for rotation movements, there was an increase of 0.35° in the discrepancy, and an increase of 0.40° and 0.41° for mesio-distal and buccal-lingual tip, respectively. EX30 and SmartTrack discrepancies were compared by multilevel linear regression. Conclusion: EX30 aligners reached higher accuracy for buccal-lingual tip in anterior teeth. However, for rotation and mesio-distal tip, SmartTrack and EX30 are similarly accurate. The total amount of planned movement has a significant impact on accuracy rates, with a decrease in accuracy for every additional degree. Objective rotational mesiodistal mesio distal buccallingual buccal lingual movements Methods EX 2013 use 5 Comprehensive models initial predicted achieved arch superimposition calculations method groupsand investigated Results EX3 p= (p 0007 0 007 0.00 respectively . respectively) 035 35 0.35 discrepancy 040 40 0.40 041 41 0.41 regression Conclusion However accurate rates 201 000 00 0.0 03 0.3 04 4 0.4 20 0.

RESUMO Objetivo: Esse estudo retrospectivo teve como objetivo aferir a previsibilidade dos alinhadores Invisalign em relação aos movimentos de rotação e inclinações mesiodistal e vestibulolingual. Material e Métodos: Foram incluídos dois materiais nessa análise: EX30®, utilizado até 2013; e SmartTrack®, atualmente em uso. Esse estudo avaliou 56 pacientes tratados com Invisalign Comprehensive. Os dados foram avaliados em três pares de modelos digitais; modelo 1 - inicial, modelo 2 - planejado, e modelo 3 - alcançado. Foram marcados 60 pontos de referência em cada arcada, sendo a sobreposição realizada com auxílio de planos de referência. O grau de rotação e inclinações mesiodistal e vestibulolingual foi obtido por cálculos de trigonometria, usando um método validado publicado anteriormente. Os resultados foram comparados de acordo com os tipos de movimento dentário e grupos de dentes, também foi investigada a influência de variáveis predeterminadas na confiabilidade dos movimentos. Resultados: Os movimentos de rotação e inclinação mesiodistal não apresentaram diferença estatística, quando comparados os grupos EX30® e SmartTrack®. Somente a inclinação vestibulolingual apresentou diferença estatisticamente significativa, sendo que os grupos de incisivos e caninos tratados com alinhadores EX30® apresentaram um aumento na previsibilidade(p= 0,007 e p= 0,007, respectivamente). Para cada grau adicional planejado para movimento de rotação, ocorreu um aumento de 0,35° na discrepância, e aumentos de 0,40° e 0,41° para as inclinações mesiodistal e vestibulolingual, respectivamente. As discrepâncias entre EX30® e SmartTrack® foram comparadas por regressão linear multinível. Conclusão: Os alinhadores EX30® alcançaram maior previsibilidade para a inclinação vestibulolingual em dentes anteriores. No entanto, para rotação e inclinação mesiodistal, SmartTrack® e EX30® apresentaram previsibilidade similar. A quantidade total de movimento planejado apresenta influência significativa nas taxas de previsibilidade, com diminuição na acurácia para cada grau adicional. Objetivo Métodos análise EX30 EX 2013 SmartTrack uso 5 Comprehensive digitais inicial alcançado 6 arcada trigonometria anteriormente Resultados estatística previsibilidadep= previsibilidadep p previsibilidade(p 0007 0 007 0,00 respectivamente . respectivamente) 035 35 0,35 discrepância 040 40 0,40 041 41 0,41 multinível Conclusão anteriores entanto similar EX3 201 000 00 0,0 03 0,3 04 4 0,4 20 0,

ABSTRACT Objective: The purpose of this retrospective study was to compare accuracy of arch expansion using two different thermoplastic materials in Invisalign aligners: EX30® (Polyethylene Terephthalate Glycol, or PETG) and SmartTrack® (polyurethane). Methods: The study sample comprised 65 adult patients consecutively treated with Invisalign from two private practices: group 1 - treated with EX30® (358 teeth) and group 2 - treated with SmartTrack® (888 teeth). Six hundred and twenty-three measurements were assessed in three digital models throughout treatment: model 1 - initial, model 2 - predicted tooth position, and model 3 - achieved position. Sixteen reference points per arch were marked and, after best alignment, 2 points per tooth were copied from one digital model to another. Linear values of both arches were measured for canines, premolars, and first molars: on lingual gingival margins and cusp tips of every tooth. Comparisons were performed by Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney test. Results: Both termoplastic materials presented significant differences between predicted and achieved values for all measurements, except for the lower molar cusp tip in the SmartTrack® group. There is no statistical difference in the accuracy of transverse expansion between these two materials. Overall accuracy for EX30® aligners in maxilla and mandible were found to be 37 and 38%, respectively; and Smarttrack® presented an overall accuracy of 56.62% in the maxilla and 68.72% in the mandible. Conclusions: It is not possible to affirm one material expands better than the other. Further controlled clinical studies should be conducted comparing SmartTrack® and EX30® under similar conditions. Objective EX30 EX Polyethylene Glycol PETG SmartTrack polyurethane. polyurethane . (polyurethane) Methods 6 practices 358 (35 teeth 888 (88 teeth. twentythree twenty treatment initial position alignment another canines premolars molars MannWhitney Mann Whitney test Results 38 38% respectively Smarttrack 5662 56 62 56.62 6872 68 72 68.72 Conclusions other conditions EX3 (polyurethane 35 (3 88 (8 566 5 56.6 687 7 68.7 ( 8 56. 68.

RESUMO Objetivo: O objetivo deste estudo retrospectivo foi comparar a acurácia na expansão da arcada utilizando alinhadores Invisalign com dois tipos de material termoplástico: EX30® (Polietileno Tereftalato Glicol, ou PETG) e SmartTrack® (poliuretano). Método: A amostra desse estudo incluiu 65 pacientes adultos tratados consecutivamente em dois consultórios particulares: grupo 1 - tratado com EX30® (358 dentes), e grupo 2 - tratado com SmartTrack® (888 dentes). Foram avaliadas 623 medidas em três pares de modelos digitais, ao longo do tratamento: modelo 1 - inicial, modelo 2 - posição dentária planejada, modelo 3 - posição alcançada. Foram marcados 16 pontos de referência por arcada e, após o bestfit, 2 pontos por arcada foram copiados de um modelo digital para o outro. Medidas lineares de ambas as arcadas foram aferidas para caninos, pré-molares e primeiros molares, localizadas na margem gengival lingual e ponta de cúspide de todos os dentes. Foram realizadas comparações usando os testes Wilcoxon e Mann-Whitney. Resultados: Ambos os materiais termoplásticos apresentaram diferenças significativas entre os valores planejados e alcançados em todas as medidas, exceto na ponta de cúspide dos primeiros molares inferiores do grupo SmartTrack®. Não houve diferença estatística entre esses dois materiais quanto à acurácia da expansão transversa. Em termos gerais, a acurácia dos alinhadores EX30® na maxila e mandíbula foi de 37% e 38%, respectivamente. O grupo SmartTrack® apresentou acurácia de 56,62% e 68,72% na maxila e mandíbula, respectivamente. Conclusões: Não foi possível afirmar que um material expande melhor que o outro. Estudos clínicos controlados futuros devem ser conduzidos comparando SmartTrack® e EX30® sob condições similares. Objetivo termoplástico EX30 EX Polietileno Glicol PETG SmartTrack poliuretano. poliuretano . (poliuretano) Método 6 particulares 358 (35 dentes, dentes , dentes) 888 (88 62 digitais tratamento inicial planejada alcançada bestfit outro caninos prémolares pré MannWhitney. MannWhitney Mann Whitney. Whitney Mann-Whitney Resultados transversa gerais 37 38 38% respectivamente 5662 56 56,62 6872 68 72 68,72 Conclusões similares EX3 (poliuretano 35 (3 88 (8 566 5 56,6 687 7 68,7 ( 8 56, 68,

Abstract In this essay I will argue in defense of the idea, that moral education plays an indispensable role for the application of Kantian ethics and that, although the philosopher did not develop a systematic theory on this topic, it is formulated explicitly in some works and tacitly assumed in others. To do this, I turn to three aspects, that seem relevant to me in order to understand an legitimize his conception: 1) moral education as a fundamental human right; 2) its task as an exercise of the faculty of judgment and as a social phenomenon and 3) the role of the State in promoting it. These three aspects may not cover Kant’s account on moral education, but without them his understanding is not possible. idea topic others conception 1 right 2 3 Kants Kant s possible

Resumo Neste ensaio argumentarei em defesa da ideia de que a educação moral representa um elemento de suma importância para aplicação da ética kantiana e que, apesar de o filósofo não ter elaborado uma teoria sistemática sobre o tema, ele é formulado de modo explícito em algumas obras e pressuposto de modo tácito em outras. Para isso, recorro a três aspectos que me parecem importantes na perspectiva de legitimação do tema: 1) a educação moral como direito humano fundamental; 2) sua tarefa enquanto exercício da faculdade de julgar e como fenômeno social; e 3) o papel do Estado no seu fomento. Estes três aspectos podem não cobrir tudo o que a educação moral significa para Kant, mas sem eles não é possível a sua compreensão. tema outras isso 1 fundamental 2 social 3 fomento Kant compreensão

Abstract: The aim of this work is to present the contributing influences for the development of the study of time in Husserlian phenomenology, discussing the relationship between the improvement of science as an episteme and the fundamental method to elaborate studies on temporal perception. The production of studies by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) on temporality was directly influenced by thinkers of the early Christian era - Saint Augustine (354-430) and the idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), from which he inherited the origin of transcendental phenomena. The Cartesian idea of Cogito later enabled the development of the phenomenological method, used in different areas of science and also in Psychology and your segmentation, the Phenomenological Psychology.

Resumo: O trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar as influências contribuintes para o desenvolvimento do estudo do tempo na fenomenologia husserliana, discutindo a relação do aperfeiçoamento da ciência enquanto episteme e do método fundamental para elaborar estudos sobre a percepção temporal. A produção dos estudos de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) sobre a temporalidade foi influenciada diretamente por pensadores do período medieval, em especial Santo Agostinho (354-430) e do filósofo idealista Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), do qual herdará a origem dos fenômenos transcendentais. A ideia cartesiana de Cogito possibilitou mais tarde o desenvolvendo do método fenomenológico, utilizado nas diversas áreas da ciência e também na Psicologia e sua segmentação, a Psicologia Fenomenológica.

This article addresses the fundamental question of how knowledge about religion is acquired in the academic study of religion. It does so by means of a comparison of the answers to the question by Emile Durkheim and David Chidester. Durkheim, in engaging with the conventional distinction between rationalist and empiricist theories of knowledge of his time, as well as their combination by Kant, argues that categories of thought (such as space, time, causality, number, and classifications) are not mere abstract conditions of understanding, but are to be conceptualized as constructs of particular societies. This social-anthropological shift in the theory of knowledge has been of decisive influence since the beginning of the 20th century, among others on the late 20th-century and beginning of the 21st-century South African scholar of religion, David Chidester. From a comparison of Durkheim's epistemology with that of Chidester it is, however, clear that the latter brings new insights to the epistemological question by insisting on a postcolonial and material approach to the study of religion. The comparison of the two episte-mologies that I provide here should give substance to this point by comparing ways in which they deal with a selection of categories and concepts in their study of religion.