Resumen El artículo describe la necesidad de la identificación del beneficiario final para efectos de la transparencia en materia tributaria y su evolución normativa en el Derecho Internacional; además sobre el impacto positivo de la figura jurídica del beneficiario final como forma de mantener una imagen ética en la comunidad. Por otra parte, el beneficiario final, como figura desarrollada por el GAFI a propósito de la lucha contra el lavado de activos y contra el financiamiento del terrorismo, ha sido adaptado para fines fiscales como una respuesta normativa a los evasores de impuestos y otros infractores de la ley, quienes en general procuran mantener el anonimato para hacer difícil la actividad del control tributario por parte de la autoridad. Sin embargo, existen varios tópicos que se deben resolver en las relaciones entre el contribuyente y el Estado; así como entre el inversionista y el representante legal de la persona jurídica y de la estructura jurídica. Todos los mencionados tienen distintas posiciones y dudas con respecto a la puesta en marcha en el Ecuador y a nivel regional de los estándares que rodean al beneficiario final, algunas de ellas son tratadas en el presente artículo.

Abstract This paper describes the need to identify beneficial ownership for tax transparency purposes and its legal historical developments within International Law; in addition to the positive impact of the legal concept of beneficial owner as a way to maintain an ethical reference for the community. On the other hand, the beneficial owner, as a figure developed by the FATF in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, has been adapted for tax purposes as a normative response to tax evaders and other offenders of the law, who in general try to maintain anonymity to make difficult the activity of tax control by the authority. However, there are several issues that must be resolved in the relationship between the taxpayer and the State; as well as between the investor and the legal representative of the legal entity and of the legal arrangement. All those mentioned have different positions and doubts regarding the implementation in Ecuador and at the regional level of the standards that surround the beneficial owner, some of them are dealt with in this paper.

Resumen: El terrorismo es un delito que requiere la cooperación intergubernamental debido a la dimensión transnacional que logró en las últimas décadas. Sin embargo, aún no existe una definición legal universal. Por lo tanto, los estados argumentan la necesidad de prevenir y suprimir un delito indefinido. En este artículo se analiza el marco regulatorio e institucional de Brasil en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo. El país ha ratificado las principales acciones globales y regionales en la materia y recientemente aprobó leyes para frenar la financiación y definir el delito de terrorismo. Esto se debió a las presiones para aplicar las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, las Recomendaciones de Acción Financiera (GAFI) y la celebración de eventos internacionales en el país, como los Juegos Olímpicos en 2016. La adecuación de la legislación a directrices internacionales sobre la financiación fue la decisión correcta, pero la definición adoptada por la ley antiterrorista (ley 13.260 / 2016) es defectuosa y revela el intento de Brasil de armonizar el deseo de afirmarse como global player y la tradicional política de neutralidad y preferencia por el soft power.

Resumo: O terrorismo é um crime que requer a cooperação interestatal em razão da dimensão transnacional que alcançou nas últimas décadas. Entretanto, ainda não existe uma definição legal universal. Assim, os Estados discutem a necessidade de prevenir e reprimir um delito indefinido. Este artigo analisa o quadro normativo e institucional brasileiro concernente ao combate ao terrorismo. O país ratificou os principais atos globais e regionais sobre o assunto e, recentemente, aprovou leis para coibir o financiamento e definir o crime de terrorismo. Isso ocorreu em virtude de pressões para a implementação das resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e das Recomendações da FATF (Financial Action Task Force, 2012) (Gafi) e da realização de eventos internacionais no país, a exemplo das Olimpíadas em 2016. A adequação da legislação às diretrizes internacionais relativas ao financiamento foi uma decisão acertada, mas a definição adotada pela lei antiterrorismo (lei 13.260/2016) apresenta falhas e revela a tentativa do Brasil conciliar a aspiração de se afirmar como global player e a tradicional política de neutralidade e preferência pelo soft power.

Abstract: Terrorism is a delict that requires multilateral cooperation, moreover because of its transnational dimension. Nevertheless, there is no universal legal definition for terrorism. Hence, states discuss the necessity of prevent and punish an undefined delict. This article analyses the legal and institutional Brazilian framework concerning terrorism. Brazil ratified the main global and regional acts about this subject and, recently, has passed laws in an attempt to curb the financing and reach a legal definition. This is the consequence of the pressure for the implementation of the UNSC resolutions and FATF recommendations and the promotion of international events such as the Olympic Games (2016). The adequacy of the legal framework to the international guidelines concerning the financing of the terrorism was a good decision but the definition adopted by the antiterrorism law (n. 13.260/2016) is flawed and reveals the Brazilian purpose of harmonizing the aspiration to assert itself as a global player and the traditional policy of neutrality and preference for the soft power.

Banks must undertake due diligence measures on customers in the frame of money laundering prevention. Under the Recommendation N° 17, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) allows States to admit a financial institution to rely on due diligence procedures performed by other financial institutions or introducers. The aim of this paper is to analyse the FATF Recommendation Nº17 regarding this issue, and to identify some potential obstacles on its implementation and compliance between banks.

Los bancos, en el marco de la prevención del lavado de activos, deben aplicar medidas de debida diligencia respecto de sus clientes. El Grupo de Acción Financiera Internacional (GAFI) admite que los Estados, bajo ciertas condiciones, establezcan que las instituciones financieras pueden confiar en los procedimientos de debida diligenciallevados a cabo por otras instituciones financieras o presentadores ("terceros"). El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar la Recomendación Nº17 del GAFI que se refiere, precisamente, a la dependencia o colaboración de terceros en el cumplimiento de las medidas de debida diligencia e identificar algunos posibles obstáculos para su aplicación entre bancos.

Mobile financial services, specifically mobile money, has the potential to expand access to financial services to millions of unbanked people in South Africa. As such, it looks very promising in terms of financial inclusion. However, concerns exist that mobile money can be detrimental to financial integrity since there are several proven risk factors linked to mobile financial services. These risk factors make mobile money very susceptible to money laundering. The potential for abuse and the need for appropriate controls is therefore something which cannot be ignored. While the South African legislator has made provision for comprehensive anti-money laundering preventative measures by means of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, there exists no South African legislation explicitly concerned with mobile money. It is therefore difficult to determine what the regulatory stance is in terms of mobile money in South Africa. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is, however, currently focusing attention on the effect which mobile money may have on financial integrity. The latest FATF Recommendations make provision for several anti-money laundering controls which are specifically applicable to mobile money, including controls regarding money or value transfer services and new technologies. While it is always difficult to balance financial integrity and financial inclusion, the risk-based approach makes it possible for governments to implement effective anti-money laundering measures, thereby preserving financial integrity, without the need to compromise on financial inclusion objectives. The fact that South Africa has not fully adopted a risk-based approach is a problem which needs to be addressed if mobile money is to deliver on its promises for financial inclusion, without being detrimental to financial integrity.

Mobile financial services, specifically mobile money, has the potential to expand access to financial services to millions of unbanked people in South Africa. As such, it looks very promising in terms of financial inclusion. However, concerns exist that mobile money can be detrimental to financial integrity since there are several proven risk factors linked to mobile financial services. These risk factors make mobile money very susceptible to money laundering. The potential for abuse and the need for appropriate controls is therefore something which cannot be ignored. While the South African legislator has made provision for comprehensive anti-money laundering preventative measures by means of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, there exists no South African legislation explicitly concerned with mobile money. It is therefore difficult to determine what the regulatory stance is in terms of mobile money in South Africa. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is, however, currently focusing attention on the effect which mobile money may have on financial integrity. The latest FATF Recommendations make provision for several anti-money laundering controls which are specifically applicable to mobile money, including controls regarding money or value transfer services and new technologies. While it is always difficult to balance financial integrity and financial inclusion, the risk-based approach makes it possible for governments to implement effective anti-money laundering measures, thereby preserving financial integrity, without the need to compromise on financial inclusion objectives. The fact that South Africa has not fully adopted a risk-based approach is a problem which needs to be addressed if mobile money is to deliver on its promises for financial inclusion, without being detrimental to financial integrity.

The authors explain the relationship between anti Money laundering policies and the fight against organised crime at a financial level as well as the existing link between Mexico's regulations and the international guidelines on the matter. In order to do so, it is assessed the anti money laundering scheme, which is extended to terrorist financing, regarding banks which substantially mirrors that applicable to the rest ofthe financial system. It is criticised its adoption highlighting the need of it but raising some issues which must be tackled to better its results.

Los autores explican la relación existente entre el lavado de dinero y el combate al crimen organizado desde el punto de vista financiero, así como la vinculación existente entre la regulación nacional y los lineamientos sugeridos por iniciativas internacionales en la materia. Con tal finalidad, se analizan las políticas públicas que se aplican al sector bancario, para combatir tanto al lavado de dinero como al financiamiento del terrorismo. Los autores plantean revisar tales políticas antes de proceder a su adopción.