Abstract In the past two decades, there has been a sudden increase of inquiry within the branch of analytic philosophy on the nature and role of intuition in philosophy. Philosophers began to investigate what intuition is, how it should be defined, what role it plays in philosophy, what its epistemic status is and many more. There is also a growing number of philosophers arguing that the whole debate rests on a mistake: intuition in philosophy plays no role whatsoever and philosophers do not use it as (a source of) evidence for their philosophical claims. This strategy is often conducted by differentiating among the two senses in which intuition is supposed to play an evidential role in philosophy. Intuition, thus, can be understood as a state of intuiting something or a propositional content that is intuited. Intuition in the first sense, the argument goes, cannot be treated as evidence as it would present the risk of psychologizing evidence in philosophy. If, however, we take intuition as evidence in the second sense, there is nothing distinctive about it: ultimately, all evidence in philosophy is of propositional nature, regardless of the intuitiveness of a given proposition. In my paper, I argue that this strategy fails and propose, instead, the view on intuition that, firstly, explains why the aforementioned distinction does not render the intuitiveness of the content irrelevant to its epistemic status, secondly, is in accord with the current findings in psychology, and, thirdly, is minimal enough to allow the different views of intuitions to be incorporated under that umbrella. In particular, I argue that it is an intuitive judgment, characterized by its non-inferentiality and defeasibility, that serves as evidence for particular philosophical claims, while its source is an intuition understood as a state of non-propositional character that can be examined empirically.

Resumen En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juega la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente.

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide an argumental reconstruction and comparison of Robert Alexy and Juan Antonio García Amado’s proposals about legal defeasibility. Observing this task, the theoretical foundations of this authors will be exposed in a systematic and summary way to further reveal their specific thesis on this matter. Finally, a critical analysis of the debate and its projections will be done, demonstrating the disadvantages of García Amado’s theory and the advantages of a model based on Alexy’s theory, but with some modifications.

Resumen El propósito del presente trabajo es proporcionar una reconstrucción y comparación de los postulados de Robert Alexy y Juan Antonio García Amado sobre la derrotabilidad normativa. En miras a tal cometido, se expondrán sistemática y someramente los cimientos teóricos de cada uno de los autores para posteriormente explicitar su específica tesis sobre el particular. Finalmente, se realizará un análisis crítico de las posturas y sus principales proyecciones, demostrando las desventajas de la teoría de García Amado y las ventajas que ofrece un modelo basado en la teoría de Alexy, pero con algunas modificaciones.

Abstract: In this article I am going to analyze and criticize the proposal for conceptualizing the defeasibility of rules and the defeasibility of principles in the theses of Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz Manero. For this purpose, I will carry out a brief critical reconstruction of their proposal of distinction in order to indicate in a brief, clear and precise way how they understand the defeasibility of prescriptive norms. I will do that for the purpose of justifiying three points: a) the defeat of rules is better understood as a reinterpretative process of legal material; b) defeating rules is not equivalent to defeating principles; and c) the language of rules and principles presents the same operations and results as the language of recalcitrant experiences and axiological gaps, only that, unlike these, the first of the languages presupposes a prescriptive claim about how the language of the legal material should be understood. To achieve this objective, I will take the following steps: in section II, I will present critically the distinction between rules and principles, the notion of licit and illicit atypical act, and what it means to say that rules are resistant to principles. In section III, I will present that the reconstructed thesis suffer from ambiguity when they develop the notion of defeasibility. They present, on the one hand, a problem of superability between norms and, on the other, a problem of apparent relevance of a norm to solve an individual case. Likewise, I will offer a proposal to reformulate the defeat of rules from the theory of interpretation. Finally, I will end by showing that the language of rules and principles presupposes a normative thesis about how norms should be identified.

Resumen: En el presente artículo voy a analizar críticamente la propuesta de conceptualización de derrotabilidad de reglas y derrotabilidad de principios en las tesis de Manuel Atienza y Juan Ruiz Manero. Para tales efectos realizaré una breve reconstrucción de sus propuestas con el fin de justificar tres puntos: a) la derrota de reglas es mejor entendida como un proceso reinterpretativo del material jurídico; b) derrotar reglas no es equivalente a derrotar principios; y c) el lenguaje de las reglas y los principios presenta las mismas operaciones y resultados que el lenguaje de las experiencias recalcitrantes y de las lagunas axiológicas, solo que, a diferencia de estas, el primero de los lenguajes presupone una pretensión prescriptiva sobre cómo debe ser entendido el material jurídico. Para alcanzar estos objetivos tomaré los siguientes pasos: en la sección II presentaré de forma crítica su distinción entre reglas y principios, la noción de lícito e ilícito atípico y qué quiere decir que las reglas sean resistentes a principios. En la sección III discutiré el que las tesis reconstruidas padezcan de ambigüedad al momento de hablar de derrotabilidad. Presentan, por un lado, un problema de superabilidad entre normas y, por el otro, un problema de relevancia aparente de una norma para resolver un caso individual. Asimismo, ofreceré una propuesta de reformulación de la derrota de reglas desde la teoría de la interpretación. Por último, finalizaré mostrando que el lenguaje de las reglas y los principios presupone una tesis normativa sobre cómo deben ser identificadas las normas.

Deontic logic is a logic often used to formalise scenarios in the legal domain. Within the legal domain there are many exceptions and conflicting obligations. This motivates the enrichment of deontic logic with not only the notion of defeasibility, which allows for reasoning about exceptions, but a stronger notion of typicality that is based on defeasibility. KLM-style defeasible reasoning is a logic system that employs defeasibility while Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) is a logic that does the same for the notion of typicality. Deontic paradoxes are often used to examine logic systems as the paradoxes provide undesirable results even if the scenarios seem intuitive. Forrester's paradox is one of the most famous of these paradoxes. This paper shows that KLM-style defeasible reasoning and PTL can be used to represent and reason with Forrester's paradox in such a way as to block undesirable conclusions without completely sacrificing desirable deontic properties.CATEGORIES: • Theory of computation ~ Logic • Theory of computation ~ Semantics and reasoning

Abstract The objective of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theses of H.L.A. Hart about the conceptual defeasibility formulated in the article “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights” give reasons to sustain that it is not equivalent with the notion of open texture. For these purposes, I will give an account of the various theoretical difficulties that the defeasibility proposal suffers and analyze what exactly it preaches of concepts.

Resumen El objetivo del presente artículo es realizar una reconstrucción de las tesis de H.L.A. Hart acerca de la derrotabilidad conceptual formulada en el artículo «The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights» y dar razones para sostener que esta no es equivalente con la noción de open texture. Para estos efectos, voy a dar cuenta de las diversas dificultades teóricas que padece la propuesta de derrotabilidad y analizar qué es exactamente lo que predica de los conceptos.

RESUMEN Con el objetivo cardinal de analizar las implicaciones de la irrupción del neoconstitucionalismo en el sistema jurídico colombiano, en el presente escrito se analiza si la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre los “casos límite” en materia de pensión de invalidez goza de razón suficiente para justificar la no aplicación de los requisitos fijados por el legislador como condición para acceder al derecho prestacional indicado. Aplicando una metodología analítica, se abordaron elementos conceptuales que permiten estudiar, explicar y valorar la tensión subyacente entre la protección de los derechos fundamentales en situaciones concretas, y la legitimidad y eficacia de los mandatos legales. Considerando el papel de los jueces y la supremacía de la Constitución, se verá que la derrotabilidad de las leyes en situaciones concretas obedece a que la esencia misma de la Ley Mayor lleva al poder judicial a adoptar medidas concretas para superar los efectos inconstitucionales de la ley en casos específicos.

ABSTRACT To analyze the implications of the emergence of neo-constitutionalism in the Colombian legal system, this paper discusses whether constitutional case law on “borderline cases” of disability pension is a good cause for the nonapplication of the requirements set out by the legislator to access the relevant benefits right. Using an analytical method, the research addresses conceptual elements to study, explain, and assess the underlying tension between the protection of fundamental rights in specific situations and the legitimacy and effectiveness of legal orders. Considering the role of judges and the supremacy of the Constitution, it is concluded that defeasibility in specific cases is because the very essence of the Constitution causes the judiciary to adopt concrete measures to overcome the unconstitutional effects of the law.

RESUMO Como objetivo principal de analisar as implicações da irrupção do neoconstitucionalismo no sistema jurídico colombiano, neste texto, é analisado se a jurisprudência constitucional sobre os “casos-limite” em matéria de aposentadoria por invalidez é suficiente racional para justificar a não aplicação dos requisitos estabelecidos pelo legislador como condição para acessar o direito prestacional indicado. Aplicando uma metodologia analítica, foram abordados elementos conceituais que permitem estudar, explicar e avaliar a tensão subjacente entre a proteção dos direitos fundamentais em situações concretas e a legitimidade e eficácia dos mandatos legais. Considerando o papel dos juízes e da supremacia da Constituição, é visto que a derrotabilidade das normas em situações concretas obedece a que a essência em si da Lei Maior leva o poder judicial a adotar medidas concretas para superar os efeitos inconstitucionais da lei em casos específicos.

Abstract Self defense justifies actions if the defense has been rational and necessary. One of the criteria applied to value the action, is that the defender should use only the minimum force required to achieve the defensive goal. Thus, the defender should choose the less damaging mean from all the available options to defend himself (lesser evil). This paper attempts to give reasons to argue that the criterion of “minimum force” is defeatable, is a bad generalization about defensive actions and it is contrary to the criterion “ought implies can”. I will back up these statements using empirical research from Neurobiology and Psychology.

Resumen La legítima defensa es procedente como causal de justificación cuando la acción defensiva ha sido racional y necesaria. Un criterio que se emplea para valorar la acción defensiva consiste en que esta sea el resultado de la elección del medio menos lesivo por parte del sujeto. Este trabajo pretende justificar que dicho criterio es derrotable y una mala generalización acerca de la “necesariedad” de la defensa, y, además, no cumple con la máxima “debe implica puede”, sobre la base de estudios de la neurobiología y de la psicología.

Resumo O presente artigo investiga o conceito de derrotabilidade (defeasibility) para Herbert L. A. Hart, que tem sido identificado como o responsável por introduzir referida noção no âmbito da filosofia do direito. Examinam-se os argumentos de Hart e a importância de sua contribuição para o debate atual sobre adequação das normas jurídicas gerais a casos particulares a partir da relação regra/exceção.

Abstract This article investigates the defeasibility concept to Herbert L. A. Hart, who has been identified as the responsible to introducing this notion to the field of Philosophy of Law. Research examines Hart’s arguments and their relevance to the current debate on the adequacy of general legal rules to particular cases from the rule/ exception relationship.

Resumo Este artigo versa sobre a distinção entre regras e princípios e analisa alguns aspectos da difundida tese da distinção qualitativa sustentada por Ronald Dworkin e Robert Alexy. A partir de um exemplo que envolve duas normas da Constituição brasileira que tratam da substituição do presidente da República, e por meio de uma abordagem analítica, adere-se a uma crítica que envolve um dos principais elementos da teoria dos princípios: a de que a ponderação é a forma de aplicação dos princípios. Defende-se que a ponderação é uma técnica de resolução de conflitos normativos que, excepcionalmente, pode ser usada também para aplicação de regras, do que decorre diversas consequências. São abordados, assim, alguns tópicos essenciais nesse contexto, como derrotabilidade normativa, caráter prima facie, subsunção e ponderação, dimensão de peso e mandamentos de otimização. No final, tendo em conta as críticas referidas, expõe-se um possível critério de distinção com base nas diferenças comportamentais e estruturais existentes entre as espécies normativas.

Abstract This paper deals with the distinction between rules and principles and analyzes some aspects of the widespread thesis of the qualitative distinction supported by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. From an example involving two norms of the Brazilian Constitution that treat of the substitution of the President of the Republic, and through an analytical approach, assent to a critique that involves one of the main elements of the theory of principles: that balancing is the form of application of the principles. It is argued that balancing is a technique for solving normative conflicts which, exceptionally, can also be used for the application of rules, resulting in several consequences. Thereby, some essential topics in this context are discussed, such as normative defeasibility, prima facie character, subsumption and balancing, dimension of weight and optimization requirements. In the end, taking into account the criticisms pointed out, a possible criterion of distinction is exposed based on the behavioral and structural differences between the normative species.

Abstract The article analyses the practical scope (PS) of legal rules and its relation with the defeasibility of the rules (DR). First, I argue that to determine the PS depends on three factors: a) the content of secondary rules, b) the legal systems and, c) establishing the specific and legitimate jurisdiction of the authorities. Second, I suggest that the PS can include or exclude the justificatory reasons of rules and, in those contexts where such reasons are not excluded, it is possible that they generate implicit exceptions that cannot be identified in advance. Third, the author concludes that DR is a contingent property that depends on two elements: a) the presence of justificatory reasons -that are not excluded according to secondary rules and the limited domain of authorities- and, b) that the normative consequences of such reasons cannot be identified ex-ante.

Resumen En este artículo se analiza el alcance práctico de las reglas (AP) y su relación con las reglas de derrotabilidad (RD). Primero, se afirma que determinar el AP depende tanto de las reglas secundarias del sistema jurídico como del dominio limitado de las autoridades. Segundo, se muestra que las reglas secundarias pueden incluir o excluir las razones justificatorias de las reglas y, en esos contextos en donde esas razones no son excluidas, es posible que ellas generen excepciones implícitas, las cuales no pueden ser identificadas de manera anticipada. Tercero, se concluye que la derrotabilidad de la reglas es una propiedad contingente que depende de dos elementos: a) la presencia de razones justificatorias que no son excluidas de acuerdo con las reglas secundarias y el límite de dominio de las autoridades, y b) que las consecuencias normativas de esas razones no puedan ser identificadas ex-ante.

A partir da análise de Maimom Schwarzschild sobre a doutrina da questão política e a descrição dos respectivos casos judiciais, surge-me imediatamente uma questão metateorética: existe mesmo uma doutrina da questão política ou aqueles que a referem estão somente a falar de fenómenos jurídicos já conhecidos? No meu comentário, partindo da análise de Henkin e Seidman e recorrendo a conceitos jurídicos tais como discricionariedade e a derrotabilidade, procurarei perceber se, mediante a apreciação de três possibilidades resultantes da jurisprudência da Supremo Tribunal Norte-Americano e das ideias de Ely e Bickel, se justifica o isolamento de uma doutrina da questão política.

From Maimom Schwarzschild’s analysis of the political question doctrine and the respective judicial cases’ description, a metatheoretical question immediately arises to my mind: is there truly a political question doctrine or are judges and scholars just talking about already known phenomena? In my commentary, starting from Henkin and Seidman’s analysis and resorting to legal concepts such as discretion and defeasibility, I will try to briefly address this question by assessing if some of the three possibilities arising from the Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as Ely and Bickel’s ideas can justify an autonomous political question doctrine.

O presente artigo, numa sistemática de conflitos de direitos fundamentais, comum aos ordenamentos jurídicos dinâmicos contemporâneos, examina a propriedade da derrotabilidade normativa, tratando do processamento das normas, sua análise e solução jurídica nos casos difíceis. Nesta dicotomia, passa-se pela reflexão de alguns pontos das teorias de HART, DWORKIN e ALEXY, a fim averiguar o evoluir e atual panorama que se insere esta dialética. Abordando os critérios que devem o aplicador do direito seguir num conflito normativo em atenção ao equilíbrio da segurança jurídica e adequada solução jurídica, busca-se examinar desde o processo de interpretação normativa para alcance da norma, a estrutura normativa dentro da ótica de lógica monotônica para determinar o seu alcance, até o processo de interação com outras normas no ordenamento jurídico e a chegada da referida colisão, onde são analisados os aspectos do instrumento de ponderação, bem como a instrumentalidade descritiva da lógica jurídica não monotônica.

This present article, in a system of conflicts of fundamental rights, common to contemporary dynamic legal systems, examines the property of normative defeasibility, dealing with the processing of norms, their analysis and legal solution in hard cases. In this dichotomy, we go through the reflection of some points of the theories of HART, DWPRKIN and ALEXY, in order to ascertain the evolution and current panorama that this dialectic inserts. Approaching the criteria that should the right applicator follow in a normative conflict in view of the balance of legal certainty and adequate legal solution, we seek to examine from the process of normative interpretation to reach the norm, the normative structure within the monotonic logic to determine its scope, until the process of interaction with other norms in the legal order and the arrival of said collision, where the aspects of the weighting instrument are analyzed, as well as the descriptive instrumentality of the non-monotonic legal logic.

The present work aims to provide tools to operate in mixed systems of assessment of evidence. It is a question of verifying how is it possible to make compatible an assessment system that, along with predisposing the result of certain means of proof, refers to the judge's self-assessment the evidential results of the other means. For this context, it has been postulated the thesis that the norms of legal evidence constitute simply presumptive legal norms and, ultimately, the burden of proof. The author, along with disposing of the forms of defeasibility of the norms of legal evidence, places its work in the instrumental proof under the context of the reform of the Chilean civil procedure, which, along with the assessment of the evidence according to the sana crítica, establishes legal evidence norms for recognized public and private instruments.

El presente trabajo tiene por finalidad brindar herramientas para operar en sistemas mixtos de valoración de la prueba. Se trata de verificar cómo es posible compatibilizar un sistema probatorio que, junto con predisponer el resultado de ciertos medios de prueba, remite a la libre valoración del juez los resultados probatorios de los otros medios. Para tal contexto se ha postulado la tesis de que las normas de prueba legal constituyen normas de presunción simplemente legales y, en último término, de carga de la prueba. El autor, junto con disponer las formas de derrotabilidad de las normas de prueba legal, sitúa su trabajo en la prueba instrumental bajo el contexto de la reforma al proceso civil chileno, que junto a la apreciación de la prueba conforme a la sana crítica, consagra normas de prueba legal para los instrumentos públicos y privados reconocidos.

This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery.

En este trabajo se examina y compara las ideas de Mario Jori y de Frederick Schauer en relación con el formalismo jurídico. A pesar de haber sido desarrolladas de forma independiente unas de las otras, dichas ideas presentan notables semejanzas ya que ambos autores utilizan el concepto de una norma o regla como punto focal para aclarar la noción de formalismo jurídico, y porque ambos lo defienden de las críticas que usualmente se le dirigen. La autora considera que el examen de las ideas de los dos autores puede contribuir a aclarar (y criticar) la controvertida noción de defeasibility (derrotabilidad) de las normas jurídicas y, de modo general, también a redimensionar, desde el punto de vista teórico-jurídico, las novedades que presentan los derechos de los modernos Estados constitucionales, y comprender mejor los mecanismos de su funcionamiento.

Primeiramente, oferecemos uma apresentação teórica da representação do pensamento prático, começando pela distinção entre silogismo dialético e silogismo demonstrativo. Fazemos referência à crítica de Toulmin contra o dedutivismo dominante de seu tempo. Em seguida, fornecemos argumentos para apoiar a relevância heurística do modelo de Toulmin para entender a discussão sobre a inclusão da lógica padrão na representação do pensamento comum. Afirmamos que o projeto analítico toulmaniano permite entender, com clareza metódica, a derrotabilidade dos argumentos do senso comum por meio da investigação da noção modal de probabilidade na linguagem comum.

First, we offer theoretical resemblance of the representation of practical reasoning, beginning with the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical syllogism. We make reference to the Toulmin’s critique against to the dominant deductivism in his time. Then we give arguments to sustain the heuristic relevance of Toulmin’s model to understand the discussion about the inclusion of default logics in the representation of ordinary reasoning. We assert that the Toulminian analytic design allows to understand, with methodical clarity, the defeasibility of common sense arguments by means of the investigation of the modal notion of probability in ordinary language