Die inflasiekoers en die produksiegaping speel 'n belangrike rol in die monetêrebeleidstand-punt. Alhoewel die publiek inflasie redelik goed verstaan, is die produksiegaping 'n relatief onbekende begrip. Definisies van potensiële produksie kan dubbelsinnig wees, aangesien die term dikwels gebruik word om verwante, maar logies afsonderlike, konsepte te beskryf. Die produksiegaping word ook nie direk waargeneem nie en word afgelei uit beramings van potensiële produksie, wat self nie waarneembaar of meetbaar is nie en dus beraam moet word. Hierdie beramings kan egter sensitief wees vir verskillende metodologiese paradigmas en databeskikbaarheid. Die doel van hierdie artikel is om by te dra tot 'n beter begrip van en groter deursigtigheid in plaaslike monetêre beleid deur die rol van die produksiegaping in Suid-Afrikaanse monetêre beleid te verduidelik. Eerstens word die idees onderliggend aan die konsep van die produksiegaping bespreek, waarna 'n werksdefinisie van die produksiegaping in die konteks van monetêre beleid voorgestel word. Verskeie metodologieë en empiriese tegnieke waarvolgens potensiële produksie en die produksiegaping beraam kan word, word bespreek, insluitende eenveranderlike statistiese tegnieke, strukturele modelle en semistrukturele benaderings. Die artikel verduidelik voorts hoe die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank (SARB) die plaaslike produksiegaping beraam en hoe hierdie beraamde produksiegaping op die monetêrebeleidstand-punt inwerk. Ten slotte word die SARB se monetêrebeleidstandpunt beskou met betrekking tot die inflasiekoers en produksiegapingsberamings oor die afgelope twee dekades ten einde die reaksie van die plaaslike monetêre beleid op groot ekonomiese skokke soos die wêreldwye finansiële krisis en COVID-19 te illustreer, en ten einde die beramings se sensitiwiteit vir datahersienings uit te lig.
The inflation rate and the output gap are two of the main determinants of the monetary policy stance. However, while inflation is relatively well understood by the public, the output gap is not. The output gap is not directly observed and is derived from estimates of potential output. Potential output is also not observable or measurable, and therefore needs to be estimated. Such estimates can, however, be sensitive to different methodological paradigms and the availability of data, while definitions of potential output may be ambiguous, because the term is often used to describe related, but logically distinct, concepts. With the aim of contributing to a better understanding of and greater transparency in domestic monetary policy, this paper describes the role of the output gap in South African monetary policy by broadly examining the following three questions: (i) What exactly is the output gap?; (ii) How is it measured? and (iii) Why is it important? To begin with, the idea underlying the concept of the output gap is explained and a tentative working definition of the output gap in the context of monetary policy is provided. Various methodologies and empirical techniques of estimating potential output and the output gap are then discussed, including univariate statistical techniques, structural models and semi-structural approaches. This is followed by an explanation of how the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) estimates the domestic output gap, and how the estimated output gap feeds into the monetary policy stance. Finally, the SARB's monetary policy stance is viewed in relation to the inflation rate and output gap estimates over the last two decades to illustrate the domestic monetary policy response to notable economic events such as the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 shock, and to highlight the sensitivity of the estimates to data revision. This paper shows that both actual and potential economic growth have declined over the last decade, even without taking into account the COVID-19 shock. This is consistent with the South African empirical literature, and points to a worrying and persistent stagnation in domestic economic activity. After strong economic activity during the early 2000s, the economy started slowing down in 2008. This may be ascribed to a number of factors, including the introduction of load-shedding in 2007, changes in the global economic landscape following the globalfinancial crisis, dwindling infrastructure investment after the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament, and uncertainty about domestic economic policy. COVID-19 brought about a massive economic shock in 2020. Lockdown regulations saw capital and labour withdrawn from economic use, which caused real GDP and potential output to contract by 6,2% and 2,7%, respectively, for the year. The output gap, which has mainly remained in negative territory since 2009, fell to -7,9% in the second quarter of 2020. In response to the crisis, the SARB drastically lowered the policy rate and applied several other financial market interventions, but even this extensive range of stimuli failed to prevent an economic collapse. Moreover, the output gap has remained negative despite a minor rebound of the economy in 2021 and 2022, which indicated that economic activity remained on its weakpre-COVID-19 trajectory. Inflation has stabilised markedly since 2010. This may be partly due to weak domestic economic activity that does not exert significant domestic inflationary pressures. In fact, many of the notable inflationary episodes of the last 25years were largely caused by external factors, such as the rand depreciation shock and the global financial crisis. This benign domestic inflationary environment has arguably made it easier for the SARB to achieve its inflation target. Such consistency has contributed to an increase in the SARB's credibility, which, in turn, has led to inflation expectations that are lower and better anchored.
; Luis Arismendiz, Leslie Diana