Trata-se de estudo de caso sobre a relação entre o legislativo e o executivo na definição de legislação com impacto no financiamento da saúde, desde a última Constituinte. Destacaram-se as histórias legislativas e os efeitos das seguintes normas: a Constituição de 1988; a Lei Orgânica da Saúde; as relacionadas à Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira; a Emenda Constitucional 29, de 2000; e a Lei Complementar nº 141 de 2012. Observou-se que apesar da maior iniciativa do legislativo para avançar na agenda do financiamento à saúde, a dependência de estímulos externos tem tornado sua atuação fragmentada e inconsistente. Os avanços dependem de soluções incrementais, insuficientemente definidas pelas coalizões de governo.

This case study reports the interaction between the legislative and executive powers in the definition of federal legislation impacting on health funding since the last National Constituent Assembly. It highlights the legislative histories and the effects of the following laws: the 1988 Constitution, the Organic Health Law; those related to the Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions; Constitutional Amendment 29 of 2000, and the Complementary Law 141 of 2012. It was observed that, despite the Legislative best endeavor to move the health financing agenda forward, its dependence on external stimuli has rendered its performance fragmented and inconsistent. The advancements depend on incremental, yet insufficient, solutions to be adopted by the government coalitions.

Trata-se de estudo de caso sobre a relação entre o legislativo e o executivo na definição de legislação com impacto no financiamento da saúde, desde a última Constituinte. Destacaram-se as histórias legislativas e os efeitos das seguintes normas: a Constituição de 1988; a Lei Orgânica da Saúde; as relacionadas à Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira; a Emenda Constitucional 29, de 2000; e a Lei Complementar nº 141 de 2012. Observou-se que apesar da maior iniciativa do legislativo para avançar na agenda do financiamento à saúde, a dependência de estímulos externos tem tornado sua atuação fragmentada e inconsistente. Os avanços dependem de soluções incrementais, insuficientemente definidas pelas coalizões de governo.

This case study reports the interaction between the legislative and executive powers in the definition of federal legislation impacting on health funding since the last National Constituent Assembly. It highlights the legislative histories and the effects of the following laws: the 1988 Constitution, the Organic Health Law; those related to the Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions; Constitutional Amendment 29 of 2000, and the Complementary Law 141 of 2012. It was observed that, despite the Legislative best endeavor to move the health financing agenda forward, its dependence on external stimuli has rendered its performance fragmented and inconsistent. The advancements depend on incremental, yet insufficient, solutions to be adopted by the government coalitions.

This article discusses the relationship between Brazil's Legislative and Executive Branches in lawmaking. It identifies elements in the lawmaking system in Brazil and strategic interactions between hierarchical channels (Constitutional, complementary, and ordinary legislation) in the context of coalition Presidentialism. The model was applied to bills submitted between 1999 and 2006 and generated data that run counter to the widespread perception of a sharp divide between the respective agendas of the two branches and the hypothesis of absolute predominance by the Executive. However, the prevailing government coalition predominated in all the lawmaking channels. Various types of interaction between the branches were suggested, according to patterns of conflict and leadership by the players (leadership, cooperation, and impasse), as generated by the bills' contents.

Cet article aborde les rapports entre les pouvoirs Législatifet Exécutif lors de la production de normes légales. 11 identifie des éléments du systeme brésilien de production législative et des interactions stratégiques en fonction de voies hiérarchisées (constitutionnelle, complémentaire et ordinaire) dans le contexte du présidentialisme de coalition. Ce modele a été appliqué aux propositions présentées entre 1999 et 2006 et a produit des données qui s'opposent à la perception selon laquelle il y aurait une démarcation d'agenda entre ces Pouvoirs. Elles contredisent également la these selon laquelle il y aurait une prédominance absolue de l'Exécutif. Toutefois, la coalition a prédominé dans toutes les voies. rexistence de plusieurs types d'interaction entre les Pouvoirs est ici suggérée en fonction des modeles de conflit et de leadership des acteurs (leadership, coopération et impasse) tels qu'ils sont engendrés par le contenu des propositions.