Abstract James Gross has argued that emotion regulation is a second-order or reflective process which is different from emotion. Also, he claims that his proposal is independent of the theory of emotions that one endorses. In this paper, I will challenge this presumed independence. I will argue that the evolutionary approach to emotions proposed by Tooby and Cosmides has two implications regarding the relation between emotion and emotion regulation: (1) the processes normally considered as regulatory are, under this approach, part of emotion itself and (2)emotion regulation is a horizontal process which consists in the interaction between different emotions at the same level.

Resumen James Gross ha desarrollado una propuesta muy difundida según la cual la regulación emocional es un procesoreflexivo o de segundo orden que es diferente de las emociones. A su vez, Gross considera que esta propuesta esindependiente de qué teoría sobre las emociones uno adopte. En este trabajo discutoesta presunta independencia. En particular, sostengo queel enfoque evolutivo de Tooby y Cosmidestiene dos implicaciones respecto de la relación entre emoción y regulación emocional:(1) los procesos comúnmente considerados como regulativos son, de acuerdo con esta propuesta, parte de la emoción misma y(2) la regulación emocional se lleva a cabo horizontalmente, es decir, entre emociones que se encuentran en el mismo nivel.

Abstract Causal approaches to explanation often assume that a model explains by describing features that make a difference regarding the phenomenon. Chirimuuta claims that this idea can be also used to understand non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. She argues that mathematical principles that figure in efficient coding explanations are non-causal difference-makers. Although these principles cannot be causally altered, efficient coding models can be used to show how would the phenomenon change if the principles were modified in counterpossible situations. The problem is that efficient coding models also involve difference-makers that, prima facie, cannot be characterized as non-causal in this sense. Mathematical principles always involve variables which have counterfactual (instead of counterpossible) relations between them. However, we cannot simply assume that these difference-makers are causal. They can also be found in paradigmatic non-causal explanations and therefore they must be characterized as non-causal in some sense. I argue that, despite appearances, Chirimuuta's view can be applied to these cases. The mentioned counterfactual relations presuppose the counterpossible conditionals that describe the modification of a relevant mathematical principle. If these conditionals are the hallmark of non-causal relations, then Chirimuuta’s criterion has the desired implication that variables in mathematical principles are non-causal difference-makers.

ABSTRACT Safety has been proposed repeatedly as a condition to solve the problem of epistemic luck. (Pritchard, 2015) offers a peculiar defense of this condition, based in a general (not exclusively epistemic) notion of luck. In this paper I argue that the notion is no sufficient to characterize safety. Pritchard´s safety condition is vulnerable to the classic generality problem for reliabilism and the notion of luck does not provide conceptual resources to solve it. I propose naturalistic solution to the problem based on epistemic considerations.

RESUMEN La condición de seguridad ha sido propuesta repetidamente para resolver el problema de la suerte epistémica. (Pritchard, 2015) ofrece una defensa peculiar de esta condición, basándose en una noción general (no exclusivamente epistémica) de suerte. En este trabajo argumento que la noción de suerte no es suficiente para caracterizar a la seguridad. La condición de Pritchard es vulnerable al problema de la generalidad y dicha noción no nos da las herramientas para resolverlo. Ofrezco una respuesta naturalista al problema basada en casos específicamente epistémicos.

Fodor argues for two theses that can be characterized as forming a dilemma: On one side, if we endorse a functional theory of concepts, we explain Frege cases in semantic terms but we cannot avoid semantic holism. On the other side, if we endorse a causal/informational approach, we avoid semantic holism but we cannot explain Frege cases in semantic terms. Fodor (e.g., 1994, 1998 y 2008) avoids the dilemma claiming that we can give a syntactic, non-semantic explanation of Frege cases. In this paper, I want to offer an alternative answer to the fodorian dilemma. I will offer a semantic explanation of Frege cases that incorporates both causal and functional elements. I will claim that the cognitive content of a concept (the kind of content apparently motivated by Frege cases) is the set of causal/informational contents of the representations that figure in its functional role. I believe that individuating representations in functional roles by their causal content helps to avoid holism (avoiding the process of ramsification typically used to individuate roles) and that identifying cognitive or narrow content with causal contents makes possible to endorse a causal theory while avoiding referentialism (whose rejection is motivated by Frege cases).

Fodor ha argumentado a favor de un par de tesis que pueden caracterizarse como constituyendo un dilema: Por un lado, si adoptamos una teoría funcional para los conceptos explicamos semánticamente los casos Frege pero caemos en el holismo semántico. Por otro lado, si adoptamos una teoría causal/informacional evitamos el holismo pero no explicamos los casos Frege semánticamente. Fodor (por ej, 1994, 1998 y 2008) intenta evitar la segunda parte del dilema argumentando que los casos de Frege pueden tener una explicación sintáctica y no semántica. En este trabajo intentaré ofrecer una salida alternativa al dilema fodoriano. Propondré una explicación semántica de los casos Frege que incorpora tanto elementos de una teoría causal como de una de rol funcional. Afirmaré que el contenido cognitivo o estrecho de un concepto (el tipo de contenido aparentemente exigido por los casos Frege) es el conjunto de contenidos causales/informacionales de las representaciones que figuran en su rol funcional. Considero que individuar a las representaciones en los roles por medio de sus contenidos causales permite evitar el holismo (evitando el proceso de ramsificación típicamente empleado para individuar a los roles) y que identificar el contenido cognitivo con contenidos causales/informacionales de las representaciones en los roles permite evitar el referencialismo de las propuestas causales (podemos distinguir sentido de referencia en términos causales).