O ácido dimetiléster 1-metilcarbazol-2,3-dicarboxílico, um intermediário chave na síntese de carbazóis b-fusionados, foi transformado com êxito nos seus 6-bromo e 6-nitro derivados via uma substituição eletrofílica numa solução de ácido acético, usando como reagentes N-bromosuccinimida ou nitrato de uréia, respectivamente. Com a N-clorosuccinimida foi também obtido o derivado 6,8-dicloro congênere, em quantidade apreciável. Os carbazodiésteres 6-substituídos foram usados como matéria-prima para a preparação de vários novos derivados piridazino- ou pirrolocarbazóis fusionados com cadeias laterais básicas, levando à estrutura básica de compostos antitumorais previamente desenvolvidos.

1-Methylcarbazole-2,3-dicarboxylic acid dimethyl ester, a key intermediate in the synthesis of b-fused carbazoles, was successfully transformed into its 6-bromo and 6-nitro derivative via electrophilic substitution in acetic acid solution, using N-bromosuccinimide or urea nitrate, respectively, as reagents. With N-chlorosuccinimide, a 6,8-dichloro congener was also obtained in substantial amounts. The 6-substituted carbazolediesters were used as building blocks for the preparation of several new pyridazine- or pyrrole-fused carbazoles with basic side chains, featuring the core structure of previously developed antitumor compounds.

Las intuiciones basadas en la perspectiva de la primera persona fácilmente nos pueden inducir a error sobre lo que es y no es concebible. Este punto usualmente se presenta como apoyo de posiciones reduccionistas comunes sobre el problema mente-cuerpo, pero considero que se puede separar de tal perspectiva. Me parece que la fuerte apariencia de contingencia en la relación entre el funcionamiento del organismo físico y la mente consciente -una apariencia que depende directa o indirectamente de la perspectiva de la primera persona- tiene que ser una ilusión. En otras palabras, creo que hay una conexión necesaria en ambas direcciones entre lo físico y lo mental, pero que no puede descubrirse a priori. La opinión se divide fuertemente entre la credibilidad de algún tipo de reduccionismo funcionalista, y no examinaré mis razones para ubicarme en el lado antireduccionista de este debate. Mi lectura del asunto es que nuestra falta de habilidad para obtener una concepción inteligible de la relación mente-cuerpo es un signo de la inadecuación de nuestros conceptos actuales, y que se requiere algún grado de desarrollo.

The Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable. This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first person- perspective must be an illusion. In other words, I believe that there is a necessary connection in both directions between the physical and the mental, but that it cannot be discovered a priori. Opinion is strongly divided on the credibility of some kind of functionalist reductionism, and I won't go through my reasons for being on the antireductionist side of that debate. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed.