Resumo O objetivo do estudo é investigar, da perspectiva do institucionalismo histórico, a evolução histórica e a configuração atual do Serviço de Acolhimento Institucional para Crianças e Adolescentes em situação de risco. Argumenta-se que decisões prévias, por favorecerem o desenvolvimento de certas capacidades estatais em detrimento de outras, influenciam decisões correntes, explicando a dificuldade de mudança no curso das políticas. A análise mostra que escolhas feitas na Era Vargas prejudicaram a implementação de inovações do Código de Menores de 1979 e do Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA), de 1990, até meados da década de 2000, quando a burocracia estatal na área da assistência foi fortalecida. A empiria utilizada são os dados do Censo Suas 2014 e as normativas que têm estruturado, desde o início do século XX, as políticas de assistência social e de atenção à criança e ao adolescente.

Abstract The objective of the study is to investigate, through a historical and institutional perspective, the historical development and current configuration of the Institutional Care Service for Children and Adolescents at risk. It is argued that, by favoring the development of certain skills at the expense of others, previous decisions have influenced current decisions, explaining the difficulty of changing the course of policy. The analysis shows that choices made in the Vargas Era undermined the implementation of innovations established by the Código de 1979 and the Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA) (1990) up until the mid-2000s when the bureaucracy of state social assistance was strengthened. The empirical data used are found in the Censo Suas 2014 and the regulations that, from the early twentieth century, have been structured in child and adolescent social assistance policies.

Resumen El objetivo del estudio es investigar, de la perspectiva del institucionalismo histórico, el desarrollo histórico y la configuración actual del Servicio de Acogimiento Institucional para los Niños y Adolescentes en situación de riesgo. Se argumenta que, al favorecer el desarrollo de ciertas habilidades a expensas de la otra, las decisiones anteriores influyen en las decisiones actuales, lo que explica la dificultad de cambio en el curso de la política. El análisis muestra que las decisiones tomadas en el estado Vargas minaron la aplicación de las innovaciones establecidas por el Código de Menores de 1979 y el Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA), de 1990, hasta mediados de 2000, cuando se fortalece la burocracia estatal de asistencia social. El empírica utilizada son los registros del Censo Suas 2014 y las normas que se estructuran a partir de principios del siglo XX, las políticas de asistencia social y la atención a los niños y adolescentes.

O estudo avalia a influência da racionalidade que orienta as estratégias coligacionistas estabelecidas na disputa majoritária federal sobre as configuradas nas eleições para a Câmara, Senado e governadorias, no período 1990-2010. A hipótese que orienta a análise é que, dado o surgimento de incentivos institucionais e políticos, os partidos replicam, nas alianças estabelecidas nas últimas, as preferências e resistências que imprimiram na primeira. Na análise dos dados, são tomadas como unidades de análise as coligações e as alianças, e os partidos são classificados em relevantes e micros. Verifica-se tendências consistentes na participação eleitoral dos dois tipos de partidos e, no que se refere à racionalidade das estratégias coligacionistas, padrões de comportamento diferenciados entre os partidos, sendo que os principais competidores pelo cargo presidencial e seus aliados mais leais replicam, nas coligações estabelecidas para os outros cargos, a mesma racionalidade que imprimiram nas coligações da disputa presidencial. Esse comportamento é traduzido em uma resistência política que se sobrepõe à tradicional resistência ideológica nas estratégias coligacionistas.

This article analyzes the electoral coalitions established to the Presidency of the Republic, Federal Senate, Chamber of Deputies and governatorates in the period of 1990 to 2010. The objective is to evaluate the presence of trends and rationalities in the coalitionist behavior of the parties in these elections. The hypothesis that guides such analyzis is that the emergence of institutional and political incentives, replicate, in the coalitions established in the in the last, the preferences and oppositions exercised on the first. In the data analysis, are taken as units of analysis the coalitions and alliances, and the parties are classified as relevants or micros, according to Giovanni Sartori’s terms. The study has allowed to verify consistant trends in the electoral participation of both types of party and, in respect to the rationality of the coalitionist strategies, patterns of different behaviour among the parties, and the main contenders for the presidencial post and their most loyal allies replicate, in the coalitions established to the other posts, the same racionality imposed in the coalitions of the presidential dispute. In general terms, this study proves and qualifies thesis already existant in the literature and elaborate new ones, in particular, concerning the rationality that guides the main federal coalitions is replicated, by a significant number of the parties that compose the system, in the federal legislative and majoritary state elections, also that the traditional ideological resistance among the brasilian parties, in the formation of electoral coalitions, has been subsomed in a political resistance.

This article analyzes the Brazilian policy for guaranteed non-contributive income cash transfer to the elderly and persons with disability, called the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC). Based on the definition of the political cycle as a "strategic field" and attention to the preferences of the ruling coalition in the Brazilian government, the analysis focuses on the dynamics of interaction between state actors, stakeholders, and the target population and the changes introduced in the regulatory and management structure. The article identifies two phases in the implementation of the BPC, distinguished according to the degree of political responsiveness and bureaucratic insulation, and highlights its growing judicialization. The study draws on evidence in the regulations, rulings issued by its conferences, bills of law, court cases, and finally the results of the BPC.

Dans cet article, on examine la politique brésilienne de la garantie de revenu non cotisant pour des gens âgés et handicapés. À partir de la définition du cycle de politique comme "champ stratégique" et de l'attention portée aux préférences de la coalition au pouvoir, l'optique de l"analyse est orientée dans le sens de la dynamique d'interaction entre les acteurs régionaux, les stakeholders et la population visée ainsi que des changements introduits dans leur structure régulatrice et gestionnaire. On distingue deux phases d'implantation de ce bénéfice d'après leur capacité de réponse politique et d'insularité burocratique, leur croissante judiciarisation étant constatée. Les preuves en sont recherchées dans la réglementation, les délibérations pendant les conférences, les projets de loi et actions judiciaires concernant le bénéfice et, finalement, dans ses résultats.

Neste artigo, são comparadas as prerrogativas dos líderes para coordenarem o processo legislativo e distribuírem cargos na Câmara e no Senado. A comparação é feita a partir da análise dos regimentos e resoluções que regulam a dinâmica das duas casas após 1989. Os Diários do Senado, as reportagens veiculadas pela Agência Câmara de Notícias e os estudos que tratam da dinâmica legislativa brasileira ilustram a análise e fornecem a base empírica de diversas inferências. A análise mostra a centralidade das lideranças na coordenação do processo legislativo e na distribuição dos cargos, especialmente na Câmara dos Deputados, ou seja, a importância desses atores para que os parlamentares possam superar os imperativos práticos da ação coletiva e maximizar suas preferências. Mostra também mudanças institucionais importantes que influenciam positivamente o conteúdo da delegação aos líderes. Na medida em que fortalecem as lideranças e, portanto, os partidos políticos, essas mudanças apontam para o fortalecimento do poder Legislativo vis-à-vis o poder Executivo.

In this article, we compare the prerogatives of leaders who coordinate legislative processes and distribute positions in the House and the Senate. The comparison is carried out through analysis of the regiments and resolutions that have regulated the dynamic of the two Houses since 1989. The Senate Daily Reports, reports put together by the House News Agency, and studies that deal with Brazilian legislative dynamics illustrate our analysis and provide an empirical base for a variety of inferences. Analysis reveals the central role of leadership in coordinating the legal process and in the distribution of positions, especially within the House of Representatives, that is, the importance these actors have in allowing members of parliament to go beyond the practical imperatives of collective action and maximize their preferences. It also reveals important institutional changes that have positively influenced the content of what has been delegated to leadership. To the extent that leadership has been strengthened and, consequently, political parties as well, these changes point to the strengthening of Legislative power vis-à-vis the Executive.

Dans cet article, sont comparées les prérogatives des leaders pour coordonner le processus législatif et pour distribuer des positions dans la Chambre et dans le Sénat. La comparaison est faite à partir de l'analyse des régiments et résolutions qui régulent la dynamique des deux chambres après 1989. "Les Journaux du Sénat", les reportages diffusés par "l'Agence Chambre de Nouvelles", et les études qui s'occupent de la dynamique législative brésilienne, illustrent l'analyse et fournissent la base empirique de plusieurs interférences. L'analyse montre la centralité des leaderships dans la coordination du processus législatif et dans la distribution des positions, spécialement dans la Chambre des Députés ; c'est-à-dire, l'importance de ces acteurs pour que les parlementaires puissent surmonter les impératifs pratiques de l'action collective et maximiser leurs préférences. Elle montre aussi des changements institutionnels importants qui influencent positivement le contenu de la délégation aux leaders. Dans la mesure où elles renforcent les leaderships et, donc, les partis politiques, ces changements pointent au renforcement du pouvoir Législatif vis-à-vis le pouvoir Exécutif.

This article discusses the impact of electoral dynamics on partisan political behavior in the Brazilian Congressional arena. Based on an analysis of voting and electoral alliances, the author shows that Presidential elections became efficient and influenced the parties' performance and alignments in Congressional disputes. She then proceeds to argue that repeat contestants in Presidential races behave more coherently and in a more disciplined way in the Congressional arena in order to maximize their party's electoral value, which is not expected of one-time Presidential contestants. The findings show that the partisan approach underlying the behavior of party leadership and delegations in the Brazilian Congress is explained by the electoral and organizational dynamics, and not only by centralization of the decision-making process.

Dans cet article, on examine l'influence de la dynamique électorale à l'égard de la conduite des partis sur la scène parlementaire brésilienne. D'après l'analyse des séances de vote et des coalitions électorales, on voit que les élections présidentielles sont devenues efficaces et influencent l'action et les associations de partis lors des disputes au Congrès. On peut donc penser que les candidats qui se présentent le plus souvent aux élections présidentielles ont une conduite plus cohérente et mieux disciplinée, afin de tirer profit de la tête de liste de leur parti, ce qu'on n'attend pas des candidats éventuels. Les résultats montrent que l'esprit partisan qui guide le comportement des dirigeants et des groupes parlementaires s'explique par la dynamique électorale et organisationnelle et pas seulement par la centralisation du processus de décision.