This paper analyses the question of the counterparts that governments should claim from firms and/or economic sectors supported by vertical industrial policy. This is a discussion that still have to advance because everything indicate that the set of current counterparts (goals of costs, productivity, exportation, etc.) still may be increased and improved, what will facilitate the assessment of industrial policy execution by society and the verification of its efficacy in order to yielding more possibilities of economic growth for a country or region. To reinforce the commitment credibility of the agents supported by industrial policy, this paper proposes to maintain the counterparts meant before and that such agents will be stimulated to commit specific assets in their activities that are supported by govern. It is shown that, without use more public resources than the used currently, this new counterpart may reinforce substantially the incentives that the firms supported by vertical industrial policy have it to execute the traditional counterparts assumed by them, and with it guarantee the best possible use of public resources.

Este artigo pretende mostrar que o enfoque das "capacitações dinâmicas" da firma, quando aborda o tema da cooperação interfirmas, pode ser dividido em duas vertentes razoavelmente distintas, no que se refere a desenvolvimentos teóricos sobre sua coordenação: (i) uma análise denominada "Freeman-Lundvall", que teoricamente busca interfaces com abordagens da sociologia; e (ii) uma análise denominada "Teece-Pisano", teoricamente bastante próxima da abordagem dos custos de transação. Conclui-se que a visão "Teece-Pisano" é a única entre as duas que é compatível com uma teoria dos contratos, o que a permite considerar uma importante fonte de vantagem competitiva - a economia de custos de transação. Por isso, é analiticamente mais relevante se a cooperação é tratada, em termos teóricos, como uma estratégia subordinada ao processo de concorrência capitalista.

This article shows that the "dynamic capabilities" approach - when treated in respect to inter-firm cooperation - can be divided into two distinct views for theoretical analysis about coordination: (i) the "Freeman-Lundvall" view searches for interfaces with sociology analysis; and (ii) the "Teece-Pisano" view is in theoretical perspective very near transaction costs analysis. This article concludes that the "Teece-Pisano" view is the unique between both that is compatible with a contract theory, and that allow for considering an important source of competitive advantage - the economy of transaction costs. Thus, the "Teece-Pisano" view is more relevant if cooperation is treated, in theoretical perspective, as a subordinated strategy in the capitalist competition process.