Resumo Dialogando com as diferentes abordagens presentes na literatura, este artigo procura analisar a incidência de greves nas diferentes fases econômicas e políticas do Brasil, nas duas últimas décadas. Ao mesmo tempo, inserimos as greves no contexto da conjuntura e dinâmica organizacional do movimento sindical. Ao longo desse período, a incidência de greves tendeu a diminuir nos momentos de alta do desemprego e a aumentar nos momentos de queda. Não foi encontrada relação entre greve e ganho salarial. A análise da relação entre greve e política parece corroborar a ideia de que em governos de centro-esquerda observa-se menor volume de greves do que em governos de centro-direita, enquanto a maior competição no interior do movimento sindical, inferida pelo número de sindicatos em cada ano, esteve associada a um maior volume de greves. Essas correlações, ainda que inconclusivas, apontam o caminho para novas investigações, utilizando séries mais longas e análise comparada.

Abstract Dialoging with the different approaches present in the literature, this article tries to analyze the incidence of strikes in the different economic and political phases of Brazil in the last two decades and situating strikes within the current political and economic scenario, in addition to describing the organizational dynamics of the trade union movement. During this period, the incidence of strikes tended to decrease in times of high unemployment rates, and increase when those fell. No relation was found between strikes and wage gains. Analysis of the relationship between strikes and politics seems to corroborate the idea that in mid-left governments there is a lower volume of strikes than in mid-right governments, while the greater competition within the trade union movement, inferred by the number of unions in each year, was associated with a higher amount of strikes. These correlations, although inconclusive, indicate the way to further investigations, with the use of longer series and comparative analysis.

O objetivo deste artigo é resgatar o debate sobre os rumos do corporativismo no Brasil após a redemocratização e avaliar o impacto das mudanças institucionais recentes para o sistema de intermediação de interesse. A retomada da abordagem corporativista na literatura internacional permite um contraponto para o debate interno ao recolocar a importância das dimensões organizacionais e de "modo de tomada de decisão" para caracterizar o corporativismo como sistema de intermediação de interesses. A partir dessa leitura, o trabalho aponta para o fortalecimento da estrutura sindical, particularmente das organizações de cúpula, e para a multiplicação e a consolidação de diversas arenas tripartite, responsáveis pela definição de temas importantes da política pública. Esses novos traços parecem aproximar cada vez o modelo brasileiro do tipo societário de corporativismo, em oposição ao pluralismo.

The purpose of this article is to rescue the debate about the direction of corporatism in Brazil after the democratization, as well as to assess the impact of the recent institutional changes on the system of interest intermediation. The resumption of the corporatist approach on the international literature allows for a counterpoint to the internal debate, as it reinforces the importance of the organizational dimensions and the "mode of decision making" to characterize the corporatist interest intermediation. The argument points to the strengthening of the trade union structure, particularly of its top organizations, and to the multiplication and consolidation of several tripartite arenas responsible for the definition of important issues of public policy. These new traces seem to place the Brazilian model of corporatism closer to the "societal" type, as opposed to pluralism.

Le but de cet article est de récupérer le débat à propos des différentes orientations du corporatisme au Brésil qui a eu lieu après la démocratisation ainsi que d’évaluer l’impact des changements institutionnels récents pour le système d’intermédiation d’intérêts. La répétition de l’approche corporatiste dans la littérature internationale permet un contrepoint au débat interne en redonnant de l’importance aux dimensions organisationnelles et au « mode de prise de décision » en vue de caractériser l’intérêt corporatiste comme système d’intermédiation des intérêts. À partir de cette interprétation, l’étude indique un renforcement de la structure syndicale, particulièrement des organisations dominantes et vers la multiplication et la consolidation de diverses arènes tripartites, responsables de la définition de thèmes importants de la politique publique. Ces nouveaux propos semblent rapprocher davantage le modèle brésilien du genre sociétaire de corporation en opposition au pluralisme.

This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched "earlier" and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration waslessintense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto power did not impede the reform, but increased the cost of its unilateral adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form a minimum consensus within the governing coalition.

Dans cet article, on examine les déterminants politiques de la privatisation dans le secteur de la téléphonie fixe dans quatre pays à partir d'une approche néo-institutionnelle. Ces pays ont subi des pressions assez semblables en faveur de la privatisation des entreprises de téléphonie qui convergeaient apparemment vers la réorganisation du secteur. Malgré leur adhésion à la privatisation, chaque pays a suivi des voies et des modèles divers. Cette variation peut s'expliquer à partir des différences de contexte institutionnel où les réformes ont eu lieu. La concentration du pouvoir exécutif a contribué à un début "précoce" de la privatisation approuvée dans un délai plus court que celui des pays où cette concentration était plus faible. La présence de plusieurs points de veto et de partenaires ayant pouvoir de veto, n'a pas empêché la réforme mais a accru le coût de son adoption unilatérale par le pouvoir exécutif, imposant la négociation et la formation d'un consensus mínimum au sein de l'alliance gouvernementale.