Um dos principais temas da teoria democrática é o processo por meio do qual os cidadãos controlam a atividade de seus representantes. Neste artigo, analisam-se o sistema político brasileiro em termos gerais e as eleições de 1998 e 2006 em particular, com o objetivo de discutir se o processo de accountability vertical nos interstícios eleitorais torna os cidadãos capazes de punir ou recompensar seus representantes na eleição seguinte. A importância deste artigo está na análise dos efeitos do envolvimento de políticos nos escândalos do Mensalão e dos Sanguessugas, que abalaram a sociedade brasileira nos dois anos que precederam a eleição de 2006. Apesar dos custos de informação, dos baixos interesse e envolvimento político, da desigualdade social e pobreza característicos da sociedade brasileira, os eleitores foram capazes de punir grande parte dos políticos denunciados nos escândalos.

One of the main themes in democratic theory is the process through which citizens control the activity of its representatives. In this paper we analyze the Brazilian political system in general terms and the 1998 and 2006 election in particular in order to argue that the processes of vertical accountability in the electoral gaps empower citizens in the sense of punishing and rewarding their representatives in the electoral moment. The importance of this work is guaranteed by the political context experienced by the country in the last couple of years before the 2006 election. A significant number of politicians had been involved in corruption scandals that resounded in the Brazilian society in a very negative way. Despite of the costs of information, limited time to be concerned with politics, and the huge social inequality allied to poverty, we show that voters have been able to punish those that had been involved in scandals.

This article focuses on the behavior of legislators in twelve States of Brazil. The aim was to analyze the effects produced by: 1) degree of electoral and legislative competition; 2) the ideological position of the State legislators' parties; 3) types of voter constituency; and 4) types of consistent supporters of State legislators in relation to the degree of their particularist behavior. The study drew on the results of a survey conducted in twelve States of Brazil, besides secondary data from the 2006 elections. The analysis used multiple linear regression models. The main observations related to: (a) the positive effect of regional interest representation and consistent regional supporters on particularist behavior and (b) the increased likelihood of particularist behavior among State legislators belonging to parties on the right of the political spectrum.

Dans cet article, on examine le comportement des législateurs de douze États brésiliens. On cherche à détecter les effets produits par: 1) le degré de compétition électorale et législative; 2) la position idéologique des partis auxquels sont liés les députés étudiés; 3) les types de base électorale; et 4) la fermeté des défenseurs des députés des États, sur le niveau de leur comportement particulariste. On s'est servi d'un survey effectué dans 12 États de la Fédération et de données secondaires sur l'élection de 2006, dont l'analyse s'est basée sur des modèles de régression linéaire multiple. On a observé: a) l'effet positif de la représentation d'intérêts de type régional et des défenseurs fermes régionaux sur le comportement particulariste et b) la plus grande probabilité de comportement particulariste chez les députés liés à des partis plus à droite dans la gamme idéologique.

O artigo trata do problema da democracia e sua institucionalização e consolidação. Partindo do confronto entre uma perspectiva sociológica convencional, atenta para o papel das normas, e uma perspectiva baseada na "escolha racional", atenta para o cálculo racional de interesses, os autores levantam a questão do papel dos fatores de natureza cognitiva com respeito a ambos os aspectos. Com o recurso a dados de survey executado no Brasil há alguns anos, mostram a mediação complexa exercida por aqueles fatores, tomados em termos de "sofisticação política", entre a adesão a normas cívicas e o apego egoísta ou cínico ao interesse próprio. Por fim, o artigo explora as implicações dos padrões detectados para o tema geral da democracia.

The article deals with the problem of democracy and its institutionalization and consolidation. Starting from the confrontation between a conventionally sociological perspective, which stresses the role of norms, and a rational-choice perspective, which emphasizes the calculus referred to interests, the authors raise the issue of the role of cognitive factors with regard to both aspects. With recourse to survey data produced in Brazil some years ago, a rather complex mediating role is shown to be played by cognitive factors, described as "political sofistication", between the civic adherence to norms and the selfish or cynical promotion of self-interest. Some implications of the observed patterns for the general theme of democracy are then explored.

L'article aborde le problème de la démocratie, de son institutionnalisation et de sa consolidation. Partant de la confrontation entre une perspective sociologique conventionnelle, que s'attache au rôle des normes, et une perspective fondée sur le choix rationnel, que s'attache au calcul rationnel d'intérêts, les auteurs soulèvent le rôle des facteurs de nature cognitive par rapport à ces deux aspects. Grâce à des données issues de sondages réalisés au Brésil il y a quelques années, les auteurs démontrent la médiation complexe exercée par ces facteurs, considérés en termes de sophistication politique, entre l'adhésion à des normes civiques et l'attachement égoïste ou cynique à des intérêts personnels. Finalement, l'article explore les implications des seuils détectés sur le thème général, qui est la démocratie.