ABSTRACT This article proposes a discussion on the intersection between contemporary French philosophy and psychoanalysis, specifically focused on the issue of “singularity” in psychoanalysis, highlighting authors such as Politzer, Foucault and, especially, Merleau-Ponty. It is about thinking about how these authors seek to channel the theme of singularity in Freud. The objective is to determine how the singularity that Freud encountered in his clinical work of listening to patients can be defined and in what sense this singularity is not reduced to the theoretical formulations later developed by the psychoanalyst in terms of psychic system - and which Politzer called of abstract. It considers, especially, the efforts of Merleau-Ponty to think the Freudian notion of singularity in the terms of a new theory, which became known as the theory of otherness, in which the philosopher approaches the singularity to the notion of the death drive, anticipating what years later Lacan would call “extimacy”. From where the leading question of this research follows: what is singularity in the psychoanalytic clinic and in what sense is it possible for one to hear it from the other without subjecting it to an abstraction or knowledge imposed as a device?

RESUMEN Este artículo propone una discusión sobre la intersección entre la filosofía francesa contemporánea y el psicoanálisis, específicamente enfocada en el tema de la “singularidad” en psicoanálisis, destacando autores como Politzer, Foucault y, especialmente, Merleau-Ponty. Se trata de pensar de qué manera estos autores buscan encauzar el tema de la singularidad en Freud. El objetivo es determinar cómo se puede definir la singularidad con la que se encontró Freud en su trabajo clínico de escucha a los pacientes y en qué sentido esta singularidad no se reduce a las formulaciones teóricas posteriormente desarrolladas por el psicoanalista en los términos de un sistema psíquico - y a las que Politzer denominó de abstractas. Se tiene en cuenta, muy especialmente, los esfuerzos de Merleau-Ponty de pensar la noción freudiana de singularidad en los términos de una nueva teoría, que se volvió conocida como teoría de la otredad, en la que el filósofo aproxima la singularidad a la noción de pulsión de muerte, anticipando lo que años más tarde Lacan llamaría “extimidad”. De donde se sigue la pregunta rectora de esta investigación: ¿qué es la singularidad en la clínica psicoanalítica y en qué sentido es posible que uno la escuche del otro sin someterla a una abstracción o saber impuesto como dispositivo?

RESUMO Trata o presente artigo de um estudo sobre o modo como Merleau-Ponty busca extrair, da teoria freudiana dos sonhos, consequências ontológicas concernentes à vinculação expressiva entre as diferentes dimensões da experiência onírica, especificamente sobre o papel dos restos diurnos na descarga da libido, na realização do simbolismo ou, o que é a mesma coisa, na conversão do simbolismo em algo narrativo e sensível, especificamente afetivo. Conforme se mostrará, para Merleau-Ponty, seja no sonho sonhado seja no sonho relatado podemos verificar, entre a dimensão imaginária (afetiva e narrativa) introduzida pelos restos diurnos, por um lado, e a dimensão simbólica (ou inconsciente) expressa como significante esquecido, por outro; uma sorte de unidade sem coincidência, uma indivisão meramente expressiva. A pergunta deste artigo é ‒ do ponto de vista ontológico ‒ de que modo a indivisão expressiva entre o sonhado e o relatado dispensa o recurso à ideia de uma interioridade transparente?

ABSTRACT This article deals with a study on how Merleau-Ponty seeks to extract, from Freud’s theory of dreams, ontological consequences concerning the expressive link between the different dimensions of the dream experience, specifically on the role of daytime remains in the discharge of libido, in realization of symbolism or, what is the same thing, in the conversion of symbolism into something narrative and sensitive, specifically affective. As it will be shown, for Merleau-Ponty, whether in the dreamed dream or in the reported dream, we can verify between the imaginary dimension (affective and narrative) introduced by the daytime remains, on the one hand; and the symbolic (or unconscious) dimension expressed as a forgotten signifier, on the other; a sort of unity without coincidence, a merely expressive indivisibility. The question of this article is - from an ontological point of view - how does the expressive division between the dreamed and the reported dispense the recourse to the idea of a transparent interiority?